A Local Authority v F (A Child: Article 8 Transfer of Proceedings to Romania) [2026] EWFC 129 (B)

Case No LU25C50027

[2026] EWFC 129 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT

Venue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

The Hague Convention 1996

The Children Act 1989

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 27 May 2026

Before

CATHERINE COWTON KC

(SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE)

Between

A LOCAL AUTHORITYApplicant

MF1 st Respondent

FF2 nd Respondent

Ruth Cabeza (Counsel instructed by the Local Authority) for Applicant local authority

Gareth Hutton (Counsel instructed by Cartwright King) for 1 st Respondent mother

William Metaxa (Counsel instructed by City Law Chambers) for 2 nd Respondent father

Andrew Leong (Counsel instructed by SBS Solicitors) for 3 rd Respondent child

Hearing Hearing date: 23 April 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely on 27 May 2026 by circulation to the parties’ representatives by e-mail and then for release to the National Archives.

.............................

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]This is an application made the local authority to transfer these public law care proceedings to Romania pursuant to Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“1996 Hague Convention”).

[2]The first respondent isF’s mother, who is in her 30s and of Bulgarian nationality. The second respondent is F’s father, who is in his 30s and of Romanian nationality. The parents are not married, but the second respondent is named as F’s father on her English birth certificate and so both parents have parental responsibility.

[3]The child who is the subject of the care proceedings is F who is now aged 21 months.F was born in England, and has lived here all her life to date. She has never visited Romania. Following serious concerns about the care she was receiving from her parents, care proceedings were initiated. She has been cared for by foster carers in England since February 2025. F’s Guardian in these proceedings is Mr Simon Bullen.

[4]This application was issued in Form C2 on 21 January 2026. A Directions hearing was listed in the High Court before Simon Colton KC (sitting as a DHCJ) on 2 February 2026. A Directions order was made, and today’s hearing was listed to consider the transfer application and, if appropriate, “repatriation” of F to Romania.

[5]At this hearing, all parties were represented by Counsel. Neither of the parents attended court, and attempts by their lawyers to contact them on the telephone were unsuccessful. However I note that the parents had both attended the 2 February 2026 hearing in person, that the mother continues to have frequent contact with F (three times a week), and that there was a tube strike on the day of this hearing which may have caused transport difficulties. The mother’s Counsel was fully instructed. The father’s Counsel was concerned that he did not have clear instructions from the father, and so did not make substantive oral submissions during the hearing. Both the current social worker and the team manager from the local authority attended court.

[6]In brief, the parties’ positions on the transfer application are: 6.1. The local authority asks me to transfer these proceedings to Romania. Their final care plan is for F to be placed for adoption in Romania, and they do not want to delay starting that process. If I agree to transfer the proceedings to Romania, I am asked to stay these English care proceedings, make a formal request to the Romanian authorities to assume jurisdiction, approve the practical arrangements for F to be taken to Romania by the social worker and her foster carer, and - once she has arrived and been handed over to the Romanian authorities - to dismiss these English proceedings, on the basis that all issues would thereafter be dealt with in Romania; 6.2. The mother objects to the transfer application and wishes these proceedings to continue in England. She does not agree to F being placed for adoption, and wishes for F to return to her care (or shared care with the father). However, if the court were to decide that F should be placed for adoption, the mother would wish her to be adopted by an English family, not a Romanian family; 6.3. The father at the 2.2.26 hearing agreed to the transfer of the proceedings to Romania, and the final care plan for F to be placed for adoption in Romania. However, by the time of this hearing it seemed that his position may have changed, and that he may be objecting to the transfer of the proceedings to Romania. It was also unclear what his position is in respect of the substantive care proceedings, as he has not filed his evidence or response to threshold. Given the lack of clarity about his instructions, his Counsel adopted a neutral position; 6.4. The Guardian did not agree that transferring the proceedings to Romania at this stage was appropriate, or in F’s best interests, for numerous reasons including that all the evidence is in this country, the case is essentially ready for final hearing, both parents are here, and F has never lived anywhere else. As to the substantive outcome of the care proceedings, the Guardian agrees in his final analysis that F should be adopted, rather than returned to her mother and/or her father, but considers that the adoption should be in the UK, not Romania.

[7]An envoy from the Bulgarian embassy in London attended the hearing remotely. There was no request from the Romanian authorities to attend the hearing.

[8]After Counsel’s oral submissions, which took up the morning and continued until mid-afternoon, I reserved judgment to be handed down in writing. Given the importance of the issue, which involves not just the courts of this country but also authorities in Romania and Bulgaria, and in the absence of the parents at the hearing, it did not seem to me appropriate to deliver a short ex tempore oral judgment. This Judgment was provided in draft to the parties on 11 May 2026.

[9]I note that the care proceedings are now in week 63 (having been commenced on 21.2.25). There has been significant delay in progressing the proceedings, and clearly it is imperative for F that decisions are made about her long-term future as soon as possible.

Written evidence

[10]I was provided with a bundle of 875 pages, which was the full care proceedings bundle. Within the bundle is extensive written evidence and reports, which I read carefully, including: 10.1. Statements from social workers dated 21.2.25, 24.3.25, 3.12.25 and 11.3.26; 10.2. The mother’s statements dated 26.2.25, 27.3.25 and 27.3.26; 10.3. The father’s statement dated 3.4.25; 10.4. Guardian’s reports dated 27.3.25 and 30.1.26; 10.5. Residential Centre Assessment reports for the mother dated 12.2.25 and 6.3.25; 10.6. Cognitive assessment report of the mother dated 11.4.25; 10.7. DNA testing of the father dated 8.4.25; 10.8. ISW assessment report of both parents dated 5.8.25; 10.9. Special guardianship report of the paternal grandparents dated 11.12.25.

[11]Given the nature of this application, there was no need for any oral evidence at this hearing, which was dealt with on the basis of written skeleton arguments and oral submissions.

Factual background

[12]The mother is Bulgarian by birth and nationality. She says she came to the UK a few years ago with three siblings and a niece, to work and for a better life, however she has alternatively said to professionals that she was brought here by sex traffickers. Her own mother is believed to live in Bulgaria (although attempts by the Bulgarian authorities to locate her during these proceedings were unsuccessful); her father in England. She met the father in 2022 and they started a relationship. The father is Romanian by birth and nationality. The mother became pregnant with F in 2023.

[13]F was born in 2024. During her pregnancy, the mother missed 10 ante-natal appointments. The mother also acknowledges that she smoked throughout the pregnancy. At the hospital, the mother accepts that she told the nurses that she had been sex trafficked and exploited, but within these proceedings she has said that there were attempts to sex traffic her, but that these were unsuccessful.

[14]After F’s birth, the mother was living with her in shared accommodation. It is unclear where the father was living. The mother alleges that one of the tenants (in the papers described as a madam at a brothel) threatened/attempted to sell F for £5,000, and she or her daughter tried to poison F’s bottle with detergent. The mother and F left the shared accommodation in early October 2024. There is a lack of clarity about where the mother and father were during October 2024. It seems that at some point the mother became homeless, and the mother and F appear to have been sleeping on the street. The police found the mother and F on the streets. F was described as being wrapped in a blanket, but cold to the touch. Hotel accommodation was found for them, but the mother then went missing for 2 weeks with F. It appears from the papers that they may have been with the father during these two weeks. The police located the mother and F, and F was made subject to a Police Protection Order that day. Initially F was placed in foster care, pursuant to a s.20 agreement with the mother.

[15]In November 2024, the mother and F were placed together in a residential mother and baby unit with the mother’s consent, where they remained until February 2025. An assessment of the mother’s parenting capacity, received from the unit in February 2025, was negative. A range of concerns were noted, including about the mother’s own needs relating to trauma she had experienced during her own life, her capacity to understand the risks which others could pose to F, concerns about her providing basic care to F, and a lack of understanding of risks which others could pose for F.

[16]The information I have about the father is less clear, not least because he has only filed a short statement early on in these proceedings, in which he was unwilling even to explain where he was living (“I do not know my current address…I cannot recall my previous addresses as I have had too many”), and his engagement with the proceedings has been inconsistent. The local authority have numerous concerns about the father, including that he had previously been arrested for offences including running a brothel and sex trafficking. The father denies this, and has no convictions for these specific offences. However he does have numerous convictions including for multiple counts of theft (shoplifting), driving without insurance or a licence and failing to stop after an accident, failing to surrender to custody, and failing to comply with a community service order,

[17]On 21 February 2025, the local authority applied for an interim care order, and separation of the mother and F, arguing that they needed to share parental responsibility to protect F from the risk of trafficking and poor parenting, and being removed from a place of safety. The court made an ICO on 21.2.25, for the mother and F to remain together for the next few days, and listed a further hearing on 27.2.25 to consider interim separation. The court approved separation on 27.2.25, and F has been cared for in foster care ever since.

[18]The mother currently has supervised contact with F three times a week. She has shown commitment to F by consistently attending these sessions, and shows love and affection towards her daughter, engaging warmly with her. F engages well with her mother, is described as being excited to see her, and appears to enjoy spending time with her.

[19]The father has been inconsistent in attending contact.

[20]In terms of F’s immigration status, I understand she would be entitled to both Bulgarian and Romanian citizenship through her parents, although no steps have yet been taken to obtain any nationality or travel documents for her from either country. Neither parent has settled legal immigration status in this country: 20.1. The mother had pre-settled status, but allowed this to expire. However she is said to be making enquiries about regularising her immigration status here; 20.2. The father was ordered to leave the UK in February 2024 and was banned from returning for 5 years. Despite this, he came back to the UK in April 2024 “as a passenger in a vehicle”. He is therefore at risk of detention and deportation; he should not be working in this country, and is not entitled to benefits. There is a concern about how he is supporting himself, including whether he is working illegally on the black market and/or committing criminal offences.

Court proceedings

[21]During (and prior to) these care proceedings multiple assessments have been carried out: 21.1. Residential parenting assessment of the mother with F (negative); 21.2. DNA testing of the father (confirmed paternity); 21.3. An ISW with experience of working with Romanian culture, and with parents who have cognitive difficulties, prepared a parenting assessment which was negative, and did not recommend that F return to her parents, together or separately; 21.4. A cognitive assessment was carried out of the mother by a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, who concluded that she is likely to be functioning at “well below average level”, and is very likely to be affected by “significant intellectual limitations”. The mother is described as lacking “insight into her own limitations…[with] a poor capacity to see that she is struggling as much as she is”. 21.5. With the assistance of the Romanian authorities, the paternal grandparents in Romania, who the father put forward as alternative carers for F, have been assessed. These assessments were negative. There are no other identified potential paternal family carers in Romania. 21.6. The Bulgarian Embassy sought to locate the maternal grandmother, who the mother had put forward as an alternative carer, but were unable to trace her. The mother has not put forward any other members of her family as alternative carers.

[22]There have been multiple court hearings and directions orders: 22.1. 21.2.25 – interim care order and directions order; 22.2. 27.2.25 – interim care order (approving separation); 22.3. 31.3.25 – directions order including listing an IRH on 5.9.25; 22.4. 20.6.25 – directions order including re-listing the IRH on 8.10.25; 22.5. 6.9.25 – directions order (on paper), including re-listing the IRH on 29.1.26.

[23]The local authority filed their final evidence and care plan on 15.12.25. The care plan is for F to be placed for adoption, in Romania. They have not made a placement application for adoption in England. The local authority considers that Romania is more appropriate than England because of F’s paternal heritage – but I note that this does not reflect her mother’s heritage, which is Bulgarian.

[24]The local authority then made two C2 applications: 24.1. C2 dated 18.12.25, seeking allocation to the High Court or to a s.9 Judge sitting in the local Family Court “to determine the jurisdiction and repartition [sic] issues”; 24.2. C2 dated 21.2.26, for transfer of these proceedings to Romania.

[25]The case was reallocated to a High Court Judge (Simon Colton KC as DHCJ) for a directions hearing on 2.2.26, and he listed this hearing to consider the transfer application. The IRH on 29.1.26 was vacated and the substantive care proceedings have effectively been put on hold while this application is dealt with.

[26]The Guardian’s final analysis is dated 30.1.26.

[27]Pursuant to the 2.2.26 directions

[28]The local authority has already liaised with the Romanian authorities about practical arrangements, were the court to approve transfer. I have carefully read a letter from the Romanian authorities dated 5.3.26 which sets out information about the process of taking a child to Romania, foster care arrangements on arrival, and court proceedings in Romania leading to adoption. In summary, the Romanian authorities have indicated that they would promptly accept the request for transfer, and have identified a potential foster carer. They have explained the legal framework under which they would make arrangements for F’s permanent care, including allocating a social worker, and bringing the case before the Romanian court within 5 days of her arrival, at a hearing where the parents will be required to express their views on their daughter’s future. The Romanian authorities have also indicated that they would issue emergency travel papers for F, and would issue a Romanian birth certificate after her arrival in Romania.

[29]The local authority indicated in submissions that they are alert to the issue of a “limping adoption”, were the Romanian authorities not to recognise an adoption order made by the English court. They note that adoption is outside the scope of the 1996 Hague Convention. They want to avoid further delay for F, if the best outcome for her is adoption in Romania. I was told that Romanian proceedings dealing with adoption would take 6 months, and the local authority do not wish to delay the start of that 6-month period.

Legal framework: 1996 Hague Convention

[30]Both the UK and Romania are Contracting States to the 1996 Hague Convention. Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the 1996 Convention:

“The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child's person or property.”

[31]There is no doubt that F is habitually resident in England and Wales, as since birth she has never lived anywhere else. Both of her parents live in England, and since she has moved into foster care, her foster carers have always lived in this country. The English court therefore has jurisdiction to take measures directed to her protection.

[32]Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention states (my emphasis):(1) By way of exception, the authority of a Contracting State having jurisdiction under Article 5 or 6, if it considers that the authority of another Contracting State would be better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child, may either: - request that other authority, directly or with the assistance of the Central Authority of its State, to assume jurisdiction to take such measures of protection as it considers to be necessary, or - suspend consideration of the case and invite the parties to introduce such a request before the authority of that other State.

(2) The Contracting States whose authorities may be addressed as provided in the preceding paragraph are: a) a State of which the child is a national, b) a State in which property of the child is located, c) a State whose authorities are seised of an application for divorce or legal separation of the child's parents, or for annulment of their marriage, d) a State with which the child has a substantial connection.

(3) The authorities concerned may proceed to an exchange of views.

(4) The authority addressed as provided in paragraph 1 may assume jurisdiction, in place of the authority having jurisdiction under Article 5 or 6, if it considers that this is in the child's best interests.

[33]Through her father, F is a Romanian national. The English court may therefore request the Romanian authorities to assume jurisdiction to take such measures of protection as it considers necessary, but only if the English court consider that the Romanian court is “better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child” than the English court.

[34]I was referred by Counsel for the parties to numerous authorities, which I deal with below. Clearly each decision is fact-dependent, and so I have summarised the facts of each case. The emphasis (in bold) in some of the quotes from the authorities, is my own.

[35]The local authority referred the Court to Re N (children) (adoption: jurisdiction)

[2016] All ER 1086

(Court of Appeal decision) and In re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) (AIRE Centre and others intervening)

[2016] 2 WLR 1103

(Supreme Court decision, in the same case). This case was considered before Brexit, when the provisions of Brussels IIR applied between the two jurisdictions in that case (England and Hungary), and Article 15 of BIIR provided an equivalent provision to Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention. The children were Hungarian nationals, in foster care in England, where they were habitually resident. The mother and father, both Hungarian nationals, had returned to live in Hungary; the mother had had another baby in Hungary. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court overturned the first instance Judge’s decision to transfer the proceedings to Hungary, partly because to do so would effectively rule out one of the potential long-term options for the children, to live in England with foster carers or in an adoptive placement. I note that at §4 of the Supreme Court decision, Baroness Hale states:

“It goes without saying that the provisions of the Regulation are based upon mutual respect and trust between the member states. It is not for the courts of this or any other country to question the “competence, diligence, resources or efficacy of either the child protection services or the courts” of another state (see In re M (Brussels II Revised: Article 15) [2014] EWCA Civ 152; [2014] 2 FLR 1372, para 54(v), per Munby P). As the Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation puts it, the assessment of whether a transfer would be in the best interests of the child “should be based on the principle of mutual trust and on the assumption that the courts of all member states are in principle competent to deal with a case”

(p 35, para 3.3.3). This principle goes both ways. Just as we must respect and trust the competence of other member states, so must they respect and trust ours.”

[36]In terms of the correct approach for the court to adopt, at §43-44, Baroness Hale states:

“43. It is the case, as argued on behalf of the mother, that the “better placed” and “best interests” questions are inter-related. Some of the same factors may be relevant to both. But it is clear that they are separate questions and must be addressed separately. The second one does not inexorably follow from the first. 44. The question remains, what is encompassed in the “best interests” requirement? ….The court is deciding whether to request a transfer of the case. The question is whether the transfer is in the child’s best interests. This is a different question from what eventual outcome to the case will be in the child’s best interests. The focus of the inquiry is different, but it is wrong to call it “attenuated”

. The factors relevant to deciding the question will vary according to the circumstances. It is impossible to be definitive. But there is no reason at all to exclude the impact upon the child’s welfare, in the short or the longer term, of the transfer itself. What will be its immediate consequences? What impact will it have on the choices available to the court deciding upon the eventual outcome? This is not the same as deciding what outcome will be in the child’s best interests. It is deciding whether it is in the child’s best interests for the court currently seised of the case to retain it or whether it is in the child’s best interests for the case to be transferred to the requested court.”

[37]In Re A and B (Children: Transfer of proceedings to Romania) (No.1)

[2021] EWHC 3703 (Fam)

and Re A and B (Children: Transfer of proceedings to Romania) (No.2) [2021], Mr Justice Poole dealt with a (post-Brexit) application pursuant to Article 8, 1996 Hague Convention for transfer of care proceedings to Romania. The Romanian parents had abducted their 2 young children to Romania during English care proceedings, and said that they would not return to England. The Romanian authorities were already in the process of assessing child protection issues in Romania. The parents supported the transfer application, but the Guardian opposed it. For reasons relating to the facts of that case – not least that the parents and children were living in Romania and engaging with Romanian child protection authorities - the court was satisfied that the Romanian courts would be better placed to protect the children, and that it was in the children’s best interests for the proceedings to be transferred to Romania.

[38]In Re B (Children: Care Proceedings: Jurisdiction: Transfer of Proceedings

[2022] EWHC 1494 (Fam)

, HHJ Moradifar (sitting as a DHCJ) was dealing with the mother’s application to transfer proceedings to Romania pursuant to Article 8, 1996 Hague Convention. The mother was only 15 years old when she gave birth, and 16 years old during the proceedings. Given her young age, the mother was herself subject to the care proceedings, as well as her baby. Interim care orders were made for the mother and baby. By the time of the transfer decision, the mother was believed to be living (without the local authority’s agreement) in her home country of Romania, and she wanted the baby to join her there. The mother’s parents, the baby’s father, and the mother’s Guardian (dealing only with the mother’s best interests, not the baby’s) supported the transfer of proceedings to Romania. The local authority, and the baby’s Guardian, opposed the transfer application. The court refused the transfer application in respect of both the mother and the baby.

[39]Re S (A Child: Article 9 Transfer to Norway)

[2024] EWHC 2814 (Fam)

, Trowell J was dealing with a request by the Norwegian authorities to transfer care proceedings relating to an 11-month old child with Norwegian nationality, to Norway, pursuant to Article 9, 1996 Hague Convention. The court applied the same test as under Article 8 (better placed to assess the child’s best interests, and the child’s best interests overall). The parents supported the transfer, and the mother was in the process of returning to Norway to live; the Guardian and local authority opposed the transfer. On balance, the court ordered the transfer of proceedings, relying particularly on fact that the mother would herself be living in Norway.

[40]In AM & GM v KL & VL

[2023] EWFC 15

, MacDonald J dealt with private children applications proceeding both in England (initiated by the parents) and Greece (initiated by the maternal grandparents, who were Greek nationals and lived in Greece). He decided that the English Courts had jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5 of the 1996 Hague Convention, based on the children’s habitual residence, and refused the grandparents’ application to transfer to Greece under Article 8 of the 1996 Convention. MacDonald J stated at §23-28: Transfer of Jurisdiction23. Art 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention provides a mechanism whereby a Contracting State with substantive jurisdiction under Art 5, based on the child's or children's habitual residence, can transfer that jurisdiction to another Contracting State...

24. The test for transfer under Art 8(1) is whether the other Contracting State is better placed to assess the best interests of the child. Where the Contracting State with jurisdiction is better placed to assess the best interests of the child, or where the Contracting States are equally well placed to assess the best interests, the Art 8(1) test will not be made out and jurisdiction will remain with the Contracting State having jurisdiction.

25. The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention at paragraph 5.9 makes clear that a transfer under Art 8 may only be effected when three conditions are satisfied. First, that there is a connection between the child and the Contracting State to whose authorities it is permissible to transfer jurisdiction. Art 8(2) provides an exhaustive list of the factors capable of demonstrating such a connection. Second, the transfer must be in the child's best interests. Third, both Contracting States must agree to the transfer of jurisdiction. With respect to the best interests criteria, the Practical Handbook further observes as follows:

"The authority making the request that jurisdiction be transferred must consider that this will allow for a better assessment of the child's best interests. The authority asked to assume or cede jurisdiction can only do so if it believes this is in the child's best interests." 26. Art 8(1) of the 1996 Hague Convention states expressly that the power to transfer jurisdiction under Art 8 is to be applied by way of an exception and, accordingly, represents an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction set out in Art 5. Further, the wording of Art 8(1) makes clear that even where the court concludes that the authority of another Contracting State would be better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child, the court with jurisdiction retains a discretion as to whether to effect that transfer and is not obliged to do so. 27. There would appear to be no prior domestic authorities that deal expressly with the terms of Art 8(1) of the 1996 Hague Convention and their application. However, in Child and Family Agency v D (R intervening) (ECJ) [2017] 2 WLR 949 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that, in the context of the similarly (but not identically) worded provision in Art 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003), the court having jurisdiction must determine whether the transfer of the case to the other court is such as to provide genuine and specific added value with respect to the decision to be taken in relation to the child, as compared to the case remaining before the court having jurisdiction. In the later case of EP v FO (Case C-530/18) [2019] ILPr 32 at [30], the CJEU further observed in the context of the similarly worded provision of Art 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003) that: "

The court of a Member State that normally has jurisdiction to deal with a given case must, if it is to be able to request a transfer to a court of another Member State, be capable of rebutting the strong presumption in favour of maintaining its own jurisdiction, on the basis of that Regulation (judgment of 27 October 2016, Child and Family Agency v D (C-428/15) [2017] ILPr 5, [49])." 28. In deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction, both the domestic authorities and the European authorities make clear that it is not appropriate to engage in comparisons between the respective laws and legal systems of the two jurisdictions in question, and I make clear that I have not done so in this case. In Re N (Children)

[2016] UKSC 15

at [4], the Supreme Court observed in the context of Art 15 of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 that it is not for the courts of this or any other country to question the competence, diligence, resources, or efficacy of either the child protection services or the courts of another state…

[41]MacDonald J further stated at §34-35:34. Central to the general rule of jurisdiction under Art 5 of the 1996 Convention that the Contracting State of the children's habitual residence has jurisdiction to determine questions in respect of the children's welfare is the idea that, ordinarily, it is in children's best interests for questions concerning their welfare to be decided in the place where the children are integrated into a family and social environment. The aim is that the court of the Contracting State with which the children have the closest connection will be the one to determine their best interests. The reason for this is self-evident. The authorities in the country of the children's habitual residence are closer to, and will ordinarily have a greater understanding of, the children and their social and family environment. They are therefore, ordinarily, better able to assess fully the children's situation and welfare needs when reaching decisions about the children's best interests.

35. It is in this context that Art 8(1) of the 1996 Hague Convention requires that it be demonstrated that, by way of exception to the general jurisdictional rule, another Contracting State is better placed to assess the best interests of the child before a transfer of jurisdiction can take place and that such a transfer is in the children's best interests.

[42]I was also referred to B v N (No.2) (Art 7 and Transfer of Jurisdiction)

[2024] EWHC 17 (Fam)

, another decision of Mr Justice MacDonald, where the father sought the transfer of the proceedings to Germany pursuant to Article 8, 1996 Hague Convention. These were not care proceedings, but had started as private children proceedings between the parents, and then transitioned into 1980 Hague Convention proceedings in England (the father’s application), and later 1980 Hague Convention proceedings in Germany (the mother’s application), after the father removed the child from England to Germany without her consent. The authority also deals with an issue relating to Article 7, which is not relevant to the current case. At the time of the Article 8 decision, the father was living in Germany with the child, and the mother was in England. The German court had rejected the mother’s 1980 Hague Convention application, based on the child’s objections. On the facts of that case, the court considered it appropriate to transfer the welfare proceedings to Germany because the German courts would be better placed to assess the child’s best interests, and the transfer would also be in the child’s best interests, as he had been living in Germany with the father for 15 months, was attending school in Germany, had personally engaged in the German Hague proceedings, and had been assessed by the German authorities.

[43]I note that in none of the above authorities was the Court contemplating transferring ongoing care proceedings to a country where neither of the parents was living, where the child had never lived, where there were no extended family members assessed as suitable potential carers, and of which the mother is not a national, in the face of the parents’ objections.

Legal framework - domestic statutory provision: Children Act 1989

[44]The mother’s Counsel, Mr Hutton, referred the court to the provisions of the Children Act 1989, Schedule 2, paragraph 19, in his written and oral submissions. Counsel for the local authority, Ms Cabeza, said that this statutory provision did not apply in this case, that it was a “red herring”, and could safely be ignored. Her argument was in essence that these care proceedings would be stayed and then dismissed, if the court acceded to the local authority’s application for transfer of the proceedings to Romania, and so I did not need to consider the provisions of that section of the Act. She also submitted that she was fortified in that argument by the fact that CA 1989, Schedule 2, paragraph 19 is not referred to in any of the authorities I note that this statutory provision is in fact referred to in Re B (Children: Care Proceedings: Jurisdiction: Transfer of Proceedings

[2022] EWHC 1494 (Fam)

, in paragraph 49, albeit that this is an obiter comment. dealing with transfers pursuant to Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention. Counsel for the Guardian, Mr Leong, agreed with Mr Hutton that the Children Act provision does apply.

[45]Having carefully considered the matter, I am satisfied that the provisions of Children Act 1989, Schedule 2, paragraph 19 do apply to this case. Indeed from the plain reading of that paragraph, I do not see how it could be otherwise. The 1996 Hague Convention deals with jurisdiction, and issues arising between two Contracting States, but the Children Act 1989 is domestic law, and applies to children proceedings which are ongoing in this country. In none of the authorities to which I was referred, did the provisions of CA 1989 Schedule 2 para 19 have to be expressly considered/determined, because in none of those cases was the local authority seeking to place a child, who was being looked after in local authority care in England under an interim care order, during the currency of ongoing contested care proceedings, in another Contracting State, without the consent of that child’s parents.

[46]The provisions of CA 1989 Schedule 2, paragraph 9 state as follows: Arrangements to assist children to live abroad(1) A local authority may only arrange for, or assist in arranging for, any child in their care to live outside England and Wales with the approval of the court.

(2) A local authority may, with the approval of every person who has parental responsibility for the child arrange for, or assist in arranging for, any other child looked after by them to live outside England and Wales.

(3) The court shall not give its approval under sub-paragraph (1) unless it is satisfied that: (a) living outside England and Wales would be in the child’s best interests; (b) suitable arrangements have been, or will be, made for his reception and welfare in the country in which he will live; (c) the child has consented to living in that country; and (d) every person who has parental responsibility for the child has consented to his living in that country.

(4) Where the court is satisfied that the child does not have sufficient understanding to give or withhold his consent, it may disregard sub-paragraph (3)(c) and give its approval if the child is to live in the country concerned with a parent, guardian, special guardian, or other suitable person.

(5) Where a person whose consent is required by sub-paragraph (3)(d) fails to give his consent, the court may disregard that provision and give its approval if it is satisfied that that person: (a) cannot be found; (b) is incapable of consenting; or (c) is withholding his consent unreasonably.

(6) Section 85 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (which imposes restrictions on taking children out of the United Kingdom) shall not apply in the case of any child who is to live outside England and Wales with the approval of the court given under this paragraph.

(7) Where a court decides to give its approval under this paragraph it may order that its decision is not to have effect during the appeal period.

(8) In sub-paragraph (7) “the appeal period” means: (a) where an appeal is made against the decision, the period between the making of the decision and the determination of the appeal; and (b) otherwise, the period during which an appeal may be made against the decision.

(9) This paragraph does not apply: (a) to a local authority placing a child in secure accommodation in Scotland under section 25, or (b) to a local authority placing a child for adoption with prospective adopters.

[47]For completeness, Ms Cabeza for the local authority also argued that the local authority can place a child outside the jurisdiction for 28 days without an order of the court, relying on s.33 Children Act 1989. However, I note that s.33(7) and (8) state as follows: (7). While a care order is in force with respect to a child, no person may—(a) cause the child to be known by a new surname; or

(b) remove him from the United Kingdom, without either the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court. (8) Subsection (7)(b) does not— (a) prevent the removal of such a child, for a period of less than one month, by the authority in whose care he is; or (b) apply to arrangements for such a child to live outside England and Wales (which are governed by paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 in England…).

[48]The arrangement which the local authority are proposing would lead to F living abroad for much longer than a month (s.33(8)(a)) – their intention is that she would be placed with a foster carer in Romania for as long as it would take the Romanian courts to make a final adoption decision, and not return to England. Section 33(8)(b) brings the Court back to CA 1989 Schedule 2, paragraph 19, which in my Judgment plainly applies and which the court would need to consider, if the court were to decide under Article 8 that the Romanian authorities were “better placed to assess [F’s] best interests”, in circumstances where her mother (and possibly also her father) do not agree to her being removed from England.

Analysis and reasoning

[49]The local authority argues that Romania would be “better placed to assess the best interests” of F, and “importantly, to identify and provide the most appropriate long term care for her”. Given her age and developmental stage, the local authority considers that it is in F’s best interest for her care to be transitioned to the Romanian authorities “sooner rather than later”. Understandably the local authority is concerned about further delay in these long-running proceedings. The local authority also makes the point that the ISW who assessed the parents is a Romanian speaker and, if required, could give evidence in any Romanian court proceedings.

[50]The local authority further submits that the English court should proceed on the basis that the Romanian court process and protective services are competent. They refer to the mother’s expressed concerns about the Romanian courts and child protection services, but say that it is not the role of the English court to pass judgment on the Romanian court system. Of course I accept that that is not my role and would not be appropriate. However, that is not the test that I have to apply. I am not considering and expressing views about the relative merits of the English and Romanian court and child protection systems. The test under Article 8, 1996 Hague Convention - where the child is habitually resident in England (as here) - is whether Romania is “better placed to assess the best interests” of F, and that is my focus.

[51]The local authority also urged me to focus on:

“The real issue…what is the best outcome for this child if she cannot be returned to the care of her parents”

. However, I made clear in oral submissions that I did not consider that to be my role, at this ½ day hearing, at which I was going to hear none of the substantive evidence in the case, in the context of contested care proceedings. I was troubled by the submission on behalf of the local authority:

“what is the point of a final hearing, if the care plan is for adoption in Romania?”

. The local authority’s care plan is challenged by the mother (possibly also the father), and the Guardian. In circumstances where there is no agreed outcome to these care proceedings, the court will need carefully to consider all the evidence, and to decide what is best for F, rather than this being determined by the local authority.

[52]I was assisted by the helpful and focussed arguments of Counsel for the mother and the Guardian, who both opposed the local authority’s application at this stage. They argued that this application is premature, that all the evidence and witnesses relevant to the decision about whether F should be placed for adoption rather than returned to one or both of her parents, is in England, where F has lived all her life to date, and where both of her parents live at the moment. Counsel for the Guardian submitted that the local authority was asking me to look at the case “from the wrong end of the telescope”, and that I was being asked to do what Baroness Hale said in §44 of Re N (quoted above) was inappropriate, in conflating the question of transfer with the eventual outcome of the substantive proceedings.

[53]After carefully considering all the submissions, and evidence in this case, I cannot see how I could come to the conclusion that the Romanian courts are better placed to assess the best interests of F at this stage: 53.1. Other than the assessments of extended paternal family members in Romania, which were negative and are not challenged, the evidence and witnesses in this case are all in England; 53.2. Both parents are in England; 53.3. The social workers, who have worked very hard on this case, are in England; 53.4. The ISW who assessed the parents is in England; 53.5. The residential placement where the mother stayed with F before she was placed in foster care, is in England; 53.6. The mother’s cognitive assessment was done in England; 53.7. The contact centre which provides contact notes for the mother’s regular contact with F is in England; 53.8. All of the events leading to F being placed in Police Protection, and later in foster care, took place in England; 53.9. The extensive documentation relating to F’s life and the concerns about her care (the bundle in this case is 875 pages) is in English; 53.10. The Guardian has been involved with F since the beginning of these proceedings, 15 months ago; 53.11. These court proceedings are well advanced; there was supposed to have been an IRH on 29.1.26 (the IRH having adjourned twice, from 5.9.25 and 8.10.25); 53.12. All of the evidence (save for that of the father) has been filed; 53.13. Save for any placement application which the local authority indicated it may make following this hearing, to give the court the alternative of an adoption placement in England, and consequential/updating evidence, the case is ready for a final hearing; 53.14. I understand that the Romanian courts would not be bound by the evidence and assessments so far provided in these English proceedings; they may well wish to carry out their own assessments, which would entail further delay for F; 53.15. F has a Guardian in these proceedings, and her own representation, so that her best interests can be carefully considered; 53.16. Both parents have legal aid and legal representation here, and so can challenge the evidence insofar as they wish to do so (and the mother certainly wishes to do so); 53.17. The English court will ensure that both parties have access to interpreters in these proceedings, so that they can engage fully with these court proceedings.

[54]There are also in my view important arguments about the Article 6 and

Article 8 ECHR

rights of the various parties, were these proceedings to be transferred to Romania and F taken to that country by the local authority, before these care proceedings have concluded: 54.1. F has only (to date) lived in England; she has never visited Romania; 54.2. Both of her parents live in England at the moment; 54.3. She has been cared for by foster carers in England for 14 months; 54.4. The language which has surrounded her is English; moving to a Romanian foster care placement suddenly, would be a significant change for her; 54.5. She has regular contact with her mother, seeing her three times a week; they are described as having a loving relationship. I cannot see how the mother can practically continue to have contact with F if these proceedings and F were to be moved immediately to Romania, when the mother lives in England. I recognise that the outcome of the care proceedings may be adoption, and that post-adoption contact may not be possible, but that decision has not yet been made by any court; 54.6. The mother has no accommodation and no family in Romania; 54.7. I have no evidence about whether the mother would be able to access legal advice and representation in Romania, or engage effectively with the courts of that country, where she does not live; 54.8. The father did not engage in this hearing or give his instructions to his lawyers; he does have family in Romania, and as a Romanian citizen he is likely to be in a better position to access legal advice and representation there, and to engage effectively with the Romanian authorities, but the mother’s position as a Bulgarian national is likely to be more problematic.

[55]Putting it colloquially, I agree with the mother’s Counsel that the local authority’s application puts the “cart before the horse”. No-one has yet decided that F should be placed for adoption, let alone that it is best for her that she should be adopted in Romania, a country which she has never visited, and which is only half of her cultural heritage. In my view this was a premature application, in circumstances where the mother strongly objects to her child being adopted, and also to adoption in Romania, and is entitled to challenge the local authority’s application in the English court within these court proceedings.

[56]For all the above reasons, I cannot agree that the Romanian court is better placed to assess F’s best interests, and so the Article 8 transfer application must fail.

[57]I will briefly deal with the domestic statutory provision, as set out in paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 of the Children Act 1989. In practice, this does not arise in this case now, because I have decided that the Romanian court is not better placed to assess F’s best interests, and so the care proceedings will continue in England, and F will not be moving to Romania at this stage, but will remain in foster care in England at least until the final care hearing. However, given that the local authority has challenged the applicability of this section, and so it was addressed by all Counsel in their oral submissions, for completeness, I will deal with it briefly: 57.1. F is currently a “child in care”, as she is subject to an interim care order; 57.2. Pursuant to §19(1):

“A local authority may only arrange for, or assist in arranging for, any child in their care to live outside England and Wales, with the approval of the court”; 57.3. §19(2) does not apply, becausethe local authority do not have the “approval of every person who has parental responsibility for the child”, as the mother has always objected to this; 57.4. Pursuant to §19(3), “The court shall not give its approval” (under §19(1)) unless it is satisfied that living outside England/Wales is “in the child’s best interests”, “suitable arrangements have been, or will be, made for [her] reception and welfare” in Romania, and every person with parental responsibility has consented. The parents have not consented, and for the reasons set out in this Judgment, I also do not consider such a move to be in F’s best interests at this stage. For this reason, I do not need to consider the suitability of the arrangements which have been made; 57.5. I do not need to have F’s consent (under §19(3)(c)), given her very young age (§19(4)), but only if I am satisfied that she is to live with “a parent, guardian, special guardian, or other suitable person”

. At the moment I have minimal detail about the proposed foster carer; there is no “parent, guardian [or] special guardian” in Romania; 57.6. Pursuant to §19(5), I can dispense with the parents’ consent if I am satisfied that they are “withholding [their] consent unreasonably”. In circumstances where the mother does not agree to F being adopted, no court has yet ruled on this, and she wishes to challenge the evidence in the English court, I could not conclude that she is withholding her consent unreasonably.

Conclusion

[58]For the reasons set out in this Judgment, I do not agree that these proceedings should at this stage be transferred to Romania under Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention, nor that F should now move to live with a foster carer in Romania. Although I am grateful to the Romanian authorities for the time they have taken to liaise with the local authority, in my view the application for transfer lacks merit, and the final care hearing should take place in England, where F is, and has always been since birth, habitually resident.

[59]I make it clear that I am not expressing any view about whether - if the court were to conclude at the final hearing that F should not return to the care of her mother and/or father, and that she should be adopted - this adoption should be in England or Romania.

[60]Counsel for all parties asked that I adjourn this application for transfer pursuant to Article 8, 1996 Hague Convention, rather than dismissing it, because pursuant to FPR 12.62(3), 42 days’ notice is required to issue a fresh application under Article 8, which could cause significant delay later in these proceedings. For that reason, I will adjourn the application, rather than dismissing it.

[61]I am concerned that these court proceedings relating to this very young child have effectively been “paused” for several months while the local authority made this application and the court has adjudicated on it. There was supposed to be an IRH on 29 January 2026, but that hearing was adjourned while this jurisdictional issue was resolved. The case needs now to progress to a final hearing as soon as possible.

[62]To avoid further delay, I agreed to make directions to progress the case to a final hearing. Now that this interim jurisdiction issue has been resolved, I indicated to Counsel that I did not consider that this was a case which was sufficiently complex that it needed to be allocated to the High Court for the final care hearing. It should be remitted to the local Family Court, which has dealt with all the substantive hearings to date, where the parents live and the social workers are based, so that the hearing can be attended more easily by all of them.

[63]I will make the following directions, which were agreed by Counsel at court (in the event that I did not agree to transfer the proceedings to Romania at this stage): 63.1. The application for transfer to Romania pursuant to Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention is adjourned, and the court may reconsider it at the conclusion of the final care hearing, if appropriate; 63.2. The proceedings are reallocated to the local Family Court (if possible, to be heard by the Circuit Judge who has dealt with the previous hearings); 63.3. The local authority shall file and serve an updating statement by 4pm on 28 May 2026, and any application for a placement order by 4pm on 2 June 2026; 63.4. Permission to the parents to file any updating evidence not later than 4pm on 4 June 2026; 63.5. The Guardian shall file and serve an addendum final analysis, to include his recommendations on any placement order application, by 4pm on 16 June 2026; 63.6. The local authority shall file and serve contact notes by 4pm on 21 May 2026; 63.7. A final hearing should be listed on the first open date after 23 June 2026 (time estimate 4 days); 63.8. An advocates’ meeting should take place not less than 4 clear days before the final hearing.

[64]This Judgment should be translated into Romanian and Bulgarian, so that the parties, and both countries’ authorities, can understand the reasons for my decision. A copy should be sent to the Bulgarian embassy (for the attention of the envoy who attended this hearing), and the Romanian authorities. The cost of translation should be covered by the local authority, as this was their application.

[65]There will be no order as to costs, save for assessment of the parties’ publicly funded costs. 27 May 2026

order

27.1. The local authority filed further evidence on 11.3.26; and 27.2. The mother provided her final evidence on 27.3.26.