Oxfordshire County Council, Applicant v M & Ors [2026] EWFC 228 (B)

[2026] EWFC 228 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT OXFORD

HEARD 30 th June 2026 to 3 rd July 2026

Before Her Honour Judge Owens

Handed down on 31 st july 2026

Oxfordshire County Council, Applicant

M, First Respondent

F, Second Respondent

A, Third respondent, acting through their Children’s Guardian

Between

Oxfordshire County CouncilApplicant

M, FirstRespondent

F, SecondRespondent

A, Third respondent, acting through their Children’s GuardianRespondent

for Applicant Local Authority: Ms Howard, Counsel, instructed by Oxfordshire County Council

for M, First Respondent: Mr Forbes, Counsel, instructed by Oxford Law Group

for F, Second Respondent: Mr Hodge, Counsel, instructed by Reeds

for A, Third Respondent, acting through the Children’s Guardian, Peggy Sipeer: Mr Turner, Counsel, instructed by Truemans

This judgment is being handed down in private on 31 st July 2026. It consists of 35 pages and has been signed and dated by the Judge. The Judge has given permission for judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.

INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND EVIDENTIAL SUMMARY

Date 2026-07-31

[1]This is a final hearing in public law proceedings. M and F are the parents of A.

[2]Local Authority concerns relate to M and F’s ability to recognise and protect A from sexual, physical, emotional harm and neglect.

[3]There is a long history of concern about F posing a risk of sexual harm to children and female partners. In early 2019 he was made subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) which he was convicted of breaching in 2021. In 2022 F was convicted of sexual offences relating to arranging/facilitating the commission of a child sex offence, attempting/engaging in sexual communication with a child, attempting/causing/inciting a female child under the age of 16 to engage in a sexual act, and further breach of the previous SHPO, resulting in a further 5 year SHPO being made at the end of 2022. The conditions of that order prohibit him from accessing social media apps and from having contact with a child under 16 without the permission of the child’s parent and the Local Authority. In November 2024 F was sentenced for a further breach of the SHPO and has therefore breached his SHPO on three occasions since 2019 when the first order was imposed.

[4]M is aware of F’s convictions and history but has continued to be in a relationship with him. She has admitted being complicit in enabling F to breach his SHPO by supplying him with a smart phone without the prior permission of the police. Professionals are concerned that M is unable to recognise and protect A from sexual risk.

[5]Concerns about M’s ability to protect A from domestic abuse also form part of this case. There have been numerous reports of domestic abuse by F against M throughout their relationship, and professionals are concerned that M has poor insight regarding the risk of domestic abuse posed by F and is therefore unable to protect A from this risk in future. In addition, there have been concerns about the stability of M’s accommodation and M and F’s ability to maintain adequate home conditions and provide a safe and nurturing home environment.

[6]Proceedings commenced on 29th May 2025, and the Court granted an Interim Care Order (ICO) on 2nd June 2025 with an interim care plan for M and A to move to a parent and baby foster placement. Unfortunately, this placement did not prove effective in safeguarding A due to difficulties with M engaging with the foster carer and following advice and guidance. This led to M and A moving to a residential assessment unit towards the end of September 2025. This broke down, the unit having given notice after M and A had been there for four weeks, citing difficulties with M’s engagement with assessment and with staff.

[7]On 31st October 2025 the Local Authority applied for a hearing to consider an application to approve a change of interim care plan and to sanction interim removal of A from M’s care. That application was listed on 13th November 2025 but there was insufficient time in the 30 minutes allowed for the hearing to determine the issue. The application was listed for a contested hearing on 26th November 2025 at which the District Judge refused the Local Authority application on the basis that M said she was ready to work with professionals to improve her parenting capability. The District Judge made a non-molestation order against F and directed that the Local Authority file and serve a position statement setting out its plan in respect of interim placement for A and M. A new residential placement was identified and M and A moved there on 5th December 2025.

[8]Unfortunately, that placement, having started relatively positively, culminated in a negative conclusion about M’s ability to care for A in the community. Although M had engaged with the assessment and completed a domestic abuse course, they were of the opinion that M continued to minimise risks posed by F. On 13th March 2026 the matter returned to Court and an interim care plan for A to move to the care of his aunt and uncle, still under an ICO, was endorsed by the Court.

[9]The case was originally timetabled to an Issues Resolution Hearing (IRH) on 22nd April 2026. However, on 13th March 2026 this was vacated and re-listed for 10th June 2026 with a final hearing also listed for 30th June 2026 to 3rd July 2026, both hearings to be before me. The IRH was my first involvement with the case. The witness template was approved and the listed final hearing confirmed as effective.

[10]M was subject to a psychological assessment by Professor Craig (E71-E106 15th September 2025). He concluded that M struggled with abstract reasoning, demonstrated a concrete interpretation of the world around her and demonstrated traits that were associated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (E75). He was of the opinion that M had significant levels of unresolved trauma which impacted on her mental health (E75) and noted that she had been a victim of domestic abuse in three of her four relationships. She also lacked insight into the reasons for the Local Authority concerns and into the effects of sexual abuse, domestic abuse and the impact this could have on a child and her (E75). He noted that she adopted a defensive position in relation to F, persevering in a belief that he did not pose a risk to A whilst at the same time admitting that A may be at risk of harm if caught in a domestic abuse incident between M and F, and that she could not manage F (E75). Professor Craig concluded that M was “ambivalent about losing her relationship with F over that of losing A, which suggests she cannot prioritise A over her relationships. Under these circumstances, M cannot keep A safe from harm for as long as she pursues dysfunctional and abusive relationships” (E75). He was also skeptical about her ability to benefit fully from educative and therapeutic interventions, arising from aspects of her personality which made her “inclined to resist external influences perceived at challenging her attitudes, values and beliefs, which may impede her therapeutic progress” (E75).

[11]The second residential placement completed a full parenting assessment of M, and their summary report is at C380-C390, with the full report at C391-C491, both dated 2nd March 2026. The assessment concluded that, whilst it is clear that M loves A and had demonstrated the practical ability to complete basic care tasks for him at times, A would be at risk of neglect and his physical and emotional safety would also be put at risk if he were to continue living with M, and also that further delays in A receiving security, safety and consistency would be likely to have a detrimental impact on his wellbeing and development (C487).

[12]For this final hearing I have read the Bundle and heard evidence from the Parent Assess assessor, the final residential unit parenting assessor (whom I will refer to as the parenting assessor in this judgment for brevity), the allocated social worker, M, F and the Guardian.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

[13]The Local Authority seeks a Care order for A with him remaining in the care of his aunt and uncle, who have been caring for him since 13th March 2026.

[14]M opposes the final care plan for A and wants him returned to her care. She would agree to any protective orders that the Court deemed necessary to mitigate any risks posed by F.

[15]F does not seek to care for A himself but supports M’s case for A to be returned to her care. He would also agree to any protective orders deemed necessary.

[16]The Guardian recommends that A should be made subject to a Care Order and remain in the care of his aunt and uncle as the Local Authority final care plan proposes.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

[17]The Court in public law proceedings must first consider whether the Local Authority has proved, on balance of probability, that, at the relevant time, A was suffering or was at risk of suffering significant harm as set out in s31 of the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989). The burden of proof is on the Local Authority and must be based on evidence (ABC (Children: Overlaying Child)

[2020] EWFC 57

). As set out by Lady Hale in B (A Child)

[2013] UKSC 33

at para 193:

“when deciding whether the threshold is crossed the court should identify, as precisely as possible, the nature of the harm which is the child is suffering or likely to suffer…Significant harm is harm which is ‘considerable, noteworthy or important’”

. If threshold is proved, then the Court proceeds to consider whether the final care plans is in the welfare interests of the child, by reference to the welfare checklist contained in s1(3) of the CA 1989.

[18]Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) sub nom Darlington Borough Council v M, F GM and GF

[2016] 1 FLR 1

, FD is relevant because of criticism of the revised threshold document made by Mr Forbes in his closing submissions about whether the Local Authority can prove threshold as pleaded.

[19]The Court will have regard to the art 6 and 8 rights of A, M and F. P, C and S v United Kingdom

(2002) 35 EHRR 31

was also relied upon by Mr Forbes in closing. That case was concerned with broader issues around the compatibility of measures taken in the circumstances of a public law case and, in particular, around the removal of a very young baby from the care of its mother at birth and subsequent placement of the baby for adoption, and whether those steps were necessary and proportionate in light of the facts of the case in question. The Court concluded that the actions of the Local Authority in that case in seeking an urgent hearing were necessary and proportionate notwithstanding that they represented an interference with the article 6 and 8 rights of those involved. It held that the removal of a young baby at birth requires exceptional justification and went on to consider the necessity of the final orders made by the first instance court which freed the baby for adoption. The Court assessed the general legal principles in paras 113-120, and at para 117 Mr Forbes highlighted that the Court held that the convention applies not just at the point of separation of a child from parent but also subsequently and that, following removal, “a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations by the authorities, for example on parental rights of access, as such further restrictions entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed. The taking into care of a child should normally be regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as the circumstances permit, and any measures of implementation of temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent and child. In this regard a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child remaining in care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child. In carrying out this balancing exercise, the Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent”. The Court considered both interim and final aspects of public law proceedings which culminated in a child being freed for adoption, as I have noted, and, in respect of the latter held that restrictions on post adoption contact by way of indirect contact at the discretion of prospective adopters would need to be justified as necessary within the meaning of article 8. This latter aspect was also something that Mr Forbes relied upon in submitting that the proposals for contact if a care order were made were not necessary or proportionate in this case.

[20]The realistic options for A must be weighed in accordance with the considerations set out in Re B-S (Children)

[2013] EWCA Civ 1146

[21]I have also borne in mind the principle set out by Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria)

[2007] 1 FLR 2050

, and endorsed in Re A, that society must be willing to tolerate diverse standards of parenting.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

[22]The final amended threshold document dated 30th June 2026 is appended to this judgment. It was provided late in the afternoon of day 1 of this FH, Mr Forbes and Ms Howard having raised at the outset of the hearing that he had questioned the Re A compliance of the previous threshold document. I would note in passing that this sort of last-minute discussion and then re-drafting of threshold is really not helpful to anyone, least of all the parents. It is also not what is envisaged by the overriding objective nor by PD12A. Some threshold aspects were accepted by M and F in their response documents at A176-A179 and A172-A175 respectively. Having considered the unchallenged evidence about those undisputed aspects which form criteria 1(a), 2(d) and 4, I will adopt the accepted threshold findings relating to those as my threshold findings for the purposes of section 31.

[23]The key areas that are disputed by reference to the final threshold document criteria are as follows: 1, 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) - M does not accept that F poses a risk of sexual harm to A, or that A is at risk of emotional harm through exposure to F’s sexual offences, nor does she believe the allegations of sexual assault made against F by his ex-partner. She also does not accept that she is unable to understand or recognise her responsibility as a parent to educate and safeguard A from underage/inappropriate sexual activity, or that A is at risk of emotional harm by not having a parent who is able to provide him with age-appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding. She also denies that she is unable to understand or recognise the risk that F may pose to A’s peers as he grows, or that A is at risk of emotional harm through exploitation and isolation from his peers if he does not have a parent who can impose appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding. 2(a), (b) – these are both accepted by M. However, F does not accept that A was at risk of harm because M was not pregnant at the time, and he does not recall such incidences occurring after A was born though he does accept that he was convicted of an assault on M on 6th August 2024. 2(c) - M accepted that F hit her on the side, which is acceptable to the Local Authority and the amended threshold records this. However, in his response to threshold F denied hitting M at all, though he does accept that they had an argument. 2(e) and 3 - M and F do not accept that either parent has prioritised their relationship over A. M denies that she has become isolated from her support network as a result. M does not accept that F poses a risk of physical and emotional harm through his exposure to his parents domestically abusive relationship and their inability to safeguard him. 5 – M denies this and says that she has been able to adapt her parenting and accept support and advice to ensure that A experiences a positive routine, age-appropriate stimulation, consistent response to cues, calm emotional security in her care, and that A does not remain at risk of physical and emotional neglect due to her inability to prioritise his needs over her own.

[24]In addition to the factual disputes raised by M and F, Mr Forbes in closing submitted that some aspects of the threshold document were still not Re A compliant and that, therefore, the Local Authority had not properly particularised their pleadings by reference to the evidence concerned. He therefore submitted that criterion 5 raised serious procedural issues engaging M’s article 6 rights such that it could not be determined by the court if M had not been given a fair opportunity to know what examples the Local Authority relied on. I have looked carefully at threshold criterion 5. It has not changed since the final threshold document dated 9th June 2026 (A164-A166). No issue had been taken with its formulation prior to this FH commencing. I have considered this aspect of threshold first because, if it is not properly formulated so as to make it clear to M what is alleged and for her to therefore have a fair trial on the issue, as Mr Forbes submitted it may not be possible to go on to consider whether or not it has been proved on balance of probabilities.

[25]The evidence that is cited as relied upon for criterion 5 is at C487. This is part of the conclusion of the final residential assessment. The conclusion starts at C485 and acknowledges that M “has evidenced during this assessment that she has the practical ability to complete basic care tasks for A at his current age. M is able to offer physical affection, age-appropriate play, and access the community regularly”. However, the report goes on to conclude that, “whilst this practical ability is positive, there continues to be intensive oversight required where staff have needed to step in and prompt M to ensure A’s needs are met in line with his routine and developmental stage. This includes preventing A spending long periods laid in his cot, and to support M in recognising A’s cues that are not consistently recognised or acted upon without staff support. When receiving daily support, nurturing, prompting and guidance, depending on M’s emotional presentation, M can at times listen and follow advice. However, staff have not been able to safely step back to allow M to evidence independent care, due to the risk of delay or neglect of A’s needs. It is recognised that this is not ill-intent, but it does demonstrate limited attuned care and inconsistent responsiveness” (C485). It goes on to note that A’s basic physical and developmental needs have only been met with a consistent level of oversight and without this they “would continue to be inconsistently met, with likely ongoing impact on his development and his ability to achieve age-related milestones” (C486). The conclusion of the assessment is that this inconsistency is due to a lack of consistent focus by M, variable and often “reactive” engagement by M with staff, health professionals and the Local Authority and, ultimately, there is “a foreseeable risk of harm to A because M struggles to assess risk and make safe, informed decisions about care, supervision and safety” (C486). The assessment noted that the concerns identified by the Local Authority prior to M entering the unit remained at the end of the placement “due to M’s minimisation of the risks” (C487) and linked the concerns about F and the risks he poses to M’s lack of ability to put A’s needs first: “Unfortunately, M has evidenced that she is unable to prioritise A's needs in the immediate and has reached the limit of her current parenting capacity. M has found it difficult to understand the impact of her choices on A and continues to dismiss professional challenge regarding this. We remain concerned about M's motivation and willingness to make the immediate and sustained changes required within A's timescales. Our conclusion is that A would be at risk of experiencing neglect, and his physical and emotional safety would be compromised if he were to continue living with M, and that further delays in A receiving the security, safety and consistency is likely to have a detrimental impact on his wellbeing and development.” (C487)

[26]It is clear from M’s response to criterion 5 that she understood the basis of the allegation being made about her parenting capability was about her ability to consistently ensure that A’s basic care needs were met: “denied, the mother has been able to meet A’s basic care needs. She has brought age appropriate toys and took A to sensory play sessions” (A179). It is also clear that the conclusion referenced in the criterion is at the end of a very detailed and lengthy assessment report and has to be read in conjunction with the report as a whole. Mr Forbes took the assessor to various aspects of the report that she said demonstrated the concerns about parenting capability identified. He was somewhat skeptical that one of the examples, which involved A being observed to be left alone playing with a balloon on a string while M went to another room, albeit with a video monitor, exposed A to a risk of significant harm and put this to the assessor. She remained clear that this did pose a risk of harm to A despite his cross examination and was clear that the harm was potential for strangulation or choking. Were this to be an isolated example of the concerns relied upon by the assessment, Mr Forbes’ case that it was not possible to prove significant harm would have been stronger. However, the concerns about potential neglect of A’s needs identified throughout the assessment and contained in the report when read as a whole are not just one isolated incident of A being left to play with a balloon on a string. They relate to failure to consistently follow advice from the health visitor about having three meals a day, incorporating regular teeth brushing into A’s routine, failure to supervise him appropriately when administering medication, failure to maintain a consistent and developmentally appropriate evening routine, leaving him for long periods of time restricted in his cot, bouncer chair and highchair, failing to ensure that his face was not covered by a blanket when sleeping, and failing to treat headlice promptly. These concerns are detailed and summarised in relation to M’s parenting capability between C415-C437. Whilst it is noted in the report that M did respond to A’s needs appropriately at times and that her basic care improved after a contract of expectations was issued on 4th February 2026, overall, it is also noted that this still required a very high level of supervision to achieve this. There were also other instances of A being left in unsafe situations such as playing with a shoelace, unattended in his chair despite still being wobbly when seated, being left with clothing that he could wrap round his neck and a loose teething dummy with a strap attached to it (C433). As the assessment concluded, A was observed on multiple occasions with “items which could pose clear choking, strangulation hazards or suffocation. When staff intervened, M responded with resistance and argument, failing to recognise the seriousness of the risks” (C434). Each of the issues identified in the assessment are cross-referenced to the daily logs for the placement. Daily logs would not ordinarily form part of a bundle pursuant to PD27A and the fact that they are not before the Court for this final hearing is simply because nobody appears to have sought their inclusion. The threshold response from M and her written evidence simply took issue with the conclusions of the parenting assessment and did not raise any issue that would have clearly necessitated inclusion of the daily logs. Mr Forbes’ questioning of the parenting assessor about the availability of certain primary daily logs was therefore slightly surprising, though I appreciate that M also took issue with an allegation contained in the assessment that she may have been in contact with F after the imposition of the non-molestation order. That latter allegation is one that I have not deemed necessary or proportionate to consider further in light of the limited evidence from both the unit and M about it, and the volume and weight of the other evidence available about the relationship between M and F and their ability to comply with Court orders whilst remaining in a relationship with each other.

[27]It is clear to me that threshold criterion 5 was sufficiently particularised as required by Re A, M knew and understood the basis of the allegation, and thus it is not unfair for this to be sought as a finding by the Local Authority in this case. It is also clearly made out on the evidence before me, and I find this threshold criterion proved on balance of probabilities.

[28]In relation to items 1(a), (b), (c) and (d), the evidence that F has been convicted of numerous sexual offences and is subject to a SHPO is uncontested. F has not engaged with risk assessment within these proceedings. That non-engagement by F in risk assessment adds weight to the evidence of concerns about the risk that he may pose because he has done nothing to help evidence that the risk he poses may be lower than initially indicated by his offending history and the assessment of him by Probation in June 2025 (C39-C93). He was assessed by Probation to pose a high risk of harm to women he is in a relationship with (especially if they are vulnerable), a high risk of harm to the wider public, and a medium risk of harm to children (C40, C41). As Probation noted at C42, he has been convicted of an offence whereby he was willing to meet a girl under the age of 16 for sexual purposes and poses a high risk of harm to towards female children under 18 (C42) and, concerningly “F appears to have little insight into why such a relationship would be inappropriate, as such he does not have the necessary strategies to manage his own behaviour towards female children…F may pose a risk of sexual harm towards future partners who may present with additional vulnerabilities. There could be a risk of sexual abuse and exploitation of vulnerabilities. F appears to lack insight and skills to form appropriate relationships” (C42). Although F was actually communicating with an undercover police officer rather than an actual police officer, this does not in any way undermine the seriousness of his actions or the risks he has been assessed to pose. M told the police and Professor Craig that F was somehow that he had been entrapped (F148 and E89) and, because it was not actually a child that he was seeking to meet that this reduced the seriousness. However, she also told Professor Craig “she is ‘not bothered by this, as ‘nothing happened’, and that ‘people have relationships with children who are underage, 14 or 15 years of age, have relationships with people in their 20s, which is consensual’. When questioned as to the exchange of messages from F to the [underage] police decoy, she denies this could be an example of grooming behaviour. She adds if she was in a relationship with him at the time, she would be concerned of potential cheating on her” (E89). It is a stark illustration of the fact that M simply does not accept that what F has done is wrong, that he poses a high risk of sexual harm and of her inability to see this which, in turn, means she is unable to safeguard A from that risk of harm.

[29]Probation also assessed F as posing a high risk to any vulnerable adult in early June 2025 and concluded that he posed a high risk of harm to M in respect of domestic abuse (C42 and C43).

[30]Considering the known facts about F’s offending history and her accounts of his violence towards her, I find that M’s responses to these facts evidence her minimising what F has done both to her and to others. Identifying F as “a ‘safe adult’ to be around A” (C384) as she did during the parenting assessment is clear evidence of her lack of insight to the risks posed by F to both her and A. At C460 in the parenting assessment her ability to be able to provide A with age-appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding was also considered. It is clear from paragraphs 14.2-14.17 (C384-C464) that considerable effort was expended by the placement into trying to provide M with education and resources around the risks posed by F and the need to be able to provide A with age-appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding. However, M’s reaction seems to have been to minimise and deflect, rather than to take on board the need to acknowledge the risks posed by F and to act protectively towards A: “she continues to interpret risk primarily through her own belief system rather than through evidence based safeguarding principles. The risk an individual poses is informed by their behaviour, attitudes, insight, and circumstances, not solely their registration status. However, M repeatedly framed her position around the belief that F would not harm A and that the ending of his registration signifies reduced risk, despite this being inconsistent with professional guidance and factual safeguarding expectations” (C463). However, it was accepted by both the parenting assessor and the team manager that there is more that could be done to provide M with resources to try to help her develop her understanding and insight into this risk, and I will return to this aspect when looking at parenting capability and risk of harm under the welfare checklist considerations.

[31]In terms of threshold, the evidence is simply overwhelming that F poses both a risk of sexual harm and of physical and emotional harm arising from domestic abuse, and that M is unable to recognise these risks. It is also overwhelmingly clear that M lacks the ability to provide A with age-appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding (see for example C460). From the evidence before me the main risk posed by F towards A in relation to both sexual risk of harm and domestic abuse is more indirect rather than direct. The Probation risk assessment of F identifies he poses a risk of harm specifically towards female children, though doesn’t rule out that he poses a more generalised risk of harm to children regardless of their sex and, as such, if he were to have unsupervised contact with any children regardless of their sex, that may increase the level of risk he poses (C43). There is a clear risk of him grooming children identified in the Probation evidence and based on his conviction for communicating with a girl under the age of 16 online, and I find that may include friends of A. A is very likely to form friendships with children who are both boys and girls, and even friendships with boys who have female siblings may mean that A’s wider friendship circle could include female children. If F were to be in contact with A without strict supervision, that could in turn provide him with access to A’s friends and their siblings.

[32]To some extent, the concerns about M’s acceptance and understanding of the risks posed by F mirror the limited insight and acceptance that F has about the risks that he poses too, as Probation also noted: “I take note of F’s vulnerabilities, previous failure to engage with professionals and adhere to restrictions imposed, lack of insight into his behaviour and lack of awareness of consequences, as well as his lack of work around relationships, that would help him develop strategies to manage his own sexual behaviour in a pro-social way. This appears to be continued in his inclination to blame the Police for his index offending…and ongoing inability to share the truth with Police or probation” (C43). The combination of the risks objectively identified by Probation in relation to F, the minimisation of these risks and the lack of insight demonstrated by M both in the parenting assessment and in her own evidence about this aspect, as well as her apparent inability to recognise that she may be precisely the sort of vulnerable person that F would be likely to target, proves that she is more likely than not to be unable to safeguard A (and his peers) and provide him with age appropriate sexual guidance. It is also more likely than not that other parents would simply refuse to allow their children to socialise with A in light of the risks posed by F. This would also result in A being more likely to be more isolated than is appropriate. These threshold criteria are therefore also proved on balance of probabilities.

[33]Items 2(a) and (b) are disputed by F but not by M. The precise scope of F’s dispute narrowed considerably during his oral evidence to me, though. He accepted that there had been an argument and that he hit M after the pub on 1st June 2024, and that he had “tapped” M “lightly” on 25th November 2024. He was convicted of assault following the latter incident and does not dispute that conviction. In his evidence to me he accepted that he had been drinking on both occasions and that his memory was not entirely clear for either occasion. Given A’s date of birth, M would not have been pregnant with him on 1st June 2024, but she would have been by the time of the second incident. The threshold pleading for 1st June 2024 is not that M was pregnant with A at the time and, even on F’s accounts, he is accepting that he was physically and verbally abusive towards M. Whilst he said that he did not recall any incidents after A was born, and the Local Authority evidence also confirmed that there were no further incidents after M left the last residential placement on 13th March 2026 (C523), the issue of risk of future harm relates to whether M and F accept that there is a risk and can act protectively to ensure that A is not exposed to such risk directly or indirectly. As noted at F163, the incident on 1st June 2024 was a serious assault involving F punching M in the presence of witnesses and seems to have been precipitated by F becoming angry after reading messages on M’s phone. M did not want to press charges (F164) and has said she would not have reported the second assault if she had known that F would be arrested. It is also striking that F was in breach of his bail conditions imposed in connection with the earlier assault (F192), but M blamed herself for F breaching his bail (F193). The assault was witnessed by a third party (F195-F196) and seems to have been triggered by F’s jealousy again. The evidence is, again, simply overwhelming that, at the relevant date, the threshold criteria set out in grounds 2(a) and (b) are made out and these are therefore also found proved on balance of probabilities.

[34]The final disputed aspects of threshold relate to whether M and F have prioritised their relationship over A. Both indicated in their responses to threshold that they have put A first and rely upon compliance with the non-molestation order as further evidence of this. It is true that the non-molestation order has not been breached as far as police and Local Authority evidence is concerned. However, as the parenting assessment of M makes clear, she clearly lacks insight and acceptance about the risks posed by domestic abuse to her and A. F also clearly lacks insight and acceptance as the Probation risk assessment evidences, and this was reinforced by his evidence to me which minimised the assaults on M and the likely impact on A of his mother being subjected to such assaults. The absence of breach evidence has to be balanced against this lack of insight and M’s lack of support for F being prosecuted as well as her failure to ensure that he complied with his bail conditions in the past. Both have clearly prioritised their relationship with each other over A’s needs, both while M was pregnant with A and after he was born, I find. The parenting assessment of her noted that she “has found it difficult to understand the impact of her choices on A and continues to dismiss professional challenge regarding this” (C487). Yet, as Professor Craig noted in his assessment of her at E76, M also acknowledged and repeated in her evidence to me that A would be at risk if there were to be domestic abuse incidents and A was “caught in the crossfire”.

[35]The issue of M’s support network was explored during the parenting assessment of her (C476-C481). Various friends and family members were spoken to during that assessment, and it is clear that the issue of M’s relationship with F does limit the extent to which they would be willing to help M, as well as that they were willing to offer elements of practical and emotional support to M and A despite this. As noted at C28 in the initial social work statement, M herself told social workers that she was “estranged from the majority of her family members due to her relationship with F”. Although M’s evidence was that she does have some family support (C119 and C509), her family told the parenting assessor that they were aware that M would need a high level of support in the community to be able to parent A safely (something that the parenting assessment also noted would be required), and that had significant concerns about the risk of domestic abuse posed by F towards M. The Parent Assess assessor also explored the support network available to M and F. She noted that “there is a shared worry for the safety of A in his parents’ care. This extends to concerns as to how/if incidents of harm (domestic and sexual harm) caused to M or A would be reported by M to ensure A and she are safe. The support network around M and F have shared that they would report any concerns they might have to the police or the social work team but they are only able to do this if they are made aware of them” (C248). The same report also noted that, when the assessor explored the views of M’s support network, they were concerned about M’s relationship with F, and only A’s current carers and maternal grandfather appear to have maintained regular contact with M and A. On balance, the evidence shows that M has been estranged from her family as a result of her relationship with F, and that their relationships with her are therefore not as close or supportive as they would be if she had ended her relationship with F and this threshold criterion is therefore also proved on balance of probabilities.

[36]The relevant welfare checklist is my next consideration in determining what outcome is in A’s welfare interests, his welfare being the Court’s paramount concern. The first relevant heading is the wishes and feelings of A in light of his age and understanding. A is too young to be able to independently articulate his wishes and feelings. He would no doubt want to grow up with his parents, as the Guardian noted in her Final Analysis (E114), but he would also want to be safe and have his needs met consistently to a good enough standard.

[37]The next relevant welfare checklist heading is A’s physical, emotional and educational needs. He has some identified medical needs which are under investigation. The extent to which his early adverse life experiences will impact on his long-term development is unknown at present, as the Guardian noted at E113.

[38]The likely effect on A of any change in their circumstances. As I have already noted, A moved to live with his current carers some months ago. A move away from their care would be a significant change for him, but a change to live with M would be a return to living with her as he did first in a parent and child foster placement and then in residential placements. Any move for A would have to be carefully managed to ensure that he was able to adapt to the change without adverse long-term impact on him. He would also need any move to be a permanent one since the professional evidence makes it clear that he needs permanency and stability sooner rather than later (see for example C228).

[39]The A’s age, sex, background and any characteristics of theirs the court considers relevant. I have already implicitly or explicitly covered this under other aspects in this judgment.

[40]Any harm which A has suffered or is at risk of suffering is the next relevant heading, which is inextricably linked to the heading considering how capable M and F are of meeting A’s needs. A has suffered and was at risk of suffering significant harm as at the relevant date as set out in the threshold findings I have made above. This harm was multi-faceted arising from sexual risks posed by F, domestic abuse risks posed by F towards M and A, and risks of physical and emotional neglect. The final parenting assessment concluded that M could not prioritise A’s needs and consistently ensure that these were met to a good enough standard, nor of being able to identify risks posed by F or to act protectively to ensure that A was not at risk of further significant harm from them. M and F were also subject to a Parent Assess assessment dated November 2025 (C235-C315). F accepts that he failed to fully engage with that assessment identified in the parenting assessments completed in these proceedings. Unfortunately given the issues around domestic abuse, it was that part of the assessment that was affected by F’s failure to engage so the assessor was heavily reliant on police records and information from M about this (C275-C276). The conclusions of the Parent Assess assessor are strikingly similar to those of the parenting assessor. The former noted clear love and attachment between A and his parents but identified concerns about M being unable to prioritise A over F, M being able to work with professionals to improve her parenting skills, ability of both parents to keep their home environments safe and clean, and about both parents lacking insight and ability to safeguard A from the risks of domestic abuse and sexual harm. M told the Parent Assess assessor that she accepted A would “likely get caught in the crossfire, but F would not mean to hurt him”, and that she would be unlikely to call the police if there was an incident because of the potential consequences for F (C246). F declined to explore this topic during the assessment (C246). The conclusion of the Parent Assess assessor was that “A would be at significant risk of being harmed as neither parent is able to speak of how they would protect him” (C246). F was also noted to have failed to engage in the expert assessment of the risk of sexual harm posed by him, so “this is still unassessed, and the risk of his criminal history and the risk of further offending remains a cause for concern” (C246). Overall, as set out a C247, the Parent Assess assessor identified that “there are significant areas of concern surrounding A’s safety. This is related to the domestic abuse and criminal activity documented in the police disclosure of F along with M’s struggle to understand the risk of A being exposed to domestic abuse…Without his care givers having a full understanding of the risk A would not be safe in the care of M and F in the community”. The Parent Assess assessor noted the need for both parents to meaningfully engage in work to understand the risk of domestic abuse, but that this had been attempted unsuccessfully by M. Such work and work to improve her basic parenting skills was likely to be unsuccessful in future given past failures and the fact that “M is trusting in her own views and actions. It has been difficult to support M to explore and experience all areas of parenting for A and support her for next steps in A’s development. This is further evidenced during her stay with the foster carer and the residential unit, therefore it remains uncertain as to how M would learn and adapt in line with A’s development” (C247). The evidence about M and F not being able to parent A to a good enough standard, and A being at risk of future harm because of the identified risks of domestic abuse, sexual harm and neglect of his needs is therefore overwhelming. The key question is whether there is sufficient evidence of the clearly identified risks being mitigated to enable me to conclude that A can be safely parented by M to a good enough standard in the future.

[41]In relation to the risks posed by F, the evidence is very stark in my view. M and F remain in a relationship and neither of them have successfully completed work that would enable me to conclude that there is a reduction in those risks while they remain in a relationship. F is engaging with Probation, as the written evidence from Probation and his oral evidence showed, but there is no up to date objective assessment of him which shows that he has developed sufficient insight into his thoughts and actions and developed the sort of strategies that would be required to mitigate the risks posed by him. His evidence to me about the two incidents in 2024 when he assaulted M highlighted that he struggles to accept the seriousness of what he did (which M was very clear about in her oral evidence to me) and was largely minimising his actions in the way that is often seen in domestic abuse perpetrators who have not accepted the reality of their actions. M told me that F has not only monitored her phone in the past but continues to do so because she “gave up a long time ago, I am not bothered because there is nothing in the phone”. This was a striking illustration of the inappropriateness of F’s actions towards M, checking and monitoring her phone being a controlling and abusive action, and deeply concerning given that both M and F accept that F being jealous is a trigger for him becoming abusive towards M. It was also a clear example of why M is unable to act protectively while she remains in a relationship with F. Whilst she may think it is the safest thing to allow him to monitor her phone in this way, it seems on her own evidence that he is capable of misinterpreting innocuous messages and, of course, this level of controlling behaviour is itself abusive.

[42]It was accepted by the team manager that M has not yet started work designed to help her develop her understanding of the risks and ability to manage them. She did explain that initially this was delayed because of an understandable desire to avoid overwhelming M. It is confirmed in the bundle that this work was not possible while M was in the final residential placement (B160), and by March 2026 the Local Authority had confirmed that they had considered a referral for this after M completed the residential placement (C499), but funding for this was refused by the Resource Panel because it was not felt that this work would prove effective in light of M’s continued stance about F’s offending and her lack of insight. As the team manager told me, this changed and the referral was then made in May and M confirmed in her evidence to me that she was due to start the work towards the end of this month. Whilst the delay is regrettable, even if the work had commenced earlier this year, it would still be comparatively early days to be able to confidently predict that M would be able to act protectively. The reality is that the work has not yet commenced so the sad fact is that M has yet to undertake work that might mitigate the risks and A cannot wait any longer for a decision about his permanency.

[43]The aspect of risk mitigation also involves the extent to which M and F would be able to act protectively if A were to be in M’s care, and this includes complying with any orders in place to keep A safe. As I have noted earlier, there is a non-molestation order in force, and no evidence that F has breached that order. However, enforcement of that order largely relies on M being willing to report any potential breaches. The evidence in relation to M not supporting prosecution of F in the past and being complicit in his breaching bail and the SHPO I find shows that it is more likely than not that she would fail to report any breach. Her concern for the consequences of F being arrested as she previously told the police and the parenting assessor (C468) shows that she is likely to continue to prioritise F’s needs over those of A and would not be likely to report any breaches because she would fear the consequences for F, I find. Any protective order would therefore be largely reliant on third parties noticing and reporting any breach which would simply expose A to too great a risk of harm.

[44]To some extent, M’s inability to prioritise A and to act protectively to safeguard him from the risks posed by F is understandable when one considers the conclusions reached by Professor Craig in his assessment of her. She is inherently unable to see the contradiction in her stance that “she is confident in her belief that she can protect A from harm, although she admits, at times, she cannot manage F’s behaviour when he has lost his temper. She appears unable to reconcile these two positions” (E90). As he noted, the issue is not simply the relationship with F but her tendency to pursue dysfunctional and abusive relationships generally (E76). Overall, her functioning as analysed by Professor Craig may also mean that she is less likely to be able to make changes to improve her capacity to protect A: “M struggles to perspective take and struggles with emotional reciprocity which has a negative impact on interpersonal relationships. She is likely perceived as someone who is difficult to work with, is quite fixed and demonstrates little to no flexibility. This will likely pose challenges for those working with her” (E92).

[45]In addition to the evidence from Professor Craig, the Local Authority evidence shows that M has been offered other support designed to improve her ability to keep herself and A safe. She has had an Independent Domestic Violence Advisor (IDVA) assigned in the past. There is a statement from the IDVA at C107-C108 which sets out the steps attempted by the IDVA to engage with M and provide her with necessary support, however “when the bail conditions ended, contact with M was not so frequent as M had resumed her relationship with F” (C107). As was noted by the parenting assessor at C438:

“critically, M’s lack of engagement [with support in the placement], combined with her minimisation of risks related to domestic abuse within the relationship, F’s convictions, and her inability to implement safety principles for A, renders any community-based plan as being too high risk. These factors directly impact on M’s capacity to recognise danger, act protectively, and sustain safe routines without continuous oversight”

. The evidence is therefore very clear that, whilst M may say that she will act protectively, she will not be able to because of her lack of ability to recognise the dangers posed by F. When I add the concerns about F’s lack of insight and lack of evidence of him having made sustained changes to reduce the risks that he poses, this all supports the conclusion that protective orders would not be sufficient to ensure that A would be protected from future risk of harm in the care of M.

[46]The realistic options before the court at this point are A remaining with his current carers as per the final care plan, or returning to the care of M. The details of what the latter would look like are not clear from the written evidence of M and F, and this was explored with them in their evidence to me. From their oral evidence it seems that they would be proposing some sort of shared care in future, but quite what this would look like remained very vague. M told me when asked by Mr Turner for the Guardian about this that the reason they would not be living together would be because of the terms of one of the orders that F was subject to which said he could not live with any children. She also said that she has been staying at F’s home on the days that they both had to attend contact, and that they would “sort something out” about how she would spend time with and see F if A was living with her. Crucially, given that it is her case that A can safely return to live with her, she told Mr Turner that she did not trust any professionals and accepted that she had shouted at them in the past as was noted during the last parenting assessment of her, but this was not intentionally done when A was in the vicinity and was just because “it escalated”. Given my findings about protective orders being unlikely to secure A’s safety in the care of M in light of her inability to act protectively, and the evidence from M about her distrust of professionals and acceptance that she has become dysregulated when challenged by them in the past, I am satisfied that A would be at risk of significant harm in the care of M. It would also not be in his welfare interests to have the sort of intensive support that the professional evidence rightly concluded M would need to be able to meet his basic care needs consistently in the community. This support would also be highly likely to break down in light of M’s distrust of professionals and the limited family and friends support available. These negatives must be balanced against the positives of A being able to be cared for by his mother, and where she has at times been able to provide him with good enough basic care. I also acknowledge the bond that she has with A and the clear love that she has for him.

[47]The alternative for A is that he remain in the care of his current carers. That placement could not currently be secured by a Special Guardianship Order (SGO), though the Guardian notes that this would be preferable for A, there are issues of concern about managing M’s input to A’s care that necessitate the making of a final care order to provide A and his carers with a higher level of support than would be provided under an SGO (C523-C524). The views of his carers are also important, and they do not wish to pursue a private law order for A at the moment either. The advantages of this placement would be that A would remain with carers who have been caring for him since early March this year. The assessment of them is thorough, balanced and overall, extremely positive, though did note some potential vulnerabilities (C138-C191). The main vulnerability was in relation to managing the relationships with M and F (C187), but this could be mitigated with careful management and with support from both their support network and professionals (C187). The Guardian had also highlighted that it would be important that A’s current carers were provided with support by the Local Authority especially in managing A’s relationship with his parents (E118), something that she reiterated in her evidence to me. She also told me that it had become clear that the relationship between M, F and one of the carers is “quite tricky, especially since she had to take a step back from supporting M”. She was also concerned that, whilst M might not have sent messages to the carer that were per se abusive, the two messages that she had seen were felt by the carer to be undermining of her, and the amount of messages that M sends is also challenging. A is also in a kinship placement which has the advantage of A being brought up within his family. The negatives relate to the need for this placement to be underpinned by a final care order which will bring with it a continued level of state scrutiny and intervention that is higher than if a private law order had been possible. A final public law order for such a young child is also an unusual outcome, but one that is supported as necessary and proportionate in A’s welfare interest by the social work evidence and that of the Guardian.

[48]In light of my findings, I am satisfied that the negatives of returning to live with M outweigh the positives, and the positives of his remaining in his current placement significantly outweigh the negatives. A welfare therefore requires that he should remain in the care of his current carers under a final care order.

[49]Contact under the final care order had been proposed to reduce under the final care plan at D18, but M did not agree with this and sought an indication that it should be more frequent. Following the evidence of the Guardian to me, the Local Authority reflected on its final contact proposals and agreed that the plan should be amended to a reduction to once per fortnight and then to review that before any further reduction. As the Guardian’s evidence both in her Final Analysis (E117), the purpose of contact changes once it is clear that A will not return to live with his parents:

“it would be for A to maintain a relationship with his parents to know that they are well and still care for him…It is important that family time does not undermine the placement…It is also important to keep family time under review. If family time is beneficial to A and his parents are doing well then it may be possible to increased (sic) that time. If not, then family time may need to be reduced further”

. Based on the professional evidence, I accept that a reduction in the time that A spends with his parents is in his welfare interests.

CONCLUSIONS

[50]Given my findings, I will grant a final care order to the Local Authority in respect of A and endorse the final care plan including the revised contact proposals as being in his welfare interests. APPENDIX FINAL THRESHOLD On the relevant date, namely 29th May 2025, A was likely to suffer significant harm, and that the harm or likelihood of harm was attributable to the care given or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give a child. The harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the child is in the category of sexual harm, physical harm, emotional harm and neglect. The Local Authority relies on the following evidence to inform the threshold finding as pleaded above: Sexual harm

FINAL THRESHOLD

[1]A is at risk of sexual harm from M due to her lack of insight and subsequent inability to recognise, understand and protect him from sexual risk as he grows, for example:a. M accepts that on 06.08.2024 M provided F with an iPhone without prior permission from the Police, thus enabling him to breach his Sexual Harm Prevention Order (A33; C35). A is at risk of emotional harm through exposure to his father's sexual and criminal offences;

b. M does not believe that F was to blame for his sexual conviction and does not believe the subsequent allegations of sexual assaults made against him (E93). M does not accept that that F poses a risk of sexual harm to A and identified him as a ‘safe adult’ to be around A (C384). A is at risk of emotional harm through exposure to his father's sexual offences;

c. M is unable to understand or recognise her responsibility as a parent to educate and safeguard A from underage / inappropriate sexual activity (C460); A is at risk of emotional harm by not having a parent who is able to provide him with age-appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding;

d. M is unable to understand or recognise the risk that F may pose to A's peers as he grows (C461); A is at risk of emotional harm through exploitation and isolation from his peers if he does not have a parent who can impose appropriate sexual guidance and safeguarding;

Domestic abuse

[2]M and F have exposed A to domestic abuse in utero and will continue to place him at risk of significant physical and emotional harm from domestic abuse, for example:a. On 01.06.2024, F assaulted M by punching her to the face and holding her around her throat within a Public House following M receiving a text on her phone. M refused to support investigation due to fear F would get into trouble. A is at risk of ongoing physical harm and emotional harm though exposure to his father's violent outbursts and emotional dysregulation and due to his mother's inability to recognise his offending risk (F160-170).

b. On 25.11.2024, F was convicted of assault by beating on M which took place on 06.08.2024. M said that she would not have reported this assault if she had known F would be arrested. A is at ongoing risk of physical harm through exposure to his father's violent outbursts and emotional dysregulation and due to his mother's inability to recognise his offending risk (F5).

c. M accepts that on 09.12.2024, F hit M in the side and verbally assaulted her. M stated she was fearful of her baby's safety but refused to separate from F. A was placed at risk of physical harm in utero through his exposure to domestic abuse and will continue to be placed at risk of harm through his parents domestically abusive relationship (A34; C36).

d. M accepts that on 24.03.2025, F assaulted her and smashed her phone. A was placed at risk of physical harm in utero through his exposure to domestic abuse and will continue to be placed at risk of harm through his parents domestically abusive relationship (A34; C37).

e. Despite M accepting that her relationship with F has been physically and emotionally abusive (C383), M does not accept that F poses a risk of harm to A. M and F continue to be in a romantic relationship. A will be at risk of physical harm and emotional harm through his exposure to his parents domestically abusive relationship and their inability to safeguard him (E94);

Neglect and emotional harm

[3]M has, and continues to, prioritise her relationship with F, thus causing her to become isolated from her support network. A is at risk of neglect and emotional harm through his mother's inability to prioritise his needs and safety over the wants and needs of F (C28; C532).

[4]M is a vulnerable adult who has previously suffered with a psychotic disorder and displayed suicidal tendencies and ideation. M displays symptoms of depression and anxiety which are easily triggered and which cause M to display with emotional dysregulation. A is at risk of emotional harm and neglect due to his mother's inability to regulate her emotions and provide him with safe, attuned, reliable and sensitive care (C27; C437; C474; E91).

[5]M has been unable to adapt her parenting or accept support and advice to ensure that A experiences a positive routine, age-appropriate stimulation, consistent response to cues, and calm emotional security whilst in her care. A remains at risk of physical and emotional neglect due to his mother's inability to prioritise his needs over her own (C487); 30th June 2026 HHJ Eleanor Owens 31st July 2026