“… it is quite clear that the test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short, where nothing else will do. In many cases, and particularly where the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so, it will be necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions.”
“…before making an adoption order in such a case, the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support.” 41. This echoes what the Strasbourg Court said in Y v United Kingdom(2012) 55 EHRR 33 ,[2012] 2 FLR 332 at [134]: “[F]amily ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to “rebuild” the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.” 42. In Re F (above), I suggested that in assessing the risk of future harm, the court should consider: the type of harm that may arise; the likelihood of it arising; the severity of the consequences if it arose; and what risk reduction or mitigation steps can be taken. Having reached its conclusion about those matters, the court should make a comparison of the welfare advantages and disadvantages of each course of action and finally step back and check that any interference with rights arising from its proposed decision is necessary and proportionate. In summary: in a case that turns on risk of harm, does the risk justify the remedy? 43. In Re B, in a finding upheld by the Supreme Court, the trial judge had expressed himself satisfied that the threshold had been crossed, “not perhaps in the most extreme way that is seen in some cases, but crossed it has been”
“[S]ociety must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.”