“ Detailed provisions irrespective of the spouse's length of service or type of engagement (ie pensionable or otherwise), where an officer or airman dies from causes accepted by the Department of Social Security as attributable to or aggravated by service, his eligible survivors may be awarded an attributable family pension at the discretion of the Defence Council as follows…”
“In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used in paragraph 3090 (1) is that the DSS would determine the issue whether the death was attributed to service and that it would neither be necessary nor permissible for a panel to repeat the exercise. The panel would exercise its discretion under the AFPS on that footing”
“1. The case was to be distinguished from Alakesan and Elhasoglu: in those cases the decision not to grant exceptional leave depended on the assessment by the Secretary of State of the general circumstances obtaining in the individual's home country. On that matter of the Secretary of State might well be better informed than the adjudicator: in the instant case the decision depended on the disagreement of the Secretary of State with the adjudicator's assessment of the story of the individual appellant. 2. The Secretary of State would not be entitled to base his decision on such a disagreement unless the adjudicator's factual conclusion was demonstrably flawed or fresh material had subsequently become available to the Secretary of State as could realistically have affected the adjudicator's findings, or the adjudicator had decided the appeal purely on the documents or his findings of fact owed nothing whatever to any assessment of the witnesses.”
“I agree with Simon Brown LJ's conclusion and the reasons for it. His judgment demonstrates the essential independence of the special adjudicator within this statutory scheme governing applications for asylum without undermining the ultimate responsibility of the Secretary of State for deciding whether to grant an asylum seeker exceptional leave to remain. The desirable objective of an independent scrutiny of decisions inthis field would be negated if the Secretary of State were entitled to act merely on his own assertions or reassertions about relevant facts contrary to express findings made at an oral hearing by a special adjudicator who had seen and heard the relevant witnesses. That would approach uncomfortably close to decision making by executive or administrative diktat. If therefore the Secretary of State is to set aside or ignore a finding of fact on a crucial issue which has been considered and evaluated at an oral hearing by the special adjudicator he should explain why he has done so, and should not do so unless the relevant factual conclusion could itself be impugned on Wednesbury principles, or has been reconsidered in the light of further evidence, or has a limited or negligible significance to the ultimate decision for which he is responsible.”
“The local authority, acting through their social services committee could not overrule the decision of the review panel without a substantial reason and without having given the panel's recommendation the weight it required. It was a decision taken by body entrusted with the basic fact-finding exercise under the complaints procedure. It was arrived at after a convincing examination of the evidence, particularly expert evidence. The evidence had, as to the practicalities, been largely one-way. The panel had directed themselves properly in law and had arrived at a decision in line with the strength of the evidence before them. They have given clear reasons and they had raised the crucial factual question with the parties before arriving at their conclusion. The strength, coherence and apparent persuasiveness of that decision had to be addressed head-on if it were to be set aside and not followed. Not to face them was either unintentional perversity on their part or showed a wrong application of the legal standing of that decision. Anybody required at law to give reasons for reconsidering and changing such a decision must have good reasons for doing so and show that they had given the decision sufficient weight.”
“Before approving an application I would expect the Commission to be satisfied that... there is a significant wider public interest, as defined by the funding code guidance, in the applicant being legally represented at the inquest.”
“However, as I say, the test is how representation of your client would bring benefits to the public at large. To establish this, you would need to demonstrate that, for example, any health or safety issues that arise will only do so due to the representation of your client, or that such issues have not been raised before in cases of this nature. Given the involvement of the Health and Safety Executive, the police and the rail safety standards board it is not clear that either of these features apply.”
“(b) cases where funding for the family of the deceased is likely to be necessary to enable the coroner to carry out an effective investigation into the death as required byArticle 2 of the ECHR .”
“In this case, whilst Article 2 may or may not be engaged, the Minister did not consider that funding of advocacy services is necessary for the coroner to investigate the facts.”
“The Minister’s view is that, even if Article 2 is engaged, the coroner will be able to carry out an investigation into the deaths without legal representation for Mr Main. There is no evidence of any particular complexity that would warrant advocacy in this case. If the State has any obligations under Article 2 these will be discharged by the inquest itself as well as the health and safety and Police investigations. You have provided no evidence to suggest that these investigations, taken with the inquest itself, will fail to discharge any Article 2(1) obligation that may be incumbent on the State in this instance.”