In the Financial Remedies CourtVenue Sitting at the Royal Courts of JusticeCase No 1707-3205-6751-3730[2026] EWFC 245 (B)Date Monday 24 August 2026In the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
Before
Recorder Nahal-Macdonald (sitting as a Deputy District Judge)
Between
‘HJ’Applicant‘QY’RespondentThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of courtRespondentPreliminaryRespondent‘HJ’ (the applicant wife)-v-‘QY’ (the respondent husband)This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of courtPreliminary
[1]This is a written judgment further to a short ex tempore decision I gave today between 11:56 a.m. and 12:13 p.m., having heard from the applicant only, represented ably by her counsel, Mr Zacharie Mouillé, at a Final Hearing in the matter at the Royal Courts of Justice.[2]I decided to publish this judgment for several reasons, inter alia:a. The respondent did not attend;b. The case involved litigants in person with relatively low income and assets (a so-called “small money” case within the field) which account for a majority of the cases in the FRC, yet a relatively small amount of the jurisprudencec. The case has had over a dozen hearings by various judges at different levelsd. The case has involved several third-party disclosure orderse. The case had the benefit of pro bono advocacy to a high standardf. All of the difficult features of this case were, in my view, caused by the approach the respondent tookg. As a result of the respondent’s behaviour being unreasonable and his conduct of the case being out with the acceptable approach, I have made a costs order against him in favour of a charityh. In all the circumstances, there may well be other litigants who might benefit from a note about such a case in a wider public interest sense[3]I am grateful to the erudite and earnest assistance of Mr Mouillé, who provided pro bono advocacy through the ‘Advocate’ scheme. For the reasons outlined below, I decided to make a costs order pursuant to s.194Legal Services Act 2007 and FPR r.28.3(6)–(7), that the respondent pay a sum representative of counsel’s time to the Access to Justice Foundation.
Background
[4]Background The applicant (‘W’) is in her mid-thirties. She was introduced to the respondent (‘H’) in around 2017 and they married on 27 April 2018, in what they may then have considered “a picture day in the book of life”. H is now in his early forties. The marriage ended after a relatively short time, in 2021, but not before the parties had a child together, (‘C’) who is now seven years old.[5]C resides with W by way of a ‘Lives With Order’ made by the Family Court pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989. H has video contact only with C at the present time. He is in arrears for Child Maintenance, pursuant to their order, which W tells the court is in excess of £35,000 as of even date.[6]W issued her Form A seeking financial remedies in September 2023. Notwithstanding the parties are still legally married in the UK, in June 2025, H remarried in a religious ceremony to a new wife whilst he was aware this matter progressed.[7]There has since followed, by my count, no fewer that 15 different court hearings listed in this matter between the parties, heard variously by Recorders, DDJ’s and a Circuit Judge, HHJ Hess, who is Deputy Lead Judge for the FRC.[8]A typical case in the FRC should resolve quickly, and in no more than three hearings for most cases (a First Directions Appointment; then a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing; then if needed a Final Hearing). The reason that this case has taken over two years and a dozen court hearings to come to finality, is, in my finding, solely due to the disengagement, defiance and obstruction of H. This is invidious.[9]H has attended only a few hearings, resulting in many adjournments and eventually threats of contempt proceedings, which served to sharpen his focus. Nevertheless, his approach of failing to provide a scintilla of accurate disclosure in this case has caused numerous third-party disclosure applications by W against banks, the DVLA and others to try to piece together the true extent of H’s income and assets. It is to W’s credit that she has not been dissuaded and has instead persevered in that process.[10]Eventually, hearings earlier this year led to judges taking the view that H ought to be debarred from giving evidence at this hearing, and accordingly for any inferences drawn from W’s evidence to fall in her favour if there was doubt. H has done himself no favours by failing to attend today, and I take the view in all the circumstances that he is clearly voluntarily absent.
The evidence
[11]The evidence I heard from W alone in evidence, at some length. She was taken through statements she had given in respect of the test at Section 25 MCA 1976 (‘s.25’) as to how the parties met; what she knew of H’s income and lifestyle; how they lived during the marriage and the information she had gathered since. She gave an account of what she and C needed to live on now, in order to rebuild and hopefully find stable accommodation for themselves, as currently W and C live with her parents.[12]W has (as mentioned above) not given up when faced with wholesale non compliance by H as to his means. H failed to provide any evidence in support of his Form E, making bare assertions as to having a significantly depressed income, and having been removed from a directorship of his prior company, inter alia. W was therefore caused to make several Third-Party Disclosure Order (‘TPDO’) applications, for example to the DVLA to find out which vehicles were registered with H (he had made assertions as to disposals and third-party ownership) and to various banks.[13]By piecing together the disclosure from the various banks which resulted from the responses to the TPDO’s, W managed to build a picture supported by documentary evidence. H, for example, said that he was an employee of a company related to one he formerly directed and thus had limited income far below full-time working hours as against minimum wage. W managed to put together that in fact, during the 12 months from March 2025 to March 2026, H received income into two current accounts with Santander and Starling totalling over £88,000. Extrapolating for deductions at source i.e. tax and NI (presuming H has a higher respect for HMRC than he does for the court) and other deductions, it is arguable that H’s true income was in the last year in the region of £100,000 or more.[14]W also managed to put before the court documentary evidence from H himself (including via social media) demonstrating a penchant for designer clothes and holidays. It appears to the court that H has travelled extensively during the period where he is apparently earning less than minimum wage – including for a Padel trip with friends to Barcelona, and for holidays to Türkiye, Jordan, Dubai and others. During this period, it is of stark contrast that W has been forced to live with her parents, working limited hours whilst raising C alone. It is also of note, that H has failed to pay sums ordered by the CMS during this period.[15]It is W’s evidence that during the marriage, H used to work long hours, at least six days per week, at a company where he was a registered director (‘RK’ Ltd). He had a company car, phone and other indications of his import to the company. After W made an application to enforce arrears of child support via the Tribunal, H then said he had been removed as a director and was now a mere employee, and on a fixed income considerably below the National Minimum Wage for a full-time worker. Concurrently W adduced evidence that H was living with his mother and in receipt of state support for her as a carer.[16]W in turn provided evidence regardingH’s relationship with two apparently related businesses: RK (of which he has been an employee since 2014 and officially receiving a salary of £800 per month), and ‘RKM’ Ltd (a maintenance business incorporated right before the marriage of which H was sole director and shareholder). H apparently operated the secondary business as an income vehicle. H maintained a close relationship with the directors of RK, registering cars in the business’s name and receiving the benefit of using a company car and phone, though he has never been a director of that business. Since opening a Starling current account, and the dissolution of RKM, H has apparently continued to receive income from the main business though the precise nature and source of the payments is unclear.[17]W said that by September 2025, the volume of hearings necessitated the attention of HHJ Hess, who heard from H in person where I am told contempt proceedings were contemplated. This is agreed as one of only a few hearings where H attended. It is of note that prior to the marriage, H had been sent to prison for a serious offence in which he killed a pedestrian whilst driving uninsured. I take the inference that the threat of contempt was perhaps necessary to focus H’s attention to this matter, but it is regrettable that his attention did not last until the conclusion of proceedings.[18]W asked me to draw the inference that H has significantly under-declared his true income, and that he has assets including three motor vehicles (I am told two of which are BMW vehicles and one worth circa £40,000). W also provided cogent evidence that H has made transfers totalling £65,000 to offshore holdings during the course of the marriage which are not commensurate with his stated means.[19]W gave evidence about her own impecuniosity and difficulty securing housing because of this. She sought to persuade me that her father could provide some sort of bridging loan or act as a guarantor to try to assist her pending any award in these proceedings, which taken together could provide a deposit or rental funds for W and C to rehome. W was clear and concise with her command of the figures in this case, on each instance as to her own limited means, and what she demonstrated the evidence could tell the court about H’s means in turn.
The Law
[20]The Law The applicable principles are well established including in the cases of NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), where Mr
Justice Mostyn (as he then was) said [1]:
[21]“The law of financial remedies following divorce has many commandments but the greatest of these is the absolute bounden duty imposed on the parties to give, not merely to each other, but, first and foremost to the court, full frank and clear disclosure of their present and likely future financial resources. Non-disclosure is a bane which strikes at the very integrity of the adjudicative process.” [my emphasis added]. In Moher v Moher[2019] EWCA Civ 1482; King, Moylan and Rose LJJ set out the cannon of caselaw as to disclosure and the importance of it, and the propriety of drawing inferences inter alia. Lord Justice Moylan summed up the authorities, including those of Prest v Petrodel Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] 2 AC 415 and endorsed that:[22]“when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party's non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called "the inherent probabilities" the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome” In summary, where a party fails to give full and frank disclosure, the court may draw adverse inferences and quantify them robustly; uncertainty created by non-disclosure is resolved against the non-discloser.[23]In Crowther v Crowther & Ors [2021] EWFC 88at [58], Mr Justice Peel held that a finding of non-disclosure could be established by one of the following:a. Direct evidence of an asset which the alleged non-discloser has not revealed (the classic example being the revelation of the existence of a bank account or accounts which feature nowhere in his/her financial presentation, and holding large sums of money);b. Failure to comply with court orders and/or provide adequate or complete responses to questions asked, from which failure the court feels able to draw inferences adverse to the alleged non-discloser;c. Evidence of a lifestyle which is wholly inconsistent with disclosed financial resources.[24]In the current case, the wholesale lack of disclosure by H, the failure to provide complete accounts (and the evidence arising from those accounts when W secured the evidence via repeated TDPO’s) the repeated failure to comply with court orders for disclosure (despite being given many opportunities to do so in the form of ‘unless orders’ et al.) and evidence of a lifestyle far in excess of that reported (i.e. the designer clothes, the many holidays etc.) all tend in favour of inferences being drawn as to H’s income and assets, and in favour of W’s applications in this case in turn.
Decision
[25]Decision I commend W and her counsel for their work and their assistance in the hearing and leading up to it. It cannot have been easy for W to put together the pieces of the financial jigsaw whilst working and being a single parent to C.[26]I find that in all the circumstances, the systemic non-disclosure by H has been deliberate and calculated to leave W at a disadvantage. The fact that H does not pay anything close to the sum ordered by the CMS, and that he has already re-married, and that he has suppressed his true income, are all factors that can be taken together to demonstrate H’s disregard for W and his lack of respect for court orders.[27]I have heard from W as to her request for a capital sum rather than ongoing provision, so as to lead to a clean break between the parties. I have also heard from her counsel as to enforcement and costs.[28]I find that the inferences I can draw are that H has significant undisclosed income and access to significant valuable assets, including high value performance motor vehicles and designer goods. I find that H’s lifestyle is such that he is spending significant sums on himself to the detriment of W and C, which ought to be deprecated.[29]In the circumstances, I have considered the length of the marriage as against the material non-disclosure. This is a case where W is of limited means and has obvious shortfalls in her income which tend in favour of a capital award so that she can rebuild her life and provide for her and C going forward to have their own accommodation. I have heard thoughtful evidence as to her needs in that regard and am persuaded that a lump sum is appropriate.[30]Accordingly, I order that H pays to W the sum of £110,000 within 28 days of this order. W has leave to apply for enforcement of the above sum after 28 days without further delay. Her counsel has advised her as to appropriate methods.[31]I also order that H pays the sum of £750 in costs to the benefit of the Access to Justice Foundation within 28 days of this order.[32]As H did not attend, he has leave to apply to set aside this order within 14 days of the same. DDJ Nahal-Macdonald 24 August 2026