X, Re [2026] EWFC 167 (B)

This judgment was given in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.[2026] EWFC 167 (B)Date 12 June 2026
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Before
District Judge Chataway
Between
A COUNTY COUNCILApplicantMOTHERRespondentFATHERRespondentXRespondent(Through his Children's Guardian)RespondentA COUNTY COUNCIL Applicant-and-MOTHER 1 st Respondent-and-FATHER 2 nd Respondent-and-X (Through his Children's Guardian) 3rd Respondent
Ms Kara Cann for local authorityMs Lauren Bovington (instructed by Adam King, Creighton and Partners) for motherMs Baljinder Bath (instructed by Samanatha Harris, Freemans) for fatherMs Lorraine King for Michael Trueman for the Child’s GuardianHearing Hearing dates: 8, 9, 10 and 12 June 2026
Approved Judgment.............................

District Judge Chataway :

[1]I have already handed out a short letter to the parents summarising my decision and the reasons for it. This judgment explains my reasons in more detail.[2]These proceedings are about X. The applicant is A County Council. The first respondent is X’s mother. She is a protected party. The official solicitor acts on her behalf. The second respondent is X’s father. X is the third respondent. He has taken part through his court-appointed guardian.[3]I am going to refer to X’s parents as “the mother” and “the father”. This sounds impersonal. I mean no disrespect.[4]All parties have been legally represented. The parents have both been assisted by interpreters at the hearing, and the mother by an intermediary. I thank all the lawyers and other professionals for their help.

The parties’ positions

[5]X was born in hospital and discharged into foster care. He has remained with the same foster carer ever since. He has family time with his parents.[6]The local authority seek both care and placement orders. Their plan is for X to be placed for adoption as soon as possible. They propose that X’s family time should be gradually reduced. Subject to review, they propose it should stop when X is placed with prospective adopters and that there should be “letter box” contact only from then on.[7]The official solicitor does not oppose placement but makes it clear the mother herself is desperate to look after X. The official solicitor has also applied for an order for continuing contact up to the point of adoption.[8]The father opposes the making of any care or placement order. His case is that X should be looked after by both parents, with the father acting as X’s primary carer. If this is not possible now, he asks for a further period of assessment. Alternatively if the court requires it, he proposes to look after X on his own. If a placement order is made, then he supports the application for contact.[9]The Guardian supports the position of the local authority.[10]It follows the options for X which I have to consider and compare are as follows: i) For X to remain in foster care pending a placement for adoption. As this is the applicant’s proposal, I will call it “Option A”; and ii) For X to be returned to both parents’ joint care, alternatively to the father’s care, either now or after a period of further assessment - “Option B”.[11]If I order Option A, I need to decide whether or not to make a contact order.

The law

[12]There has been no disagreement about the law. I remind myself of the key principles.[13]The court’s power to order a child to be placed for adoption comes from the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Where a child has parents, section 21 of the Act provides that the court cannot make a placement order unless there is already a care order, or the threshold for making a care order is met.[14]When asked to make a placement order, the court must apply the principles in section 1 of the 2002 Act. Where a care order is sought, it must apply section 1 of the Children Act 1989. However, the focus should be on the 2002 Act. The child's welfare must be the paramount consideration. This means his welfare, not just as a child, but throughout his life.[15]The court must bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to a decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.[16]It must have regard to the particular factors listed in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act. I will say more about these factors in due course.[17]The court has to consider the whole range of powers available to it, and must not make any order unless it considers that making an order would be better for the child than not doing so.[18]Where a child's parents do not consent to adoption, the effect of section 52 of the Act is that the court cannot make the order unless satisfied the child's welfare requires that consent to be dispensed with.[19]Article 8 of Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 is engaged. A placement order is one of the most serious orders a court can make. No such order can be made unless the court is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate. Before reaching this decision, the court must analyse the pros and cons of each of the realistic options placed before it. In short, the court must not make a placement order unless this analysis leads to the conclusion that “nothing else will do”.[20]Where it is necessary to determine a disputed issue of fact, it is up to the party asserting the fact to prove it. This has to be done on the balance of probability. In other words, the court has to be satisfied that the allegation is more likely than not to be true.[21]Where a placement order is made, the court has power to make a contact order under section 26 of the Act. The order takes effect up to the date of any final order for adoption. Section 27 provides that a section 26 contact order may be varied or revoked by the court on application by the child or the local authority. Even without any variation or revocation, the local authority may refuse to allow contact required by an order for up to seven days in an urgent case where to do so is necessary to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.

Background

[22]X’s parents are both from a country in South Asia. They have Portuguese passports.[23]The mother came to the UK in around 2018. She states she came looking for work. She has lived here ever since and now has settled status.[24]The mother has a daughter. She was aged around 3 when the mother left her home country. That daughter remains there and is said to be looked after by her paternal grandfather.[25]The mother faces substantial challenges. She has been assessed as having a significant impairment of intellectual functioning. Most of her family lives on the other side of the world. Despite having lived here for 8 years, she does not speak English. Her native language is rare and one which very few people in the UK speak. She has, at least at times, been isolated and left with minimal community support.[26]In 2020 the mother became pregnant. Children services became involved following a referral from her midwife. The mother was then living in shared accommodation. Concerns were raised about her home, her financial and immigration status and apparent vulnerability. Her baby, Y, was born in November 2020. Initially he was discharged into the mother’s care with a child in need plan in place. However, on 21 January 2021 he and the mother were re-admitted to hospital because Y was failing to thrive. There was found to be no medical cause. They remained together in hospital for about 11 days, during which it was recorded that the mother needed frequent prompting to feed Y, was struggling to make up his formula milk correctly, and was not waking at night to feed him so that the nurses had to take this over.[27]On 28 January 2021 the local authority applied for a care order. On 1 February 2021 the mother and Y were given a mother and baby foster placement. This was initially by agreement, and later under an interim care order. The mother and Y stayed in a series of foster placements over the next 8 months. During that time continuing concerns were recorded about the mother’s care of Y and her ability to respond to advice and support. These included concerns about her ability to measure out and collect medication; co-sleeping with Y despite advice not to; a resistance to accepting help generally; and the mother’s capacity to respond consistently to Y’s emotional needs and to pick up cues, such as when he was crying.[28]On 13 October 2021 the mother tried to take Y away from the placement, but was stopped by the police. This was after she had been told of a plan to extend it. She and Y were then separated. Y has been in foster care ever since.[29]The proceedings regarding Y were extended. The mother was assessed as being a protected party. An assessment dated 15 December 2021 noted that she showed “no evidence of understanding the concerns of the Local Authority”. At the end of the proceedings a final care order was made. A threshold document was agreed and approved by the court recording findings as to the circumstances in place as at 28 January 2021. I will quote these in full:
“Instability / home environment: 4. Y was at risk of physical and emotional harm as a result of his mother's vulnerability and lack of a stable and consistent home environment for him. (i) The mother had experienced a number of home moves since arriving in the UK and a period of homelessness …. (ii) Until 19 January 2021, Y had been living with his mother in a home of multiple occupation with a number of different people, some of whom were unknown to the mother; her accommodation was not suitable for Y's care and she and Y were moved to emergency accommodation on 19 January 2021 …. (iii) The mother accepted that she had a very limited support network … and her inability to speak English exacerbated her isolation. (iv) The mother accepted that she was in financial difficulties, to the extent of asking friends for food as she did not have any; she was not able to prioritise funding items to meet Y's or her own basic needs …. (v) The mother has been assessed as having a significant impairment of her intellectual functioning (full scale IQ = 58) …. Her cognitive difficulties make her more vulnerable and adversely affect her ability to mitigate the concerns for Y's welfare. Inconsistent engagement: 5. The mother has not been able to engage consistently with professionals involved in Y's care and/or these proceedings. This has placed Y at risk of emotional and physical harm: (i) The mother's engagement with the midwife service was sporadic, with appointments being missed and the service having difficulties in contacting the mother …. (ii) The mother did not engage in English classes proposed by the Local Authority in order to assist with her isolation in the community. (iii) The mother disengaged with her first PAMs assessment …. Emotional dysregulation: 6. Y has suffered emotional harm and has been at risk of physical harm as a result of his mother's emotional dysregulation/erratic behaviour: (i) On 13 October 2021, the mother twice attempted to leave the mother and baby foster placement with Y. The mother was in a very distressed state, shouting and crying. When the foster carer stood in front of the gate to prevent the mother leaving with Y, the mother tried to climb over a low fence with Y in her arms. Y was distressed by his mother's actions and was taken into police protection. The mother then returned to the foster placement later that evening and on the following morning…. Y's needs: 7. Y has been assessed as being autistic. He is significantly behind his peers in a number of areas and can exhibit extremely challenging behaviour. He requires a high level of care with significant additional support …. Due to the mother's difficulties as noted above, she is unable to provide Y with the high level of care he requires.”
Inconsistent engagement: Emotional dysregulation:

Y's needs:

[30]Y’s care plan provided for him to have both face-to-face and remote contact with the mother. The face-to-face contact was to take place monthly, with the proviso that it would reduce to six times a year if contact sessions were missed or deemed poor quality. In due course the mother’s direct contact with Y was reduced. The authority’s evidence is that even after this she managed to attend only around 10% of the scheduled sessions.[31]The father came to the UK in around 2020. He also has a daughter who remains in his home country, looked after by relatives. Initially the father settled in the East Midlands. He and the mother met in around 2024.[32]In around July 2024 the mother became pregnant with X. Children services learnt of the pregnancy that October, from Y’s foster carers. They commenced an assessment, completed in January 2025. In the course of the earlier proceedings, the mother had been given a one bedroom flat with a housing association. It was found this had been lost. At the time of the assessment, the mother was living in emergency hotel accommodation provided by A City Council. The assessment recorded continuing concerns in line with the earlier threshold findings. It recorded the mother was not engaging with Children Services.[33]On 15 January 2025 the City Council provided longer term temporary accommodation in the local area. The mother did not settle there. Instead, she went to London and began living with the father. They squatted in a room in a “void” flat in a large block on a housing estate in Central London. The block was in poor condition. When a social worker later visited the block she noted, “I saw human excrement in a corridor, bags of rubbish with dirty nappies and a needle was also visible. The flat where [the mother] says she is based is between two flats, where the doors are boarded up with metal barriers. Outside the flat door was a large collection of male clothing”.[34]The mother made contact with antenatal services in London. In early February 2025 she attended appointments both there and in A City. She was found to be malnourished, and given an iron infusion. A social worker from A City Council met her at the local appointment. She offered to refer the mother for advocacy support. The mother’s only response was to plead “please do not take my baby”.[35]On 14 February 2025 the mother collapsed at a betting shop in London. She stated she had not eaten for a number of days. She was taken to hospital and given food. The father came to collect her and she was discharged.[36]Thereafter the mother continued to engage with antenatal services in London. She remained resistant to engaging with A City Council’s Children Services, but did engage with a PAUSE worker allocated by her London based Children Services. The authority allege that around this time housing assistance was offered but not taken up. This is disputed. I deal with it further below.[37]In April 2025 X was born in hospital in London. These proceedings were issued that day. An emergency protection order was granted on 1 May, and thereafter an interim care order. On 6 May 2025 X was discharged from hospital into the care of a foster carer in London.[38]The mother began having family time with X at a contact centre in London soon afterwards. Arrangements were put in place for both parents to have family time 3 times a week.[39]The parents remained living at their accommodation. In around late July 2025 they moved to a three bedroom flat in London shared with 6 others.[40]In around February 2026 the family time sessions with X were reduced to once a week. Around the same time, the parents moved together to Yorkshire. The father’s statement signed in March 2026 refers to their staying with family there in a rented house. By 29 April 2026 the father had moved again to the East Midlands, to take up a job in a restaurant. He has remained there, staying in shared accommodation provided by his employer. He told me he works long hours, from around 11am to 10pm each day for 6 days a week. The mother was not able to join him there. Instead she began staying separately with friends in A City, where she has found part-time work.[41]At the hearing the parents both confirmed their commitment to each other. The father stated in evidence that if X were returned to their care, he would rent a home where they could live together in the local area.

The proceedings

[42]During the course of the proceedings various assessments have been carried out: i) An assessment of litigation capacity by a psychologist, David Morgan, dated 19 May 2025. This concluded the mother is a protected party. ii) A joint parenting assessment completed by an independent social worker, Jo Spicer, dated 18 December 2025. The mother engaged fully in the parenting assessment but the father did not. Various appointments were arranged, but he met the assessor only twice. The first was at the flat in London on 27 October 2025. The second was after an observed family time session on 1 December 2025. The assessment drew on the information from the earlier assessments of the mother completed during the previous proceedings. It concluded the parents would not be able to care safely for X and that there was no support which could be put in place to enable this. iii) An intermediary report for the mother completed by Communicourt on 1 June 2026.[43]In the course of the proceedings the official solicitor had applied, on the mother’s behalf, for a residential assessment of the parents together with X. This was refused. On 27 February 2026 the father applied for a further independent social worker’s assessment of his own capacity to look after X in the community. This too was refused.

The hearing

[44]The final hearing was given a generous listing of 5 days. Each parent was assisted at the hearing by an interpreter. The mother was also assisted by an intermediary. I heard oral evidence from X’s current social worker, Mr O; the independent social worker Jo Spicer (by videolink); the father; and X’s guardian Ms H. The mother did not give evidence but was clearly engaging with the proceedings throughout.[45]A series of ground rules had been agreed at a pre-trial review on 2 June 2026. These were followed at the final hearing. The mother was given an opportunity to visit the court room in which most of the hearing took place. The court took regular breaks. The oral evidence was spread out over 3 days so as not to overload her.

The witness evidence

[46]All the professional witnesses gave clear evidence. They were quick to acknowledge the parents many positive qualities, including their love and commitment to X. The independent social worker, Ms Spicer, gave clear and robust evidence. Mr O’s evidence was also clear but was necessarily limited. He explained he only became X’s allocated social worker in early May 2026, had had no prior involvement with the case, was not the author of either the authority’s initial or final statement of evidence, and had not met either parent. Ms H was similarly a late arrival to the case, having had to take over the case from an earlier guardian on 7 April 2026. However, she had had the opportunity to meet the parents and observe family time. It was clear to me that each of these professionals had given careful thought to the issue of the parents’ capacity to provide safe and proper care for X, and to the proposal for a placement order.[47]I was not satisfied the same level of focus had been applied, before the hearing, to the issue of future contact. In oral evidence each of the professionals made cogent and persuasive points about contact. However, the issue of post-placement contact was not within the remit of Ms Spicer’s instructions. It was within the scope of the authority’s final evidence and the guardian’s analysis. However in their oral evidence both Mr O and Ms H adopted positions which were significantly different from the positions set out in those documents, and in the parties’ position statements. While they continued to oppose the proposal for a contact order, they both showed themselves significantly more open to the possibility of contact being in X’s best interest. This shift in position indicated a readiness on their part to consider the points raised at the hearing. But that also called into question how carefully the local authority and guardian had examined the contact issue going into the hearing, and the extent to which they had reached a fully-considered and settled assessment.[48]The father gave evidence through an interpreter. His love for X was clear. So too was his commitment to the mother. Much of his evidence was frank. When asked, for example, about whether there was anything about the mother which he thought might be a risk to X he answered “no” straightforwardly. Likewise when asked whether he and the mother would need any help, if X were placed back with them, he made it clear he thought not and did not want this. However, there were other times when I found him less straightforward. One example is his evidence about their accommodation in London. Initially the father stated he had been told the accommodation would not be appropriate for X but did not understand why, as there had been other children living there even people with babies. He went on to describe it as a “good place”. However, when pressed on the issue he repeatedly avoided answering further questions, instead telling me that he and the mother had been looking for accommodation elsewhere.

Threshold

[49]The facts relied on by the authority to establish the court's jurisdiction to make public law orders were set out in an amended threshold document dated 8 June 2026. Those facts were largely conceded by the official solicitor on behalf of the mother. Some of the allegations were denied by the father, as was threshold overall. The parties all asked me to determine the issues in dispute. My findings are as follows.[50]I find that while the couple were living at the accommodation in London, other men living there smoked cannabis in the flat (paragraph 2(a)(iii)). In his written response the father stated he did not recall this. In oral evidence he admitted there had been smoking but stated this had only happened outside. However I accept the authority’s evidence that the mother reported smoking indoors to midwives on 4 and 7 April 2025. A midwife attended the child protection conference that day. The record of the conference includes a detailed account from the mother that “other tenants … are smoking cannabis in the living room and kitchen, so she stays in her bedroom as does not want to breathe in the smoke”. This account is detailed. It is likely this is what the mother said, and that it was true.[51]I find that at the accommodation in London, masked men visited the property at night to collect rent money (paragraph 2(a)(iv)). The authority’s initial statement of evidence dated 28 April 2025 states “[The mother] has told her midwives recently that masked men come the property at night to collect money”. Again, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not the mother said this and that it was true. The allegation is unusual. I was given no other explanation for it. It is entirely consistent with the accepted evidence that the flat was a “void” property which was being occupied illegally, and that the parents were being asked to pay rent.[52]I find the parents failed to engage fully with housing support and action the advice given (paragraph 2(a)(v)). There is clear evidence about this including a statement from Housing Services dated 14 May 2025, and from A City Council’s records. In particular: i) It is not disputed that the mother had accommodation available to her in A City, which would have been suitable for X, and that she abandoned it on around 1 February to move to London. I appreciate she wanted to be with the father. But the accommodation in London was manifestly unsuitable. It would have put X at risk. The parents knew it would be difficult to find anywhere else. ii) The evidence is that on 10 April 2025 the mother was encouraged by her PAUSE worker and midwife to return to the flat in A City with the father but they refused. When asked about this in oral evidence the father stated that at the time the mother was not working, that his work was in London, and that they did not want to move away because they feared it would leave them with no money to buy food or pay rent. But if the parents had engaged properly with the support services, they would at least have raised these difficulties and sought help. There is no evidence they did so, either with the PAUSE worker, the midwives, A City Council, Housing Services or Children Services. The mother, at least, had pre-settled status and had been in work. She was granted settled status from 2 May 2025. She should have been entitled to housing and other benefits. She had been receiving benefits including, it appears, benefit mistakenly paid for Y. If the parents had engaged properly, it is likely they would have been able to access further support. iii) From 24 April the mother was offered emergency accommodation in London but did not take it up. Again the statement from Housing Services is clear.[53]These findings are consistent with the parents’ failure to engage fully with housing services after proceedings were issued. On 8 May 2025 they attended a meeting with London-based Housing Services, together with an interpreter. The evidence is that they were invited to make a joint application but did not do so. The mother made a single application. This was referred back to A City Council. Housing Services in London arranged an appointment for the mother with A City Council Housing Services on 12 June. They provided her with money for travel. However she failed to attend or to pursue the application. This was despite advice given by London Housing Services that A City Council Housing Services may be able to provide accommodation in London, near the father’s work.[54]Paragraphs 2(c)(i) and (ii) of the amended threshold document refer to the mother’s failure to engage with A City’s Children Services. The allegations were not disputed. However, the official solicitor disputed their relevance to threshold. I am satisfied they have been properly included. A key aspect of the circumstances, as at the relevant date, was the parents’ need for additional support in order to provide adequate care for X when he was born. One can readily understand why the mother did not want to involve Children Services (see her comment above; “please do not take my baby”). Her situation demands sympathy. Nevertheless paragraphs (i) and (ii) are properly pleaded as instances of the parents’ wider failure to engage, which contributed to the lack of support in place for X when he was born.[55]Lastly, I find that the father did not prioritise attending appointments for his parenting assessment or his contact with X. I am satisfied this has been properly pleaded as part of the threshold document (paragraph 2(c)(iv)).[56]The father acknowledged he had failed to engage with Ms Spicer’s assessment, which took place between August and December 2025. As noted above, he met with her only twice. Numerous other appointments were missed. He further accepted that he had failed regularly to attend family time before early 2026. The evidence is that during the months when family time was scheduled to take place 3 times a week, the father attended only 17% of the sessions overall, attending once a week for about half of the weeks. His attendance since then, when family time has been rescheduled to happen only once a week, has been very much improved.[57]The father told me he had not realised the importance of his engaging with the assessment process. I do not accept this. Ms Spicer was clear she had spelt this out to both parents, and that the father had a clear understanding of it. Aside from the advice they were given, the parents knew X had been removed from them, and that Y had been removed from the mother beforehand.[58]The father also suggested that he had had good reason for missing appointments, in that he had had to prioritise work in order to earn money for food and housing. It is clear both that the father was working hard, and that his employment was insecure. He lost a job during this period after spending time off sick. But these pressures have to be seen in the context of the parents’ wider failure to engage properly with support services referred to above. Moreover, it is clear Ms Spicer made considerable efforts to arrange and re-arrange appointments to fit in with the father’s stated work commitments.[59]Ms Bath, for the father, argued that these failures where not relevant to threshold because they all post-dated the issue of proceedings. But again, the failures are pleaded as part of the allegation in paragraph 2(c). The threshold issue raised is about the parents’ inability or unwillingness to engage with support and/or their failure to put X’s needs first. I accept the father’s failures to engage with the assessment process between August and December 2025, and to attend regular contact up to the end of 2025, are relevant as evidence of the state of affairs that was in place when X was born.[60]The other facts set out in the threshold document were not disputed and amply evidenced. I am satisfied on the basis of the stated facts that X was at risk when the proceedings were issued, and that the threshold test for making public law orders is met.

Welfare

[61]I turn to consider some of the factors under the welfare checklist. (a). the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding)[62]X is too young to speak. He has never lived at home with his parents, but has had family time with them ever since he was discharged. He clearly has a bond with them both. He is comfortable with them and has been observed to cling to his mother when family time ends. (b). the child’s particular needs, (d). the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant,[63]X is 13 months old. He is healthy. One of his parents has learning difficulties. His half-brother Y has autism. X underwent a permanency medical in September 2025 and no concerns have been raised about his developmental progress thus far. However, given his age he is entirely dependent on others to meet his basic needs. For this reason alone he is vulnerable.[64]X is also entering a key stage in life in terms of his ability, and need, to form settled bonds and attachments. If he is given the opportunity to form such attachments, this should help him to develop resilience and confidence to support him throughout his life. The flip side is that if he loses this opportunity, it could have lasting consequences. Moreover, in X’s case this need is particularly acute. He has already experienced one significant move, i.e. when he was taken from his mother and placed with his foster carer. He will face at least one more very significant move, when he is removed from his current foster carer. Either he will be placed with prospective adopters (as the authority propose) or back with his parents (as they propose).[65]All this means that X has a pressing need for a safe and stable home and family in which to grow up. In my judgment this is his primary need.[66]In terms of his background and heritage, X’s parents both come from a South Asian Country. They speak a rare language. They are Catholic. These are factors which the local authority will be required to take into account if authorised to place him for adoption. Unsurprisingly the evidence from the adoption agency is that, of the 8 families approved by them who are open to adopting a 1 year old male child, none of them fully reflects his ethnic background. 2 are Asian British, 1 is Portuguese/White British and the others are White British or European. (f). the relationship which the child has with relatives … including … (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so [and] …(iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives ….[67]X is deeply loved by his parents. Everyone in the case has recognised this. The family time is described as very positive. The guardian summarised it as “sweet and loving”. X’s parents are devoted to him and desperate for him to be placed with them. Moreover, X’s relationship with his parents provides a link to his distinctive family background and heritage which is not likely to be matched by any placement for adoption.[68]In addition, X has wider family, including three half siblings. Sibling relationships are potentially life-long. If X is adopted, there are no plans for direct sibling contact. This applies even as regards Y, who is in the UK but whose long-term foster carer appears resistant to contact. (e)(ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs; and (e). any harm … which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering,[69]The starting point here must be to acknowledge the many positives about these parents. As regards the mother, her love and commitment to X are obvious. All the professionals acknowledged her family time with him is warm and loving. The mother emphasised, through her counsel, how much she loves him, and her willingness to do anything to be able to look after him. The father’s love for X is also clear. It has likewise been recognised by everyone involved in the case. The guardian, for example, readily acknowledged in evidence not only the father’s obvious love for his son but also his recent commitment to contact; his positive impact on the mother, who has appeared calmer, and better able to look after herself when they are together; and his work ethic. She described his presentation as “calm and pleasant”. This is how he presented in court. Her assessment of him is consistent with the evidence from Mr O and Ms Spicer, and the written evidence from the other professionals in the case.[70]The concerns in this case are not about the parents’ love, but rather their capacity to meet X’s needs. Ms Spicer was instructed to do a joint assessment of both parents. Her conclusion reached was that the parents do not have the capacity to parent X safely, either now or within his timescales. Her assessment is a detailed piece of work. It sets out serious concerns about the parents’ ability to understand the concerns about the mother identified in Y’s case; their ability to recognise X’s basic needs and meet them, even in some instances during the limited family time; their ability to understand risks and keep X safe, including new risks that will emerge as he grows; their ability to understand their own emotional wellbeing, as well as X’s emotional needs; and their ability to provide and maintain a suitable home and finances.[71]As regards the difficulties faced by the mother, Ms Spicer’s evidence was not challenged either by the official solicitor or the father. The father’s opposition to a placement order was based instead on his proposal to act as X’s primary carer. He was adamant at the hearing that he is ready to give up work to do so.[72]In my judgment there are several problems with this response: i) Notwithstanding the father’s non-engagement with the assessment process, the best evidence as to the father’s capacity to meet X’s needs, if he were to become his primary carer, remains Ms Spicer’s assessment. It is right that since that assessment, the father has engaged much more consistently in family time. Not all the contact records from those sessions are available. The ones that are demonstrate an improvement in terms of the parents’ need for prompting, to feed X and change his nappy. But there is a world of difference between engaging with a child in a 2 hour contact session and acting as the child’s primary carer as they grow. ii) The father has no insight into the difficulties the mother faced in looking after Y in the past, and would face in looking after X in the future. When asked whether he understood the concerns about her care of Y he replied that he did not know. The evidence overall supports the assessment set out in the authority’s final statement of evidence that he, like the mother, has an “entrenched lack of insight” into her limitations. This lack of insight threatens to undermine his assertion that he should be trusted not to rely on or permit the mother to look after X. iii) The father continues to show a lack of insight into the wider risks to X. For example, he refuses to acknowledge that the environment at the London accommodation was wholly unsuitable. iv) There is the history of non-engagement with services, both before and after X was born. The father failed to engage with Children Services, or the midwifery teams before X was born. Thereafter he failed to engage fully with the housing and other support services and the parenting assessment process. More recently he has applied for a further assessment and has been more engaged with contact. But this comes after more than a year of court proceedings. Even at the hearing, when the father was asked by his counsel whether he could consider moving with X to a parent and child foster placement, or a residential assessment centre, his initial response was to say that he may not be able to accept this as he did not see the need for it. He was asked by Ms Cann, for the local authority, whether he and the mother would need any help if X were placed back with them. His reply was that he did not think so and that “we don’t want any more help”. His counsel later confirmed the father’s readiness to accept any placement or assessment. But the father’s answers during questioning bear out the central concern; there remains an entrenched lack of insight into the need for further assessment and support, even after a year of proceedings, which undermines the father’s assertion that he would maintain proper engagement with support services in the future. v) The parents continue to face huge practical hurdles. There are the mother’s cognitive problems and vulnerability; the parents’ lack of English; the fact that they are on the other side of the world from their homeland and most of their family; the apparent lack of any significant family support in the UK; and their wish to continue to provide financially for their children in their home country. It is clear both parents have worked incredibly hard to make a life for themselves here. But they have struggled to secure sufficient housing and subsistence even for themselves, let alone a dependent child. They do not presently have a home, or even place where they can stay together. The mother has settled status. At the hearing I was told the father also has pre-settled status and a right to work/claim benefits. It is likely the parents are entitled to more state support, in terms of housing and benefits, than they have been getting. But the evidence is that they have not been able or willing to engage with services so as to access this. In the past, the father has been the main breadwinner. He accepts he has seen this as his role. If X were placed back in his care, with the father to be his main carer, the pressures on the father to go back to work would be continuing and intense. vi) The father’s plans for the future are wholly unrealistic. In oral evidence he told me that if X were placed back with him he would stop work immediately and rely on the mother’s earnings. He would find a home to rent where he, the mother and X could live together. He envisaged this would be in the local area. It is naïve to imagine things would be so simple.[73]All of this leads me to accept the conclusion reached by the authority and the guardian. The father’s plan to take on X’s care is not viable; he would not be able to provide safe or adequate care for X with the mother or alone. There is no effective or sufficient support which could be put in place to assist the couple. This is because they share an entrenched lack of insight into what would be involved in looking after X and into their need for support. It is not likely they would maintain any engagement.[74]I turn to consider the pros and cons of the competing options before the court. I will do so relatively briefly because the substance of the issues that arise is dealt with above.

Option A – placement for adoption

[75]In my judgment placement is the option most likely to ensure that X’s primary need is met, namely that he is provided with a safe and stable home and family, within a time frame which will allow him to flourish.[76]Placement would bring with it substantial disadvantages and risks. Most obviously, X’s bond with his parents, and through them his wider family, would be largely severed. I refer above to all the good qualities they have to offer. Any plan for placement and adoption carries risks. Given X’s age and good health, the prospects of securing a placement are good. But the evidence suggests there is no prospect of a placement which matches his distinctive background and heritage. I also take notice of the fact that support for adopted families is limited. Some adoptions fail. Even where adoptions succeed, they frequently give rise to intense and difficult issues of identity as the adopted child grows, such as magnetic and profoundly unsettling thoughts of what might have been.[77]To a limited extent, some of these disadvantages and risks may be mitigated by post-placement and post-adoption contact. But even where a section 26 order for direct contact is made, contact is severely limited and its continuation uncertain.

Option B – placement with the parents

[78]A placement with his parents would if possible enable X to maintain his relationship with them. There would be scope for his developing some relationship with his half-siblings and wider family. There would be no issues of identity, or loss of heritage and family background.[79]The problem with this option is that, for the reason set out above, I find that X’s parents would not be able to meet his needs, either in the short or longer term. Notwithstanding their love and commitment, they would not be able to protect him and would be likely to come to harm.[80]Ms Bath, for the father, sought to renew the father’s application for a further expert assessment of his parenting capacity. I reject that proposal for two reasons. First, notwithstanding the father’s limited engagement with Ms Spicer, the wider evidence as to the limits of his capacity is not only sufficient but clear. It remains neither necessary nor proportionate to direct further evidence. Secondly, any adjournment for further assessment would cause substantial delay for X at a crucial time. It would be inconsistent with his primary need as outlined above.[81]It follows that I am satisfied that, having regard to X’s welfare, his placement for adoption is necessary and proportionate. In short, nothing else will do. X’s welfare requires that his parents’ consent to placement be dispensed with.

Section 26 contact

[82]The authority’s plan is that direct contact should be gradually reduced to monthly sessions pending X’s placement, and should then cease. Thereafter contact should be limited to annual letterbox contact with the parents to be provided with help from an interpreter. This plan was supported by the guardian. In her final analysis filed shortly before the hearing she opined that, “Post adoption contact is difficult to contemplate at this stage”, but that it could be kept under review after adoption as “as his needs will change over the years”.[83]Both X’s current social worker and the guardian took a significantly different position when giving evidence. By the end of his evidence the gist of Mr O’s position was that there may be a distinction to be drawn between contact with the mother and contact with the father; that contact with both parents, alternatively with the father, may well be beneficial for X; that the issue should be subject to open-minded review by the authority.[84]This was broadly consistent with the oral evidence from the guardian, Ms H. She proposed that, as an additional safeguard, the potential benefits of contact, and an expectation that it should be fully considered, could be recorded in a recital to the order as well as reiterated in her letter to the independent review officer.[85]The parties helpfully directed me to the recent case of Re B-A (Placement Order and Contact Order) [2026] EWCA Civ 356. Among the important principles brought together in that case I note the following: i) It is the court, rather than the local authority or any other person, which has the responsibility for determining whether there should be ongoing contact between the child and the birth family. ii) While it is extremely unusual for the court to order contact post adoption, the court’s responsibility is to “set the template” for contact at the placement order stage. iii) It would be wrong for the risk of deterring potential adopters to be the determining factor in each and every case. Each case must be assessed on its own facts. There will be some cases where the priority to be given to birth family relationships will be such that the court should make a contact order, notwithstanding that to do so may make the task of finding an adoptive family more challenging. iv) The “no order” principle applies. However an order may be appropriate to reflect “the real world challenges with which [a parent] would be presented in seeking to press home an informal arrangement”, even absent any outright opposition to contact by a local authority or reason to mistrust their willingness to promote it.[86]On face of it, direct contact offers by far the best means by which some of the disadvantages to placement outlined above could be mitigated. Given the parents’ language problems and other challenges, letterbox contact is likely to be limited at best. Life story work will be undertaken, but this offers no real substitute for the opportunity for X to maintain some relationship with his parents, and to learn about his background and where he comes from as he grows. Contact to date, albeit in different circumstances, has been very positive. There needs to be a good reason as to why it should not continue.[87]The professional witnesses raised the following concerns.[88]First, it is not yet clear how the parents will react to the order for placement. Mr O opined that it would be a “huge ask” for them to resist bringing a sense of injustice to contact, when neither of them has any insight into the reasons why X is to be adopted. Ms Spicer likewise referred to the parents’ “absolute lack of understanding” about this, and her concern as to whether they would be able to continue contact in a positive way. As regards the mother, the evidence suggests she lacks the capacity to understand the reasons for placement. It is not clear she has the capacity to understand even what adoption means. In Y’s case a final care order was made in 2024, and a plan approved for long term foster care with a view to the foster carers’ adopting him in the future. The authority’s evidence is that despite this the mother has continued to ask Y’s social worker when Y will be returning to her care.[89]Secondly, the mother has a history of reacting in a dysregulated way. If she were to become upset during contact, this could be deeply unsettling for X.[90]Thirdly, the period after placement will be crucial in terms of enabling X both to deal with the upheaval of separation from his foster carer, and to settle in to his “forever home”. Concerns about the parents’ ability to engage positively with contact would therefore be particularly acute at this stage. Moreover, depending on where any prospective adopters were located, contact may need to take place at an unfamiliar venue with unfamiliar staff.[91]Fourthly, there are concerns the mother may say things to X which would unsettle him. The authority’s evidence is in sessions with Y the mother has discussed plans to take him to her home country. Their chronology suggests it happened in around March 2025. It led to the mother’s family time with Y being reduced albeit not discontinued. Mr O pointed out that as X grows, he may ask difficult questions of the parents as to why he does not live with them.[92]Fifthly, there were concerns about whether the parents would maintain contact. The evidence is that the mother has attended only around 10% of the contact sessions scheduled to take place with Y (currently scheduled to take place 6 times every 12 months). Neither is it clear whether they will engage with professionals such as the birth relative support worker, who will be key to facilitating contact (whether direct or indirect).[93]An order for contact would limit the prospects of securing a suitable placement by deterring some prospective adopters. Mr O noted it is already more challenging to find placements for non-white British children. The evidence from the adoption agency is that, of the 8 possible placements identified by them, only 4 have stated they are open to arranging direct contact. Ms Spicer referred to this as striking, and emphasised that the focus for X must be on securing the “most suitable placement”. The guardian likewise expressed her concern not to limit the pool of potential adopters. She emphasised that the priority for X must be to find adopters as soon as possible, and that there should be no risk of delay pending any application under section 27.[94]In the face of these concerns, Ms Cann for the authority submitted that the court is not in a position to determine at this stage whether post placement contact would or would not be in X’s best interests. That task should be left to the local authority.[95]In my judgment I am in a position to decide whether contact is likely to be in X’s best interest, and it is my responsibility to do so. The decision must be provisional to an extent, in the sense that it is forward looking. It may need to be revisited as new information becomes available, including as to the parents’ reaction to the placement order, their future engagement, and the availability of prospective adopters who are open to contact. But I am not persuaded that the evidence is insufficient, or the uncertainties are such, that it is not possible or appropriate for me to form a judgment at this stage.[96]The concerns raised about contact have substance. However in my judgment the possible disadvantages and difficulties with contact are not likely to outweigh the likely benefits. As regards the concerns: i) I do not see the parents’ lack of understanding as to the reasons for placement are likely to make it impossible for them to make contact a positive experience for X in the future. There is no indication that they have allowed their sense of injustice to undermine their contact with X to date. The mother’s lack of understanding as to why Y was taken away has not undermined her contact with him. Whatever problems there have been with that contact, the fact the authority has continued it suggests that overall they consider it remains beneficial. ii) As regards the mother’s reaction and what she might say, she is not likely to have to navigate contact alone. She has been alone when spending supervised time with Y. But with X it is likely she will have help and support available from the father. The professionals have recognised that he has had a calming influence on her. He is likely to have a better understanding, at least as to the effect of the placement order if not the reason for it, and the need to make contact positive for X. As regard the risk of inappropriate comments, such as the mother’s comment to Y about going to her home country, it will be some time before X is old enough to risk being unsettled by such comments. The mother will have time to adjust, and develop some understanding of the situation with the father’s help. X is not likely to learn her language in any event. Any communication is likely to be made through an interpreter. iii) As regards the potential disruption, in particular over the initial period of placement, the proposed contact is severely limited. It is to take place only twice a year. I further accept the point made by Ms Bovington that some continuity of contact with his parents may be as likely to assist X with the transition as opposed to making it harder. iv) In terms of commitment, the parents have shown a good commitment to attending contact with X to date despite substantial travelling. It is likely the parents will be support each other with attending. Only 2 contacts a year a proposed. v) I have found the parents struggled to engage with professionals in a number of respects. But they will have a strong incentive to engage with X’s social worker and in due course the birth relative support worker. They will know that contact will not take place unless they engage. vi) An order for contact will further limit the pool of prospective adopters. But unless contact proves unworkable for some other reason, I am satisfied an openness to contact is a factor which goes to the suitability of a proposed placement. If it proves impossible to secure a prompt placement with prospective adopters open to contact, then section 27 provides a means by which the contact order can be revisited. I will direct that any such application be referred to me to consider listing it for urgent hearing.

Conclusion

[97]I therefore declare and order as follows: i) The section 31 threshold for both orders have been met. ii) The application for a care order is granted. iii) The parents’ consent to the application for a placement order is dispensed with. iv) The placement order is granted. v) There should be a section 26 order for contact, providing for direct contact to be reduced up to the date of placement as the local authority propose, but thereafter continuing for 2 sessions per year. vi) Any application under section 27 should be reserved and referred to me to consider urgent directions. vii) The care plan should be approved subject to amendment to take account of the order for contact. District Judge Chataway 12 June 2026