"This court will only interfere with the exercise of the justices' discretion whether to grant an adjournment in cases where it is plain that a refusal will cause substantial unfairness to one of the parties. Such unfairness may arise when a defendant is denied a full opportunity to present his case. But neither defendants nor their legal advisers should be permitted to frustrate the objective of a speedy trial without substantial grounds."
"Applications for adjournments must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Any defendant who is guilty of deliberately seeking to postpone a trial without good reason has no cause for complaint if his application for an adjournment is refused: see, for example, Reg. v Macclesfield Justices, Ex parte Jones [1993] RTR 143. In deciding whether to grant an adjournment justices will bear in mind that they have a responsibility for ensuring, so far as possible, that summary justice is speedy justice. This is not a matter of mere administrative convenience, although efficient administration and economy are in themselves very desirable ends. Delays in bringing summary charges to trial are, unfortunately, not infrequent: last minute adjournments deprive other defendants of the opportunity of speedy trials when recollections are fresh. The difficulties adjournments cause give rise to a proper sense of frustration in justices confronted with such applications: see Ex parte Rowles [1994] RTR 40, 45E-F, per Farquharson LJ. It is important that in those cases where this court is compelled to intervene, its rulings should not be seen to be inhibiting justices from refusing repeated applications for adjournments where it is appropriate to do so."
"First, a decision as to whether or not proceedings should be adjourned is, as counsel for the defendant rightly urged, a decision within the discretion of the trial court. It is pre-eminently a discretionary decision. It follows, as a matter of undoubted law, that it is a decision with which any appellate court will be very slow to interfere. It will accordingly interfere only if very clear grounds are shown for doing so. "
"The third factor which impresses me is that I think that the justices failed to pay regard to the interests of justice as they affected both sides. They were conscious, and rightly conscious, of the defendant's desire that the matter alleged against him should be cleared up one way or another and were no doubt conscious of the fact that he had had this matter hanging over him for some time and that another adjournment would prolong his uncertainty and concern. On the other hand, of course, there was the interest of the prosecution, representing the public, that a charge properly preferred against the defendant should be the subject of proper adjudication. It is, of course, right that those about whose guilt there is any doubt should be acquitted, but it is equally in the interests of society that those against whom true allegations are made should be convicted. I think that, in their consideration of this matter, the justices perhaps failed to pay proper regard to the undesirable consequence of refusing an adjournment when, as they claim they understood, the result would be that the prosecution would thereupon collapse. "