“On14 February 2025 extensive findings were made against the father at the conclusion of the hearing where both parents gave oral evidence to the court. The findings made against the father were of physical, sexual and verbal abuse by him against the mother, the court concluding that the abuse amounted to a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. The findings included serious physical violence and non-consensual sexual abuse and the repeated use of denigrating language towards her in the presence of the children. On the same date the mother issued a C2 application to withhold information from the father as to: (1) the nature of her illness and the proposed treatment; (2) the proposed location of her treatment; and (3) her application for the children to be placed with her in country X and the outcome of that application, including the children’s care arrangements. The mother’s application first came before the court on19 February 2025 . At the hearing the father was notified of the application but not of the subject matter. The matter was transferred to the High Court and directions were given listing the mother’s application for hearing on27 February 2025 at 2pm [that is to say this hearing].”
“The children are the subject of interim care orders. The local authority is committed to keeping the sibling group together and in their current schools while the mother undergoes her medical treatment so as to minimise the disruption for them. Enquiries are also being made as to whether they can, in fact, remain in the family home at this time with the local authority carers rather than moving to foster care. The local authority need to assess fully the possible care arrangements for the children in country X, including the extended family as potential carers. It is understood that ICACU have terminated their assessment of the maternal grandmother because of the size of her accommodation. The local authority is currently liaising with ICACU and country X authorities in order to try and recommence, progress the relevant assessments.”
“Mother was seen in clinic at [redacted] yesterday by a member of the neuro-oncology surgical team who explained to her that the MRI scans of her brain show that she has progression of her known glioblastoma tumour. The proposed management of this tumour progression is to have another craniotomy to remove the tumour so that the recurrence can be removed and also the tissue can be analysed to confirm that the diagnosis is still in keeping with the glioblastoma. This diagnosis is a very serious one and she will require further chemotherapy to stop the tumour cells from re-growing for as long as possible. Unfortunately it is not possible to cure this type of brain tumour but the chemotherapy aims to control it. At some point the cells will become active again. Mother is currently experiencing headaches and memory difficulty as a result of this tumour and has been started on some steroid medication (Dexamethasone) to try to alleviate these symptoms. Dexamethasone is not a medication that should be used for long periods of time so it is imperative that she receives the operation that she needs as soon as possible. If she cannot receive the operation as soon as possible, this tumour will continue to grow putting her brain under more and more pressure. There are also concerns that if she does not have an operation soon, the tumour may grow too large to be able to have an operation and the surgery window will have been missed. Undergoing a redo craniotomy will have more of an impact on mother compared to the first surgery that she had. She is likely to be kept in hospital for longer and take longer to feel that she is able to care for herself.”
“(1) R is entitled under Article 6 to a fair trial. So also, of course, are the mother and the children, W and G. The parties’ rights to a fair trial are absolute. Their rights to a fair trial cannot be qualified by the mother’s or the children’s or anyone else’s rights under Article 8. (2) R’s right to a fair trial means that he (like all the other parties) is entitled to be involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide him with the requisite protection of his interests. He must be able to participate in such a way as will enable him not only to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also to assess his prospects of thereafter making an appeal to any relevant appellate court. He must have a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponents. He must have a reasonable opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other parties. (3) Prima facie this means that R is entitled to disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to him. If he is a party to the proceedings he is prima facie entitled to see all the documents that are available to the other parties. (4) Nevertheless the decision-making process, although it must be fair to R (and to all the other parties) must also, so far as is compatible with that overriding requirement, be such as to afford due respect to the interests of the children, the other parties and the witnesses safeguarded by Article 8. (5) So a limited qualification of R’s right to see the documents may be acceptable if it is reasonably directed towards a clear and proper objective – in other words, if directed to the pursuit of the legitimate aim of respecting some other person’s rights under Article 8 – and if it represents no greater a qualification of R’s rights than the situation calls for. There may accordingly be circumstances in which, balancing a party’s prima facie Article 6 right to see all the relevant documents and the Article 8 rights of others, the balance can compatibly with the Convention be struck in such a way as to permit the withholding from a party of some at least of the documents. The balance is to be struck in a way which is fair and which achieves a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the interests at stake and the gravity of the interference with the various rights involved. (6) Bearing in mind the importance of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 and the fact that, as Sedley LJ pointed in Douglas, Zeta-Jones, Northern and Shell Plc v Hello! Ltd[2001] 1 FLR 982 , paragraph 141, Article 8 guarantees only ‘respect’ for and not inviolability of private and family life, any restriction of a party’s right to see the documents in the case must, as it seems to me, be limited to what the situation imperatively demands. Non-disclosure can be justified only when the case for doing so is, to use Lord Mustill’s word, ‘compelling’ or where it is, to use the court’s words in Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom[1984] 7 EHRR 165 , ‘strictly necessary’. (7) Moreover, to adopt Lord Mustill’s word, the court must be ‘rigorous’ in its examination of the risk and gravity of the feared harm to the child or other person whose Article 8 rights are said to be engaged. (8) Finally, any difficulties caused to a litigant by a limitation on his right to see all the documents must be sufficiently counterbalanced by procedures designed to ensure, in accordance with the principles in (2) above that he receives a fair trial. (9) At the end of the day the court must be satisfied that whatever procedures are adopted, and whatever limitations on a litigant’s access to documents may be imposed, everyone involved in the proceedings receives a fair trial.”
“A court that is asked to authorise non-disclosure in the interests of a child should therefore ask itself these questions: (1) Is the material relevant to the issues, or can it be excluded as being irrelevant or insufficiently relevant to them? (2) Would disclosure of the material involve a real possibility of significant harm to the child and, if so, of what nature and degree of probability? (3) Can the feared harm be addressed by measures to reduce its probability or likely impact? (4) Taking account of the importance of the material to the issues in the case, what are the overall welfare advantages and disadvantages to the child from disclosure or non-disclosure? (5) Where the child’s interests point towards non-disclosure, do those interests so compellingly outweigh the rights of the party deprived of disclosure that any non-disclosure is strictly necessary, giving proper weight to the consequences for that party in the particular circumstances? (6) Finally, if non-disclosure is appropriate, can it be limited in scope or duration so that the interference with the rights of others and the effect on the administration of justice is not disproportionate to the feared harm?”
“It has been established that the non-fatal strangulation of the mother on19 July 2013 prompted her to leave the relationship and ultimately the country. It was further established that the father eventually travelled to country X in November 2014 and the parties resumed their relationship. It is submitted that if the father knows of the mother’s and the children’s whereabouts there is a real risk that he will attempt to track them down and continue his abusive behaviour as he has previously done. This will be a heightened period of vulnerability for the mother as she undergoes treatment and therefore requires more protection.”