“The Public Prosecutor in charge of the investigation, stated that according to her recollection, since she could not look at the case file in a short time: 'Raffaele Sadutto's co-operation with investigators was very useful and conclusive and therefore he was granted the concession set out in paragraph 7 of Article 73 of the Presidential Decree 709/90. Furthermore on account of this co-operation there was an attempt to obtain official protection for him as a co-operating witness by the Ministry given the criminal prominence of the Leveque family which was mentioned by him.' This attempt was unsuccessful and therefore Sadutto decided to hide abroad because he feared for his safety. Mr Niccolai was actually appointed by the Court as [his] defence counsel.”
“6. I co-operated with the police from the outset.... I wanted to be represented by Modero who had represented me previously but the police said that I would be better off being represented by a lawyer called Nikkolai. 7. During the next few days whilst in prison I spoke to the police about the possibility of me assisting in the investigation. This was at the preliminary investigation stage of the case. At this point Judge Renzo Dell'Anno, the prosecution Miss Corsiers and Mr Nikkolai came to the prison. These matters were discussed.... 8. Discussions took place in front of the Judge as to whether some sort of arrangement might be reached whereby I would assist the police. The police wanted to see firstly how much I knew. I was shown photographs of people and asked to identify them. I was able to do this and therefore began to assist the prosecution. 9. I informed the police about people whom they did not know about. A senior officer came from Naples to see if [I] knew people operating in Naples. I was able to give information about persons not mentioned in this case. 10. I was released from custody on20 June 1991 , having assisted the police. 11. I was given home detention. Whilst under home detention I accompanied the police to Milan to point out places that I had been with other people involved in the drug trade. 12. During the time I was under home detention I made a statement setting out what I knew. 13. In October or November 1991 home detention was lifted and I was allowed to work and travel freely without having to sign on at a police station. I was not bailed to attend a court. 14. I worked as a plasterer and travelled for the purposes of work. This went on for a number of months until late 1991. I was in touch with Nikkolai from time to time. 15. Things changed dramatically when the police started to arrest people that I had named. I was told that [a] safe place would be found for me to go before the police started to arrest people. This was on the basis that it was likely that I would be revealed as the informant. .... 17. I came to England with my wife and daughter at Christmas. My wife remained here with our child. 18. I returned to Italy at the start of 1992 because I wanted to sort things out. I called the police because I wanted to know what was going on as there had been an arrest and I had not been warned. They did not take my fears seriously and they went back on their promise to protect me. It was clear that I was not going to be offered a safe place to live or any protection. 19. I spoke to Nikkolai about it -- he didn't seem to want to be involved. 20. At that time it was still not known that I was the informant but I knew it was only a matter of time so I returned to the UK after about 8 weeks. I had no choice except to go.”
“23. By giving information I put myself at considerable risk. The people who I had informed upon were dangerous and powerful. They were not people that you would want to upset and I knew that I was in danger. 24. I believed my life was in danger. It will still be in danger if I am returned.”
“28. I had previously understood that as a result of my co-operation that I would receive a much lesser sentence. In the end my life was at risk because of the help I had given.”
“A person who is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of an extradition crime shall not be returned to a foreign state, or committed or kept in custody for the purposes of return to a foreign state, if it appears to an appropriate authority -- (a) that the conviction was obtained in his absence; and (b) that it would not be in the interests of justice to return him on the ground of that conviction.”
“Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court apart from this section, the court shall order the applicant's discharge if it appears to the court in relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant's return is sought, that -- .... (b) by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed it .... .... it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him.”
“8. The European Court of Human Rights and the Commission have repeatedly made clear that it regards the appearance of a criminal defendant at his trial as a matter of capital importance: see, for example, Poitrimol v France(1993) 18 EHRR 130 , 146, para 35; Pelladoah v The Netherlands(1994) 19 EHRR 81 , 94, para 40; Lala v The Netherlands(1994) 18 EHRR 586 , 597, para 33. That court has also laid down (1) that a fair hearing requires a defendant to be notified of the proceedings against him: Colozza v Italy(1985) 7 EHRR 516 , 523-524, para 28; Brozicek v Italy(1989) 12 EHRR 371 ; (2) that a person should as a general principle be entitled to be present at his trial: Ekbatani v Sweden(1988) 13 EHRR 504 , 509, para 25; (3) that a defendant in a criminal trial should have the opportunity to present his arguments adequately and participate effectively: Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v Germany (1978) 14 DR 64, 115; Stanford v United Kingdom23 February 1994 , Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 282-A; (4) that a defendant should be entitled to be represented by counsel at trial and on appeal, whether or not he is present or has previously absconded: Delcourt v Belgium(1970) 1 EHRR 355 , 366-367, para 25; Poitrimol v France 18 EHRR 130, 146, 147, paras 34, 38; Pelladoah v The Netherlands 19 EHRR 81, 94, para 40; Lala v The Netherlands 18 EHRR 586, 597-598, paras 33-34; Van Geyseghem v Belgium Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-1, 127, 140, para 34; Omar v France(1998) 29 EHRR 210 , 233, paras 41-42. The right to be defended has also been described by the European Court of Justice as a fundamental right deriving from the constitutional traditions common to the member states of the European Union: Bamberski v Krombach (Case C-7/98 )[2001] QB 709 . 9. All these principles may be very readily accepted. They are given full effect by the law of the United Kingdom. But the European Court of Human Rights has never found a breach of the Convention where a defendant, fully informed of a forthcoming trial, has voluntarily chosen not to attend and the trial has continued. In the Ensslin case 14 DR 64, in which proceedings were continued during the absence of the defendants caused in large measure by self-induced illness, the proceedings were held to have been properly continued. In Poitrimol v France 18 EHRR 130, 145, para 31 the court questioned whether a full hearing on appeal could be required by a defendant who had waived his right to appeal and defend himself at trial. In Van Geyseghem v Belgium21 January 1999 , at p 138, para 28 the court was not concerned that the applicant had not wished to avail herself of her right to attend an appeal hearing. In a concurring opinion in that case Judge Bonello (at p 145) held that the presence of a defendant during his trial was basically his right, not his obligation. There is nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to suggest that a trial of a criminal defendant held in his absence is inconsistent with the Convention.”
“So, as it seems to me, for all the reasons I have identified, if justice is to be done this conviction needs to be reviewed, but Professor Iorio says that even today there is no scope for such a review, and that is confirmed ....”