X (A Child) (Child Arrangements at the Conclusion of Public Law Proceedings), Re [2026] EWFC 140 (B)

[2026] EWFC 140 (B)

Case No ZW25C50295

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT WEST LONDON

West London Family Court

Gloucester House, 4 Duke Green Avenue,

Feltham, TW14 0LR

Date 28 May 2026

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE WILLANS

Between

LONDON BOROUGH OF EALINGApplicant

A MOTHERRespondents

A FATHERRespondent

A CHILD (by her Children’s Guardian)Respondent

Taj Brar (instructed by Ealing Legal Services) for Applicant

Christian Mitchell (instructed by Child Law Partnership) for First Respondent

Tamara Muhammad (instructed by TV Edwards Solicitors) for Second Respondent

Tim Hussein (instructed by Miles & Partners LLP) for Third Respondent

Ann Courtney (instructed by) for Local Authority X

Hearing Hearing dates: 17 April 2026

JUDGMENT

HHJ Willans:

[1]On 17 April 2026 I heard the IRH/EFH in this matter. I heard submissions as to the final orders in the public law proceedings and there was a consensus around the making of a supervision order to Local Authority X. The only issue in this regard was as to whether the order should subsist for 6 or 12 months. But for the matters below I would have determined all issues on that day and the case would have ended.

[2]I was not able to do so as there remained a list of essentially private law issues which were not agreed and indeed in some regards had been raised unhelpfully late such that I could not fairly seek to resolve them within the ambit of the hearing. These issues related to: i) Should I make a lives with order in favour of the mother? ii) Should I make a child arrangements order for spending time between the child and father or should I instead make either no contact or indeed a ‘no contact’ order? iii) Should I permit a change of the child’s surname to that of the mother’s alone? iv) Should I make a s91(14) order barring future applications by the father unless with the Court’s permission?

[3]I gave case management directions for the resolution of the issues and determined it was appropriate for the matters to be considered on written submissions from each party (to be filed by 18 May 2026). In the circumstances of the case, I formed the view there was no need for an attended hearing or for live evidence on these issues. In part I formed this view based on the position of the father set out in a position document that the matters were capable of fair determination in this way. However, in my order I provided an opportunity for the father to seek an oral hearing (see recital F(iv)) if he felt this was necessary. No such application has been made and I now proceed to give judgment.

Parties Positions

[4]The applicant proposes a 12-month supervision order to be held by designated Local Authority X, supports the mother’s applications and opposes any spending time with order to the father. The Mother and child’s guardian takes the same position. Local Authority X argue for a 6-month order but will accept a 12-month order if the Court deems that proportionate and necessary. The respondent father agrees a lives with order to the mother but opposes the change in surname and argues against a s91(14) order. He challenges the proposed contact arrangements as to quantum and looks to build towards direct contact in due course. He does not seek direct contact at this time.

Background

[5]In a judgment reported as Re A (A Child) (Non-Notification of Father with PR)

[2025] EWHC 2696 (Fam)

I considered and determined an applicant made by the mother for non-notification of the father within these proceedings. I refused this application for the reasons set out but provided safeguards to maintain the mother’s security.

[6]In §§12-17 of that judgment I set out the relevant background. I appreciate at that point in time the father had no role in the proceedings and so the account provided to me has the potential to be skewed. I note the following: i) The parties met in around June 2023. They conducted a religious marriage a year later in June 2024. The child was was born on 11 July 2024 being conceived in the early stages of the relationship. In my judgment I recorded the father last seeing the child when she was about 2-months of age (i.e. in about September 2024). This was a relationship of little more than 1-year. ii) The records indicate the child was known to relevant children services as an unborn child due to concerns around domestic abuse and concerning the mother’s poor mental health. The family moved around South London with a series of local authorities being involved. The child was placed on the Child Protection Register in summer 2024 under the category of emotional abuse. In September 2024 the mother moved into a refuge with the child and made allegations of domestic violence against the father. iii) The father was subsequently arrested and was on remand at the date of my earlier decision. The mother had made a number of very serious allegations against the father. In respect of some she later withdrew her allegations or would not support the prosecution of the same. The initial statement in the case sets out a very concerning history albeit with no findings having been made. iv) Ultimately various allegations came to trial in November 2025. The father was convicted of:(i) assault by beating;

(ii) assault occasioning actual bodily harm;

(iii) intentional strangulation (x2), and; controlling and coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. He received a custodial sentence of 42 months and a restraining order was imposed until 2036. The father remains in prison but a combination of a significant period on remand in conjunction with the 50% principle for sentences under 4 years mean he us due for release in the foreseeable future.

The proceedings

[7]Following the decision on non-notification the proceedings continued with appropriate assessments including a residential assessment of the mother.

[8]On 21 January 2026 the case returned to Court. The assessment of the mother was sufficiently positive for the parties to agree to a testing period via a transition into the community. At that hearing I was informed the father had applied for a child arrangements order to the East London Family Court. I subsequently had that application transferred to this Court and consolidated with these proceedings. I gave directions with respect to designation issues if a supervision order was the preferred outcome (the mother at that stage proposing to move into the area of Local Authority X). I gave directions for a special guardianship assessment of the paternal grandmother, final evidence and IRH.

[9]The case returned for this hearing. The mother had made good progress and all agreed the child should remain in her care subject to a supervision order to Local Authority X (the length of which to be determined).

Discussion

[10]The outcome for the child in this case is positive yet at stages during the proceedings there was no certainty this would be the outcome. There was a very real chance the outcome for the child would have included consideration of removal of the child from her family with a plan of adoption. That this is not the case is without doubt a function of the mother’s commitment to her, the work she has undertaken during the proceedings and a willingness to work openly and honestly with professionals.

[11]Yet it would I believe be wrong not to keep in mind that these remain early days for the mother in her progress towards a future stable life with her daughter. There will be challenges ahead and it is crucial for the child that her mother has the highest stability (both emotionally and in all other regards) that is possible. Without this there remains a danger that the placement will come under strain and be vulnerable to breakdown. I do not wish these views to be taken in any way as critical of the mother. Far from it. But I do want to continue to be realistic when I come to assess future risks and when I come to assess the issues that may destabilise and therefore negatively impact the child.

[12]I have assessed all the evidence and I agree the appropriate outcome in this case is that the child remain with her mother. There are grounds for optimism as to the future and this is the outcome which best meets her welfare needs. These needs are paramount and I have reflected on the welfare checklist in approving this outcome. I could not on the evidence contemplate any alternative plan (adoption of long-term foster care) as the same would plainly be a disproportionate response to the circumstances before the Court.

[13]I agree with proposal of a supervision order. On the facts of the case the mother continues to require a level of support which is most consistent with such an order. She agrees the same (as do all the parties) and this signals to me the justification for the order when one considers proportionality and necessity. I have considered whether no public order would suffice but have concluded that would be an inferior outcome and would raise unnecessary risks for the future.

[14]I consider a 12-month order is the right order having regard to all the circumstances of the case. This has regards to the point the mother is in her progress, her still relatively new state of independent living and the issues that may arise as regards the father over the next period. My overarching view is that a 6-month order would in all likelihood require extension and so I start by fixing the appropriate length of order.

[15]I intend to make a lives with order in favour of the mother. This is sought and supported by the professionals and not disputed by the father. On balance it will fortify the placement and provide security and stability. It reflects the reality of the child’s life.

[16]I turn to the father’s application with respect to contact. The father argues for indirect updating information in respect of the child to include photograph updates, he would then want to undertake a risk assessment on release from prison as a prelude to direct contact being considered.

[17]The applicant had cautiously proposed the potential for no more than 3 updates being provided during the course of the supervision period but was worried as to how this would effectively continue thereafter without risking breaching the mother’s anonymity as to location. The applicant does not support conventional direct or indirect contact at this time. The guardian is worried about the updates and has questioned whether such updates are consistent with the child’s welfare rather than being adult orientated.

[18]There is of course an important distinction between making no order for contact and positively directly there should be no contact. The latter is a ‘no contact’ order and requires justification. I bear in mind the presumption in favour of a relationship with both parents continues but this can be displaced.

[19]In this case Practice Direction 12J applies and so I must approach the welfare checklist keeping this in mind at all stages. Contact can only be ordered, in any form, if the Court is satisfied it will be safe both for the child and the mother. Safety includes emotional safety as much as physical safety.

[20]Under paragraph 37 of PD12J: In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider –(a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living;

(b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents;

(c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent;

(d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and

(e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.

[21]It is clear from the papers that the father does not accept his convictions or the findings that underly it. He is intending to appeal his conviction. I intend to proceed on the convictions as I am entitled to do. I have determined the father remains in denial and lacks insight. In such circumstances I am naturally very concerned as to the potential for repeated behaviour of a similar nature.

[22]I do not lose sight of the seriousness of the matters that underly the convictions. They combine violence, high level intimidatory behaviour with potentially fatal consequences and coercive behaviour patterns. These events occurred within a relatively short relationship and suggested a very worrying state of affairs. I appreciate there are many other serious matters alleged and whilst no findings have been made in such regards I am entitled, indeed obliged, to reflect on this worrying picture when calibrating a safe outcome for the child and mother.

[23]I reflect on the imposition of a 10-year restraining order and note that whilst this does not prevent contact occurring it was imposed to protect the mother from contact from the father.

[24]I also have regard to the vulnerability of the mother which continues while she builds resilience. It is crucial for the child that her mother is given the very best opportunity to continue in her progress without surrounding anxiety related to the father. I do not lose sight of the fact that it was in part this behaviour which placed the child’s future family life at risk.

[25]On the evidence I am far from satisfied the father’s intentions are child focused and not part of a continuing wish to control the mother. I consider it would be necessary to have clarity through proper assessment before a confident conclusion could be reached. I am frankly not willing to take a chance in this regard where the consequences, if wrong, will sound profoundly on the life expectations of the child whose welfare is my sole concern.

[26]I remain concerned as to whether the father will use contact as a route to further domestic abuse of the mother.

[27]In this case the magnetic feature in the welfare checklist is risk of harm when considering the above paragraphs. This interlinks with the needs of the child (both emotional and physical) which are symbiotically related to the emotional wellbeing of the mother. I have concluded the mother has capacity to provide the child with good enough care but I have doubts whether she could maintain the same were the father in the picture given his previous debilitating impact upon her.

[28]The father draws attention to the child’s identity needs her cultural background and the importance of the same to the child with his role as the parent best able to promote these features. I agree these points are important but they are very much secondary to the child being kept safe and secure.

[29]On the serious facts of this case I have concluded there should be no contact with the father and make a no contact order. This is not a lifelong order and is susceptible to review if the father demonstrates change. In his argument he suggests it is unclear what is expected of him. I can help by identifying the following expectation the Court would have when considering any future application. I would expect him to have fully engaged with an accredited DAPP course. I would expect to see a report from such a provider which indicates full engagement on the part of the father and clear evidence of remorse and insight. These are the foundations of change. If this can be done then I would expect a professional risk assessment to be undertaken to give confidence as to positive contact if ordered. One would of course also have to reflect on the position of the mother at such future time.

[30]I turn to the application for a section 91(14) Order. I intend to make such an order for a period of 3-years. This reflects my concern as to the father’s likely behaviour once released from prison. On the evidence it appears he will likely apply as soon as he is released. This would be most unhelpful for the child’s stability. Plainly he will not have engaged with any of the work noted above, which is likely to require 6-12 months in any event. The next year is a period of particular importance for the mother as she settles into her new life. Thereafter there will be a period as she moves away from local authority support. This underpins my 3-year assessment.

[31]It is well understood the circumstances for making such an order have been extended in cases of domestic abuse and that it is no longer required to find evidence of vexatious conduct or litigation behaviour. It is sufficient in cases of domestic abuse to determine that such an order is required in order to safeguard the welfare of the child. In this case I consider the mother needs an unimpeded period in which to continue her progress without distraction or anxiety. I judge further litigation from the father, and possibly almost immediately, will be inimical to the welfare of the child. I consider it is likely to amount to a continuing process of control.

[32]I turn to the proposed change of surname. The law in this regard clearly requires a change to have a welfare positive for the child and reinforces the significance of a surname and particularly where the parties have elected to choose that name. In a case in which contact is not ongoing the link by name may be the last remaining link and may take on additional importance. Further in cases involving international or cross-cultural relationships a name can be an important link with the cultural identity of one of the parents and an integral part of the child’s identity. In such cases changing a name may have significant impact.

[33]The father is intended to make these points and they resonate with the Court. He suggests a compromise of double-barrelling the name. In contrast those who support the change make two points in particular:(1) The child’s name may make locating her easier if not changed. I note the mother has a common family name, although the child’s first name is quite unusual, and;

(2) It is likely to be negatively impactful on the mother for the child to continue to bear the surname of the person who has so seriously abused her.

[34]I reject the notion of the usage of a double-barrelled name. Whilst that is an often-used solution to such a dispute it does not fit with the arguments in this case. Double barrelling the child’s name if anything makes her identification risk greater.

[35]In the ultimate analysis I cannot overlook the significant domestic abuse experienced by the mother. The effect on her of the same did not end on separation. It will continue with her for many years, if not forever, at an emotional level. It has left her damaged and vulnerable. I understand her emotional response to having to use her abusers name on a daily basis when identifying her daughter. I also understand her worries about anonymity. I agree maintaining confidentiality is very important for the child. Any loss of confidentiality would likely lead to the mother having to move causing huge disruption for the child.

[36]On the circumstances of the case I consider the mother should be given permission to change the surname of the child.

[37]In different circumstances I might consider making a non-molestation order of the Court’s own motion. However, I note the significant nature of the restraining order and do not feel the same would bring any additional positive benefit.

[38]These are my conclusion. I will send the judgment to the parties and will hand it down electronically without attendance at 10am on 28 May 2026. If there are any corrections or requests for clarification then they should be sent to me by 10am on 27 May 2026. I have drafted this in a largely anonymous form but would welcome any proposed further redactions (ignoring the front page) by 10am on 27 May 2026.

[39]The applicant should upload a final order for approval by close on 29 May 2026. HHJ Willans