Mohammed v Public Prosecutor of Paris, France [2008] EWHC 3238 (Admin)

[2008] EWHC 3238 (Admin)Case No CO/8512/2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate Thursday, 20 November 2008
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE LATHAM
MR JUSTICE UNDERHILL
Between
MOHAMMEDClaimantv
Between
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF PARIS, FRANCEDefendant
Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes ofWordWave International LimitedA Merrill Communications Company190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AGTel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr Ben Lloyd (instructed by Lawrence & Co) appeared for ClaimantMr Ben Keith (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) appeared for Defendant
J U D G M E N T

LORD JUSTICE LATHAM:

[1]This is a statutory appeal from a decision by District Judge Workman of 4 September 2008 in which he concluded that the conduct alleged against this appellant satisfied the conditions in the Extradition Act and justified, accordingly, an order that he be extradited.[2]The appeal is based upon a narrow ground. A requirement in the case of a European arrest warrant is that the warrant should, by Section 2 (4) (c) of the Act, contain - "(c) particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed the offence, including the conduct alleged to constitute the offence, the time and place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence and any provision of the law under the category 1 territory under which the conduct is alleged to constitute an offence."[3]The appellant submits that the warrant did not contain sufficient material to constitute "particulars" for the purposes of that provision. It is unnecessary to cite any further authority governing this particular problem other than the judgment of Lord Justice Dyson in Von der Pahlen v Government of Austria [2006] EWHC 1672, which was itself cited by the district judge in his judgment. Lord Justice Dyson said as follows:
"The sub-section requires the warrant to obtain particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed the offence. These particulars must include four elements: (1) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence; (2) the time and (3) the place at which he is alleged to have committed the offence; and (4) any provision of law under which the conduct is alleged to constitute an offence ..... The use of the introductory word 'particulars' indicates that a broad omnibus description of the alleged criminal conduct, 'obtaining property by deception', to take an English example, will not suffice."
[4]The simple submission on behalf of the appellant by Mr Lloyd is that the warrant did not meet those requirements. It is necessary therefore to turn to what the warrant contained. In the first five paragraphs the warrant set out in general narrative form the way in which the particular criminality, which is essentially conspiracy to facilitate illegal entrants, was both uncovered and then investigated. It is apparent that the allegation is that there was a network of people who it is said included the appellant who were engaged in this both in the United Kingdom and in France. The general allegation was particularised so far as the leading conspirator was concerned in the following terms:
"One of the telephone numbers supplied ..... was tapped. It transpired from the conversations recorded that the telephone's user, who called himself Mohammed, was the main organiser of the network in France. He collected the illegal immigrants on arrival in Paris and organised their onward journey to the UK (via Cherbourg, Calais Le Havre or Belgium) or to Sweden (via Belgium and the Netherlands). An Iraqi, he used numerous identities (RACHID Ahmed, Ali Ahmed, BACHIR Ahmed etc .....) and had two Iraqi associates: Aziz CHAHIN (AMOU) and Said MOAYAD (BIBOU). The network had logistical and financial support in numerous countries: Turkey; Greece; Italy; Germany; Belgium; Netherlands; Sweden; Norway; UK; Ireland; Iraq; Iran and China."
[5]That was included in the general description of the background to the inquiries, not only in the warrant relating to this appellant but in the warrants relating to a number of other persons who had been arrested in this country and whose extradition was being claimed at the same hearing as this appellant.[6]As far as this appellant was concerned, the detail in the warrant then continued:
"The telephone tapping identified Mohammed Karzan, who was living in the UK and actively participating in this network. Using telephone numbers [two telephone numbers are given] he was in contact with Mohammed and arranged the travel from the UK to France."
Then a summary of the telephone conversation is set out:
"On 13/03/2008 at 2012 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) does not manage to contact the Pakistani customer indicated by Mohammed. On 14/03/2008 at 1443 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) asks Mohammed to ensure that the Pakistani customer agrees to go, as HAMA is sending several customers. On 14/03/2008 at 1733 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) and Mohammed talk about 7 customers for Sweden, and Mohammed goes to meet the customer sent by HAMA at the station. On 14/03/2008 at 1911 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) tells Mohammed that if the customers do not have the money, Mohammed must not send them, so from now on Mohammed must send customers for Sweden to him. On 15/03/2008 at 1338 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) tells Mohammed that he is bringing customers from England. On 16/03/2008 at 1803 hours: Mohammed Karzan (HAMA) talks about customers he is sending to Mohammed and alludes to working with TOTTA for Sweden. On 18/03/2008 at 1308 hours: Mohammed brings 3 Pakistani customers to Mohammed Karzan (HAMA), with payment being made in Kurdistan. These telephone conversations are therefore clear and consistent evidence of Mohammed Karzan's implication in th is offence of facilitating unauthorised entry or residence as part of a criminal organisation, and criminal conspiracy. He acts as intermediary for several immigrants. The offences of which he is accused are inextricably linked to the offences committed by the other members of the network active in France."
[7]Speaking for myself, I find it difficult to see how - on the face of that warrant in those terms - it could sensibly be said that the warrant failed to give particulars which accorded with the statutory requirements. It identified the nature of the general conspiracy. It identified the central person in the conspiracy. It identified the appellant's contacts with that person in conversations which contain detail which, on their face, appear to be relevant to the nature of the conspiracy and consistent with his playing a part in the conspiracy at least during the period when the telephone conversations were being recorded. That, in my judgment, is sufficient to justify the conclusion that this appellant formed part of a conspiracy relating to the facilitating of unauthorised entry or residence.[8]For my part, that is sufficient to justify the decision of the district judge.[9]On behalf of the appellant, Mr Lloyd pointed to the warrant in relation to one of the other persons in respect of whom extradition was requested, whose case was dealt with at the same time by the same district judge, and suggests that there is little difference between those two warrants, yet the district judge concluded that the warrant relating to the other person did not contain the relevant or sufficient particulars.[10]The argument, in my view, does not avail the appellant for two reasons. One is that the mere fact that the district judge may have come to a conclusion in favour of another of those in respect of whom warrants have been issued which may have been too favourable to that particular person does not assist the appellant. Secondly, when one looks at the particulars in that individual's case the particulars relate essentially to payments of money which might or might not be to do with a conspiracy relating to illegal entrants. The conversations which are particularised in relation to this appellant are clearly capable of being identified as relating to the movement of illegal immigrants. There is therefore a factual distinction which itself could be said to justify the ultimate conclusion of the district judge in relation to the two cases.[11]I would dismiss this appeal.

MR JUSTICE UNDERHILL: I agree.

[13]MR LLOYD: The appellant is the beneficiary of a legal aid order and I would ask for an assessment of his costs.

LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Yes.