Gibson & Anor v Secretary of State for Justice [2007] EWHC 2670 (Admin)

CO/4171/2007 & CO/6948/2007 & CO/8037/2007

[2007] EWHC 2670 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

DIVISIONAL COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date Friday, 2nd November 2007

Strand

London WC2A 2LL

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE KEENE

MR JUSTICE GIBBS

Between

GIBSONClaimant

KELLYClaimant

BAILEYClaimant

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICEDefendant

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Mr S Simblet (instructed by Christina Harrison Solicitors) appeared for First Claimant

Mr H Southey (instructed by Prisoners Advice Service and Langleys) appeared for Second and Third Claimants

Mr P Patel (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for Defendant

J U D G M E N T

LORD JUSTICE KEENE:

[1]These applications, two for judicial review and one for habeas corpus, raise yet another problem about the release on licence of prisoners sentenced for offences committed before the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on that topic came into effect. They illustrate the unsatisfactory drafting of the relevant subordinate legislation already commented upon by the House of Lords in the case of R (on the application of Stellato) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2007] 2 AC 70

[2]All these applicants were sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for offences committed after 29th September 1998 but before 4th April 2005. The significance of those dates is that the former was when the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 ("the 1998 Act") amended the release on licence regime existing under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act"). The latter date is when the new regime under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 ("the 2003 Act") came into effect, in any event in respect of its provisions relevant to these applications. So all these three applicants were sentenced under the 1991 Act regime as amended by the 1998 Act. I will from time to time refer to this as the amended 1991 Act.

[3]All of them were classed as long-term prisoners under that regime and, in accordance with section 33(2) of the amended 1991 Act, all were released on licence at the two-thirds stage of their sentence. In the applicant Kelly's case that was on 15th February 2007, in Bailey's case it was on 9th March 2007, and in Gibson's case it was on 21st August 2006. All subsequently had their licence revoked and were recalled to prison. Kelly was in fact released and then recalled a second time but all three were eventually released from prison after serving three-quarters of their sentence. That release at that stage reflected (to use a neutral expression) the terms of section 33(3) of the amended 1991 Act, although the decision to release at that stage was one taken by the Parole Board.

[4]However, in all these cases the applicants were released explicitly on the basis that they were released on licence, not unconditionally, and that their licences would continue until the expiry of their whole sentences. Thus, in the case of Kelly his licence does not expire until October 2008, while Bailey's does not expire until November of that same year. Gibson's expires in April 2008. This has already proved to be of significance in the case of Bailey, who has just been recalled to prison again and who is detained there now. Gibson also was subsequently recalled again for breach of licence conditions and is also now in custody.

[5]The applicants now challenge the legality of the decisions that their licences continue until the expiry of their original sentences. They contend that they are entitled to be released unconditionally.

[6]To deal with the issues thus raised, it is necessary first to describe the statutory regime which existed under the amended 1991 Act and then to set out the amendments made by the 2003 Act to the previous regime. I do so only in respect of those prisoners sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment or more, that is to say those defined as long-term prisoners. As I have indicated, under section 33(2) of the 1991 Act, a long-term prisoner had to be released on licence as soon as he had served two thirds of his sentence. However, unlike the original 1991 Act regime which provided for unconditional release at the three-quarters stage for those who had been recalled since release, the 1991 Act regime as amended by the 1998 Act provided for the further release to be on licence (see section 33(2) as amended). These statutory regimes therefore had to make provision for those who had been released on licence.

[7]Section 33(3) was in the following terms:

"As soon as a short-term or long-term prisoner who -- (a) has been released on licence under this part; and (b) has been recalled to prison under section 39(1) or (2) below, would (but for his release) have served three quarters of his sentence, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence."

That therefore created a duty to release on licence at the three-quarter stage those who, having been earlier released on licence, had since been recalled under section 39(1) or 39(2). Those last subsections empowered the Secretary of State to revoke a prisoner's licence and to recall him to prison, either on the recommendation of the Parole Board or, in certain circumstances, without such a recommendation.

[8]Section 37 dealt with the duration and conditions of licences. With certain exceptions, section 37(1) provided that a licence remained in force until the three-quarters stage. One of the exceptions was where a prisoner had been recalled and then released on licence again after serving three quarters of his sentence. Thus, section 37(1A) stated:

"Where a prisoner is released on licence under section 33(3) or (3A) above, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the reference of three-quarters of his sentence there were substituted a reference to the whole of that sentence."

[9]That then was the statutory regime for long-term prisoners after the 1998 Act amendments and prior to the 2003 Act. It was, in essence, a duty to release prisoners on licence after two thirds of their sentence had been served, with the licence period normally extending only to the three-quarters stage. However, if the prisoner was recalled by the Secretary of State while on licence, the duty was then to release him at the three-quarters stage on licence. The licence would then run until the expiry of the sentence imposed by the courts.

[10]Pausing there, it can be seen that the substance of what has happened to these applicants in fact was what the amended 1991 Act provided for. They were released at the two-thirds stage, were then recalled, and were later released at the three-quarters stage with their licences set to run for the remainder of their five year sentences. But then along came the 2003 Act and its subordinate legislation.

[11]In broad terms, that Act introduced a new regime with a duty to release long-term prisoners at the halfway stage but on licence, with the licence extending for the whole of their remaining sentence. This came into effect on 4th April 2005 by virtue of Article 2 and Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement Number 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005, which for brevity's sake I shall refer to as the 2005 Order. That Order also brought into effect section 303(a) of the 2003 Act which repealed Part 2 of the 1991 Act; that is to say, the part of that statute which contained the statutory provisions to which I have been referring.

[12]However, as its title indicates, the 2005 Order also included transitional and saving provisions in Schedule 2. It is necessary to set out the relevant parts of paragraphs 19 and 23 of that schedule because they are at the heart of this case. Paragraph 19 provides:

"The coming into force of -- (a) sections 244 (duty to release prisoners), 246 (power to release prisoners before required to do so), 248 (power to release on compassionate grounds), 249 (duration of licence), and 250 (licence conditions) . . . (c) the repeal of sections 33, 33A to 38A, 40A to 44, and 46 to 47 and 51 of the 1991 Act; and (d) the repeal of sections 59 and 60, 99 and 100, 101, 103 to 105 and 121 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, is of no effect in relation to a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of an offence committed before 4th April 2005."

The applicants are, of course, prisoners who come into that particular category. One notes that section 249 of the 2003 Act, dealing with duration of licences, is one of the provisions which is of no effect therefore in relation to these applicants. Paragraph 23 of the Order, in so far as relevant, reads:

"(1) . . . in relation to a prisoner who falls to be released under the provisions of Part 2 of the 1991 Act after 4th April 2005 -- (a) the reference to release on licence in section 254(1) of the 2003 Act (recall of prisoners while on licence) shall be taken to include release on licence under those provisions; and (b) the reference in sections 37(1) and 44(3) and (4) of the 1991 Act to revocation under section 39 of that Act shall be treated as a reference to revocation under section 254 of the 2003 Act."

[13]In relation to prisoners such as the applicants, sections 33 and 37 of the 1991 Act as amended were amongst those provisions which remain in force. However, it will be noted that section 39 of that Act, giving the Secretary of State power to revoke a licence and recall a prisoner, was not saved by the 2005 Order. Consequently, one finds paragraph 23(1)(b), which I have just read, providing that references in certain sections of the 1991 Act to revocation under section 39 shall be treated as referring to revocation under section 254 of the 2003 Act, that being the provision which now gives the Secretary of State the power to revoke a licence and recall the prisoner to prison. So far so good. But it will be seen that paragraph 23(1)(b) only substitutes section 254 revocation for the now repealed section 39 revocation in certain sections of the 1991 Act. Those include section 37(1) but not section 33 or, for that matter, section 37(1A), even though those provisions remain in force in respect of these applicants and others in a similar position. It is that which has given rise to the present argument.

[14]What is said on behalf of the applicants -- principally by Mr Southey for Kelly and Bailey but adopted by Mr Simblet for Gibson with some brief additional submissions -- is as follows. There is now a different procedural regime for the recall and release on licence of prisoners. The old section 33(3) provided for automatic release on licence where recall took place under section 39, but section 39 has now gone. Paragraph 23 of the 2005 Order identifies certain provisions where references to section 39 are to be taken to be references to section 254 of the 2003 Act. But section 33(3) is not amongst them. That suggests, submits Mr Southey, a deliberate decision on the part of the legislature to exclude section 33(3) from that deeming provision. These men were released by the Parole Board not under section 33(3) but under section 256 of the new Act. Their release was directed under that provision. Section 256, and indeed section 254, were intended to give the Parole Board a greater role in the recall of prisoners. The release at the three-quarters date does not occur explicitly because of section 33 of the old Act but because of the operation of the Secretary of State's directions to the Parole Board, directions made under section 239(6).

[15]Mr Southey contends that there is still, on the basis of his argument, a proper role for section 33(3) because it does still apply to those prisoners recalled before the 2003 Act came into operation, but who only reached the three-quarters mark of their sentence after that date. Those individuals, he entirely accepts, would be on licence for the remainder of their sentences. The applicants, however, do not come into that category. It is acknowledged on behalf of the applicants that prisoners to whom section 33(3) does still apply would therefore end up, if this argument is right, in a different situation from those in the applicants' position simply because of their date of recall. But Mr Southey submits that that should come as no surprise. The date of recall does have some significance under the new legislation. For instance, it makes a difference to the powers possessed by the Parole Board. He concedes that being on licence or not being on licence is a matter that goes beyond mere procedure and so the applicants do obtain a substantive advantage if this argument is right. Nonetheless, it is submitted that that is no reason not to adopt the interpretation which is now being advanced.

[16]The Secretary of State, in contrast, it is said, wishes to write words into paragraph 23 of the 2005 Order. To do that requires, at the very least, a high threshold to be surmounted. The court must be sure that there was an error or inadvertence on the part of the draftsman, and yet if one looks at the House of Lords decision in Stellato, one finds that Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood does not ultimately there resolve why section 33(3) was omitted from paragraph 23 of the Order.

[17]Mr Southey, with the support of Mr Simblet, emphasises that where the liberty of a subject is in issue there needs to be some clear statutory provision to justify interference. He cites (though I need not refer to) authority for that proposition. Here, it is said, one cannot be sure that it was mere inadvertence which led to the omission of any reference to section 33(3) from the relevant paragraph in the 2005 Order. Mr Simblet, in addition, has drawn our attention in particular to the Strasbourg jurisprudence where issues of liberty and Article 5 are involved.

[18]For the Secretary of State, Mr Patel emphasises that the House of Lords has already had to consider the interpretation of the 2005 Order in its decision in Stellato. There, the Secretary of State had argued that the omission of a reference to section 33 was deliberate in the 2005 Order. It is significant that that argument failed. He draws our attention to the judgment of Lord Hope in Stellato, in particular at paragraph 15, where it is clear that he said that the 2005 Order was not intended to deal with matters of substance, but only with matters of procedure.

[19]It is argued on behalf of the Secretary of State that the submission of the applicants would effectively mean the repeal of section 104 of the 1998 Act which introduced section 37(1A) to the 1991 Act and amended section 33(3), and yet, points out Mr Patel, section 104 is expressly saved by paragraph 19(d) of the 2005 Order. It is submitted that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between those prisoners recalled before 4th April 2005 and those recalled after it when both categories were sentenced for offences under the 1991 Act (as amended) regime. That would be an entirely arbitrary distinction, says Mr Patel. Furthermore, if the applicants are right there would be no statutory duty to release such prisoners at the three-quarters stage. It is pointed out that the whole regime of the 2003 Act was to have prisoners, when released, on licence for the whole of their sentence. It would, it is said, be a most remarkable situation if the 2005 Order was seeking to do quite the opposite in relation to prisoners who fell into the category of the applicants.

[20]So far as the drafting of paragraph 23 is concerned, Mr Patel contends that section 37(1A) of the 1991 Act does not need to be brought into paragraph 23(1)(b). It is only section 33(3) that has been inadvertently omitted and this court can and should conclude that the terms of the Inco Europe test (that is to say the decision in Inco Europe Limited v First Choice Distribution

[2000] 1 WLR 586

) are here met. It is suggested that into paragraph 23(1)(b) some wording such as "the reference in section 33(3) to recall under section 39(1)" should be read in. It is said that as a matter of interpretation that is clearly what was intended in this particular case.

[21]It seems to me that the applicants' argument amounts really to this. They say that section 37(1A) of the 1991 Act as amended, a provision under which whole sentence licences operated under that statutory regime, cannot affect them because it only applies "where a prisoner is released on licence under section 33(3) or (3A) above" (see Section 37(1A) of the 1991 Act as amended). The applicants have not been released under section 33(3) because that subsection only bites where a prisoner has been released on licence and then has been "recalled to prison under section 39(1) or (2) below". Section 39, they rightly say, has gone and their recall was made under section 254 of the 2003 Act. Although section 254 has been substituted, by virtue of paragraph 33(1)(b) of the 2005 Order, for section 39 for the purposes of some sections of the 1991 Act, those sections do not include section 33. Consequently, the argument runs, section 33(3) cannot be read as applying to those recalled under section 254, and so section 37(1A) cannot operate so as to impose a whole sentence licence upon them.

[22]This is a line of argument which gives rise to some very obvious problems. If the applicants are right, the mere fact that the 2003 Act has changed the procedures for release and recall will have conferred a considerable substantive benefit on them. Had they been released and recalled before the 2003 Act came into effect, they would have been released at the three-quarter stage of their sentence because of the provisions of section 33(3) and their licence then would have extended for the remainder of their sentence. If they are right in their present argument, the Act and its subordinate legislation has affected the duration of their licence, in that once released at the three-quarters stage of the sentence, albeit by the decision of the Parole Board, they are free from any licence thereafter. Their release has become unconditional. They would, as Mr Patel pointed out, end up in a better position than they would have been prior to the 2003 Act coming into force. They would have obtained a substantive advantage, even though, as Lord Brown noted in Stellato, their position is intended to be "saved" by the second schedule of the 2005 Order (see paragraphs 32 and 43 of Stellato). It seems to me highly unlikely that that was Parliament's intention. As Lord Hope said in the same case, paragraphs 19 and 23 of the second schedule:

" . . . are to be understood as dealing only with matters of definition and procedure of a transitional nature, not with matters of substance affecting prisoners' rights [see paragraph 15]."

There, of course, as Mr Southey emphasises, the House of Lords were seeking to ensure that prisoners' rights were not reduced by some procedural changes. By the same token, Parliament cannot have intended to enlarge those rights by such changes. The changes were not intended to alter the substantive regime applicable to prisoners in the applicants' position.

[23]There are also other powerful indications that the applicants' interpretation is unsound. The whole of section 33 and the whole of section 37 of the 1991 Act as amended are expressly preserved in relation to prisoners whose sentence related to a pre-4th April 2005 offence. Paragraph 19(c) of the second schedule to the 2005 Order explicitly so provides. Yet if the applicants are right, what was the point of preserving section 33(3) and section 37(1A)? The only situation the applicants can suggest where those provisions would still operate, on their argument, would be where a prisoner on licence had been recalled before 4th April 2005 under section 39 powers but only reached the three-quarter stage of his sentence after that date. He would have a whole sentence licence. But it is absurd to believe that Parliament intended to put him in a worse position than the applicants merely because his recall preceded that date rather than followed it, when he had been sentenced under precisely the same regime as they have. It seems to me that Mr Patel is entirely right when he argues that this would display an arbitrary and unjustified distinction.

[24]In Stellato, Lord Brown observed that the drafting of paragraph 23 of the second schedule "leaves much to be desired" (paragraph 36), a proposition upon which there seems to have been no dissent at the Bar in this case. Lord Brown went on to say in paragraph 42 that:

"[It] would have been better for the draftsman to provide (perhaps in an additional subparagraph) that section 33(3)'s reference to recall under section 39 should be treated as a reference to recall under section 254 (which uses the omnibus expression 'revoke his licence and recall him to prison')."

It is clear to me that that is how Lord Brown interpreted paragraph 23(1)(b). That is the whole point of him saying that it would have been better for the draftsman to have done that, because it would make the position crystal clear. Nonetheless, he ends up with that interpretation and the rest of the House agreed with his judgment. He also went on to emphasise, in what to my mind is a very important passage, in paragraph 43:

"[The] longer one considers the scheme of this part of Schedule 2, the plainer it becomes that paragraph 23 is concerned only with the process of recalling and re-releasing prisoners on licence and not in any way with the duration of their licences and the point at which they become entitled to unconditional release."

That last phrase appears because Stellato was a case concerning an offender whose offence was committed before 30th September 1998 and who therefore was entitled to unconditional release under the original 1991 Act regime at the three-quarter stage. That, however, is of no significance. What is important is his Lordship's emphasis on the fact that paragraph 23 is not concerned with the duration of prisoners' licences. I respectfully agree. One gets a further indication of that from the heading to paragraph 23 itself. It is dealing, as it says, with recall arrangements, not with the duration of a licence.

[25]In the light of that House of Lords authority, it is unnecessary for this court to engage afresh in the exercise of applying the Inco Europe principles. I would merely say that the conditions required by that case for reading words into a statute, as, I emphasise, a matter of interpretation, are amply met in the present case. In the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at page 592 F to G:

" . . . the court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed."

[26]I am satisfied, in short, that the 2005 Order was intended to preserve for prisoners such as the applicants the statutory regime which applied to them in terms of duration of licence before the 2003 Act came into force. Such a prisoner sentenced for a pre-4th April 2005 offence and recalled, either under section 39 of the 1991 Act as amended or under section 254 of the 2003 Act, would, on subsequent release at the three-quarter stage of his sentence, be on licence for the whole of the remainder of his sentence by virtue of section 37(1A) of the 1991 Act as amended. Any other interpretation of the relevant provisions simply does not make sense.

[27]In so concluding, I bear fully in mind that one is here dealing with the liberty of the subject and the courts will not lightly interpret legislation so to restrict that liberty, but the proper interpretation here of those provisions is sufficiently clear as to leave no real room for doubt as to Parliament's intention. I therefore, for my part, would reject these applications for judicial review and, in Gibson's case, the application for habeas corpus.

MR JUSTICE GIBBS: I agree.

[29]MR SOUTHEY: My Lord, there are two other issues I need to address you on. Firstly, in terms of costs. The straightforward application I need to make on behalf of both appellants is for assessment for the purposes of Legal Services Commission.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: You can certainly have that, that is uncontentious. That applies to both of you.

[31]MR SOUTHEY: Secondly, more substantively, we do seek permission to appeal. However arguable your Lordships thought this case to be having heard argument in relation to it, this case clearly did raise issues of significant wider application in relation to a provision which is, I think everybody agrees, badly drafted and just causes all kinds of problems.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: You would have to go to the Court of Appeal from here, would you?

[33]MR SOUTHEY: Yes. Stellato went to the Court of Appeal as did Buddington, which were the two previous cases in relation to it. Buddington in some respects was perhaps a clearer issue of statutory interpretation. In my submission it is appropriate, given the importance of the issue and given the lack of clarity in this area. I am not sure there is much else I can say in relation to that. That is my application.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Presumably you support that, Mr Simblet?

[35]MR SIMBLET: I am not sure that I need it. Since mine is a habeas corpus case, you do not need permission. If I need it, I would like it.

[36]MR SOUTHEY: If my learned friend does not need permission then in some ways that strengthens my argument.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: I got there already. Mr Patel?

[38]MR PATEL: I accept the provisions are poorly drafted but this court is now the sixth court which has had the opportunity of dealing with it.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: You mean taking Stellato into account?

[40]MR PATEL: Yes.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: The sixth?

[42]MR PATEL: I think so. There were three in Stellato, this is the fourth. There has been Martin and Buddington. There is in fact seven courts who have actually considered these provisions. I think it is clear when one looks at the House of Lords judgment and what your Lordships have said today that, notwithstanding the drafting, the proper interpretation of the order is the preservation of the substantive regime. I would urge you not to grant permission.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: It is an important topic though, is it not?

[44]MR PATEL: It may be. If it is so important then the claimants can persuade the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: All right. Anything further?

[46]MR SOUTHEY: In response to that, subsequently to Stellato the Secretary of State unsuccessfully opposed the claim in Martin, suggesting there was still a lack of clarity. Martin was a case where Collins J recognised the potential issue, still unresolved, which led to this claim.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Anything further, Mr Simblet?

[48]MR SIMBLET: It is a separate point from Stellato and, your Lordship certainly in argument with Mr Patel drew attention to the distinction between removing rights rather than certain people gaining them, that has not been definitively decided by Stellato. Further, there was the court reading words into the statute which may be a subject upon which the higher courts ought to express an opinion.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Yes, thank you. Yes, we think this is an issue of sufficient importance for it to be appropriate for us to grant permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in this case, to the extent that it is required by the parties. In granting permission to appeal, let us just think about the other considerations that come into play. I would think, given how long we have taken today, that the time estimate ought to be a day, ought it not?

[50]MR SOUTHEY: I think that is probably right, my Lord, yes.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: It ought to be dealt with, I would have said myself, by a three LJ court. It ought to be considered for the Lord Chief or the MR's list.

[52]MR SOUTHEY: My Lord, just two other orders that may be appropriate. Given, in particular, that two out of three of the claimants remain in custody, first, I would ask for an expedited transcript of your Lordship's judgment. Secondly, I am conscious of the difficulties of Court of Appeal listing at the moment which are perhaps not quite as bad as the Administrative Court's listing but still pressing, but some indication of some degree of expedition would be appreciated, I think.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Are you asking for expedition to be heard by a particular date?

[54]MR SOUTHEY: I think it is difficult to set any particular date because this court will not have details of the Court of Appeal's listing. For example, I note my learned friend --

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: There is no real chance of getting in in this term.

[56]MR SOUTHEY: I do not think there is.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: We might be inclined to direct that it should come in before the end of next term. Did you want to say something, Mr Patel?

[58]MR PATEL: My Lord, certainly not if it is going to be considered for the Lord Chief Justice's or the Master of the Rolls' list because trying to list appeals for either of those two is very difficult. I make no submissions on the matter.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Those behind you may know more about the state of their lists than I do. Are you saying no space even before the end of next term?

[60]MR PATEL: There was another case called James and Walker which had to be heard by the Lord Chief Justice. The court had literally one day available for this term.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: It will not get in this term.

[62]MR PATEL: No, but I suspect even next term we will have little choice.

[63]MR SOUTHEY: I have been involved in some of the appeals from Special Immigration Appeals Commission which have been referred to the Master of the Rolls. Again, I think there was a one week slot essentially available in February, so I suspect there is a tension between wanting it and getting it.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: I think what we might direct then is that if possible it should be heard before the end of next term. That will enable a proper balancing exercise to be done between expedition and the seniority of those involved.

[65]MR SIMBLET: My Lord, the only other issue is that in drawing up the order might I have your Lordship's leave to pass to the associate the transcription of the amendment.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Of course. On an expedited transcript, yes, we will direct that. I am going to be away for most of next week so I am afraid you will not get the approved transcript certainly not before a week today and probably not before a couple of weeks today.

[67]MR SOUTHEY: I do not imagine that will cause any problem at all.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: All concerned with the transcript will do their best to get it out as soon as we can.

[69]MR PATEL: My Lord, I should just add that there is no order for costs.