“[33] I have considered long and hard the divergent views about whether a contact order should be made and if so, on what basis. On the one hand an order could expose P-M to instability and split loyalties arising out of the reasonable anxieties that Ms D would harbour with the risk that she would not be able to cope with what she says she can commit herself to voluntarily. A contact order could tend to be antagonistic to the rationale for the adoption order that I intend to make and everyone agrees that nothing must be allowed to put at risk the placement that P-M has with Ms D. On the other hand, Ms D must understand that it is my firm view that provided circumstances do not change for the worse, the contact that I have set out is in P-M's best interests and I expect him to be afforded the benefit of it. In particular, the contact between P-M and his sister is necessary for his welfare to be safeguarded throughout his life, ie in the long term. [34] As the parties know only too well, I have changed my mind more than once. For what I believe to be good legal and evaluative reasons I intend to hold to the view with which I concluded the proceedings in January. I have decided to make a limited contact order alongside an adoption order. For me, they are inextricably linked on the facts of this case: both orders are necessary and the success of the adoption order is in part dependent upon a minimum level of contact with P-M's birth family, particularly his sister and maternal grandmother. The balance of contact though desirable should not form part of an order as in my judgment that would go too far and be potentially antagonistic to the exercise of Ms D's parental responsibility. [35] Although this is not a part of the reasoning of the court, it has to be remarked that all too often adoption orders are made with all the best intentions for continuing sibling contact which are then thwarted for no particularly good reason. Too often the lack of post-adoption support or any pro-active communication causes parties to drift so quickly that the absence of contact over time becomes a barrier with the very understandable fear on the part of adopters that its recommencement will be so unsettling that it may damage a placement; a fear that may well be justified. Perhaps more often than hitherto, courts faced with agreed contact post adoption might consider whether an order can give reassurance to the child by keeping an enduring relationship that is important and for some children critical to their welfare throughout their lives.”
“[53] Mr Macdonald for the Father says, however, that I should make a contact order. I do not agree. I am giving the Applicants sole parental responsibility for N by the adoption order. They become her parents and are to be trusted to do what is right for her as any parent would do for their child. Applying section 1(6) of the 2002 Act, I am quite satisfied that it is not better for N to make such an order. Apart from anything else, there must be finality to this litigation. The ability to apply to vary a contact order would be very deleterious to N’s welfare. [54] Mr Macdonald makes the valid point that it would not be satisfactory if I made an order based on there being continuing contact if it were, for whatever reason, to stop after the order was made. I have already found that the Applicants are to be trusted in this regard but, in any event, I remind myself that there is still the ability of the court to grant the Father permission to make an application for contact. In this particular case, if the contact was to stop, I have no doubt that a judge would, at the very least, want an explanation from the Applicants. The safety valve of being able to make that application is fatal to Mr Macdonald’s submission that there needs to be a contact order.”
“[126] …I do not make a contact order because I entertain the slightest doubt about the dedication of these prospective adopters to ensure this contact takes place, indeed, I am satisfied that the prospective adopters are committed to this contact and recognise that it is in the welfare best interests of BT and GT. I make a contact order (i) to mark for the twins the importance this court places on their ongoing relationship notwithstanding they are adopted separately and (ii) to fortify the adopters in the event that one or other twin is reluctant to the attend contact in the future.”
“The children’s guardian recommended/ court would expect that each annual review undertaken by the post adoption team about the children’s contact will consider: […] g. the court’s expectations (supported by the guardian and the local authority within the adoption proceedings) that the benefits of direct annual contact with the parents (and their siblings G and H), if possible, should be reviewed by the meeting to further consider the current professional recommendations that such contact may be in the best interests of the children.”
“We feel that we have made every effort to do the right thing at every step of this process. It has been made much more stressful and frustrating by the local authority. It is therefore disheartening that we may be made subject to a court order due to their actions and not our own.”