THE APPLICANT did not attend and was not represented
THE RESPONDENT appeared in Person
JUDGMENT
10 th APRIL 2026
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WARNING: This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
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JUDGE PARKER:
Date 2026-04-10
[1]I am concerned with two children: LJ, who is aged ten years of age; and B, who is six.[2]This is the father’s application for child arraignments and a spend time-with order. He has not seen the children since January 2023 being the parties’ date of separation.[3]The issue in this case are the disclosures of the father overly chastising the children. The mother in her statement before the court outlined details as to her and the children’s experiences with the father which includes physical and emotional abuse, anger and aggression, both towards her and the children and, more importantly, the consequential effects on the children of that behaviour and her concern that any form of contact is likely to traumatise them.[4]The initial child impact report of 3rd July 2025 recommends no contact at all, be it direct or indirect, which, of course, is an extreme and draconian order. The mother agrees with the recommendation, but the father does not.[5]On 16th July 2025, I requested an updating child impact report commenting upon what pre-conditions and/or work would be recommended prior to the re-introduction of any contact. That addendum report outlines that the father needs to demonstrate that he has meaningfully accepted responsibility for the emotional and physical harm caused to the children and display understanding and remorse. It is suggested that there be therapeutic support for the children, therapeutic support for the father and for him to undertake a parenting course.[6]The court is also invited to consider a s.91(14) direction until the father can evidence material change and undertake the proposed work. It is suggested that this should be for a period of not less than two years.[7]I note in the addendum report that both children have shared with CAFCASS past physical and emotional abuse, and it is said that they show signs of unresolved trauma. B spoke to his nursery in 2023 about his father hitting him. CAFCASS is of the view that these recounts do not show evidence of adult coaching or manipulation. The children express grave and genuine fear of their father justifying their resistance to all forms of contact.[8]The father denies all allegations of past abuse but does accept that he has physically chastised the children. However, CAFCASS are of the view that he minimises the extent of this.[9]The father has not attended today’s hearing. There was a previous final hearing in this matter on 21st January 2026 that he did attend, but that was not effective because the author of the child’s impact report was unwell and the matter was therefore adjourned to today for a final hearing.[10]I am informed that last week the father was contacted by CAFCASS to remind him about the hearing. There was no response. There was no suggestion that the email was not delivered. The mother is here, the author of the child impact report is here and there is no indication that the father is not aware of today’s hearing or indeed contacted the court with any difficulties in attending.[11]I have heard from the author of the child impact report. She has shared with me a report from a counsellor in relation to LJ headed “Psychological report”.[12]This document has not been filed with the court or sent to the father but has been provided to CAFCASS. I have allowed it to be produced today. The father undoubtedly is not aware of this, but had he attended today he would have been.[13]It appears that therapy commenced for LJ in November 2025. She presents with symptoms of anxiety, hyper-vigilance, emotional dysregulation, sleep disturbance, recurring fears relating to her father and general trauma. During therapy she has made spontaneous and unprompted disclosures regarding fear towards her father and in witnessing domestic abuse. She has been having nightmares. The most recent disclosure being made in the session on 9th March 2026, just a month ago.[14]The therapist is of the view is that any form of contact, be it direct or indirect, will exacerbate her trauma and indeed would prove contra to her therapeutic intervention. LJ is not yet emotionally resilient enough to consider any form of contact. The recommendation is that any future contact should be child led, clinically reviewed and subject to a specialist trauma assessment.[15]I understand with regard to B that the plan is for him also to have therapy, however, he is younger. The issue with regards to the commencement of this therapy is the lack of funding and also his age and readiness. CAFCASS reports that B shares similar fears towards his father. His memories are less clear due to his age.[16]CAFCASS reports that the father does not accept the children’s disclosures, so he himself is not ready to progress contact in light of that. The CAFCASS reporter accepts that a no contact order is a draconian order, but at present she feels that any form of contact would be emotionally harmful to both children.[17]I heard briefly from the mother. LJ’s therapy is open-ended. It is likely that B’s therapy will commence this year; it is likely to be play therapy because he is less open and talkative about his experiences, unlike LJ. B’s presentation is different from LJ; he presents as angry and closed and it is posited that this is learned behaviour. It is suggested that he has similarly experienced trauma and needs therapeutic input.[18]The courts have consistently stressed the importance of contact as a fundamental element of family life which is to be terminated only in exceptional circumstances. The court has to consider all alternative means of contact, and it should only be stopped only where it is detrimental to their welfare. The court should not give excessive weight to transitory problems. Spending time with or seeing a child should not be denied unless the child’s welfare demands it.[19]As long ago as Re P (Contact and Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314, the following principles were outlined:a. Overriding all else, as provided by s.1(1) of the Children Act, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration of the court.b. It is almost always in the interests of a child whose parents are separated that they should spend time with the parent with whom they are not living.c. However, cases do unhappily and infrequently but occasionally arise in which a court is compelled to conclude that in existing circumstances an order for immediate direct contact should not be ordered because such an order would injure the welfare of the child.d. In cases in which, for whatever reason, direct contact cannot for the time being be ordered, it is ordinarily highly desirable that there should be indirect contact so that the child grows up knowing of the love and interest of the absent parent with whom, in due course, direct contact should be established.[20]Those principles have been restated in Re C (A Child) (Suspension of contact) [2011] EWCA 521, namely:a. Contact being a fundamental element of family life and almost always in the interest of the child and to only be terminated in exceptional circumstances and when there are cogent reasons for doing so and where there is no alternative, and then only if it would be detrimental to the child’s welfare.b. The court must grapple with all available alternatives before abandoning hope of achieving some contact.c. Contact should be stopped only as a last resort and only once it has become clear that the child will not benefit from continuing the attempt.d. The court must also take a medium and long term view and must not accord excessive weight to what appears likely to be short term or transient problems.e. The key question is whether all necessary steps have been taken to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstances of a particular case.f. At the end of the day, the child’s welfare is paramount and the child’s interests must have precedence over any other consideration.[21]Finally, as set out in Re T (Contact: Alienation: Permission to Appeal) [2002] EWCA 1736, the court should consider whether the fundamental need of every child to have an enduring relationship with both parents is outweighed by the depth of harm to the particular child as might thereby be caused by the contact order.[22]The father is not here. I do not know why he is not here, but he is not. Therefore, my determination has been made on the evidence available before the court, both in paper format and including the evidence presented today and the oral evidence of the parties.[23]I find as a fact, based on the evidence that I have read and heard, that the children’s life experiences with their father was not a positive one. It involved witnessing physical and emotional abuse of the mother and also included direct physical and emotional abuse towards them. I am satisfied that there is real fear towards the father exhibited by these children and their views on contact is because of their life experiences, not through any manipulation or coaching by the mother.[24]I note that the children have shared their experiences with CAFCASS, to the nursery and, more particularly in relation to LJ, through therapy. Although B is not undertaking such therapy, it is clear to me that the emotional presentation of LJ and the trauma that she is exhibiting and the work that is necessary for her to do, equally applies in relation to B because their experiences are the same, although they may be manifested in different ways.[25]The report from the counsellor makes sobering reading. I do not doubt the mother’s similar descriptions with regard to B in relation to what she says in relation to his presentation in relation to his anger and the fact that he is somewhat closed.[26]I accept that, in the particular circumstances of this case, it is in neither of the children’s welfare or best interests to have any form of contact with their father at this stage, whether direct or indirect. It is clear to me, as evidenced in relation to LJ, that any form of contact would re-traumatise her and send her backwards in relation to her therapy. It is more likely than not, in my view, that B is in a similar position, although there is no direct evidence before the court with regard to that, but I accept what the mother says and that he too will require, as with his sister, therapeutic intervention, as is suggested by CAFCASS.[27]The father has not attended today. He accepts he has physically chastised the children, but he shows no insight as to the level of trauma that they have experienced because of him and an appreciation as to the fear they exhibit. He needs to demonstrate that he has meaningfully accepted his responsibility in relation to the emotional and physical harm he has caused to them and show full understanding and remorse and undertake work to address that, so that the children and the court can be reassured. Accordingly, I will make an order for no contact.[28]I am also invited to consider an order under s.91(14) with regard to preventing any further applications without permission of the court. The caselaw in relation to this has been set out in Re P (Section 91(14): Guidelines) Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR 573. A number of points stems from that decision, namely:• The welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration.• The power to restrict future applications is discretionary and the court must weigh in the balance all the relevant circumstances.• An important consideration is that to impose a restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting their child.• The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule.• It is generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications.• In suitable circumstances, and with clear evidence, a court may impose the leave restriction in cases where the welfare of the child requires it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications.• In such eventuality, the court will need to be satisfied first that that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for time to settle to a regime ordered by the court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute; and secondly, that there is a serious risk that, without the imposition of restriction, the child, or the primary carers, will be subject to unacceptable strain.• The degree of restriction should also be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore, the court imposing the restriction should carefully consider the extent of the restriction it should impose and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be restrained and the duration of the order.[29]In the case of Re A (A Child) (Supervised contact) (Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA 1749, matters moved slightly on from the previous caselaw where it was provided that there is considerable scope for the greater use of these orders to protect children’s interests. The court’s jurisdiction to make them is not limited to cases where a party has made excessive application, but extends to situations where a party’s overall conduct merits intervention. Section 91(14) does not necessarily mean that such an order has to be made only in exceptional circumstances. Of importance to note is that the order itself is only a filter.[30]Subsequently, the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 s.67 supports that approach giving statutory effect to permitting such an order to be made where an application under the Children Act would place a parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm.[31]This provides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live from corrosive, demoralising or controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm.[32]Furthermore, there is a helpful summary in Re F (Children) [2023] EWFC 212:(a) If findings of domestic abuse are made, even if the victim did not apply for this relief, the court is now bound to consider whether or not to make a section 91(14) order.(b) While such an order is ‘the exception and not the rule’, it does not follow that the case or its circumstances must somehow be adjudged to be ‘exceptional’ before such an order could be made.(c) The court should bear in mind that such orders represent a protective filter - not a bar on applications - and that there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases.(d) Whether the court makes an order is a matter for the court’s discretion. There are many and varied circumstances in which it may be appropriate to make such an order. These may include cases in which there have been multiple applications (‘repeated and unreasonable’), but that is not a necessary prerequisite. They may also include cases in which the court considers that an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (without the need to find the ‘risk’ to be ‘serious’ or the likely ‘harm’ to be ‘significant’ or ‘serious’). (f) If the court decides to make an order, it must consider: (i) Its duration, as to which, any term imposed should be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid and in relation to which decision the court must explain its reasons. (ii) Whether the order should apply to all or only certain types of application under the Children Act. (iii) Whether service of any subsequent application for permission should be prohibited pending initial judicial determination of that application. (g) In all of this, the welfare of the child is paramount. That said, any interference with a parent’s otherwise unfettered right of access to the court, including the duration of any such prohibition pending permission, must be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid.”.[33]Again, it is reiterated that a s.91(14) order is a filter and not a bar. If this father can show the Judge that there is a real change of circumstances and has undertaken the measures set out in the child impact report then he will be permitted to make a fresh application, but he must have addressed those matters before seeking permission in order to warrant renewed judicial investigation.[34]Accordingly, I am minded to make a s.91(14) direction in this case to enable the children at the very least to complete their therapy. Therefore, I will direct that the applicant is prohibited until 23rd July 2027 from making the following applications without first seeking permission of the court, namely, a child arrangements order.[35]That period of time, of course, enables the children to complete one full year of their education as it takes them up to the end of the next school year.[36]I will further make an order that service of any subsequent application for leave should be prohibited pending initial determination of that application, and any such further application be reserved to me.[37]That is my judgment and the reasons for it. ---------------