F v M & Anor: Jurisdiction [2026] EWFC 219 (B)

IN THE CENTRAL FAMILY COURT CASE NO: ZC25P00205[2026] EWFC 219 (B)
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE MARIN
Between
FApplicantMFirst RespondentSFSecond Respondent
Ms J Perrins KC (instructed by Branch Austin McCormick) for ApplicantMr E Bennett (instructed by Mills & Reeve) for First RespondentMr W Tyler KC (instructed by Hunters Law) for Second RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 2 July 2026Judgment: 17 July 2026
Approved Judgment.............................This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child, members of the family and others who are not directly named must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.Date 2026-07-17
[1]This case concerns P, a little girl who recently celebrated her second birthday.[2]M is P’s mother. She is a dual Lithuanian-United States national. M was born and raised in Lithuania until she was seven years old when she relocated to America returning to Lithuania some years later to study at university.[3]In 2008 when M was twenty-one years old, she moved to the USA to pursue a career in ballroom dancing. Some years later in 2014 she met SF, an American national who was her student. They married in 2016 and lived in the USA which they considered to be their home.[4]Around that time, M and SF were also registered at M’s grandmother’s address in Lithuania where M subsequently inherited a flat after her father died. SF also acquired Lithuanian residency.[5]In late 2016, SF received a job offer in London and in August 2017, M and SF rented a property in London although they maintained their residences in the USA and Lithuania.[6]M continued her ballroom dancing career and in 2018, she moved to Germany where she had found a dance partner. M and SF would travel to see each other.[7]M then moved to Spain in 2021 when she found another dance partner although this did not work out and she returned to London the following year 2022, by which time SF had taken up a senior position in the London office of a well-known company.[8]M and SF’s relationship then went through what M referred to as a “rocky patch.” SF was working and living between the USA and Dubai from mid-2023 and M and SF did not see much of each other.[9]In March 2023, M attended a dance class where she met F. She admitted that given the difficulties in her relationship with SF, “it felt nice to receive” F’s attention. The relationship became intimate although M described aspects of F’s behaviour to be “objectionable.”[10]In October 2023, M discovered that she was pregnant. Later that year, she told SF who said that he was “shocked” although he accepted the situation and committed himself to support M. SF appears not to have known about the exact circumstances of P’s conception and assumed that M “had conceived using her frozen eggs and a sperm donor.” It was not until February 2025 that he was told the full truth and learned of F’s identity.[11]Meanwhile, after falling pregnant, M’s relationship with F deteriorated further such that by February 2024 it had ended.[12]P was born in England in August 2024. She is a United States, Lithuanian and British national. F does not have parental responsibility for P and is not named on her birth certificate. SF does have parental responsibility by virtue of a Step-Parent Parental Responsibility Agreement made on 24 March 2025 and recorded at the Central Family Court.[13]In February 2025, F made an urgent application to the court for a prohibited steps order referring to M’s “determination to raise the child alone and her refusal to grant me meaningful parental involvement.” He claimed that there was a “real risk that she may leave the country with the child if she becomes aware of legal proceedings.”[14]This was to be the start of highly contentious litigation which has involved M, F and SF who was joined as a respondent as he has parental responsibility for P.[15]The applications now before the court are F’s application for a declaration of parentage and parental responsibility, for child arrangements orders whereby M seeks permission for P to relocate permanently to the USA and where F seeks orders to allow him to spend time with P.[16]The litigation history is well known to the parties. I shall return later to mention some aspects of the litigation but at this point, I say no more other than it is highly contentious and fraught; each party opposes the other’s applications. This prompted Mr

Justice Poole when dealing with an appeal last year to say that:

“Indeed, all the parties are warned that they are in real danger of sacrificing [P]’s best interests as they become mired in mutual distrust and are anxious to avoid others taking what they perceive as a litigation advantage. I urge all the parties to step back and to consider how they can progress this litigation in [P]’s best interests.”
[17]Directions were given by the court which was to lead to a dispute resolution hearing in March 2026.[18]Shortly before that hearing, M issued an application inviting the court to “issue a declaration that [P] is no longer habitually resident in England and Wales” and that accordingly, the court did not have jurisdiction to make any further orders. It is that application that is before me and this judgment is the court’s determination.[19]The parties were all represented by senior and experienced Leading and Junior Counsel who thoroughly and carefully presented their cases both through their oral and written submissions.[20]The directions made by the judge leading to this hearing provided for a bundle to be prepared which would be limited to 400 pages. Instead, I was confronted with a main bundle comprising 1359 pages, a bundle of authorities from M comprising 457 pages, a bundle of further authorities from F running to 179 pages and a supplemental bundle of documents of 41 pages from F. I also received detailed position statements from the parties.[21]In circumstances where the judge’s order clearly imposed a page limit for the bundle and referred to compliance with the rules of court relevant to the preparation for the hearing, the overt flouting of this order and the lack of any remorse or apology is to say the least puzzling as it is disrespectful to the court. It also ignored the fact that one day had been allocated for this matter which included reading time. At the very least, the parties should have asked the court for permission to vary the judge’s order.[22]I have read all the material placed before the court and have considered the parties’ written and oral submissions. I am satisfied that I have everything necessary to determine this application.[23]At the outset of the hearing, Counsel for F raised the issue of the court hearing oral evidence relating to areas of disagreement between the parties.[24]I was told by the other parties that at the March 2026 hearing, it had been agreed that the application would proceed on submissions only. If oral evidence were to be given, the time estimate was insufficient; a longer hearing would probably be fixed many months later, possibly next year. After discussion, the matter proceeded on submissions only. It is regrettable that this issue was only raised on the morning of the hearing but consistent with the overriding objective, the parties proceeded on submissions and the hearing was concluded within the time provided.

The Law

[25]I turn now to the relevant law.[26]The starting point is to note that when considering the court’s jurisdiction, the parties’ applications fall under two different regimes.[27]The application for a declaration of parentage is governed by domestic law and is set out in section 55(A)(2) of the Family Law Act 1986. This provides that:
“(2) A court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an application under subsection (1) above if, and only if, either of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection— (a) is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or (b) has been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with that date, or (c) died before that date and either— (i) was at death domiciled in England and Wales, or (ii) had been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of death.” (a) is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or (b) has been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with that date, or (c) died before that date and either— (i) was at death domiciled in England and Wales, or (ii) had been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of death.”
[28]Regarding the child arrangements applications, English domestic law and European law do not apply.[29]The United Kingdom and Lithuania are Contracting States to the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children concluded on 19 October 1996 more familiarly known as the 1996 Hague Convention (“Hague 1996”). It is Hague 1996 therefore that governs the issue of jurisdiction for the child arrangements and parental responsibility applications See Part 1 and section 2 Family Law Act 1986. .[30]In Professor Paul Lagarde’s Explanatory Report on Hague 1996 Whilst not part of the actual Convention and is not legally binding, it is regarded as the official explanatory commentary to Hague 1996 and is regularly relied on when interpreting the Convention. See alsoHackney LBC v P [2013] EWCA Civ 1213 where Moylan LJ referred to it and the Practical Handbook as “appropriate materials” at paragraph 49 of the judgment. , he refers to the Convention as forming a “complete and closed system.” This was recognised in Re I-L (Children) (1996 Hague Convention) [2019] EWCA Civ 1956 where the Court of Appeal did not allow recourse to the court’s inherent jurisdiction.[31]Prior to Brexit, Brussels IIA was used to resolve jurisdictional issues in private law children matters. That jurisdiction applied the concept of perpetuatio fori being that once a court established jurisdiction, it retained it until the conclusion or transfer of proceedings. In the world of Hague 1996, that concept no longer applies. Indeed, the concept of perpetuatio fori was specifically debated and rejected by the Commission. That rejection was recognised in our courts in Hackney London Borough Council v P and others [2023] EWCA Civ 1213.[32]At paragraph 116 of the judgment,

Lord Justice Moylan said:

“It is clear…that a state can lose jurisdiction under article 5 during the course of proceedings Moylan LJ’s underlining. if the child ceases to be habitually resident in that state. The court must retain jurisdiction at the date of the final substantive hearing. If, for example, the child ceases to be habitually resident in England and Wales and becomes habitually resident in another contracting state, it is clear from the wording of article 5(2), the Explanatory Report, the Practical Handbook that that other state acquires jurisdiction and England and Wales loses it. The italics are those of the court. ”
[33]Again, at paragraph 125 of the judgment under sub-paragraph (iii),

Lord Justice Moylan stated that:

“(iii) jurisdiction under the 1996 convention can be lost during the course of proceedings, if it was based on habitual residence and the child has ceased to be habitually resident in England and Wales. Accordingly the court must be satisfied that it retains jurisdiction at the final hearing.”
[34]The courts have acknowledged that the effect of the cessation of the court’s jurisdiction may cause delay for the child and there may be some instances (as in this case) where no proceedings have been issued in the country where the child is said to be habitually resident (see for example U v E [2024] EWFC 39). However, these factors do not change the law.[35]The relevant law is found in Article 5 of Hague 1996 which provides that:
“(1) The judicial or administrative authorities of the contracting state of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child's person or property. (2) Subject to article 7, in case of a change of the child's habitual residence to another contracting state, the authorities of the state of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.”
[36]The Explanatory Report states that:
“41 The Commission also admitted unanimously the principle according to which, except for wrongful removal, the change of the child's habitual residence to another contracting state has as its effect to give jurisdiction henceforth to the authorities of this other State. The change of habitual residence implies both the loss of the former habitual residence and the acquisition of a new habitual residence. It may be that a certain lapse of time exists between these two elements, but the acquisition of this new habitual residence may also be instantaneous in the simple hypothesis of a move of a family from one country to another. … The change of habitual residence deprives the authorities of the former habitual residence of their jurisdiction to take measures of protection for the child.”
[37]The question then arises as to the definition of habitual residence.[38]In Re F (A Child) (Habitual Residence) [2025] EWCA Civ 911, the Court of Appeal held that ultimately, habitual residence was a question of fact.[39]Regarding the burden of proof, commenting on the first instance

judge placing it on one party, Lord Justice Moylan opined that:

“Although we heard no submissions on this issue, I address it briefly because it is possible that the judge’s reference to the burden being on the mother was one of the elements which led her to apply the wrong approach. In my view, it is not helpful to refer to the burden of proof in this context. I quote below what Baker LJ said in In re X (A Child) [2023] 4 WLR 46 (“Re X”) about it not being “simply … an adversarial issue”
. This is because the court has Moylan LJ’s italics to decide where the child was habitually resident at the relevant date to determine its jurisdiction and habitual residence does not have a default position in the absence of it being established. Each party will, if there is a dispute, inevitably be contending for different countries (or in unusual circumstances, one party might be contending that the child has no habitual residence) and the court will have to decide between them, applying an objective analysis.”[40]Paragraph 58 of the judgment addresses the substantive issue of habitual residence as follows:
“The determination of habitual residence is not a formulaic exercise because it requires a broad consideration of the child’s and the family’s circumstances and because different factors will be present in different cases with the same factor being more significant in one case than another. Accordingly, as was said in the case of HR, at [54], “guidance provided in the context of one case may be transposed to another case only with caution”
. With those caveats, I set out the following elements (which are not intended to be exclusive) drawn from the cases: (a) “The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact”: Re B, at [46]. It is “focussed on the situation of the child”: Re A, at 54(v) and Re R, at [17]. It is an issue of fact which requires the court to undertake a sufficient global analysis of all the relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors; (b) As set out, for example, in Proceedings brought by HR, at [41]:
“In addition to the physical presence of the child in the territory of a [member] state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent”; (c) Factors of relevance, as set out in Proceedings brought by HR, at [43], and reflected in many other domestic cases, include: “the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay in the territory of the different [member] states concerned, the place and conditions of the child’s attendance at school, and the family and social relationships of the child in those member states”; (d) The intentions of the parents are also a relevant factor and there is no “rule” that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child: Re R, at [17]; (e) As set out in Re R, at [16], it is “the stability of the residence that is important, not whether it is of a permanent character” but there “is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time” because habitual residence can be acquired quickly: e.g. A v A, at [44]; (f) The “degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question” is relevant, Re R, at [17]. It is clear that “full integration” is not required, “Re B (SC)”, at [39], but only a degree sufficient to support the conclusion, when added to the other relevant factors, that the child is habitually resident in the relevant state; (g) The relevant factors will reflect the age of the child (see Mercredi v Chaffe [2012] Fam 22, at [53]-[55]; A v A, at [54(vi], and Re LC, at [35]). Accordingly, “The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned”: Re A, at 54(vi); (h) The court is considering the connections between the child and the country or countries concerned: A v A, at [80(ii)]; Re B (SC), at [42]; and Proceedings brought by HR, at [43]. This is a comparative analysis as referred to, for example, in Re M, at [60]; Re B (EWCA), at [86]; and Re A, at [46]. As observed by Black LJ in Re J, I repeat: “What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence.”
An example of this is seen in Re B (SC) in which Lord Wilson, at [49]-[50], referred to the factors which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment” and those which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of integration in the environment in Pakistan.” “What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence.”

The parties’ submissions

[41]With these principles in mind, I turn to the parties’ evidence and submissions.[42]I start with the declaration of parentage application.[43]It is fair to say that M and SF concede that there is really nothing to suggest that F is not domiciled in this country or that he has not been habitually resident for the year prior to his application being made. The court therefore has jurisdiction to deal with this application.[44]However, they go on to submit that the application should be dismissed. The application is based on welfare grounds and it should therefore travel with the child arrangements applications.[45]F maintains that the application should remain in this court. The application was overwhelmingly meritorious. He referred to the legal complications that arise because until he has parental responsibility, he would not be considered for the purposes of Hague 1980 to hold rights of custody.[46]The main focus of the parties’ submissions was on the court’s jurisdiction relating to the child arrangements applications.[47]The parties’ submissions were detailed and referenced to the evidence and legal submissions each made.[48]I do not propose to repeat the submissions in detail as that would not do justice to them. Instead, I mention some of the points raised. In the context of what is clearly high conflict litigation, I make it clear that mention of a point does not elevate it to a higher status or importance than a point that is not mentioned and equally, the fact that a point is not mentioned does not mean that it has no value or importance. My aim is to give a flavour of the submissions only.[49]M maintained that P has been living in Lithuania since June 2025 at the earliest and September 2025 at the latest. Since then, she had ceased to be habitually resident in England and Wales and had acquired to the requisite degree of stability to be habitually resident in Lithuania.[50]P living in Lithuania was lawful. M and SF had not hidden anything about their intentions from anyone including the court.[51]P has been living in the same home in Lithuania surrounded by the majority of her and her mother's belongings; she is cared for by M who is her primary carer; the extended maternal family live close by; P is able to speak more Lithuanian than English; she is registered with appropriate professionals and has spent substantial parts of her life in Lithuania. Moreover, neither M nor SF are tax resident in the UK.[52]P also attended various activities such as music school, a gymnastic centre and sensory play in Lithuania; she has friends from amongst the children she met at her various activities and they play together.[53]SF endorsed the mother's submissions, confirmed that he is not tax resident in the UK and that he had never been habitually resident in the UK. He is habitually resident in the USA. His home and base are in Los Angeles although SF rents a flat in London which M has used.[54]In May 2023, SF relocated to Dubai where he is a resident. He is a tax resident in the UAE. The move to Dubai allowed him to benefit from USA foreign tax credits. SF has an English company although this is a vehicle for tax reasons.[55]SF travels a lot on business and divides his time between London, Lithuania, Dubai and the USA. Business travel also takes him to meetings and conferences in Portugal, France and Germany.[56]For tax reasons, SF can only spend 30 work days and a total of 90 days in a financial year in the UK. Beyond that would incur what SF described as “devastating financial implications.”[57]For his part, SF felt that there “cannot be any doubt” that P was habitually resident in Lithuania. The majority of her life had been in Lithuania where she had a doctor, attended classes and activities and where the wider maternal family lived.[58]F opposed any suggestion that P was not habitually resident in this jurisdiction. He referred to the time she has spent in Lithuania as a “contrived absence and the product of procedural delay and the obstruction of my contact with her-not a settled change of environment.”[59]Until the summer of 2025, P had spent most of her life in England. Thereafter, he did not agree to her being in Lithuania.[60]P’s medical and developmental care had been in England throughout; she was registered with a GP in London and had her vaccinations in the UK; in June 2025, P was in playgroup and attending enrichment classes; F and his family lived in this country. In Lithuania, she had no settled or established life. P had no nursery place or formal childcare. F did not believe that M had much family in Lithuania. Her mother lived in the USA and her father died some years ago.[61]M’s connection to this country is maintained; she still rents a flat in London; her “social world” is in London; she has no employment or earnings in Lithuania.[62]P’s presence in Lithuania was temporary given M and SF’s express intention to relocate P to America. There had never been a suggestion that Lithuania was P’s home and if anything, F argued that M had always said that she wanted to temporarily visit Lithuania as well as other countries.SF hardly spent any time in Lithuania which did not fit with the description of a nuclear family.[63]F referred to a table produced by M which set out the time spent by P in each jurisdiction since her birth which he said demonstrated that P had not been consistently present in Lithuania. F said that this fitted with M’s position that P had to be available to travel round the world due to SF’s international lifestyle and tax planning arrangements.[64]Overall, F maintained that M’s description of life in Lithuania had to be treated with caution. It seemed that P existed in something of a “bubble" (as put by his Counsel) in Lithuania.[65]F submitted that if the court found that P's habitual residence had changed, then article 7 of Hague 1996 was engaged as P had been wrongfully removed and retained away from England and Wales in breach of the rights of custody held by the court.[66]M’s position on where P should live had “shifted repeatedly across these proceedings.” F’s submissions really amounted to a claim that M had deceived the court as to her true intentions.

Discussion and Conclusion

[67]The parties have drawn my attention to various factors which I need to consider before undertaking a global analysis of the evidence and reaching a conclusion.[68]First, the family background.[69]I have already referred to the international background of M and SF, neither of whom are domiciled in this country and who appear to have lived here more for convenience than anything else.[70]F was born and educated in England. His parents live in England. His mother is from South-Eastern Nigeria; his father is British. F has two sisters, a nephew and cousins in England.[71]Second, family relationships.[72]M is P’s sole carer. Nothing suggested other than that they have a strong bond and that she looks after P well.[73]F’s relationship with P is the subject of contention. M and SF submit that there is virtually no relationship due to F not taking up contact at times. For his part, F expressed his sadness for the “limited” and “very often interrupted” contact that he had with P.[74]The history of contact between F and P in this case makes for uncomfortable reading but is relevant. It seems to have been fraught almost from the start.[75]By the time P was born, M’s relationship with F had ended. P was born on 19 June 2024. Nine days earlier on 10 June 2024, F sent a WhatsApp message to M which is worth setting out as it clearly set the scene for the future:
“I hope you are well, as I'm not sure if you have had the baby yet. As you know, I'd like to be there at the point of delivery, but as you haven't given me any information on this it has been difficult to know how I can do that. You have confirmed this baby is mine, and as such I want to put on record that I want my name to be reflected in the baby's name on registration because I believe the child needs to know her identity. If you are not disposed to the child having only my surname, I would certainly consent to a double-barrelled name. If this is not acceptable to you, then you leave me no other option but to go to the courts to get a DNA test and to have the child on record with my name. I want you to understand that I intend to be fully involved in the child's upbringing, and as you are aware it is much easier for the arrangements for the child to be put in place by agreement between the two of us than to go through the courts. Should we not agree, I intent [sic] to take this to court and I will request that the child spends half the time with me. I would prefer us to come to an agreement, rather than involve the services of the mediator or ultimately to take action through the courts. If I don't hear from you in the next couple of days, I will commence the court proceedings.”
[76]In view of what M saw as a “shocking and insensitive” message, M was scared to face F aloneafter P was born. She therefore invited him to her house where her mother was present. There were other meetings subsequently until M went to Lithuania in September 2024 for around a month. M said that F messaged whilst she was away but thereafter, she did not hear from him until 21 December 2024 when she was in Lithuania and was not returning until the end of January 2025.[77]The following month, February 2025, F made an urgent without notice application to the court for a prohibited steps order to stop M travelling abroad.[78]Of note is that the application referred to M having “no strong ties to the UK” and the concern that M would relocate out of the jurisdiction. The application was refused.[79]This application was to be the start of the litigation between the parties. I do not propose to narrate every step that occurred in the litigation. I shall instead focus on matters that help to shed light on the relationship between F and P.[80]In April 2025, District Judge Hughan made an interim contact order which provided that contact would be supported. This led to arguments about who should supervise or support the sessions.[81]M and SF then sought to vary the contact arrangements. The matter came before Recorder Brannan in June 2025.[82]They argued that the combination of the impact on their tax status coming to this country so often for contact and the restriction on the time available for M to spend time with P and her family in Lithuania meant that a new arrangement was required. They proposed that contact would be monthly in England and monthly in Riga, Latvia which was close to P’s maternal family in Lithuania.[83]F objected. He told the Recorder that “it is ludicrous really to compress contact into just three days and ask me to travel out to Latvia, which is not even [M]’s home country.”

The Recorder decided that M should travel with P to this country every weekend for contact with F.

[85]M and SF appealed the Recorder’s decision and the matter came before Mr Justice Poole in September 2025.[86]He allowed the appeal and ordered that contact would be in London for three consecutive days each month and in Riga for two consecutive days each month and that it should be supervised.[87]The judge was clearly not impressed by the F’s approach to litigation. When declining to make the order for costs against F, Mr Justice Poole said that F had “sailed close to the windand he will lose the benefit of the doubt on any future or repeat occasion if he makes an application of a similar kind and he is warned.”[88]Mr Justice Poole’s order specified that AidHour would supervise contact in England. F refused to allow them to supervise so he did not take up contact. He also did not travel to Riga. F applied in November 2025 to vary Mr Justice Poole’s contact order although the application was not listed. What resulted was that between October 2025 and April 2026, P did not have contact with F.[89]At a hearing in March 2026, another supervisor for contact was ordered by HHJ Orchover. This again was later the subject of argument when F would not agree the specific individual at the company nominated by the court.[90]There have also been other areas of contention with contact such as M’s objection to F filming her and F’s alleged bad or inappropriate behaviour. This brought with it solicitors’ correspondence which M found oppressive. There were also other issues outside contact within the litigation which M and SF say has unnecessarily delayed the litigation. This included F apparently instructing his mother who is a solicitor in circumstances where she was a potential witness, something that led HHJ Orchover to record in her order the court’s “dismay.”[91]What emerges from these events is that F’s relationship with P lost a considerable amount of time to develop. That relationship can probably best be described as limited. It has also led to P having little or no relationship with F’s family in this country in contrast to her relationship with M’s wider family.[92]It is difficult to conclude that F is not either wholly or heavily responsible for this state of affairs. I do struggle to accept that he has behaved properly especially when two judges have criticised his actions and in view of the message that I referred to that F sent to M, to say the least.[93]It is noteworthy that the message was sent at a time when F believed that M had either just given birth or was about to give birth to their child. Not only was its wording inappropriate but it also signalled a confrontational future which rapidly came to pass.[94]Given the litigation history and reading the transcripts of some of the hearings, it is perhaps not surprising that M maintains that this litigation has affected her mental health and that she has sought professional help.[95]SF takes a role in P’s life albeit strongly tempered by his work commitments and tax restrictions in terms of the time he can spend in a country.[96]His statement explained how he helps with P’s care when he spends time with P. SF has parental responsibility for P. That this was acquired by agreement with M must at the very least evidence some commitment on the part of SF to P and M’s trust in him as a suitable parent figure for P. To my mind, it would be hard to displace this baseline on the basis that the agreement was purely a cynical attempt to enhance M and SF’s position against F although its timing is questionable.[97]On the evidence before the court, I am satisfied that SF is well known to P and that she has a relationship with him. I cannot say anything about the depth of that relationship although she does see and engage with SF regularly and there is nothing to suggest that at the very least their relationship is warm and friendly. The welfare report from the independent social worker has been delayed; that would have provided more information and in its absence, I cannot say more about P’s relationship with SF.[98]Third, the time spent by P in various countries over her short life of just over two years.[99]Mr Bennett has provided some statistics which were helpful.[100]From P’s date of birth until 5 July 2026, there are 744 days. During that time, P spent 419 days in Lithuania (56.32%), 301 days in England (40.46%) and 24 days in the USA (3.23%).[101]From the date of the order made on 25 June 2025 by the Recorder until the appeal hearing before Mr Justice Poole on 23 September 2025, P was in Lithuania between 29 June and 14 July 2025, 17 July and 9 August, 10 August and 2 September and 3 September to 22 September. The remaining time was in England.[102]From 25 June 2025 until 5 July 2026, P was in Lithuania for 314 days (85.09%), England for 31 days (8.40%) and the USA for 24 days (6.50%).[103]From 23 September 2025 (the date of the appeal hearing before Mr Justice Poole) until 5 July 2026, P was in Lithuania for 234 days (82.98%), England for 24 days (8.51%) and the USA for 24 days (8.51%).[104]Whether one takes the starting point as the period from June 2025 or the appeal hearing in September 2025, since those dates, most of P’s time was spent in Lithuania; in excess of 80%. Her visits to England were solely to have contact with F. Taking her whole life, I accept the submission that for the first months of her life, P will have no memory of her time in England which reduces the real value of taking the lifetime amount of time she has spent in each the UK and Lithuania.[105]Four, tax status.[106]M exhibited a chronology to her statement dated April 2026 which set out periods when she was a tax resident in the UK.[107]From the tax year 2017/2018, she was a tax resident in the UK until 2019/2020. In the tax year 2022/2023, she was once again a UK tax resident until April 2025 when she ceased to be a tax resident in the UK which remains the position now.[108]I have already set out SF’s position in that he is non-resident in the UK for tax purposes and can only spend a limited amount of time in this country.[109]Due to tax changes to non-domicile tax rules and regulations which came into effect in April 2025, M and SF need to ensure that they do not re-trigger UK tax residency.[110]My understanding is that although it is only SF who has an official limit on the time he can spend in the UK, if M lived or spent time in the UK for longer than ninety days, this could also trigger financial consequences for the whole family.[111]The evidence about M and SF’s tax affairs and how it impinges on their movements is genuine. It demonstrates that over the years, they have carefully considered tax implications as they applied at various times to their living arrangements. I also accept that they can only now spend limited time in the UK and that living here would be to their financial detriment.[112]Five, M and SF’s intentions.[113]I am satisfied that M and SF have been entirely open with the court about their lives in terms of their connection with other countries, their travel and their relationship with this country.[114]Moreover, I have not seen anything that would suggest that they regarded the UK as a permanent home. It was a convenient base when it suited M and/or SF; nothing more. It was just another place on their international travels.[115]When the matter came before District Judge Hughan on 2 April 2025, the court considered the interim contact arrangements. During the hearing in an exchange with the judge, Counsel for M set out M’s need to travel and her family situation as follows:
“JUDGE HUGHAN: Yeah. Mr Bennett, is there a proposed date that your client has in mind for travelling? MR BENNETT: Yes, it would be 5 April to 5 May. My solicitor has been given the flight tickets that we are happy to disclose. As I indicated in my position statement, there are no surprises about this trip. It was flagged explicitly on the last occasion, which is why the (inaudible) notice period was given then. I have no instructions as to whether there would be any future trip on her return. My client of course understands that contact arrangements need to be made, but I would stress that she does have no immediate family here. She was brought up by her grandmother and her great aunt. They are living in Lithuania. That is where she would be, and she has made two trips there since Perla was born, and returned.”
[116]Following that hearing on 1 May 2025, SF’s accountants Blick Rothenberg in a long letter set out the tax implications faced by M and SF if M had to remain in the UK.[117]Shortly after the letter was sent, on 12 May 2025 M and SF applied to the court formally for permission for P to relocate to the USA. The application was accompanied by a Note which referred to the accountant’s letter and explained how tax considerations formed the basis of the application. SF’s statement in support of the application exhibited the accountant’s letter together with other documents to clarify the position.[118]When the application came before the Recorder on 25 June 2025, M and SF made no secret about their tax situation, the ties to Lithuania and that they were an “international family. See for example, line 8 at page 12 of the transcript (B204). ” The Recorder acknowledged the “inability of the stepfather to spend time in the UK. See B221, line 17. ” Moreover, F was acutely aware of the fact that M needed to spend substantial periods out of the country. In his submissions to the judge, he approached that as follows:
“And the second point is yes, you know, I think the child’s welfare is paramount, and part of that means having regular and frequent contact with her father without compressing all of his time into three days. I mean, if she wants to travel abroad, you know, I would be happy to take care of the kid in the meantime. So, you know, she is well within her rights to leave the child with me and my family, my mother, you know, who raised a wonderful family. You know, I ran a successful business. I have degrees, high degrees from Oxford. It is not like, you know, we are bad as people or unsafe people to leave a child with. And, you know, there are no safeguarding issues. So, I think if she really wants to relocate, then she should think about having arrangements where the child stays more permanently with me.”
[119]When the appeal from the Recorder’s orders came before Mr Justice Poole, his judgment recognised the international nature of the family, that P was by then based in Lithuania and the weak link of M to this country:
“…Having said that, the Recorder, in my judgment, failed to have any certainly no adequate regard to the impact on the child, DD The judge referred to P as DD in his judgment. , of the continuation of weekly contact in England in the circumstances such as they were at the time of his decision. DD was spending much of her time in Lithuania, where she was cared for by her mother, her main carer, and who had been her main carer throughout her short life. There, she had access to her maternal family, who were nearby, and it was convenient for her stepfather to spend time with the mother and DD without risking exceeding the 90 day resident threshold. 36. More pertinently, weekly contact in England, as the Recorder ordered, would require DD to travel to and from England on numerous occasions. This was likely to be very disruptive to her as a one year old. As a young child, in the care of her mother, she needed routine and stability. The impact on the mother, her main carer, was obviously likely to be stressful, having to travel to and from England so often, especially as she had no desire to do so and, as the Recorder had noted, contact had been problematic. Indeed, it is evident and it should have been evident to the Recorder, that it had been stressful to her in various ways. 37. She also wished to be close to her family for most of the month, and to benefit from their support during what was, and remains, a difficult time for her. I do not discount it is also a difficult time for the father and indeed the stepfather.”
[120]Given the position of M and SF at these hearings, without delving any further, I find it hard to understand how F can state that M and SF were misleading the court from the start and that they were untruthful about their plans. Quite the reverse; they were open at every court hearing about their position generally and their relationship to the UK and Lithuania. It is also instructive to refer again to F’s initial application when he sought a prohibited steps order stating that M had “no strong ties to the UK.” Mr Justice Poole also made no adverse comment about P living in Lithuania unlike F whom he criticised. In terms of the relocation, the application was made promptly once the tax advice was received.[121]Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest bad faith or dishonesty on the part of M and/or SF. At all times, the international nature of their life was known as was their nationalities and ties to countries other than the UK.[122]Six, the legality of P being in Lithuania.[123]M and SF give two dates from which to calculate when P lived in Lithuania: 29 June 2025 being after the date of the hearing before the Recorder or 24 September 2025 being the day after the hearing before Mr Justice Poole. At both times, P was living in Lithuania. I cannot say that it is clear to me why these dates are offered as alternatives. I can only assume that it derives from the Recorder’s order that contact take place in England. However, for his part, the Recorder accepted that P was based in Lithuania albeit that he was ultimately held to have not weighed that properly in his welfare analysis.[124]I refer to the extract from Mr Justice Poole’s judgment that I have already quoted and my observation that he was aware that P was based in Lithuania. As I have said, not only did he make no adverse comment about that but he went on to fault the Recorder for not taking it into account and varied the contact arrangements to allow contact to take place in Lithuania (or more accurately at a place nearby to make travel easier) where P was living.[125]When the case came before HHJ Orchover in March 2026, she too made no adverse finding or comment about P being in Lithuania.[126]I should add that F did not appeal the orders made by Mr Justice Poole or HHJ Orchover nor has he issued any proceedings in Lithuania.[127]What therefore emerges is that P being in Lithuania was not the result of some unlawful or wrongful action; it was done in the open and maintained for a long time and not adversely commented upon by the court. Put simply, it was a fact of life that everyone accepted. I find that certainly since the hearing in June 2025, P was based and living in Lithuania.[128]Seven, the nature of P’s link to the UK.[129]P’s link to the UK is really bound to that of her family given her age.[130]M’s link to this country is very weak. She has no employment here; she does not own property; SF supports her. M only comes to the UK to bring P for contact with F. Indeed, M has spent significant periods of time since 2023 abroad. That M has a limited link to the UK cannot be doubted by F as in his application at the start of proceedings to which I have already referred, he stated that M had “no strong ties to the UK” in support of his need for urgent injunctive relief.[131]SF also has no real link with this country. He has an English company which seems to be used for tax purposes although his base and work are not here.[132]F is a UK citizen and lives in this country as do his family. However, his relationship with P is basic given the issues around contact and P probably has little knowledge and certainly almost no relationship with F’s wider family.[133]P is registered with a GP in this country although that would have come about as she was born here and lived her for a time.[134]P is too young to have attended school in this country and I accept that parts of her time spent in the UK will have faded in her memory due to her young age.[135]The reality therefore is that P’s link to the UK is at best minimal.[136]Eight, P’s link to Lithuania.[137]F refers to P’s link with Lithuania being temporary as M and SF wish to relocate to the USA where SF’s family and M’s mother live.[138]That may be so for some future time but the court is concerned with the position now which is that P has spent the last year mainly in Lithuania and is living there now.[139]In Lithuania, P attends groups and has friends her age; she receives medical care including immunisations, has been referred to a neurologist, a physiotherapist and a speech pathologist; her main language (or best language skill) is Lithuanian; her main home is there, the rented flat in London only having a few belongings; her wider family live there.[140]Having considered matters under various headings, I now stand back and consider the totality of the evidence before the court, in other words the global analysis that is required and bring everything together.[141]P was born in the UK and lived here at the start of her life. She was therefore habitually resident here. However, mid-proceedings that changed. She lost that status. I find that she is habitually resident now in Lithuania. She acquired that status in June 2025 and if I am wrong about that, then certainly by September 2025.[142]The change in her habitual residence was transparent. Taking my various findings and observations together, the combination of the time she spends in Lithuania, her family connections in Lithuania and strong integration into life there (beyond the baseline of some degree that is needed) as against her minimal integration in and link to this country and weak links to family (including F) in this country all lead to what is an obvious conclusion that P is not habitually resident in the UK. This country is merely a place to visit to see F and nothing more. It is not her base or her home. That she has some belongings here is immaterial in the overall context of this matter. I accept the submissions made on behalf of M and SF.[143]F argued that if the court found that P was habitually resident in Lithuania, then Article 7 of Hague 1996 was engaged.[144]This provides as follows:
“(1) In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another State, and a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; orb) the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment. (2) The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; andb) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State. (3) So long as the authorities first mentioned in paragraph 1 keep their jurisdiction, the authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which he or she has been retained can take only such urgent measures under Article 11 as are necessary for the protection of the person or property of the child.”
[145]Professor Largarde’s Explanatory Report comments on Article 7 that the “underlying idea is that the person who makes a wrongful removal should not be able to take advantage of this act in order to modify for his or her benefit the jurisdiction of the authorities called upon to take measures of protection for the person, or even the property, of the child.”[146]I was also referred to the decision in Re H (A Minor) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2000] 2 AC 291 which held that the court may itself hold rights of custody such that removing a child during proceedings may be wrongful even if the left behind parent (in this case F) does not personally hold custody rights because that removal infringes the court’s right of custody.[147]I am at a loss to understand how any argument under these grounds can be made given my findings about the parent’s intentions and crucially, in circumstances where the court itself gave its approval to P being in Lithuania; first, the Recorder in June 2025 did not say anything about P being in Lithuania being wrong in any way and nor did Mr Justice Poole who went further and adjusted the contact arrangements to fit in with her life there.[148]I found nothing in anything submitted by F to support any claim of some wrongdoing or deceit on the part of M and SF to have any substance or merit.[149]The only other consideration which was mentioned is Article 13 which provides that:
“1) The authorities of a Contracting State which have jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 to take measures for the protection of the person or property of the child must abstain from exercising this jurisdiction if, at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, corresponding measures have been requested from the authorities of another Contracting State having jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10 at the time of the request and are still under consideration. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply if the authorities before whom the request for measures was initially introduced have declined jurisdiction.”
[150]This provision does not apply as it is designed to prevent courts in different countries from dealing with the same dispute at the same time. There are no proceedings in Lithuania and thus not relevant.[151]Accordingly, what follows is that the court makes a declaration that P is not habitually resident in this jurisdiction for the purposes of the child arrangements applications. Those applications therefore cannot proceed further and must be dismissed.[152]Turning to the declaration of parentage application, I have set out the relevant statutory provision that addresses jurisdiction.[153]At paragraph 57 of his appeal judgment, Mr

Justice Poole made these observations on the declaration of parentage application:

“The declaration of parentage application, and for that matter the parental responsibility order application were not open and shut matters suitable for summary disposal at a case management hearing listed for one hour, especially when there was so much else for the court to consider. The directions given by the recorder were perfectly reasonable and necessary for a fair determination of the father’s applications in those respects to be made. I accept that declaration and parentage and parental responsibility are tied up with other issues in this case, and will be relevant when long term welfare decisions are made ….”
[154]I respectfully agree with these comments and the view that this application is tied up with the child arrangements applications. This is a highly contentious case and to allow a situation whereby there are proceedings in two jurisdictions would be simply wrong and unfair on all the parties. Having found that P is not habitually resident in this country and that the child arrangements applications must be dismissed, P’s welfare interests are that all applications in this contentious litigation must be heard and determined by the same court; to my mind, that is also consistent with the overriding objective of family litigation. Accordingly, I dismiss the application for a declaration of parentage.[155]That is my judgment. I would ask Counsel to agree a form of order to conclude this matter. If any points arise from this judgment, they should be submitted in the next seven days and I shall endeavour to deal with them on paper. I shall then hand down the judgment without the parties being present. Time for any appeal will run from the date the order giving effect to this judgment is approved by me.