P Local Authority v BX & Ors [2026] EWFC 134 (B)

IN THE CENTRAL FAMILY COURT CASE NO: ZC25C50358[2026] EWFC 134 (B)First Avenue House42-49 High HolbornLondonBefore HER HONOUR JUDGE ROBERTSONIN THE MATTER OFP Local Authority (applicant)-v-BX (first respondent mother)KC (second respondent father)C (third respondent, by her children’s Guardian Lara Hastings)Steven Evans of counsel appeared on behalf of the applicantSherene Pascall-Wallis, Solicitor, appeared on behalf of the first respondentTrisan Hyatt of counsel appeared on behalf of the second respondentTim Hussein of counsel appeared on behalf of the third respondentJUDGMENTDate 19 May 2026WARNING: This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.Parties and applicationsP Local AuthorityClaimantRespondent motherDefendantRespondent fatherDefendant
[1]I am concerned with the welfare of C, a girl who is 1. Her mother is BX and she has been represented by Sherene Pascall-Wallis, solicitor. Her father is KC and he has been represented by Trisan Hyatt of counsel. The applicant is P Local Authority, represented by Steven Evans of counsel. Chas been represented through her Guardian, Lara Hastings, by Tim Hussein of counsel. The application is an application for a Care or Supervision Order and is dated 11 July 2025.

Background

[2]The local authority’s original concerns related to the mother’s ability to safeguard C, the mother’s young age and vulnerability, difficulties in the parents’ relationship, cannabis use, the father’s concerning background and concerns about the mother’s mental health. On 21st May 2024, the unborn C was placed on a Child Protection Plan under the category of neglect. After her birth in July 2024 the parents and C were supported by a local parenting programme. Things initially went well, and C was stepped down to a Child in Need plan in February 2025 due to positive progress having been made. However there remained concerns about the mother’s inadequate housing. She lives in a multiple-occupation building with shared utilities, which is not suitable accommodation for a child to live in. Perhaps as a result, the mother began to have symptoms of depression and anxiety for which she sought help.[3]On 16 June 2025 the mother took C to hospital with concerns about her arm. She was found to have a pulled elbow, which is a partially dislocated elbow which can be caused in a variety of ways, some of them well-intentioned and accidental. The injury was resolved by expert manipulation of the joint and C was observed to be using her arm normally again before leaving hospital.[4]Three days later, on 19 June 2025 the mother, according to her statement, noticed that C’s wrist had become swollen whilst she was sleeping. She took her to the hospital again. She was X-rayed and found to have a fractured wrist. No satisfactory explanation was put forward at that time. C remained in hospital for a few nights, and was then discharged into foster care. She was originally placed there with s20 consent, but since 14 July 2025 has been under an ICO. On 22 September 2025 she moved to the care of her maternal grandmother (“MGM”) and has remained there since then, having regular contact with her parents.

Positions of the parties

[5]The Local Authority seek findings against the parents in relation to the injuries, and seek a Special Guardianship Order to the maternal grandmother.[6]The parents deny causing the injuries. They both say that they remain in a relationship but not cohabiting. They both say they would like C to return to their care with the mother as the main carer and the father supporting her. The mother does not say that this should happen straight away but accepts that she needs to work on her psychological issues first. She has applied for an extension of these proceedings to enable her to undertake work recommended as part of her psychological assessment by Mr Dowsett so that C can, a little later, come safely home. The father supports the mother’s position and says he will support the mother in the care of C.[7]The Guardian supports the Local Authority’s position.

This hearing

[8]This hearing has been a rolled-up fact-finding and final hearing. I have had five days to complete the evidence and submissions, from 20-24 April 2026. I was not able to deliver the judgment within that time-frame and I am handing it down in written form just over three weeks’ later. I have had the benefit of a bundle, some additional documents including an updating final statement from the local authority with photographs of the cot attached, the Guardian’s final analysis and video evidence showing C’s mobility in hospital in June 2025. I have heard oral evidence from Mr Matthew Jeary (ISW), Dr Andrew Watt (radiologist), Dr Jack Pickard (paediatrician), Mr John Dowsett (psychologist), Ms Nomthandazo Nduku (social worker), the mother, the father and the Guardian. Most of the hearing was conducted remotely because of the tube strikes, but no significant issues arose with that. I heard the mother’s and the father’s evidence in person in the court room.

The issues

[9]The issues I have to decide area. Whether to make the findings sought by the Local Authority in their further amended final threshold document dated 7 April 2026b. Whether to end proceedings with the making of a special guardianship order to the maternal grandmotherc. Whether to direct an extension of proceedings to enable the mother to commence therapy with a view to paving the way for a transition of C back into the parents’ care.

The law

[10]In respect of the disputed findings, the burden of proof is on the local authority to prove the findings. In each case the standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities, not more, not less.[11]Findings of fact must be based on evidence, including‘inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation’[Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12].[12]In any decision that I make involving the upbringing of a child, their welfare must bemy paramount consideration, and I must take into account all of the relevant circumstances in the case, in particular the welfare checklist at s.1(3) CA 1989.[13]Article 8 and Article 6 of the ECHR are engaged. The child and each parent has a right to respect for their family life. Orders must be necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm.[14]In addition to the principles above, the parties have set out the law on non-accidental injuries in an agreed note which I append to this judgment and adopt. It also sets out the law on lies and extension of proceedings.

The injuries

[15]It is not in dispute that there were two injuries. The first was a “pulled elbow”, which is a partial dislocation of the elbow and which was first documented on 16 June 2025. The second was a broken wrist in the form of incomplete left distal radial and ulnar fractures, first documented on 19 June 2025. What is in dispute is whether those injuries arose from a single incident (a “cot fall”) or whether there were two separate incidents causing the two separate injuries. I am also asked to determine, insofar as I can, the cause of each injury.

The pulled elbow

[16]The first account of the pulled elbow came in the 111 call made by the mother on 16 June 2025. The transcript does not record the time of the call but it is not in dispute that it was in the small hours of the morning, perhaps around 1am. The mother rang 111 because C had woken up (which was in itself unusual), and the mother had noticed that her left arm appeared to be hurting her and she was not using it properly. The mother rang 111 in some distress. I have listened to the recording of the call and it is evident that the mother is upset and fearful. She told the 111 assessor that she had first noticed that C did not want to use her arm when she was bathing her at around 8pm. C started crying in the bath and the mother did not know why. After the bath when the mother put on C’s vest and asked her to lift her hands up to take off her clothes she cried. She described C not wanting to use her arm, and not reaching out for toys with it. The assessor told her that a clinician would call her back, but it took a long time for that to happen and the mother decided not to wait but instead took C to the hospital.[17]At the hospital C was triaged by Staff Nurse GR at 6.15am who recorded in her notes that C was bright and alert and was able to lift both arms without discomfort. There was no obvious bruising, deformity, swelling or bony tenderness. The mother told her that C was learning to walk and was falling over a lot in the limited space in the flat.[18]C was next seen by Dr EC who was working as the Paediatric Registrar that morning. In her statement she says this:
“C’s mother reported that the patient had trouble moving her left arm since the previous night. This occurred whilst dancing to the “if you’re happy and you know it” song….C’s mother explained that C had stayed in the cot the whole time the day before. She denied C had fallen or been lifted up by her arms”
. Dr EC noted that C was not in acute distress but was in discomfort when she attempted to rotate her arm at the elbow joint. She diagnosed a “pulled elbow” (also called a subluxation of the radial head). She tried to reduce the subluxation by pronating and flexing at the elbow joint but it was not successful, so she called on the Paediatric Emergency Consultant, Dr DS.[19]Dr DS saw C at around 8.45 am. The mother repeated the narrative that the evening before C had not been able to join in with the clapping in “If you’re happy and you know it” at bedtime. The mother was unable to recall C having sustained any specific injury but said she was learning to walk and she pulled herself up in the cot and often fell down. She stated she had recently lowered the cot base so C couldn’t climb out. Dr DS asked if there was any possibility that C had been held by her hands or wrists whilst standing when she fell down but the mother said she always held her round the trunk. Dr DS asked if she could have got her arm stuck in the slats of the cot and the mother said she did not see it happen but C had got her arm stuck through the slats previously so it was possible. This account is taken from Dr DS’s statement which is in turn taken from her contemporaneous notes.[20]Dr DS examined C. When she palpated her upper limb she elicited mild discomfort around the radial head near the elbow joint. Dr DS says “there was no bony tenderness anywhere else”. She was confident the injury was a pulled elbow, and performed the manoeuvre to reduce it. She records that almost immediately after the manoeuvre C was able to use her arm freely. “She was now able to pull herself up to standing and on re-examination had a full range of movement at the wrists, elbows and shoulders on both sides”.[21]Dr EC saw C after Dr DS had reduced the subluxation and noted that on reassessment she saw C was now playing using both arms and was indeed trying to pull herself up with the left arm. This was in keeping the diagnosis of a subluxation of the radial head, successfully reduced.

The wrist fracture

[22]In relation to the wrist fracture, the mother’s statement (written nearly six weeks after the event) says that on 19 June 2025 at around 9.45am when she woke up she noticed C’s left wrist was swollen whilst she was still sleeping. She says “I was unaware of when or how her wrist became swollen and decided to go back to [X] Hospital”.[23]She was seen at the hospital first by a nurse who completed an initial assessment. The mother told her she did not know what had happened to C’s arm and said that “everyone was blaming her for what happened”.[24]C was next seen by Dr FJ. In her statement Dr FJ records that the mother told her that she could not recall an event which could have led to C having a sore arm nor an event which could have caused an injury. The only thing the mother could suggest was that C had got her arm caught in the gaps between the cot slats. The mother was concerned that C could go back on the child protection plan (having been stepped down from the child protection plan to a child in need plan in February). Dr FJ examined C. She could not see swelling, but recorded that C started to get upset and went to pull her arm away when she (Dr FJ) started to move her left arm. On pronating the left wrist C seemed to get more upset. Dr FJ considered C needed an X-ray for a bony injury. The X-ray revealed a displaced transverse distal radial fracture and a non-displaced distal ulnar fracture. Dr FJ asked the mother again whether she could think of anything that could have led to this fracture. She could not. She became upset when she was told that child protection procedures would have to be followed and Dr FJ gave her some time for her to process what was happening and for her family to arrive to support her. She then asked her further questions. The mother explained to Dr FJ that she lives with C alone. When she showers she leaves C in the cot. The mother could not recall an incident where C had fallen out, only that sometimes C likes to put her arms through the gaps between the slats of the cot. Further assessment of C produced no additional concerns, and when she needed comfort during the examination C reached out for her mum.

C’s response to the injuries

[25]There have been two medical experts giving evidence in this case, Dr Watts (a radiologist) and Dr Pickard (a paediatrician). Dr Watts says in his report that he is not an expert in the clinical aspects of a child’s presentation and that he would defer to the opinion of a clinical paediatric expert if such an opinion were to differ from his. In his oral evidence he confirmed that he deferred to Dr Pickard in relation to clinical presentation.[26]In relation to the pulled elbow, Dr Pickard found it surprising if there was no immediate distress but then said maybe it was not the first time C fell out of the cot (which is what the parents were at that stage describing). He suggested “Maybe it’s not the first time she fell out. Maybe she was expecting to fall so she was not distressed”. The difficulty with that line of reasoning is that there has never been any suggestion from the parents or anyone else that she fell out of the cot more than once.[27]It is the mother’s case that after C fell out of the cot she was crying and so she picked her up and hushed her for a bit, and then she went back to sleep. She says it was not major distress, just crying for a bit. The father says he did not see it because he was in the bathroom but he heard a thud, and so came out immediately and by the time he got there, there was no distress.[28]All in all, the parents’ evidence is a little confusing but if there was a cot fall (and that is yet to be determined) their account does not, in my view, contradict the medical expectation in any significant way, if the cot fall resulted only in a pulled elbow. There was some distress (according to the mother and as expected by Dr Pickard) but she was able to hush C relatively quickly, perhaps by the time the father got there from the bathroom. The picture is not the same, however, if C sustained the wrist fractures as a result of the (as yet unproven) cot fall.[29]In relation to the wrist fractures, in his written report Dr Pickard said that C “would have shown significant distress at the time and immediately after the injury. The duration of this distress is not possible to estimate. She would likely have cried, sought comfort, then appeared withdrawn or otherwise not herself for some time.” He thought it more likely than not that some distress would have been apparent to a carer but he could not be certain how much distress or how obvious.[30]In oral evidence he expanded on this. He said that such a fracture will certainly be very painful at the time it takes place. Children are very variable as to whether that distress lasts for minutes or hours. After the initial distress he would expect significant pain on handling or moving the arm around. There would have been immediate pain, swelling and loss of function. The swelling would develop in the first few hours and would typically also be visible in the first few hours. Even when pressed as to whether the swelling might have taken longer to appear he remained of the view that if there is going to be swelling, it would be within hours.[31]In relation to the wrist fractures the level of distress which the parents say resulted from the cot fall is simply not the same as the level of distress which Dr Pickard would have expected if the cot fall had resulted in fractures. If neither parent observed her injure herself, he said it was possible that she would have become distressed for a period which was not observed, and that a reasonable parent, after that time had passed, might not realise an injury had been sustained. But that is not the parents’ case. The mother’s case is that she was in the room at the time, and the father’s case is that he was in the bathroom and came out immediately when he heard the thud. The injury therefore happened in the presence of one parent and with the second parent attending almost instantaneously thereafter. In those circumstances, Dr Pickard would have expected the parents to notice the injury, if the injury was a fracture. The parents did not: and it is a weakness in the parents’ case that the narrative of the cot-fall resulting in the wrist fracture is not supported by the medical evidence about the likely level of distress following the fall.[32]The parents’ narrative is further undermined by the swelling not appearing until three days after the cot-fall. The mother reports first seeing the swelling in the morning of 19 June. She had not seen it prior to that and her evidence was that C was using her arm normally on 17 and 18 June and no symptoms were seen on those dates. It was noticing the swelling on 19 June which caused the mother to be alarmed and to take C to the hospital that day. If the wrist had been broken on 16 June by the cot-fall, Dr Pickard would have expected the swelling to have developed and be noticeable within a few hours on that day, 16 June, not three days later on 19 June. Again, the medical evidence does not support the parents’ theory of the case. 16-19 June 2025[33]There was a period of three days between the presentation at the hospital with the pulled elbow and the presentation with the wrist fracture. In those three days, it was the mother’s clear evidence that C showed no pain or discomfort in her arm and was able to use it entirely as normal. The father in oral evidence said that in that period he could see C’s arm was different. There was a slight discomfort when she raised it. She didn’t cry but she made a gesture with her face which “told him otherwise”. There is an obvious discrepancy between the mother’s and the father’s evidence in this regard.[34]There is also a discrepancy between the parents’ evidence and the medical evidence. Dr Pickard says that even in relation to an incomplete fracture, such as these wrist fractures, it can be very painful. The bone can feel the stresses on it and it becomes less solid. In his view painkillers such as paracetamol, if administered, would be unlikely to mask the symptoms of a fracture. Paracetamol would not have protected the fracture site from the medical examination which took place on 16 June. Nor is there, in fact, any evidence of C being given paracetamol. In Dr Pickard’s view, if C’s wrist had been broken on 16 June, during those three intervening days C “would likely have shown some degree of distress on using the arm or on handling of the arm and this would have been the case until it was fixed in plaster”. Neither of the parent say that happened.

One incident or two?

[35]It is the parents’ case that there was a single incident, a cot fall, on 15 June 2025 and it caused both the pulled elbow and the fractured wrist. This seems to me very unlikely for the following reasons:a. The aftermath of the cot fall (if it happened at all) was not the aftermath which would have been expected if it had resulted in a broken wrist. There was not enough pain and distress at the time.b. On 16 June, Nurse GR and Dr DS both specifically recorded that there was no bony tenderness present on 16 June 2025.c. Dr DS records that almost immediately after the manoeuvre to resolve the pulled elbow C was able to use her arm freely, and that “She was now able to pull herself up to standing and on re-examination had a full range of movement at the wrists, elbows and shoulders on both sides”.d. Dr EC noted that after a period of observation after the manoeuvre C was now playing using both arms and was indeed trying to pull herself up with the left arm. Dr Pickard considered that was unlikely if she had fractured wrists at the time.e. The mother’s evidence that there were no problems with the arm on 17 and 18 June was much stronger and more certain than the father’s evidence that there was some sort of discomfort only discernible by the expression on C’s face. The father’s evidence on this point was vague and unconvincing and he appeared to be making it up as he went along. If there was such discomfort the mother, as the main carer, would be expected to have picked it up and she did not. I prefer the mother’s evidence. It is further supported by the fact that no other family member mentioned any pain or loss of function in the preceding three days when they were spoken to at the hospital on 19 June when they came to support the mother.f. A lack of any symptoms on 17 and 18 June as reported by the mother is at odds with Dr Pickard’s view that there would be loss of function and tenderness at the fracture site until it was protected by a cast.[36]In oral evidence Dr Pickard was pressed on the timeline of the injuries, and whether it was more likely that the pulled elbow and the fracture were injuries occurring from a single incident or from two separate incidents. He said it was possible that there could have been a single incident on 15 June 2025, giving rise to hairline fractures which did not swell and were not picked up at the hospital on 16 June, and that those hairline fractures could then have been knocked or otherwise exacerbated to open them into the incomplete fractures seen on the X-rays. It would be possible unintentionally to open up the hairline fractures into incomplete fractures by normal handling such as forcing an arm into a sleeve, but the baby would then be very distressed at that point.[37]Dr Pickard was scrupulously balanced and fair in his evidence but in the end he was clear that he thought that the “single incident” explanation was unlikely. The following things made it less likely:a. All the hospital evidence from 16 June (set out above)b. The lack of restricted movement on 17 and 18 June 2025.c. The lack of any account from the mother of C exhibiting the sort of distress associated with the opening of the hairline fractures into incomplete fractures between the two hospital admissions.d. In order for the “single incident later exacerbated” explanation to work, it would be necessary for not one but two hairline fractures to be knocked just the right amount to knock them both into incomplete fractures. Dr Pickard described that as “harder to imagine” Taking all that into account, Dr Pickard said it was more likely that there were two separate incidents, one causing the pulled elbow and the other causing the fracture.[38]Dr Pickard’s evidence was open and balanced. It was based on the evidence, and was logical and well-argued. I can see no reason to depart from his conclusion. I conclude that it is extremely unlikely the fracture was caused prior to the hospital visit on 16 June, and on the balance of probabilities, the pulled elbow and the fractured wrist were as a result of two separate injuries.

Did the cot fall happen?

[39]As I have already said, it is the parents’ case that the injuries were caused by a cot fall. The mother first mentions this in her statement of 29 July 2025, some six weeks after the injury on 16 June 2025. In that statement she says that she was lying on her bed on her phone and the father was in the bathroom. The base of the cot was in its raised, higher position so that when C stood up she could lean over the side of the cot. She said she put C to bed but she repeatedly stood up and kept leaning over the side of the cot. The mother kept telling her to stop leaning and putting her to lie back down. The mother says C did this “a few times”. The last time she did it she leaned over the side of the cot and fell out on to the laminate floor. She says “I remember it happening very quickly”. She says she cried, and the mother hushed her for a bit and she went to sleep. The mother says “not long after this KC went home”. Then she describes how C woke around 1am and the mother realised her arm was hurt and rang 111.[40]The father talks about the event in his unsigned and undated statement which was filed at around the same time as the mother’s statement at the end of July. In that statement he says that on 15 June 2025 he was in the bathroom and he heard a thud. He asked what happened and the mother explained that C had fallen out of the cot onto a pile of clothes beside the bed. He came out and saw the mother tending to her. There was no obvious distress at that moment. The next morning the mother informed him that she had called 111 and taken C to the hospital, where doctors said it was a dislocated elbow.[41]There are a number of difficulties with the parents’ accounts.a. The cot-fall described in the mother’s 29 July 2025 statement is significantly contradicted by her own first account given in the 111 call. In the 111 call she says the injury was evident in the bath, before C was in the cot. The 111 call is a very persuasive account, coming as it does immediately upon the mother noticing the injury.b. The idea of the injury occurring before the bath is supported by the mother’s accounts to EC and Dr DS (that C hadn’t been able to join in “If you’re happy and you know it”). Those two accounts and the account in the 111 call were all given within a few hours of the injury and together they form strong evidence that the injury occurred before C was put in her cot.c. The narrative of the injury happening before the bath and thus before being in the cot is further supported by the evidence the mother gave in her police interview on 25 June 2025 when she said that around 7-8pm she “went to go to get C undressed to put her in her bath and realised her arm was hurting and wouldn’t go above her head”d. The account given in the statement six weeks later mentions none of this, but suggests C was put to bed without injury, and that the injury was only caused when she fell out of the cot. It is starkly different.e. EC asked the mother if C had fallen and the mother specifically denied it. Again that was only a few hours after the incident and is powerful evidence.f. It is common ground among the witnesses including the mother that if the cot base was on its lowest setting then when C stood up in the cot, the top of her head would only have been 4cm higher than the top of the cot. It is agreed by all that in those circumstances she would not have been able to climb or fall out. On the other hand if the cot base were on the higher setting, the distance from the base to the top rail was 41 cm. C herself was at that age 71cm tall, so 30cm of her would have been above the top rail of the cot. It was plausible in Dr Pickard’s view that she could lean out and fall in those circumstances. I conclude (and the parties agree) that the only way she could have fallen out is if the cot base was on the higher setting.g. Dr DS’s statement records that on 16 June, only a few hours after the event, the mother “stated that she had recently lowered the cot base so she couldn’t climb out”. The mother now denies saying that, but I have no reason to doubt Dr DS’s record.h. Dr DS’s record is supported by the fact that on 8 May 2025 the Health Visitor “advised BX to move the mattress of the cot to the lowest level as C can fall off the cot. BX will do this ASAP”. The review strategy meeting minutes of 26 June 2025 records that concerns of the parenting group they attended included “Unsafe sleeping arrangements (cot height not appropriately adjusted), but then further records, specifically in relation to those concerns that “Despite concerns, mum responded positively to guidance and adjusted practices when reminded”. When asked why the health visitor might have said this at the meeting if the mother had not adjusted the cot height the mother said she had never got on with the health visitor. That was after saying the health visitor hadn’t visited since C was 8 months old, and then denying that she had a health visitor at all. I did not find the mother’s evidence persuasive and I take the combination of the health visitor notes and the strategy discussion minutes as good evidence in support of the contention that the mother had lowered the base some time before the incident, thereby making it impossible for C to have fallen out of the cot on 16 June 2025.i. Neither parent mentioned a cot-fall on 16 or 19 June to hospital staff or anyone else, and the mother did not mention it in her police interview on 25 June 2025, even when pressed hard by the interviewer to think about whether there had been any kind of accident, such as dropping her. The mother denied that anything like that had happened. If there had been a cot-fall it is hard to see why the mother did not mention it then.j. The mother did not mention the cot fall at all to anyone until her statement on 29 July 2025. The mother has never given any satisfactory explanation for why it took her so long to mention the cot-fall, if it really happened. When the father was asked why he had not mentioned it sooner he said it was because he was “making his own enquiries”. That was unpersuasive on a number of levels, not the least of which is that there is no evidence of him making any enquiries.k. The mother’s oral evidence was that she could not remember whether she witnessed the actual fall or not. The G accepted that responses to trauma vary, but said she would usually expect a significant event which was as traumatic as this to be embedded in the memory. She was surprised the mother could not remember it.[42]Having listed the evidence in relation to the cot-fall above, it is immediately apparent to me that there is a great deal of evidence to support the contention that there was no cot fall, and not much to support the contention that there was. The account of the cot-fall came late with no good reason for the delay. It failed to explain the wrist injury. The earlier accounts were fresher, repeated, consistent and altogether more persuasive. The account of the bed base being lowered was given in the immediate aftermath of the injury and was supported by the health visitors notes and strategy discussion minutes. In my view the clear balance of evidence lies in accepting the initial accounts as true, and concluding that the cot fall did not happen, but was something put forward later by the parents in an attempt to explain the injuries. I can not see that the story of the cot fall is a misunderstanding or a miscommunication. It is so clear, straightforward and repeated that it appears to me to be a deliberate untruth: but I remind myself that parents and others lie for all sorts of reasons including fear and shame, and the lie itself does not mean that the parents caused the injury.

Parents’ credibility

[43]This lie is not the only blemish on the parents’ credibility. The 111 call raises other serious issues of credibility in relation to the parents.[44]There are material discrepancies within each parent’s own evidence and in relation to each other’s evidence. For example, the mother has said in oral evidence that she kept telling C to lie down prior to the cot fall, but the father says C was asleep when he went into the bathroom and all he heard was a thud.[45]In her first statement the mother says that after C fell out of the cot on 16 June 2025, she hushed her for a bit and then put her back to bed. She says “Not long after this KC went home”. She then goes on to describe C waking up at about 1am and not putting weight on her arm and the mother calling 111 and going to the hospital. There is no suggestion that the father is present for any of that. In oral evidence she confirmed that the father had left by the time she made the 111 call.[46]The father in his statement describes the cot-fall (which I have found did not happen), and then simply says “The next morning (16 June) BX informed me that she called 111 and took C to the hospital”. It is implicit in this that he was not present for the 111 call and knew nothing before the next morning about the mother taking C to hospital. In oral evidence he was asked several times whether he was there for the 111 call and he said he could not remember, but he did not think so. I found his answers of “I can’t remember” very surprising indeed. It seemed to me that is something one would remember, particularly because it would mean that he was also there when the injury was discovered and when the mother was distressed and phoning for help. I took him to the transcript and read him a section. He remained unsure until I read him the part in which the mother is recorded as turning to speak to someone else momentarily. I asked him if it was him she was speaking to. He was not sure. I asked him who else it would be. He said “No one”. He then accepted that he had been there, and said it “rings a bell”.[47]Having established that I asked him why he had left in the midst of the unfolding drama. It seemed to me most unlikely that a loving father would leave in the middle of the night at just the moment where it had been noticed that his baby had been injured, where the baby’s mother was upset and ringing 111. His answer was “something came up I had to attend to”. He was then pressed further on this answer by the Guardian’s counsel who asked what could possibly have come up in the middle of the night that he had to deal with there and then. He said it was a family issue. When asked what it was he said it was “confidential” and that he was helping out. He was asked whether he had received a telephone call or a text about it. He said he had been told about it before, during the day. For clarity the Guardian’s counsel asked him “You were told before in the day there was going to be something urgent you would need to help with but not till the early hours”. The father said “yes”.[48]The father’s evidence about this was not credible. When he said it was “confidential” I had the strong impression he couldn’t think of anything else to say. The idea of it being arranged beforehand during the day is quite different from the idea that “something came up”. There is no suggestion of him sending a text or making a phone call to whoever it was he was supposed to be helping to say “can you get someone else to help you – my baby is injured and we may be on our way to hospital” which is what I would expect any concerned father to do. Such a call may not have been successful but he did not even try. The whole story, coming as it does after a pretence of not being able to remember whether he was there or not and then only remembering when forced to by the evidence of the transcript, is utterly implausible.[49]I come to the conclusion that both parents are lying about the father’s presence there that night. They have lied about the time of the injury, saying it was after the bath and after a sleep when it was in fact before the bath, they have lied about the cot-fall happening at all, and they have lied about the father being there during the 111 call then leaving. These are not peripheral issues. These are absolutely central to the case. I will consider in due course the relevance of these lies to the questions I have to decide.

Causation of the pulled elbow: NAI or accident?

[50]In relation to the pulled elbow, the medical evidence is that this is an injury which can be caused accidentally, perhaps by a child falling over and landing on an outstretched arm or even by a parent pulling a child’s arm to stop them running into traffic. Dr Pickard thought it could have been caused by C getting her arm caught in the bars of the cot but said they space the bars far apart to make that less likely. It was nevertheless not impossible. Dr Pickard said it could be non-accidental: it could be accidental.[51]I make the following observations about the evidence in relation to the pulled elbow:a. The first accounts given by the mother to the 111 operative and the hospital are in themselves convincing.b. Those accounts are the mother’s immediate account, given in the midst of real anxiety and distress about her baby when she wanted to ensure C got the proper medical treatment.c. They are not contradicted by the medical evidence.d. There would not have been a prolonged period of distress and the mother may not be lying about seeing no such distress in relation to the pulled elbow.e. The fact that the cot fall was later invented does not change that earlier evidential picture.f. Different considerations apply in relation to the wrist fracture. I will come to those shortly.g. The cot fall was, in my view, invented to explain the broken wrist, not the pulled elbow because the broken wrist is harder to cause and requires clearer explanation.h. There is no direct evidence that the pulled elbow was non-accidental, whether caused deliberately or by rough handling or negligent care.[52]Taking all that into account, I am inclined on balance to believe the mother’s first account, as given to the 111 operator that the pulled elbow was first noticed before and during the bath, that the mother may not have seen the injury and may not have picked up on the distress (which may have been slight). The pulled elbow may just have been one of those things. For those reasons I make no finding that the pulled elbow was caused deliberately or recklessly or negligently by either parent. The cause is simply unknown.

Causation of the fractures: NAI or accident?

[53]In relation to the fractures, the picture is rather different. It is plain from the evidence that it is much harder to cause them than to cause a pulled elbow. Dr Pickard did not think C could have caused the injury herself on the cot-bars. They could have been caused by a fall from the cot, but I have found that the cot-fall did not happen. It was queried whether they could have been caused by falling inside the cot. Dr Watt said that children get these injuries falling from standing, or running. It does not require a significant height. However he also said that any cushioning makes that less likely and that a mattress was quite a lot of cushioning. He was careful to say it made it less likely, not that it made it unlikely.[54]Dr Pickard said it was plausible that C could have caused the injury to herself if left unsupervised, and even supervised such injuries are possible. He said “Put simply, it would simply require that she fell from adequate height and with adequately hard or awkward landing”. He did not believe the injury could have been caused by her pulling against the cot bars, or that it could have occurred accidentally through normal handling. If it were caused by a carer, it would have been caused by significantly rougher handling than a normal carer would provide, “to the extent that it likely represents a deliberate attempt to cause harm”.[55]So, from the evidence, I conclude that the fractures could have been accidental, or they could have been caused, either deliberately, accidentally or negligently by a carer although causation by accidental rough handling is unlikely.[56]When the fractures occurred, the mother at least would have known. The clear evidence is that there would have been significant distress for an extended period. It is the mother’s evidence that such distress never happened, and also that she was with C all the time. C was never left unsupervised except when the mother went out really quickly to do the washing or take the bins out. It is more likely than not, on the medical evidence, that when the wrist fractures happened C would have exhibited significant distress for an extended period. If she fell in the cot while the mother was putting on the washing or taking the bins out, it seems to me that C would still be exhibiting the distress when the mother came back in. I base that on the mother saying she only ever went out very briefly for these tasks, and Dr Pickard’s view the distress would have been for an extended period. It is my view, based on that evidence, that even if C fell, by herself, in the cot while the mother was out of the room, the mother would still have seen and heard the significant and extended distress. If the father was present, as he often was, he would have seen and heard it too. The medical evidence is clear. Although it is only one part of the picture, there is nothing in any of the other evidence to cause me to doubt it. The mother’s continued denials drive me to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that she is lying about not having seen C’s distress after the fractures. The father may be lying about it too, but I am not able to come to that conclusion because I do not know whether he was there at the time of the injury.[57]There is no direct evidence that the fractures were caused accidentally or deliberately or recklessly or negligently by one or other of the parents. The parents have not provided a credible explanation or narrative about the fractures, but they do not have to do so. The fact that they have not does not lead me to conclude that they must in some way be culpable. However the fact that, as I have found, they lied about the injury does raise difficult questions.[58]The fact that they have lied does not necessarily mean they are guilty of anything. I remind myself that ‘It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The Court must be careful to bear in mind that the witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (R v Lucas [1981] QB 720). And so I ask myself why these parents have lied about the things they have lied about. I have considered whether there could have been undue pressure on them from external sources but can see none, save that one parent might be under pressure from the other if the other had harmed the baby and pressurised the first parent not to tell. If that were the case, then the situation would be that one parent had caused the injury and the other had subsequently lied and so failed to protect C. I have considered whether the parents might have lied because they were panicking over a pure accident. That is possible, not least because C had just come down from a Child Protection Plan to a Child In Need plan and the mother was certainly anxious about an increase in social services intervention when she rang 111. She was worried C might be taken away. It is possible, in my view, that she might have panicked at that point, on the day of the pulled elbow, and said something that wasn’t true. Again she might have panicked on 19 June 2025 in the immediate aftermath of the wrist fractures for the same reasons. But the cot-fall explanation was not an explanation given in panic. It was given six weeks after the injuries. Both parents had had time to consider what to say, and both had had legal advice both before and after coming forward with that explanation. Panic cannot be a valid explanation.[59]I have considered whether the parents may have lied because of shame, fear or distress. If shame, then that suggests culpability. If fear, that suggests an anxiety about having C removed from their care which could rest either on guilt or not. But the difficulty with that is that the explanation they have given is an explanation of an accident in relation to which they were apparently negligent. They clearly were willing to come forward with an accidental cause which left some blame on their shoulders to the extent of negligence. If the true explanation revealed a lesser degree of culpability than the invented explanation, they would surely have given the true explanation. They did not. In logic, the true explanation must involve a higher level of culpability than explanation they did give; otherwise they would have told the truth. If the lies arose from distress, which they might have done, the parents have had time and advice to help them through that and that cannot be a reasonable reason for maintaining the lie for so long, given what is at stake.[60]In addition, I must consider the parents’ wider behaviour. It is an undisputed fact that these parents were asked to hand over their phones for examination so that the Local Authority and others cold see if there was anything there to help understand the truth of the situation. Both parents refused to do so. In oral evidence they gave unpersuasive reasons why they had refused. They talked about invasion of privacy: but that is not in my view a good enough reason when it would be professionals looking at the phones for child protection purposes, and when their baby had received unexplained traumatic injuries. For most parents the need to uncover the truth about what had happened would trump their reluctance to let others see their private business. In my view this refusal on the part of the parents is not enough on its own to allow me to conclude that they must have had something to hide, but taken in the context of the other evidence as to their credibility, it may well be part of a wider picture of deceit. That still does not tell me whether the fractures were accidental or non-accidental. I make the following finding:I cannot say whether wrist fractures were accidental or non-accidental, but I find that the parents, or one of them, is culpable at least to some extent for causing the them. They may have done so in a way which was deliberate, or caused by a flash of anger, or may have been reckless or negligent, but if it was merely negligent, it was severely negligent, and more negligent than allowing C to fall out of the cot. The parents have lied about the cause of the wrist fractures and have failed to protect C by failing to tell the truth about the incident and by refusing to provide their phones for inspection.[61]Reverting back to the Local Authority’s threshold document, the result of my findings above is that I find all of paragraphs 1 to 14 of that document proved, with additions as to the level of negligence and the dishonesty of the parents as set out above.

Neglect

[62]Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Threshold document are under the heading of neglect, but it seems to me that is the wrong heading. The findings sought are really about risk of physical and emotional harm arising from an alleged unwillingness to engage with professionals and from a lack of insight into professional concerns. I substitute for the heading “Neglect” a new heading, “Risk of emotional and physical harm” and will consider paragraphs 15 and 16 in that context.[63]The first allegation is that the parents have been reluctant to engage with professionals. The parents say they are not unwilling to engage with professionals and point to their engagement with the parenting workers. It is right that they took C to the parenting programme regularly for some months. They have also engaged with their lawyers and with this court process. The ISW Matthew Jeary also said that he had managed to engage the mother with his parenting assessment. He accepted, though, that his first phone call with her was difficult, and that she was cross and fed up and unhappy with another professional asking her questions. He said that he had a lot of experience working with young mothers so he let that play out, and was patient. Once he had done that, he could build a rapport with her. He said “it does work”, and “she can engage”.[64]Mr Dowsett, the psychologist, also had difficulty engaging with the mother at first. He records that when he started off his meeting with her she told him that she wasn’t going to engage with the appointment and was not going to “carry on playing your game”. Her manner was irritable, resistant and she avoided eye contact. She said she was not willing to be interviewed and they agreed to terminate the interview. She subsequently agreed to an interview when he asked at a later date, and she did then engage. During his interview he talked to the mother about her willingness to engage with professionals more generally. He describes her as being “adamant” that if C were returned to her care, monitoring would be neither necessary nor welcome. She was inflexible and unwilling to consider ways in which working with professionals could be facilitated. She said she would not tolerate any unannounced visits at all, and was restrictive in the time of day she would accept visits, with only the afternoons being acceptable. When this evidence was put to Mr Jeary in oral evidence, he accepted that if that was what the mother was saying to Mr Dowsett (and that is not in dispute) then that would completely undermine any safety plan in terms of the return of C to her care.[65]The most up-to-date evidence on this issue comes from the Guardian who spoke to the mother on 1 April 2026. First of all, I note that the mother did engage with the Guardian when the Guardian rang her, and indeed rang the Guardian back on 9 April when she mistakenly thought the Guardian wanted to speak to her again. During the conversation on 1 April the mother told the Guardian that she did not want to cooperate with social services unless her child is returned to her care. She said she would cooperate if she had a different social worker who communicated better and did not, in her view, misrepresent what she says.[66]The issue of engagement was further followed-up in oral evidence with Mr Dowsett. He accepted that the mother could sometimes engage with professionals and that it was a mixed picture but commented that when she did engage it was in a more nurturing environment, such as with the parenting programme workers. Where the difficulty arose was in any environment in which professionals were likely to challenge her. When he was taken to the mother’s recent comments to the Guardian he said he was more pessimistic.[67]In oral evidence the mother accepted that she was defensive but said that was her mum instinct saying “I don’t know if I need you”. She said she had had four social workers in five months and not one of them had stable communication. She agreed that she had been stubborn and agreed she had been very hard to get through to. She said that if C were returned to her care she would cooperate with the Local Authority and with therapy. Her case in these proceedings is that there should be an adjournment and a further testing period, and she said that the purpose of the testing period would be for her to show that shoe could cooperate. She accepted leaving a meeting with social workers in anger, and accepted telling the social worker at a contact review meeting that she did not want advice. She also said “The social worker doesn’t like me and that’s why she wants to rip my child from me. It’s an ongoing threat from them and I’ve had enough”. She accepted it was difficult to work with the Local Authority and said that was why she’d rung the manager several times for a new social worker. She confirmed she would work with social workers if C were back in her care but even then was clear that she would not work with the current social worker.[68]It seems to me on the basis of the mother’s own oral evidence, and on the basis of the overall professional view that this is indeed a mother who finds it hard to work with professionals. She has at times refused to do so, and still refuses to do so on anything other than her own terms. That absolutely does place any child in her care at risk of emotional and physical harm. The risks of children not being seen by professionals are well-documented. A safety plan of announced and unannounced visits is vital in so many cases, and some of the most tragic cases of recent years have arisen because children disappeared from the radar of social services. In this case, C has already come to significant harm in her parents’ care. The mother is the main carer. She is very reluctant to engage with professionals and will not do so on anything other than her own terms. That is a persistent pattern. Her approach to professionals does indeed in my view lead to a risk of emotional and physical harm to C as set out by the Local Authority at paragraph 15a of their threshold document, and I make that finding.[69]I have not mentioned the father’s role in this. The father is generally thought to be a calming and positive influence on the mother. Professionals do not report the same barriers to engagement with him as they do with the mother, but there are still some concerns. Mr Dowsett records that the father was unavailable for their video meeting which had been arranged and confirmed in advance, initially failing to answer the call and then, half an hour later answering but saying he was unwilling to do it then. When he did speak to Mr Dowsett he did so without a shirt on and appeared tired. Mr Dowsett was concerned about his organisation and motivation to prioritise the appointment. When he was asked about social work visits if C were returned to the mother’s care, he visibly sighed and said that it would be “accepted” but it was not ideally what they wanted, and reiterated that he had “done nothing wrong”. There is nothing in this to cause me to hope that he is someone who will proactively make up for the mother’s deficits in terms of engagement, and nothing in it to cause me to reconsider my finding.[70]The next finding sought is that the parent’s lack of insight into professional concerns places C at risk of emotional and physical harm. There are examples of the mother’s lack of insight throughout the evidence. One example is in her conversation with Mr Dowsett in which she did not appear to acknowledge or seem to want to reflect on why professionals may have been concerned about her. She seemed to want to portray that the main problem in her life was the unsuitable accommodation combined with social services involvement in the form of child protection and child in need plans. She was not willing to acknowledge any other concerns, for example about her mental health or background.[71]A similar lack of insight or acceptance was demonstrated in her conversation with the Guardian. She told the Guardian that Mr Jeary’s assessment had mainly said she needed a bigger house. That is not a fair summary of Mr Jeary’s assessment in my view although he was concerned about the accommodation. It was not his only concern. The mother told the Guardian that she felt if she had had a bigger home, then the situation would not have happened. She did not think the psychological assessment had been necessary, and believed it had been done because the social worker wanted to build a case against her because she did not like her. She told the Guardian that she felt she had been treated unfairly and had had her baby removed because of her skin colour. She acknowledged that she had anxiety and depression but did not feel that she needed to change anything. She felt the only reason social services got involved in the first place was because of the certain concerns about the father.[72]In oral evidence, the mother repeated that her baby had been taken from her because of her skin colour. When asked why Mr Dowsett and the Guardian said that C should not come back into her care she said “they don’t know me”, and again that the social worker does not like her. There is no acknowledgement at all on the part of the mother that the Child Protection Plan which was put in place on 21 May 202 was in relation to her young age and vulnerability, difficulties in the parents’ relationship, cannabis use and concerns about the mother’s mental health.[73]There is less evidence in relation to the father’s insight. He does acknowledge that his background (which is not described here for reasons of anonymisatin) “looks bad” but does not take it any further than that. He admits smoking cannabis but says his use is recreational, and did not consider it to be a problem. It was “a bit of a reward” after work. He said he knows what he is doing. When asked whether the injuries might be seen as a failure of appropriate supervision or management of C’s safety, the father was somewhat ambivalent but did not dispute that was a possible way of looking at it. He said they were both “young parents” and essentially that they had “learned their lesson”. They had done, he said, a lot of work thinking about scenarios and risk and danger. He did not see any other obstacles as to why they would not have a chance to care for their daughter again. He said more than once in oral evidence that he did not see that mental health had anything to do with parenting. He said you could not conflate the two: parenting is one thing and mental health is another. He had no insight at all into how poor mental health might have an impact on parenting. Given my findings, that does in my view constitute a lack of insight. I note that because of this combined lack of insight from both parents, Mr Dowsett took the view that neither parent acknowledges the risk of further non-accidental injury.[74]For all those reasons I agree with the local authority that the parents do have a lack of insight into the professional concerns. I agree that places the child at risk of emotional and physical harm for the simple reason that if they do not understand what happened before, they are unlikely to be able to stop it happening again. I therefore make the findings sought by the Local Authority at paragraph 15b. Paragraph 16 is, in my view, repetitive and unnecessary and I make no finding in relation to it.

Mental health

[75]The final section of the Threshold document relates to the mother’s mental health. It is pleaded that the mother experiences fluctuating poor mental health including anxiety, periods of depression, emotional dysregulation and mood swings.[76]The mother had a full psychological assessment from Mr Dowsett. The full findings of Mr Dowsett are not repeated here for reasons of anonymisation but he had concerns about the mother in relation to ADHD, PTSD and Borderline Personality disorder and he proposed further screening.[77]The mother accepted to Mr Dowsett that she has had some problems with her mood, her emotional dysregulation and had difficulties containing her anger and frustration at times. Mr Dowsett made recommendations for work and therapy the mother could undertake to help her with these issues.[78]In oral evidence the mother accepted that she had had issues with her mental health for a long time but said she would not say she “struggled” with it. She said she’d done talking therapy. She did accept she had struggled with depression and that her mental health had been up and down. She denied that she had been at times emotionally dysregulated saying she kept it 100% when people came to her house in every situation. She did not believe that she did have emotional dysregulation but said if she did she would do therapy for it. She then did accept she sometimes had mood swings. She accepted she could get angry easily. She was taken to an online form she had filled in for Mr Dowsett in which she had said that her closes relatives had been troubled by lots of arguments with her. She said she might have mis-clicked the answer to that one.[79]Overall, I conclude that the mother’s response to Mr Dowsett’s assessment of her is ambivalent. It is clear she recognises in herself some of the traits that he identifies but finds it hard to accept the full extent of it. Even on the basis of her own admissions it is clear that there are mood swings. There is evidence of her storming out of a meeting and disputed evidence about her banging the door behind her. In my view Mr Dowsett’s evaluation of her accords with the evaluation of other professionals and to an extent with the mother’s own evaluation. I accept his opinion, which was not in any event substantively challenged. Because the mother’s acceptance of her own mental health needs is only partial, it follows in this case that it is not always well managed. That being so, I agree with the local authority that it gives rise to a risk of emotional and physical harm to C if left unaddressed. I therefore make the findings sought at paragraph 17 and 18 of the Threshold document.[80]Those then are the findings that I make. It is my view that they are sufficient to cross the Threshold set out at s31(2) of the CA 1989 and I make that final finding.

Welfare checklist

[81]I turn then to the welfare considerations. The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of her age and understanding)[82]C has been living with her maternal grandmother for the last eight months and has been seeing her parents regularly. She is thriving. She is too young to say what her wishes and feelings are.

Her physical, emotional and educational needs

[83]C is reliant on her carers to meet all of her physical and emotional needs. She needs to be in an environment which is free of dysregulated behaviour and which is physically safe. She needs a placement which is permanent, loving and secure.

Her age, sex, background, and any characteristics of hers which the court considers relevant

[84]C is British. Both her parents have overseas heritage. She is the only child of her parents and has both maternal and paternal family members close by who are supportive. How capable each of her parents is (or any other relevant person) of meeting her needs and any harm which she has suffered or is at risk of suffering[85]In relation to the parents’ care of C, there are a number of positives. There is evidence that both parents meet C’s needs in contact. Contact notes show that the contact is warm and positive and professionals have noted a close bond between C and her parents. The parents have been consistent and committed to contact and a lovely bond has grown up. In addition the mother showed herself able to act protectively when she took C to hospital after both injuries. She noticed that something was wrong and she did the right thing. Both parents have at times engaged with professionals when the professional has been able to win their trust. They also worked well with the parenting programme team.[86]The ISW Matthew Jeary produced a balanced parenting assessment dated 24 November 2025 in which these and other positives were set against the parents’ significant emotional, cognitive and maturity-related vulnerabilities. He noted limited insight, emotional avoidance, passive engagement and frustration with the process. He identified a lack of reflective capacity in, for example, the father’s comment that “I don’t’ know how it happened…it’s ridiculous”. The ISW concluded on balance that the parents would be able to care safely for C but only if there was a multi-layered Resolution-based safety plan requiring long-term professional involvement, and provided the mother was re-housed and provided there was a clear plan of support. This was on the basis of the mother being the primary carer and the father providing support to her. Mr Jeary said that even if the court were to find that the injuries were non-accidental, and there was no acceptance of blame from the parents, he would still recommend that reunification be considered working with the Resolution model.[87]In oral evidence Mr Jeary confirmed that he had not seen Dr Dowsett’s report before making his recommendations, and accepted Dr Dowsett’s recommendation from his addendum report that Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (“DBT”) could help the mother with her emotional regulation if the mother were motivated and committed to the process. He agreed that would cause a delay. His experience was that DBT usually took at least six months, not including the time spent waiting for it. He said that he would defer to Dr Dowsett, but his view was that he did not think the child could be in the parent’s care while DBT was underway.[88]He further accepted that the mother had, since working with him, told Dr Dowsett and the Guardian that she was not keen on working with professionals or would not work with them unless C was returned to her. Mr Jeary accepted that “that’s not good”. He was taken to the mother’s comments to Dr Dowsett saying that she was adamant that monitoring was neither necessary nor welcome, and saying she would not tolerate unannounced visits. He accepted that if that was what she said to Dr Dowsett (which has not been seriously challenged) then no safety plan would work. He accepted that if the parents would not engage with the Resolutions model, that model would not work either. Over the course of his oral evidence he became considerably less optimistic. He concluded that if he had been the Guardian in this case (he had worked for many years as a Guardian and so he has experience of that role) he might well have made the same recommendation as the actual Guardian had done, namely not to return C to her parents’ care. By the end I understood his evidence to be that he could not any more make a clear recommendation in favour of reunification, and he was no longer sure he could make even a provisional recommendation of such a plan, given his evidence that the safety plan and the Resolutions based plan could no longer work.[89]Mr Dowsett assessed the mother as not having any learning disability or cognitive impairment but as presenting with elevated anxiety, emotional dysregulation and avoidance-based coping mechanisms. Under stress she is reported to become defensive and overwhelmed. He said that whilst she is affectionate, resilient and capable of forming meaningful attachments, her emotional vulnerability places her at risk of unsafe decision-making when unsupported. He identified a number of weaknesses in the mother’s parenting capacity, namely a lack of insight into the wider concerns, emotional regulation and reluctance to engage. He recommended DBT for the mother alongside structured parenting support and external oversight.[90]Mr Dowsett found that the father was calmer and more cooperative but said he minimised the injury and needed encouragement to recognise the issues of supervision, openness and protection. There was a lack of insight on the part of the father with him simply considering that he and the mother were young parents who had learnt their lesson, and not seeing that there were any other obstacles to C returning home. Mr Dowsett also noted that the father tended to defer to the mother rather than clearly taking a protective stance towards C. Overall Mr Dowsett did not consider that either parent was ready to take on full-time care of C at the present, but that some intervention and work was needed, after which the parents could be reassessed between three and six months down the line.[91]In oral evidence Mr Dowsett remained concerned about the father’s ability to act protectively to put C’s interests first based on the father’s own evidence that he had taken six weeks to report a fall from the cot. He confirmed that he had read the Guardian’s final analysis including her account of the conversation with the mother, and said he was now more pessimistic now about the prospect of the mother moving forward and changing. That conversation caused him concern in terms of the mother’s attitude and level of insight and potential continued barriers to engagement. He was clear that having read that report there simply were not the indicators present to justify a further testing out period and said that to justify that we would need to have been at a different point by now. The issues had been discussed with the mother for several months but there was no evidence of any clear motivation or intention to address her difficulties. He did not think the indicators were present for a Resolutions approach. Those indicators include that the parent acknowledges the seriousness of the medical injury and that the parent displays a high level of engagement with professionals and a willingness to tolerate a period of further intrusive surveillance and monitoring. Neither of those are present in this case.[92]The Guardian in her analysis says that the ISW’s’ parenting assessment places weight on observed contact, practical parenting skills and the existence of family support, whereas the psychological assessment places much more weight on emotional functioning, insight, defensive responses and the ability to sustain professional involvement under stress. In my view that is an accurate analysis of the two reports.[93]Within the social work final statement there is a comprehensive risk analysis of the factors in the case. The Social Worker considered that there were risks to C in her parents’ care arising from the unexplained wrist fracture, parental minimisation and limited insight, and the mother’s emotional dysregulation and unmanaged mental health needs. There were also risks associated with the father playing a passive role and the mother in particular putting up barriers to professional engagement. Against that, there was positive and consistent parental contact with the parents showing warmth and affection and responding appropriately to C’s cues in contact. There was a strong family network with both sides of the family participating in the Family Group Conference and there being frequent family visits and interactions. There was the strong and stable support offered by the maternal grandmother.[94]I agree that these are the key factors in the case. When I balance them, taking into account the evidence of the ISW, Mr Dowsett and the Guardian, I come to the view that the parents are able to provide C with good, consistent care during supervised contact, but in other circumstances there are significant risks which can not easily be managed. The unwillingness of the mother to engage with professionals and her explicit rejection of unannounced visits makes it impossible to say that a safety plan could be put in place to manage the risks if the parents were caring for C for longer periods or full-time. It is my view as a result that they are not safely able to manage the care of C on a long term basis because there is a risk of physical harm to C, including a risk of further unexplained injury, arising from the parents’ lack of honesty and insight and their minimisation of the wrist fractures, and a risk of emotional harm from the mother’s dysregulated behaviour and unmanaged mental health.[95]The other relevant person in this case is the maternal grandmother, with whom C has been living since September 2025. The maternal grandmother has received a positive Special Guardianship Assessment written by the social worker Nomthandazo Nduki and the Kinship Social Worker David Wilson, and dated 9 October 2025. In that report the grandmother is described as a deeply family-oriented individual whose life revolves around her children and extended family. She is introverted, open-minded, and described by her own children as both strict and fun. She lives with her daughter who is in year 4 and there are no concerns about her care of her daughter. She has a partner who has been interviewed as part of the process and he is supportive of the SGO being made, and is willing to have DBS checks. The grandmother’s support network is assessed as being strong. The grandmother has been part of C’s life since birth, and the social worker has assessed the grandmother and C has having a close and natural bond, with C looking to the grandmother as her primary caregiver for reassurance, comfort and affection. Overall it is a very positive assessment and it has not been challenged. No party suggests that the grandmother is failing to provide good care to C. On that basis I accept that she is able to meet C’s needs, including her need for contact with her birth parents which is an issue which is covered in the SG assessment.

The likely effect on her of any change of circumstances

[96]If I grant an extension to these proceedings to allow a trial period for the parents to do further work on their various issues and to allow them to take on more care of C to test it out, the change C would experience would be that she would gradually see more of her parents. That could be positive for her, but only if the mother’s mental health is well managed, she does not exhibit any dysregulated behaviour, and adequate supervision and support is in place which the parents welcome and engage with. At the end of the testing period, C will either return to the parents’ care or return to her grandmother. If she returns to her grandmother, she is likely to continue to thrive and to see her parents regularly. If she is returned to her parents, the effect of that will depend on whether or not there are effective strategies in place to manage the risks. If such strategies are in place, she will be able to be brought up by her own parents which is a simple, straightforward and natural solution which she is likely to benefit from. On the other hand, if she is returned to her parents’ care without effective risk strategies being in place, she will be at risk of further emotional and physical harm from the parents’ lack of insight and honesty in relation to the wrist injuries, the mother’s mental health and the parents’ reluctance to engage with professionals.

Analysis

[97]Not even the parents are arguing for an immediate return of C to her parents’ care in this case. There are thus only two realistic options left. One is to make a Special Guardianship Order to the grandmother, and the other is to extend proceedings in order to allow what has been called a “trial period”. I take that to mean a period of three to six months to allow the mother to undertake work and for there to be consideration of whether C can spend more time with her parents while this is ongoing.[98]The advantage of that second option is that it keeps the door open to C being brought up by her birth parents. That is a huge advantage, and weighs heavily in the balance. Case law tells me that the best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. The parents love her, and they have a warm relationship with her and they are able to meet her physical and emotional needs within the confines of a supervised contact session. If there is a realistic prospect of this route being successful, then it would be appealing.[99]Sadly, it is not clear to me that there is a realistic prospect of this route being successful. The evidence of Dr Dowsett and the Guardian which I have set out above tends to support the proposition that the mother does not have insight into the difficulties which she needs to work on particularly in relation to her dysregulation, there is no evidence that she would realistically be able to commit to DBT, and there is no DBT currently on offer and so the time-scale is likely to be at least six months and more likely twelve, based on Dr Dowsett’s evidence. Furthermore she is unlikely to cooperate with social workers or with unannounced visits all of which makes it unlikely that a trial period would have a positive outcome. And there is also the problem that the parents have not been honest, that C has been seriously injured in their care and they are to some extent culpable for that, and they have not acted protectively by telling professionals what happened. It is my view that when those matters are taken into account, there is no realistic prospect of a “trial period” being purposeful or successful in this case.[100]I have thought carefully about my other powers, and whether there are other orders which I could make which could alter that analysis. For example, I could make a Supervision Order, or a Family Assistance Order to support any testing period or transition back to the mother’s care. I am clear that none of those would help, for all the same reasons. Such measures in order to be successful rest on an open and positive relationship between the parent and professionals. That is not present in this case.[101]The other realistic option is continued placement with the grandmother, under a Special Guardianship Order. The disadvantage of that is that C would not be able to have a “normal” childhood being brought up by her parents. But the parents and the maternal grandmother all live near each other and so there is easy visiting between them. C would grow up seeing her parents regularly, knowing who they are and knowing that they love her. The maternal grandmother will be able to provide the overseas aspect of C’s heritage, which is helpful because both her parents are of the same overseas heritage. Contact with her paternal family will be facilitated by the fact that many of them live close by. In MGM’s care the evidence is that C would be well-cared for, and that she would continue to thrive. There are no safeguarding risks, and it is a stable and secure placement.

Decision

[102]It is clear to me on the basis of that analysis that the right outcome in C’s welfare interests is to make a Special Guardianship Order in favour of the maternal grandmother. Before I make that order, I turn to the support plan. The contact arrangements are that there will be face to face supervised contact with both parents once a month to start with. The grandmother is well-placed to facilitate this with the mother, as she has been doing already. With the father, contact will be arranged by the post-order Support Team. The support plan provides for financial support, therapeutic support, and training for the MGM. It is my understanding that she has received legal advice, and she is willing to be C’s special guardian. Taking all that into account, I am satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to make a Special Guardianship Order in favour of the MGM in respect of C and I make that order and approve the support plan.

ANNEX ON THE LAW ON NON-ACCIDENTAL INJURY, LIES AND EXTENSION OF TIME

[1]All parties work within the same legal framework. As Baroness Hale said in Re S-B (Children) [2009] UKSC 17: “This case is about the proper approach to deciding who has been responsible for harming a child in proceedings taken to protect that child, and others in the family, from harm. It raises profound issues: on the one hand, children need to be protected from harm; but on the other hand, both they and their families need to be protected from the injustice and potential damage to their whole futures done by removing children from a parent who is not, in fact, responsible for causing any harm at all.” (§2)[2]There is only one standard of proof – the simple balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is on the local authority. It is not reversible. There is no burden on any other party to establish that the allegations are not made out. The inherent probability or improbability of an event remains a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred; “common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question regard should be had to whatever extent appropriate to inherent probabilities” per Lord Hoffmann in Re B [2008] UKHL 35 at § 15.[3]The term ‘non-accidental’ does not necessarily mean that an injury must have been deliberately or intentionally inflicted in order for there to be an element of wrong that satisfies the s.31 threshold criteria, as per the court of appeal decision in S (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 25 (per Ryder LJ at paragraph 19):
"The term "non-accidental" injury may be a term of art used by clinicians as a shorthand and I make no criticism of its use but it is a "catch-all" for everything that is not an accident. It is also a tautology: the true distinction is between an accident which is unexpected and unintentional and an injury which involves an element of wrong. That element of wrong may involve a lack of care and/or an intent of a greater or lesser degree that may amount to negligence, recklessness or deliberate infliction. While an analysis of that kind may be helpful to distinguish deliberate infliction from, say, negligence, it is unnecessary in any consideration of whether the threshold criteria are satisfied because what the statute requires is something different namely, findings of fact that at least satisfy the significant harm, attributability and the objective standard of care elements of section 31(2)."
[4]The court must survey a wide canvas of evidence. It must take account of all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence Re T [2004] EWCA Civ per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss at §33: Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion of whether the case put forward by the Local Authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.[5]More recently, in Re R (Children: Findings of Fact) [2024] EWCA Civ 153 the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Peter Jackson said at §33: It is wrong to describe the medical evidence as the canvas against which the other evidence was to be considered. Medical and non-medical evidence are both vital contributors in their own ways to these decisions and neither of them has precedence over the other.[6]Peter Jackson LJ said that the ‘canvas of evidence was small, densely filled, and the court could see it all’ (§31) and that the court had been called upon to ‘evaluate a number of competing improbabilities’ (§33). The Court of Appeal concluded that the judge had not carried out the necessary evaluation of the evidence for and against the local authority’s case or meaningfully synthesise[d] an assessment of the probabilities (§39).[7]In W (A Child), (Inflicted Injury - Delay) [2024] EWCA Civ 418 the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against findings of fact, concluded that threshold was not met and the proceedings were discontinued. The Court of Appeal held that the first instance judgment demonstrated that the judge had ‘analysed the medical evidence in closed off compartments’ (§56), had placed excessive weight on the issue of the likely pain response of the child to the injury and had failed to undertake a full analysis of all the evidence from the adults who had cared for the child. The Court of Appeal said that a full analysis of all the information about the child’s presentation would have “served to remind [the trial judge] that there is no hard and fast rule that the carer of a young child who suffers an injury must invariably be able to explain when and how it happened” (§88).[8]In W (A Child) the judgment of Lord Justice Baker sets out the dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41 (at §15) that the application of a ‘hard and fast rule’ that an explanation for an injury should be able to be given by a carer would amount to a reversal of the burden of proof but said: ..whilst the judge was perfectly entitled to take into account the lack of history ‘to whatever extent is appropriate’ against the backdrop that a carer will not invariably be able to explain an injury. The failure however to provide an explanation must be considered against the backdrop of all the evidence including an assessment of the lay evidence (§64).[9]In Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41 at §16 Peter Jackson J said: “The absence of any history of a memorable event where such a history might be expected in the individual case may be very significant. Perpetrators of child abuse often seek to cover up what they have done.The reason why paediatricians may refer to the lack of a history is because individual and collective clinical experience teaches them that it is one of a number of indicators of how the injury may have occurred. Medical and other professionals are entitled to rely upon such knowledge and experience in forming an opinion about the likely response of the individual child to the particular injury, and the court should not deter them from doing so.”.[10]The Court of Appeal decision in Re H (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator: Lies) [2024] EWCA Civ 1261 provides a refinement to the dicta of Macur LJ in Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451 on lies. Lord Justice Peter Jackson considered the existing authorities in relation to lies (Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 and Re A, B and C) and said this at § 20: Lies, where they are admitted or alleged, will form just one part of the overall evidence in relation to family proceedings. The underlying purpose of the Lucas direction is to ensure that proven lies are assessed with a sense of proportion.[11]At § 22 and 23 he said that the ‘austerity direction’ from Re A, B and C (it is good practice for counsel to identify –(a) the deliberate lie on which they seek to rely(b) the significant issue to which it relates and(c) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie is guilt) - “in the normal run of cases” is “neither necessary nor appropriate”. He said: “it will be sufficient for the judge to recall that the true significance of a lie must be carefully assessed, for all the well-known reasons noted by the judge in the present case. A general exclusionary rule, exclusively directed at lies, would be inconsistent with the duty on the court to consider all the evidence. Once it has done that, its conclusion in an individual case may be that the lie was told to conceal guilt, but that is a conclusion, not a test. Wherever a lie is found to be relevant to the fact-finding exercise for some other good reason, that element of the evidence should be factored in.”.[12]Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. In A County Council v KD & L [2005] EWHC 144 Fam. at paragraphs 39 to 44, Mr

Justice Charles observed:

"It is important to remember that (1) the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision. Later in the same judgment, Mr Justice Charles added at paragraph 49: "
In a case where the medical evidence is to the effect that the likely cause is non-accidental and thus human agency, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence either (a) that on the balance of probability an injury has a natural cause, or is not a non-accidental injury, or (b) that a local authority has not established the existence of the threshold to the civil standard of proof ... The other side of the coin is that in a case where the medical evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of a non-accidental injury or human agency and the clinical observations of the child, although consistent with non-accidental injury or human agency, are the type asserted is more usually associated with accidental injury or infection, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence that, on the balance of probability there has been a non-accidental injury or human agency as asserted and the threshold is established."[13]As Mr Justice Ryder (as he then was) observed in A County Council v A Mother and others [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) "A factual decision must be based on all available materials, i.e. be judged in context and not just upon medical or scientific materials, no matter how cogent they may in isolation seem to be".[14]The inability of a parent to explain an event cannot be relied upon to find an event proved. Per Re M (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1580 at §16.[15]The burden of disproving a reasonable explanation put forward by the parents falls on the local authority: Per §10 of S (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1447.[16]There is no burden shifted to the parents to prove a natural cause for symptoms. In Lancashire County Council v D and E [2010] 2 FLR 196 FD Charles J said:
"[36] The exercise of identifying a perpetrator, or pool of perpetrators, forms part of the exercise of considering whether there was an inflicted injury. In my view, it is important to remember this because it removes or reduces an approach which considers the overall question from the standpoint that someone with the opportunity to injure a child has to show that he or she did not do so. Again, in my view, the approach of the local authority and the guardian, at times, came perilously close to this. The correct position is that a medical view as to the most likely cause of injuries is that that cause is clearly established as a real possibility that has to be considered, in all the circumstances of the case, together with the other possibilities, in determining whether a child was the victim of an inflicted injury."
[17]In Re M (Fact finding: Burden of Proof) [2013] 2 FLR 874 at paragraph 881 Ward LJ stated:
"That, too, was the effect of the judge's view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents were required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury."
[18]The evidence of the parents and of any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of them - Re W and another (Non-Accidental Injury) [2003] FCR 346.[19]In Re A (Children)(Pool of Perpetrators) [2022] EWCA Civ 1248 King LJ explicitly approves the ‘proper approach’ in respect of uncertain perpetrator cases and quotes Lord Justice Peter Jackson in Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator) [2019] EWCA Civ 575, [2019] 2 FLR 211:At §36 King LJ sets out the following: “On a proper application of paragraph [49] to the issue of the identification of the perpetrator of the older injuries, the judge had to determine: i) Whether there was a list of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. Here it is common ground that there was a list of two, namely the father and the mother; ii) Whether he was able on the balance of probability, to identify the actual perpetrator. In this case it has not at any stage been suggested that the evidence would permit such a finding to be made in relation to the father alone. The question for the judge was whether such a finding could be made to the proper standard of proof in respect of the mother; iii) If, and only if, the Court was unable to make such a finding to the appropriate standard of proof, should he have resumed his scrutiny of the list and in respect of each person on the list, considered whether there was a real likelihood or possibility that one of those individuals inflicted the injury/injuries. In this case this meant, could the judge be satisfied that there was a real possibility that the father was the perpetrator of the older injuries? If so, the father was a possible perpetrator with all the serious consequences which follow from such a finding.” i) Whether there was a list of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. Here it is common ground that there was a list of two, namely the father and the mother; ii) Whether he was able on the balance of probability, to identify the actual perpetrator. In this case it has not at any stage been suggested that the evidence would permit such a finding to be made in relation to the father alone. The question for the judge was whether such a finding could be made to the proper standard of proof in respect of the mother; iii) If, and only if, the Court was unable to make such a finding to the appropriate standard of proof, should he have resumed his scrutiny of the list and in respect of each person on the list, considered whether there was a real likelihood or possibility that one of those individuals inflicted the injury/injuries. In this case this meant, could the judge be satisfied that there was a real possibility that the father was the perpetrator of the older injuries? If so, the father was a possible perpetrator with all the serious consequences which follow from such a finding.” 20. King LJ stressed the fact that there is to be no “gloss” in relation to the test: “The evaluation of the facts which will enable a Court to identify the perpetrator of an inflicted injury to a child will be determined on the simple balance of probabilities and nothing more. Having considered the matter afresh in the light of Elisabeth Laing LJ's observation, I am of the view that to go further and to add that the Courts should not "strain" to make such a finding is an unnecessary and potentially unhelpful gloss which has outlived its usefulness and which was directed at a different issue as set out in paragraph [24] above.”[§33], “… the proper approach is not to seek to distinguish as between the possible perpetrators in order to see which one inflicted the injuries. Rather the proper approach is to consider each individual separately in order to determine whether that individual can be found on the balance of probabilities, to be the perpetrator” [§43(i)].[21]Re S Child [2014] EWHC B44: Whether a Court would warrant a s.32(5) extension [beyond 26 weeks] must be determined on a case by case basis. But by way of illustration, it may be appropriate in drug abuse/alcohol abuse cases or cases involving parental mental ill-health to consider an extension beyond 26 weeks to see if a parent can make changes within the child's timescales. However, extensions should not be granted in the hope that something may turn up, but rather: "Typically, three questions will have to be addressed:a. First, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent is committed to making the necessary changes?b. If so, secondly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to maintain that commitment?c. If so, thirdly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to make the necessary changes within the child's timescale?" [Para.38]