"The proposal to retain the detached bungalow fails to meet the Council's definition of acceptable backland development, providing an unsatisfactory level of accommodation for the residents of the house and resulting in an unacceptable loss of garden space to the users of the original house at 110 Bath Road. The bungalow fails to respect the character of the area and, by its scale, position and design, harms living conditions at neighbouring properties through loss of outlook and an overbearing effect."
"Have you made any other appeals to the Secretary of State on this, or nearby land, for example, against a refusal of planning permission or of lawful development certificate."
"If yes, please give details, including our reference number if known."
"Planning Appeal ...." "
"(i) a previous appeal decision which is materially indistinguishable from the present case is a material consideration within the meaning ofsection 29 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 which an inspector should take into account in determining whether or not to grant planning permission on an appeal. An inspector is free to depart from an earlier decision but before doing to he ought to have regard to the importance of ensuring consistent decisions and must give his reasons for departing from the earlier decision. ...." "
"(i) .... mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness was a separate head of challenge on an appeal on a point of law, at least in statutory contexts (including asylum claims) where the parties shared an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result; that in order for a court to make a finding of such unfairness it would have to be shown that the tribunal whose decision was under appeal had made a mistake as to an established fact which was uncontentious and objectively verifiable, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter, that the appellant or his advisers had not been responsible for the mistake, and that the mistake had played a material though not necessarily decisive part in the tribunal's reasoning...." "61. As the passage cited by Lord Slynn shows, the editors of the current edition of de Smith, Woolf & Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action .... are somewhat tentative as to whether this is a separate ground of review, at para 5-094: 'The taking into account of a mistaken fact can just as easily be absorbed into a traditional legal ground of review by referring to the taking into account of an irrelevant consideration, or the failure to provide reasons that are adequate or intelligible, or the failure to base the decision upon any evidence.' 62. We are doubtful, however, whether those traditional grounds provide an adequate explanation of the cases. We take them in turn. (i) Failure to take account of a material consideration is only a ground for setting aside a decision, if the statute expressly or impliedly requires it to be taken into account: In re Findlay[1985] AC 318 , 333-334, per Lord Scarman." "
"66. In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law, at least in those statutory contexts where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result. Asylum law is undoubtedly such an area. Without seeking to lay down a precise code, the ordinary requirements for a finding of unfairness are apparent from the above analysis of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board case. First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been 'established', in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."
"26. It is quite correct that the Matalan decision, if it had been brought to the inspector's attention, would have been a relevant consideration. It did not create any kind of binding precedent, but nevertheless the inspector would have taken it into account if he had known about it. The fatal flaw in this limb of the claimant's case, however, is that the Matalan decision was not drawn to the inspector's attention until after he had given his own decision. As a general principle a decision-maker does not err in law if he fails to take into account relevant matters which are not drawn to his attention and of which he is unaware. There is abundant authority for the proposition that a planning inspector's duty to take into account relevant decisions of his colleagues only extends to decisions drawn to his attention .... 27. In my view the earlier decision of Hollis v Secretary of State for the Environment[1982] P&CR 351 , upon which [counsel] relies, does not support the opposite conclusion. [Counsel] submitted that the duty of planning officers to be consistent with one another was an onerous one. Accordingly, it was their duty to take into account relevant decisions of colleagues, whether or not such decisions were cited in argument. This duty could be performed by carrying out a computer check of a database of all inspectors' decisions. 28. To my mind this is an unsound argument. It flies in the face of both principle and authority, as previously mentioned. Furthermore, if correct, the proposition of law advanced by [counsel] would impose a wholly intolerable burden upon the planning inspectorate. It should be borne in mind that there are some 400 planning inspectors, all engaged upon producing decisions. It is the duty of an inspector to decide cases, not to carry out extensive research on behalf of the parties."