MZA v FHB (No 4) (private law - supplementary welfare judgment) [2025] EWFC 277 (B)

The draft judgment was circulated by email to the parties on 23 June 2025. The approved judgment was handed down in the parties’ absence at 10.00 a.m. on 2 July 2025IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the child[ren] and members of their [or his/her] family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.MZA v FHB (no 4) (private law – supplementary welfare judgment)[2025] EWFC 277 (B)
IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT OXFORD
Date 2 July 2025
Between
MZAApplicantFHBRespondentDoug Allen for Applicant mother, instructed through the public access schemeRebecca Mitchell for Respondent father, instructed by Elthorne solicitors
IN THE MATTER OF J (A BOY) AND K (A GIRL)
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
Before : HHJ Vincent
Date of hearing: 5 June 2025SUPPLEMENTARY JUDGMENTThis judgment is linked to:MZA v FHB (private law – appeal – whether to hold fact-find) [2024] EWFC 77 (B)MZA v FHB (no 2) (private law – fact-find)[2024] EWFC 467 (B)MZA v FHB (no 3) (private law – welfare judgment) [2025] EWFC 267 (B)

Introduction

[1]I have prepared a number of judgments in these long-running private law proceedings:(i) 1 March 2024, judgment on appeal against a decision not to hold a fact-finding hearing;(ii) 9 April 2024, supplementary judgment in respect of costs, publication of judgment, and non-molestation order;(iii) 30 July 2024; judgment following fact-finding hearing;(iv) 1 October 2024, supplementary judgment on costs;(v) 16 April 2025, judgment following the welfare hearing.[2]This judgment is supplementary to my judgment dated 16 April 2025, in which I made the following decisions:(i) Gave permission for the mother to relocate with the children to [County C] and enrol them at new schools;(ii) Refused the mother’s application for a specific issue order providing that she may override the father’s decision making in respect of certain aspects of the children’s lives;(iii) Made a prohibited steps order preventing the father from removing the children from the care of their mother, or any person to whom she had entrusted their care, and a further prohibited steps order preventing him from removing them from the jurisdiction of England and Wales;(iv) Extended the terms of the existing non-molestation order so as to remain in force for three years.[3]I did not make final orders in respect of the father’s application for a child arrangements order. Having worked through the welfare checklist and the provisions of practice direction 12J, I was minded to depart from the independent social worker’s recommendations in respect of the time the children should spend with him. I raised the question of supervision. The parties needed the opportunity to consider that judgment and make representations before I made a decision.[4]Other issues outstanding are the question of a section 91(14) order, and some issues around disclosure and publication of this and previous judgments.[5]The father applied for permission to appeal the judgment. On 13 May 2025, Mr Justice Peel refused the application, certifying it as totally without merit. Within his reasons for refusing permission to appeal, Peel J said as follows:
‘An appeal operates as a review, not a rehearing. The judge heard the case over 3 days. Further, she had conducted a fact finding hearing in July 2024 at which she found that the father had been responsible for a high level of domestic abuse. She was very familiar with the case. She had all the advantages of the first instance judge who can survey the entirety of the evidence and submissions. The judgment is comprehensive, clear and logically structured. The judge made a number of essential findings, including that the father lacks insight into his actions and their effect on the children and the mother, does not take responsibility for them, and casts blame on to the mother for events. She found that the father has not shown any commitment to change his behaviour. She found that he represents a risk, particularly an emotional risk, to the children. She found that the children (as the ISW reported) say they do not feel safe with the father and do not want to see him. She found that the children have been significantly impacted by the domestic abuse perpetrated by the father on the mother. She expressed significant concerns about the father’s ability to put the children’s welfare first. The judge was entitled to consider departing from the ISW’s recommendations as to the level of contact. She gave clear reasons for doing so at para 307 of her judgment. The submission that she should have given notice of the possibility she might depart from the ISW is not meritorious. The ultimate decision rests with the judge, not the ISW. And in any event, she has specifically listed another hearing on 5 June 2025 to consider this further, so both parties can make submissions on the point (para 311). I suggested in email that the father’s appeal might await the outcome of the hearing on 5 June, but I was expressly invited to deal with the PTA application before then. The other grounds of appeal do not, singly or jointly, meet the necessary threshold for granting permission to appeal. The judge carefully considered the evidence and reached an evaluation. There is no demonstrable error of law or principle. There is no justification for the appellate court to interfere with the judge’s findings and evaluation.’

Parties’ positions at the hearing on 5 June 2025

[6]The mother, represented by Mr Allen, has changed her position since the final hearing. She had previously adopted the recommendations of the independent social worker (for contact once during the week and every other Saturday), but now advances a case that contact between the children and their father should be supervised, and reduced in frequency. The mother continues to seek a section 91(14) order. She has issued an application for the fact-finding judgment of 30 July 2024 to be disclosed to the CMS tribunal. Finally, she asks that my judgments are published in anonymised form.[7]The father had been seeking orders that would provide he spends more time with his children, not less, and the question of his contact with his children being supervised had not been on the table so far as he was concerned. On his behalf, at the hearing on 5 June 2025, Ms Mitchell has advocated against contact being reduced any further, and against any conditions of supervision being imposed.[8]The father has issued an application for ‘a forensic risk assessment of the father … and the children before the final child arrangements plan is determined by the court. This assessment is necessary for the court to understand what future risk of harm and in particular any physical harm the father poses to the children in light of the findings of domestic abuse made against the father and the work he has undertaken and continues to undertake to address this risk’. Included in this application, the father seeks the appointment of a rule 16.4 guardian.[9]The father opposes section 91(14) orders and opposes publication of the judgments.[10]In addition, Ms Mitchell made representations in her position statement that I should recuse myself from the proceedings, on the basis that it was asserted that I have demonstrated actual or perceived bias towards the father, such that it would be inappropriate for me to continue to determine the issues in this case.[11]At the hearing on 5 June I heard the application in respect of recusal first. and gave an oral judgment. I refused the application.[12]I then heard submissions from Mr Allen and Ms Mitchell on the remaining issues but did not have enough time to consider all the issues and deliver judgment. I reserved the decision. Parties’ submissions Father’s submissions

Parties’ submissions

[13]Ms Mitchell submitted that there should be no reduction in contact, and that there were no grounds to support it becoming supervised, in circumstances where, she says:(i) The children have a well-established relationship with their father;(ii) They have been having unsupervised contact with him twice weekly for nearly three years, during the lifetime of the proceedings;(iii) There have been no reported concerns around the safety of the children with their father. The children feel safe and comfortable with their father and enjoy their time with him;(iv) Neither the independent social worker nor the mother were advocating supervised contact as being in the children’s interests at the hearing in March 2025;(v) The court does not have any professional evidence to support supervised contact as being in these children’s interests, nor evidence of the impact of imposing supervised contact upon them. Ms Mitchell argues supervision is likely to intrude on the children’s relationship with their father and it would be difficult for the children to understand why it had been changed. Ms Mitchell submits that the court should not impose a condition of supervision without having evidence about the length of time supervision should be in place, and in what circumstances the requirement for supervision could expect to be lifted.[14]Further, Ms Mitchell says that supervised contact can only be regarded as a short-term measure and would need to be regularly reviewed. She says this would either extend the current proceedings, or increase the likelihood of future proceedings.[15]Ms Mitchell submits that it would be inappropriate for children of this age to spend time with their father in a contact centre. On his behalf concern was expressed that the children may feel stigmatised, and that they would likely be very bored in a contact centre, which usually cater to the needs of much younger children. If contact were to take place in the community, she argues that there would likely be issues around the identity of the supervisor. She suggests that it would be hard to find third parties willing to take this on, and given that the children have spent the last three years seeing their father unsupervised, ‘it would be hard to persuade people [supervision] was necessary’.[16]As to the frequency of contact, it is submitted on behalf of the father that the children need and benefit from having their father fully involved in their lives, and that he can maintain their connections to their friends and lives in [the town where parties lived together], where they have spent their childhoods to date. It is submitted that their relationship with him will undoubtedly suffer if they see him less often than they do now.[17]Ms Mitchell questioned the extent to which the Court should intervene in private law proceedings, drawing a comparison with the high threshold and level of investigation that would happen before a parent’s contact with their children was limited to the extent being proposed, and before a condition of supervision was put on it. She argued that following public law proceedings, the local authority would continue to monitor and review the contact, but that is not being proposed in this case. Indeed, the reverse, the mother seeks a section 91(14) order, restricting the father’s ability to bring an application before the Court.[18]The Court was reminded of the work that the father has engaged with, following the recommendations of the independent social worker. I was urged to acknowledge and give credit to the father for his efforts, and to reflect that in the decision making around the arrangements for the children to spend time with their father. The father has submitted a further letter from his counsellor, Ms M. In the letter she confirms that she has now received both independent social work reports and the court judgments. She says in the letter that she had previously read some independent social worker reports, but having read the judgments, she is now fully informed with regards to all of the fact-finding aspects of the hearings. She writes:
‘There are many behaviours recorded in the fact-finding reports that we will be exploring in future sessions and the impact that these behaviours have had on the Family. Children who witness arguments between their parents experience emotional trauma and it takes a while for relationships with the parents to readjust and for confidence in the parents to be restored. Behaviours need to change, and alternative skills developed to ensure that children are safely cared for within boundaries that are not too restrictive and meet emotional needs. In future sessions we will continue to explore the emotional impact of experiencing and witnessing, spitting, finger pointing, physical harm, name calling, screaming and shouting, intimidation, antagonism threats, damage to property and withdrawal and abandonment. This will ensure that [the father] has a better understanding of his children’s needs and the need to feel secure and safe in the relationship with him.’
[19]In support of the father’s application for a risk assessment, Ms Mitchell returns to Practice Direction 12J. She submits that the court has rejected all the work the father has done to improve himself, rejected the independent social worker’s risk assessment, and carried out its own risk analysis instead. It is submitted that this is not a task I should take on alone, and that I should properly have expert assistance to accurately assess risk. It is further submitted that the court, ‘has not considered the contextual elements of the abuse it has found in this case. For example that it took placed during the breakdown of the parents relationship and the impact on this to any future risk. The court has not considered the time that has elapsed since any physical abuse was perpetrated.’ It is submitted that a ‘robust’ risk assessment is now necessary, to fairly determine what risk is in fact posed by the father to the children, whether any risk can be mitigated and how, what work is required by the father to address any risk, and the timescales for such work.[20]In support of the application for a rule 16.4 guardian, it is submitted that decisions now made about the children are likely to have a life-long impact on them. It is submitted that this is ‘a very high conflict case where the children have been impacted by the conflict between the parents and the polarising of their parents’ positions.’ Once again, it is submitted that the wishes and feelings of these children have only ever been obtained in the mother’s home and in her presence. It is submitted that ‘the fatherremains concerned that no scrutiny was applied by the independent social worker or the court to the children’s expressed wishes as contained in the report. These views simply don’t accord with the observations of the independent social worker when she observed contact or the father’s experiences with the children.’[21]The father remains concerned about the influence on the children of the mother, and in particular her anger and her firmly held views about him. He is also of the view that the children’s move to [County C] may also have impacted on their views. It is submitted that orders imposing restrictions on the time the father spends with his children and an order limiting his access to the court represent considerable interference with both the children’s and the father’s article 8 rights. In the circumstances, it is submitted there should now be an independent analysis of the proposals before the court for their benefit.[22]In respect of the question of the section 91(14) application, Ms Mitchell submits that it is the mother who has made the majority of applications in the Children Act and financial remedies proceedings. It is submitted that section 91(14) is not necessary in this case save perhaps to allow for a pause in such a high conflict case. It is said that if very limited or supervised contact is ordered then a section 91(14) order would not be appropriate as, ‘inevitably the matter will have to be kept under regular review and move on as the children get older. The Father anticipates the children will want to go on holiday with him in the future and to have overnight contact. The court may need to consider these issues in due course and it would not be in the children’s interests to prevent the children from having these opportunities.’

Mother’s submissions

[23]Mr Allen submits that the mother has experienced no change in the father’s behaviour since she relocated to [County C] with the children. The mother reports that the father continues to criticise her and her family in front of the children. She says he continues to put his interests before the children, for example on one occasion J was not well and unable to attend contact, but his father insisted he be brought out of bed to see him so that he could satisfy for himself that J was not well.[24]At the time of the hearing before me in June the father had given notice that he was representing himself in the ongoing financial remedies proceedings. Mr Allen writes in his position statement:
‘While he claims to be self-represented, the mother understands he still benefits from behind-the-scenes support from [his solicitors] and intends to instruct direct access counsel for hearings. In her view, the arrangement gives him the best of both worlds: legal firepower when it suits him and unfettered access to her the rest of the time. … M reports that, despite the court’s previous findings regarding excessive communication and coercive control, F has resumed a campaign of bombardment via the financial remedy proceedings. She describes a near-daily stream of messages - via email, via [mother’s cousin A], OFW, and direct court correspondence - often chasing responses using OFW to do so (despite it being intended only for the children’s welfare) or duplicating previous messages to elicit a response. F uses threats of accruing interest and depletion of the marital pot, which pressure M and cause her distress, as she remains locked in litigation with him and his parents. She highlights a troubling pattern of behaviour: F frequently contacts her directly, involves multiple law firms simultaneously (including [his solicitors] and [F’s parents’ solicitors])), and pressures court staff and judges with repeated correspondence. The use of unbundled legal representation only adds to the mother’s distress, as she often does not know who is formally acting for the father at any given time. She describes the impact of this ongoing campaign as deeply oppressive and emotionally draining. A similar pattern is now emerging in relation to the family home, with multiple messages from the father. She believes that this is a further tool of abuse.’
[25]Mr Allen submits that the applications for a forensic assessment and appointment of a rule 16.4 guardian are an attempt to relitigate matters already determined, disregards the need for finality, and would create further delay and uncertainty for the children, which is counter to their interests.[26]Mr Allen argues that at the time of the final hearing the mother supported the independent social worker’s recommendation for unsupervised contact, once per fortnight and once midweek. He says that her stance reflected a hope that resolution of the proceedings might create a space for the father to reflect upon the court’s findings, reflect on his behaviour and begin to forge a more appropriate and healthy relationship with the children.[27]However, it is submitted that the father has not been able to demonstrate any capacity for reflection, insight, or change. Mr Allen says the father has acted not as someone who is seeking to rebuild trust, but someone seeking to reassert control, and to find ways in which the Court’s determinations may be undone. His appeal against the findings of fact was dismissed as totally without merit. He then sought to appeal the welfare decision, has invited me to recuse myself and for another judge to continue with the case. His applications for a children’s guardian to be appointed now and for a psychological risk assessment of the children are, it is submitted, made in an attempt to revisit the findings the Court has made and the analysis of the welfare judgment.[28]The mother now considers that contact between the children and their father should be reduced to either fortnightly or monthly, and that it should be supervised. Her strong preference is for contact to take place monthly at a professional contact centre local to [town where mother and children have relocated] or, if appropriate, under the supervision of a suitably qualified independent social worker. In either case, Mr Allen says, supervision must be neutral, structured, and focused.

Analysis

[29]This judgment is to be read as a continuation of my judgment of 16 April 2025. I do not intend to rehearse, review or amend it.[30]At paragraph 155 I wrote that the independent social worker’s ‘assessment of the father’s ability to take responsibility for his actions, his insight into the children’s emotional needs, are in my judgment balanced, fair, well-reasoned, and rooted in a sound and thorough understanding of all the evidence.’[31]I have accepted her evidence about the children’s wishes and feelings. I accept her assessment that the time the children spend with the father should be reduced from the current level. However, having had the benefit of hearing evidence from her and all parties, and working through the welfare checklists and practice direction 12J, I was ultimately troubled by her recommendations in respect of frequency of contact, and supervision. At paragraphs 252 to 258 I set out the reasons that I questioned her conclusions on supervision:252. [The ISW] does address the question of supervised contact in her first report at 6.117: ‘I have considered if the contact should be supervised. Given the amount of time that has now passed without the contact being supervised, whilst I do have concerns about [the father’s] ability to meet the emotional needs of the children I have not seen anything to show he poses a physical risk to the children. I did consider if the children’s fear of being ‘taken away’ was sufficient to say contact should be supervised but again I have not seen or heard anything to show that [the father] has tried or intends to do this. If that were a real concern, then contact should be supervised.’253. I am concerned that this analysis may be flawed.254. Firstly, because, given the findings I have made of direct physical abuse to J in the past, the father’s lack of insight into that, his continued description of J in negative terms, and his continued expressed belief that J is a child whose behaviours need to be ‘reined in’, I am not persuaded that it can be said this father poses no physical risk to the children.255. Secondly, risk to the children includes emotional harm not just physical harm. Both children have clearly expressed a view that they do not feel safe in their father’s care. There is overwhelming evidence that they are justified in feeling that way as a result of the experiences they have had. They have been given no reassurance that things will be different in the future, their firm belief is that the father is the same as he always was and is incapable of change.256. Thirdly, the need for supervision does not depend only on whether there is a risk of abduction.257. Fourthly, the fact that a situation has persisted for a long period of time does not necessarily mean that it should continue. The children have been in a routine of seeing their father very regularly, but it has not in fact brought about any greater sense of stability or safety for them. Their father has not taken any steps to change his parenting or to try to repair his relationship with them, to the contrary, he does not identify any need for change. The ongoing court proceedings may also have acted as a form of protection, but this is not factored into consideration.258. Fifthly, the analysis does not consider specifically the questions put by paragraphs 35 through to 39 of Practice Direction 12J.[32]At paragraphs 303 to 311 I said: 303. I have considered carefully all the circumstances, all the factors on the welfare checklist and the provisions of practice direction 12J. 304. I have paid attention to the evidence of both parents and of the independent social worker. 305. In my judgment the progress the father has made since the fact-finding hearing is essentially superficial and presentational. I consider that the mother and the children continue to be at risk of significant domestic abuse from the father. 306. [The ISW] has set out her concerns clearly, but ultimately I have been troubled by her conclusions that the children’s contact with their father should continue at a high level of frequency and that it should be unsupervised. 307. I am minded to depart from her recommendation. I am minded to consider that fortnightly or monthly may be more appropriate in all the circumstances. My reasons are as follows:(i) Even with a package of the non-molestation order, clear definitions around parental responsibility and prohibited steps orders, I am concerned about the steps in place to manage the risks in this case.(ii) In her report [the ISW] has referred to the Cafcass guidance on domestic abuse (now updated) and to Practice Direction 12J, but she has not worked through the specific factors to address as I have now had the opportunity to do, with the benefit of having heard not just her evidence, but from each of the parents.(iii) I have set out above my concerns about [the ISW]’s analysis in respect of contact being unsupervised.(iv) The children are young and understand that it is the adults in their lives who make the decisions for them, and that it is a judge who will decide about the arrangements for them to spend time with their father. At this juncture, I am troubled by the message that I would be sending to the children if I were to say that notwithstanding their clearly expressed views, which I have found to be justified and based on their experiences of their father, they are to spend time with their father once midweek and on one day on alternate weekends unsupervised. I could direct the father to apologise to the children or engage with therapy or other work to engage with them so as to improve his parenting, but at this time, I am not persuaded it would come from a place of genuinely wanting to make change. 308. It is my duty to make the order that I consider best meets the children’s welfare. However, I must also afford the parties the opportunity to make submissions to the Court before I make any orders. 309. The mother has followed [the ISW]’s recommendations and has asked the Court to make an order for unsupervised contact once midweek and on one day on alternate weekends. 310. Anything less than that would no doubt be strongly opposed by the father. 311. In the circumstances, while I hesitate to extend these proceedings for a moment more, and I appreciate that each of the parties and the children are desperate for finality in this case, I have reached the conclusion that I must afford the parties the opportunity to consider this judgment and to make further submissions to me on the question of the extent of time the children should spend with their father, and whether or not the contact should be supervised, having specific regard to the provisions of Practice Direction 12J.[33]I have set out the parties’ submissions above, and following the hearing, have carefully considered this decision.[34]My starting point is the statutory framework.[35]Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that when the Court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, the child’s welfare will be the court’s paramount consideration.[36]In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.[37]Where the Court is considering making a child arrangements order, it is as respects each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare (section 1(2A).[38]In subsection (2A) “involvement” means involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but not any particular division of a child's time (section 1(2A)).[39]Subsection (6) provides as follows:
‘In subsection (2A) “parent” means parent of the child concerned; and, for the purposes of that subsection, a parent of the child concerned— (a) is within this paragraph if that parent can be involved in the child's life in a way that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm; and (b) is to be treated as being within paragraph (a) unless there is some evidence before the court in the particular proceedings to suggest that involvement of that parent in the child's life would put the child at risk of suffering harm whatever the form of the involvement.’
[40]The findings that I made following the hearing in July 2024 establish that the father was the perpetrator of serious domestic abuse and that J and K as well as their mother are victims of that abuse. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 recognises a child as a victim of domestic abuse if they see, hear, or experience the effects of domestic abuse and are related to, or cared for by an adult with parental responsibility who is the person being abused or the perpetrator of the abuse. In my earlier judgment I said:
‘Both the mother and children were victims of the abuse. The children suffered harm directly and suffered and/or were at risk of physical, psychological and emotional harm as a result of witnessing the father physically and verbally abusing the mother, and from living in a home environment in which the father’s behaviour towards the mother was controlling, physically and psychologically harmful, impacting all aspects of her life.’
[41]I reject the submission that these findings should be regarded as ‘contextual’ and ‘historical’. It was said they related to a time of high conflict at the breakdown of a marriage. The implication is that there was fault on both sides, and that the behaviour was limited to a specific point in time of high stress. The implication is that there is no risk of their repetition. However, the overwhelming weight of the evidence which led to the extensive and serious findings made, is that the father perpetrated abuse over a period of years, that it escalated at the point of the breakdown of the marriage and his behaviour has continued thereafter. By using the word ‘historical’, the implication is that the mother and children should put his behaviour in the past. But that would be to overlook both the continuing risk of abuse, and the continuing impact of the abuse upon the mother and the children. Even if the abuse or threat of abuse was in the past, the impact can be long lasting. The father has not been accepting of that, does not accept that his children’s clearly expressed memories, wishes and feelings are their own, but continues to assert they are the result of the mother’s influence.[42]Given the findings that have been made, the presumption of the father’s involvement in his children’s life is conditional upon the court being satisfied that he can be involved in the child's life in a way that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm (section 1(6)(a) Children Act 1989.[43]That risk assessment is for me to carry out, having regard to the provisions of practice direction 12J. At paragraphs 209 through to 240 of my judgment I set out my analysis with specific regard to the relevant paragraphs of practice direction 12J.

Application for further risk assessment and guardian

[44]The father’s applications are based on the premise that the Court cannot make a decision without instructing an expert to prepare a report and/or appointing a children’s guardian pursuant to rule 16.4 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.[45]I have considered the application, the proposed experts and their CVs, and listened to the submissions made in support of them. I have concluded that the applications for a further risk assessment and for a guardian to be appointed should be refused.[46]In my judgment both these applications constitute an attempt to revisit and reframe the determinations of the Court at the eleventh hour. The father is seeking a second opinion.[47]There is no necessity for a new expert. I have not found gaps in the independent social worker’s evidence. This was not a point taken at the final hearing by either party. The independent social worker made recommendations, but ultimately, the risk assessment in this case is to be carried out by me, having had regard to the evidence as a whole, and with specific reference to the statutory checklists. I do not accept that I need to be presented with an expert assessment of the impact of supervised contact on the children or to devise a pathway out of supervised contact.[48]It is neither necessary nor appropriate to instruct an expert at this time, after evidence has been obtained, presented to the Court, and been tested by cross-examination.[49]Similarly, there is no requirement for a children’s guardian to be appointed pursuant to rule 16.4 of the Children Act 1989. The role of the guardian would be to enable the court to understand the children’s views and wishes, assess the situation, and provide the court with an independent assessment of the children’s best interests. This is a role that has been carried out effectively by the independent social worker.[50]I have explained the reasons that I took issue with the independent social worker’s analysis in respect of the issue of supervision and the frequency of contact, but I have not rejected her evidence out of hand. She has spent a lot of time in familiarising herself with the documents, meeting the children and each of the parents. I am satisfied that she has reliably brought the voice of the children into the proceedings. I am satisfied that the views they have expressed about their father are based on their experiences of his parenting, and of the domestic abuse he has perpetrated towards their mother. Although the father has continued to level criticism at the independent social worker for speaking with the children in their mother’s house, I have set out within my judgment the reasons that I concluded the decisions she made about how and where to meet with the children were justified. I have set out the reasons that I accept her account to represent their true and genuinely held wishes and feelings, informed by their own experiences.[51]At this time the father remains unable to accept that the children’s expressed wishes and feelings are based on their experiences of the parenting they have received from him and the abuse he has perpetrated against their mother and them. He blames the mother, but also the independent social worker, for as he sees it, falling under the mother’s influence, and taking against him personally. His belief that the children are saying only what their mother has told them to say, and that she has coached them out of malice directed towards him, is not supported by the evidence. That the father may hold such a belief is not grounds for instructing either an expert psychologist or appointing a guardian in this case.[52]The father has throughout the proceedings sought to frame them as a case of ‘intractable conflict’ or ‘implacable hostility’ in which both parties are caught up in a dispute at the expense of the children’s welfare. The father has asserted in his written and oral evidence to the Court, and in conversations with the independent social worker, that it is the mother’s hostility towards him that is driving the proceedings, that she was the one who initiated them. He asserts that it is the continuation of the proceedings, and the restrictions that have been imposed on his relationship with the children, preventing it from being ‘normal’ that have caused far more damage to them than anything he has done.[53]The father has repeatedly asserted that the court’s findings in parallel financial remedies proceedings create some sort of equivalence in respect of conduct, because District Judge Devlin found against the mother in respect of her allegation that a loan from the paternal grandparents to the parents to enable them to purchase the former matrimonial home should have been treated as a gift.[54]I reject this analysis. There is nothing in the conclusions reached at the preliminary issue stage of the financial remedies hearing that undermines the findings that have been made by me within these private law proceedings concerning the parties’ children. The father’s application for permission to appeal those findings was refused by Ms Justice Henke on 13 September 2024, and certified as being totally without merit.[55]The dispute over the child arrangements order arises because the father perpetrated serious domestic abuse against the mother and children. It is his actions which have given rise to the questions the court has to determine about the arrangements for the children to spend time with him. This is not a case of ‘intractable contact’ or ‘implacable hostility’, nor of the mother exerting some kind of malign influence over the children.[56]There is no gap in the evidence that requires a new expert assessment.[57]There is no need for a guardian to be appointed.[58]Either of these actions would lead to delay and uncertainty for the parties, and more importantly, for the children. Delay is contrary to their welfare.

Child arrangements order

[59]The welfare checklist asks the court to consider all the circumstances, including the children’s wishes and feelings, the children’s physical and emotional needs, the capacity of each of the parents to care for their children, and the risk of harm to them. Practice direction 12J asks the Court to consider the effect of the domestic abuse on the children, and on their relationship with the parent, whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child, or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent, the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against who those findings are made and its effect on the child, and the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse. I addressed each of these issues in my earlier judgment.[60]The children have clearly and consistently expressed a view that they feel uncomfortable and unsafe in their father’s care. J has said that he feels his father does not love him, and he did not want to go to his father’s house. (Paragraphs 195 to 200 of my judgment).[61]I have found and set out in the judgment that the children have suffered and are at continuing risk of both physical and emotional harm from their father. I find that the children’s mother remains at risk of physical and emotional harm from the father. I considered the welfare checklist and the relevant paragraphs of practice direction 12J.[62]How can the children be protected from the risk of harm from their father?[63]If the father is to spend time with the children unsupervised, the court would need to be satisfied that he could manage his own behaviour so as to act protectively towards the children. The court would want to know that he recognises the harm his behaviour has caused to his children and to their mother, that he has taken responsibility for his own actions, has taken action to change his attitude and to stop the harmful behaviour, so that the court can have confidence that the children would not be at risk of harm.[64]For the reasons given in the judgment, and having heard evidence from each of the parties and the independent social worker, I cannot be so satisfied. I acknowledge that the father has engaged with the online courses and the work with Ms M. However, for the reasons given within the substantive judgment, I found his engagement to have been superficial and presentational. The most recent letter from Ms M is if anything an indication that the father faces a significant task ahead of him. There is much work to do.[65]I have considered carefully the further submissions made. I have regard to paragraphs 38 and 39 of Practice Direction 12J. After careful deliberation, I have concluded that the children’s contact with their father should be substantially reduced in frequency, and must be supervised.[66]I am going to direct that the children spend time with their father every four weeks. The contact shall take place either in a contact centre or shall be supervised in the community by an independent social worker, whose identity shall be agreed by the parties. The costs of the contact centre or supervising social worker shall be borne by the father, because it is his conduct that has led to the need for supervision. I would suggest the father will spend around two or up to three hours at a time with the children, depending on what the contact centre or contact supervisor can accommodate.[67]I acknowledge that this is a substantial reduction in the time that the children are currently spending with their father. I also acknowledge that this will fundamentally change the way in which they spend time together, and will restrict significantly the father’s choices in how he spends time with the children. I acknowledge this could well be to the detriment of their relationship.[68]However, in my judgment, to allow the current contact arrangements to continue would be to continue to expose the mother and the children to a risk of physical and emotional harm, with no safeguards in place to reduce the risks to a manageable level. The risks arise from the following:(i) The father has in the past acted violently towards the children’s mother and he has been physically rough with J. I found that on separate occasions he had spat in the mother’s face, stamped on her foot, used both his hands to cause a Chinese burn to the mother, slammed a door on her finger, threw her into a doorframe, pushed her, and finally in the incident in January 2022 grabbed her and pushed her, causing extensive black and blue bruising to her arms and chest. I found that he forced J to remain at the dinner table for hours, and on another occasion pulled him roughly up to his bedroom. I am not satisfied that the father has accepted responsibility for these behaviours or insight into what happens to cause him to lose control and act with violence. I find there is a continuing risk that he will cause physical harm to the children’s mother, or to J and K;(ii) There are findings of coercive control. I made findings that on two separate occasions the father had felt provoked by the mother and abandoned her and the children. In October 2021 he took the family car and left her and the children in a pub in [town C], leaving her with no money and no phone. She could not contact him for a couple of hours. When he returned, the children and the mother were upset and crying, and he took his phone out and filmed them. On a family holiday the previous year he had again taken the family car, driven to [x] station and boarded a train to Paris. He left the mother with no money and no way of contacting him. These are examples of controlling and coercive behaviour that left the mother without agency. She was isolated, confused and humiliated. In these instances he plainly failed to put the needs of his children first. Again, there has been no acknowledgment from him of the emotional harm caused to her or to them, and no evidence before the court that he has developed an understanding of his own impulsive behaviour that puts his immediate needs before the needs of his children. In the circumstances, there is a continuing risk that there will be times in the future where the children’s physical and emotional safety is put in jeopardy by the father’s actions;(iii) The children have witnessed their father be physically and verbally abusive towards their mother over years. He continues to denigrate their mother in their presence. They are justifiably anxious and concerned that he may continue to harm her physically and emotionally;(iv) The father continues to seek daily and frequent interactions with the mother. She continues to feel oppressed and traumatised by every interaction with him. Every time the children have contact with their father, or there are discussions with the father, she is thrust again into some form of communication with him, even if it is indirect, and she is concerned for her own safety and that of her children;(v) The children do not feel comfortable or safe in their father’s care. He can be strict with them and is over-focused on imposing boundaries around their behaviour. J has said he does not feel that his father is loving towards him, or in fact that he does love him;(vi) The father has attended online courses, and he is now working with Ms M. However, until very recently, she was not aware of the content of the fact-finding judgment. The work he has done has not yet put him in a place where he has been able to reflect upon the findings of the court, the impact of his behaviour upon the mother and the children, nor what steps he might be able to put in place in order to repair his relationship with them, to reassure them that he is committed to making changes so that in the future he would parent them in a way that enables them to process and recover from their experiences, and begin to trust him so that they might feel safe in his care.[69]I do not accept the premise of Ms Mitchell’s submission that supervised contact can only be regarded as a short-term measure, which requires the court to extend the proceedings so as to retain oversight of the progression of contact, or else if final orders are made, a swift return to Court to revisit the orders.[70]The point of the supervision is to provide reassurance to the children and their mother that their contact with their father will be safe, and to ensure that the children are safe in their father’s care.[71]Without the condition of supervision, I am not satisfied that the children will be safe in their father’s care.[72]The main reason for reducing the frequency of contact is to give respite to the mother and the children.[73]Perhaps the argument that carries the most weight so far as the father is concerned, is that the children have continued to see him frequently and unsupervised for the past three years while these proceedings have continued. It is said that there is no justification for taking a backward step now. I have thought about this carefully, but I have not been persuaded that continuing the status quo is the right decision for these children. My reasons are as follows:(i) This was essentially the reason given by the independent social worker for recommending a continuation of unsupervised contact, notwithstanding her concerns about the risks to the children. I have set out in my earlier judgment (and repeated above) the reasons that I do not agree with her analysis;(ii) Contrary to the father’s contention that there have been no issues around contact, there is a significant body of evidence of difficulties. The children have said very clearly that they do not feel comfortable or safe with their father, J does not want to see him at all, K initially said that seeing him for three minutes at a time would be ok, before then saying that she would want J to be there. J has memories of his father hurting his mother, K is worried that she will be taken away. Both of them have described in clear terms the lack of emotional safety they feel in their father’s care. The independent social worker identified a significant difference in the children’s presentation in their father’s care compared to their mother’s. There is overwhelming evidence in the bundle of the ways in which the father has attempted to use contact to undermine the mother, to continue to exert control over her, and that he has not been able to prioritise the children’s welfare;(iii) Upon reflection, it is arguable that I could and should have made the decision after the fact-finding to reduce contact and/or to impose the condition of supervision at that time. However, I am not bound by previous decisions made. I must make the best decision I can on the basis of the evidence that I have before me now. At the final hearing I had the benefit of hearing evidence from the independent social worker, considering each of her reports, and hearing the evidence of the mother and the father. Having reviewed all the evidence and heard submissions, I am satisfied this order meets the children’s welfare.[74]I have considered that this order represents a significant intervention in the father’s relationship with his own children. I acknowledge that there has not been local authority involvement, that no public law threshold findings have been made, and that this father has not been found guilty of any criminal offence. However, the legislation that requires the court to consider the checklists at practice direction 12J is not dependent on there having been a conviction in criminal proceedings, or local authority, or other agency investigation. The findings I have made, many of which were admitted or admitted in part by the father, the rest made following detailed review of the evidence, set out the extent of the domestic abuse that he has perpetrated upon the mother and the children. It is this conduct that then triggers the need for the Court to consider the question of the children’s and their mother’s safety, as an essential element of the determination of the application for child arrangements orders.[75]Ms Mitchell says that if an order for supervised contact is made and/or contact is reduced in frequency, then inevitably further proceedings will loom in this family’s life, because the father will need to apply back to the Court for an increase of contact time and a lifting of the condition of supervision within a short time. The prospect of future applications for overnight contact or holidays has been raised.[76]I do not regard this as a reason not to order supervised contact, or to increase frequency of contact for the following reasons:(i) The premise of the argument is that an order for supervised contact or infrequent contact is so unreasonable that an application to lift the restrictions would inevitably follow within short order. I do not agree. Having considered all the circumstances, I do not consider that the father can safely be involved in his children’s lives at this time unless his time with his children is supervised;(ii) The argument intimates that the conflict will never end until the father’s aim of a ‘normal’ relationship with his children is given to him. His position has been that it is the actions of others not himself that have taken that relationship away from him and from them;(iii) Mr Allen suggested that previously the mother agreed to a level of contact in excess of what she genuinely thought was appropriate. He suggested that informed by her experiences of abuse, she may have been acting out of fear of consequences of raising a challenge to the father, or trying to appease, hoping that agreeing to a certain level would stave off further conflict;(iv) It is a salutary submission. The court listens to the positions put forward by the parties, but ultimately makes its own assessment of what order would meet the children’s welfare. It is for this reason that, being minded to make different orders from what was proposed, I invited the parties to return to court to make submissions to me;(v) It is my role to make the orders that I consider best meet the children’s welfare. That the father says he would be more inclined to apply to the court for review of those orders if I make them should not be a reason to divert me from my path, if I consider in all the circumstances those are what is required.[77]The contact must be supervised by an independent professional, either in a contact centre or an independent social worker. It is often said that contact centres can only meet the needs of much younger children than K and J, but equally there are some which are well designed to meet the needs of children their age. This will be something the parties can look in to.[78]Given the very difficult dynamics between maternal and paternal sides of the family, it is not realistic to contemplate that contact would be supervised by a family member or friend.[79]The order for supervised contact is not a punishment, but is there as a protection.[80]Supervised contact is not designed to damage or undermine the children’s relationship with their father. The reverse is true. The father’s relationship with his children is currently damaged, as a result of the father’s actions. I accept the submissions made by Mr Allen, that ‘supervised contact will provide a protective framework, which enables the children to maintain a meaningful connection with their father, while ensuring that they are not placed in situations that compromise their wellbeing or sense of safety. It also provides the father with a clear and fair opportunity to demonstrate change — not through assertion, nor through repeated litigation, but through his conduct, his respect for boundaries, and his consistent, child-focused engagement with the process the court has established. In short, it gives him a path forward, if he chooses to take it.’

Section 91(14)

[81]I set out the law at paragraphs 146 to 148 of the judgment: 146. By operation of section 67 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 was modified by a new section 91A, which provides as follows: 91A Section 91(14) Orders: Further Provision(1) This section makes further provision about orders under section 91(14) (referred to in this section as ‘section 91(14) orders’).(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put –a. the child concerned, orb. another individual (‘the relevant individual’), at risk of harm.(3) In the case of a child or other individual who has reached the age of eighteen, the reference in subsection (2) to ‘harm’ is to be read as a reference to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.(4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made. 147. Practice Direction 12Q of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, inserted to accompany the addition of Section 91A Children Act 1989, sets out a number of ‘key principles’ to consider when deciding whether or not to make an order under section 91(14). The new provisions were reviewed by Gwynneth Knowles J in A Local Authority v F and others [2022] EWFC. 148. The Court’s approach to an application for a section 91(14) order should be as follows: a. If findings of domestic abuse are made, even if the victim did not apply for this relief, the court is now bound to consider whether or not to make a s.91(14) order. b. While such an order is ‘the exception and not the rule’, it does not follow that the case or its circumstances must somehow be adjudged to be ‘exceptional’ before such an order could be made.c. The court should bear in mind that such orders represent a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and that there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases.d. Whether the court makes an order is a matter for the court’s discretion. There are many and varied circumstances in which it may be appropriate to make such an order. These may include cases in which there have been multiple applications (‘repeated and unreasonable’), but that is not a necessary prerequisite. They may also include cases in which the court considers that an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (without the need to find the ‘risk’ to be ‘serious’ or the likely ‘harm’ to be ‘significant’ or ‘serious’).e. If the court decides to make an order, it must consider: i. its duration, as to which, any term imposed should be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid, and in relation to which decision the court must explain its reasons; ii. whether the order should apply to all or only certain types of application under the CA 1989; iii. whether service of any subsequent application for leave should be prohibited pending initial judicial determination of that application.f. In all of this, the welfare of the child is paramount. That said, any interference with a parent’s otherwise unfettered right of access to the court, including the duration of any such prohibition pending permission, must be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid.[82]The entire period of time since the parents’ separation has been taken up with litigation which has been stressful and all-consuming for both parties. The mother has experienced the litigation as a continuation of the domestic abuse that she and the children were subjected to during the marriage.[83]In his written submissions on this issue, Mr Allen said the following:
‘These proceedings have now consumed nearly three years - a significant and irreplaceable portion of J and K’s childhood - and have imposed an unrelenting toll on the mother and the children alike. The emotional wear of repeated hearings and applications designed to reframe or reargue settled issues has left the mother exhausted, anxious, and trapped in what feels like an unending cycle. This is not litigation being used for the children’s benefit; it is litigation as a weapon. The court is reminded in this respect of the father’s own WhatsApp messages, which reveal a strategy of financial and emotional attrition, not resolution. The impact on the children has been clearly recognised by the court and is not in doubt [77, §195–200]. The court was already concerned at the final hearing about the emotional harm that this drawn-out process had caused - and the pattern has continued since. The children need stability. They need to be allowed to move forward. The mother is adamant that ongoing, unpredictable litigation would run directly counter to those aims. The final judgment was unambiguous in its conclusions. The court found that F had approached these proceedings not as a means of resolving child-focused issues but as a vehicle for continued hostility towards the mother - a war of attrition designed to wear her down and assert control [73, §173–175]. His own comments during the hearing - including his suggestion that a different judge might have reached a different result - revealed an inability, or unwillingness, to accept the findings made. His warning that he would move closer to the children if not granted the contact he sought was experienced, understandably, as coercive rather than conciliatory. The court accepted this was the dynamic in play and placed it squarely within the broader context of F’s historic messaging about ‘smoking her out’ of the family home. That background, M submits, is crucial to understanding the need for protective orders that go beyond the contact regime. The ISW, too, identified a real and ongoing risk that F would use further litigation to continue his pattern of control and intimidation [1127, §4.100]. That risk has materialised. F’s recent application for a psychological risk assessment of both him and the children, coupled with a request for a rule 16.4 Guardian, is not a good faith attempt to address welfare issues. It is an attempt to re-open a case that has already been concluded - and to reset the playing field on terms more favourable to him. It is, once again, a tactic. F’s actions in seeking to re-litigate matters sit at odds with his own comments about the length of the litigation causing more harm to the children than his conduct, demonstrating yet again that he is unable to prioritise their welfare over his conflict with M. … M has been the victim of sustained pressure and intimidation from the father and his family and believes that the father’s deployment of multiple legal forums -advancing conflicting or opportunistic positions in the Family Court, the Financial Remedies Court and the CMS Tribunal – constitutes a continuation of his coercive and controlling behaviour, deploying the court system as a weapon against her. This multi-forum onslaught has worn M down and has left her under relentless and destabilising pressure causing significant toll and emotional harm.’
[84]I accept these submissions, and for the reasons given, I am satisfied that a section 91(14) order is necessary in this case.[85]It is necessary to protect the mother and the children from the harm that they have and would continue to experience as a result of the ongoing proceedings.[86]The father has had over a year since the fact-finding judgment to reflect on the court’s findings. It is of course to his credit that he responded by engaging with work designed to address his abusive behaviours. However, for the reasons given in the judgment, I found that his engagement had been superficial. He has shown commitment to working with Ms M, but it is apparent that only very recently has she gained a full understanding of the court’s findings. The father is at the very beginning of a process of understanding the impact of his actions upon his children and their mother, taking responsibility for his actions and then addressing ways in which he can change his behaviours. Whatever work he has done so far has not apparently led him to take any steps in that direction. He continues to be on the attack, to blame others for what he perceives they have done to him, rather than reflect on the impact of his behaviours on them, and to minimise his actions and describe them as a ‘historical’ or ‘contextual’.[87]If the father were permitted to issue further applications in these proceedings, before he had made the necessary changes and sustain them, the mother and children would be subjected to the risk of further harm.[88]The Court must consider the length of time of any section 91(14) order. Any interference with a parent’s unfettered right of access to the court, must be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid.[89]Mr Allen argues that a section 91(14) order should be in place until each of the children’s sixteenth birthday. That represents nearly six years from now for J and nearly nine years for K.[90]He argues that section 91(14) orders would place a clear threshold on future applications, restore a measure of predictability for the children and the mother, and ‘it would also avoid the potentially unintended impression that supervised contact is a temporary measure inevitably leading to progression. M’s position is that progression must be earned – not by litigation, but by evidence of real, child-focused change.’ He suggests that the order should contain clear and specific guidance as to the type of evidence the court would expect to see if an application for permission were made, for example:a. Independent therapeutic evidence from a suitably qualified senior practitioner (with access to the fact-finding and final hearing judgments) demonstrating meaningful insight into F’s past coercive behaviour and the harm caused to M and children, alongside evidence of sustained behavioural change;b. A clear cessation of any pattern of minimisation, denial, or reframing of the court’s findings;c. Evidence that F’s engage in contact has become child-focused and attuned to the children’s needs and responses, including observations and/or feedback that suggest a safe and beneficial experience of contact and reflected in the children’s own experiences of contact;d. Sustained, observable conduct that places the children’s emotional wellbeing at the centre of his decision-making;e. A genuine absence of risk factors that previously concerned the court; andf. A sustained period of cooperative behaviour, free from hostile communications or litigation misuse, including in dealings with M and professionals. 91. Mr Allen says that the father would not be prevented from making an application to the Court at any time during this period, but the restriction, as it is designed to do, would place the onus on the father, ‘to show, not simply assert, that he has changed.’ 92. It is arguable that simply waiting for time to pass before an application could be made without permission feeds into a narrative that the impact of domestic abuse is time-limited, and after a certain period of time children or adults who have been the victim of domestic abuse should have been able to recover themselves. Should they live their lives in anticipation that after a certain period of time, irrespective of what has happened in their day to day lives, and irrespective of whether or not the perpetrator of the abuse has changed his behaviour, they will once again be subjected to the proceedings brought by the person who has caused them harm. Must they focus on building their own resilience and steeling themselves for that future conflict? 93. In this case there is overwhelming evidence that litigation itself has been used as a means of continuing the coercive and controlling behaviour that predominated in the parties’ relationship. So the court must be cautious before inviting a return of that behaviour without any check or balance being in place. 94. These proceedings have occupied a third of J’s life and half of K’s. J is now ten. He is due to start secondary school in September 2026. The last year of primary school is a time of significant change, when children prepare to make the transition to the next stage of education, by consolidating learning and developing resilience and more independence. Settling in to life at secondary school is exciting but brings challenge with it, as those skills are put into practice on a daily basis. 95. K does not have any big milestones looming, but like her brother has just made a big transition to living in a new place with her mother, going to a new school and making new friends. Making progress in all areas of physical, emotional and educational development, building resilience, independence and a sense of self doesn’t just happen to children like J who are coming to the end of primary school, but to all children at every stage of their lives. Like her brother, K needs space to process and recover from her experiences, and to be protected from future harm. 96. I am ordering that the father’s time with his children is substantially reduced from what it has been up to now. The condition of supervision is undoubtedly a significant restriction. But I repeat, the reason for this is to protect the children and their mother from harm. It is not in order to inflict some punishment on the father, nor to seek to undermine his relationship with his children. It is to enable them to continue their relationship with him, safely, despite the harm that he has caused to them, and despite the risk of harm he continues to present to them. 97. In all the circumstances, while one might choose a set time period for a section 91(14) order to be in place, for example to see J passed his first term or first year of secondary school, I have decided that such an order would not be logical. The bar would be lifted at around the time when K was entering the final stages of primary school, and she would be exposed to the risk of harmful litigation at a particularly vulnerable time for her. For the reasons given, any arbitrary time limit puts the onus on the victims of domestic abuse to build resilience in anticipation of an application that will come. It is a form of protection but only for a limited time, whereas the impact of domestic abuse is not time-limited. 98. I could extend the time period to say five years, by which time J would be fifteen, but then the same argument applies. How would the court know that the impact of litigation upon the mother in five years will not be experienced in the same way then as it would be now? Should K be exposed to the prospect of litigation concerning her where her brother was afforded the protection of the court for the same period of his life? It is better that the court takes a more nuanced approach which looks at the situation as it is at the time an application is made. 99. I have had regard to the case of F v M [2023] EWFC 5. In that case there were findings that the applicant father had coercively controlled the mother throughout the relationship by preventing her access to ante-natal care, isolating her from her family, friends and peers, controlling her money and food and deliberately curtailing her freedom, also amounting to emotional abuse. The court found that the father had raped the mother. The court found that the father had caused emotional harm to the child of the relationship and that it would not be possible to safeguard the child from his emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviours until he had undertaken behaviour change work. The order made was for indirect contact once a year. A section 91(14) order was made. In his judgment, Hayden J at paragraph 18 he said: ‘Section 91A was inserted into the Children Act on the 19th May 2022 pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 ss. 67(3), 90(6), SI 2022/553, Regs 1(2), 2(1)(b). In Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact) (Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749, King LJ referred to a prevailing and "changed landscape", not least in consequence of social media and wide access to smart phones. She considered that this opened considerably wider scope for the greater use of Section 91(14) which, to my mind, had always been intended to provide a protective filter from inappropriate applications. The filter exists to protect the child and, not infrequently, the parent with whom the child lives. It is not a punitive measure towards a recalcitrant parent. Neither is it a bar on access to justice. Where a Court identifies an issue that requires to be resolved, the case will proceed but where it does not, the child and the primary carer are protected from the stress and uncertainty of a misconceived or vexatious application. Anticipating the introduction of the amended Section 91A reforms, which had received Royal Assent, but not yet come into force at the time of her judgment, King LJ said: "[45] …It is worth however noting that the proposed new section 91A dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s91(14) orders. In particular the provision at section 91A(2), if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of Re P (see para 39 above) by permitting a s91(14) order to be made where the making of an application under the Children Act 1989 would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm." 100. At paragraph 20 of his judgment, Hayden J said as follows: ‘The provisions within Section 91A are transformative. The section provides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm. This amended provision strikes me as properly recognising the very significant toll protracted litigation can take on children and individuals who may already have become vulnerable, for a variety of reasons. It also dovetails with our enhanced understanding of the nature of controlling and coercive behaviour. When all other avenues are lost, too often the Court process becomes the only weapon available. Lawyers and Judges must be assiduous to identify when this occurs, in order to ensure that the Court is not manipulated into becoming a source of harm but a guarantee of protection.’ 101. The imposition of a section 91(14) acts as a filter, not a bar. It does not mean that the current child arrangements order must remain in place indefinitely. The parents may of course agree variations between themselves. The father would not be prevented from making applications to the Court for a variation to the existing child arrangements orders at any time. But, as Mr Allen says, the onus would be upon him to establish, with evidence, that there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made. 102. It may well be that following a year or so of supervised contact, after resolution of the financial remedies proceedings, and following further work with Ms M, there has been such a change. It may also be the case that even if the father has made substantial changes, the children and their mother remain in need of support and reassurance. They will need to learn to trust the father again. He may have made progress, so that he has confidence that he can parent safely, but the children will need not just to be safe, but to feel safe in his care. 103. Given the levels of domestic abuse that have been found in this case, the significant impact on the mother and children, and the father’s continued denials, minimisation, and his strategy of attack and blaming, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances, to exercise my discretion so as to impose a section 91(14) bar on further applications under section 8 of the Children Act 1989. 104. I note that in the case of F v M, the bar was imposed until the children reached the age of eighteen. That was a more serious case, but comparisons are of limited use here; the bar is not imposed as a punishment. I am not carrying out a sentencing exercise and imposing a length of time to match the seriousness or otherwise of the abuse. The practice direction and guidance asks me to consider all the circumstances and come to a view. Having done so, I am satisfied that in all the circumstances of this case, and to ensure that the Court is acting protectively, rather than potentially becoming the source of further harm to the mother and children, a section 91(14) order until each of the children has reached the age of sixteen is appropriate. 105. I would not attach the section 91(14) for applications for enforcement of existing orders, but otherwise, apply the restriction to all applications made pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989. 106. On behalf of the mother, Mr Allen invited the Court to provide that she is not to be notified of a future application until after the court has made its decision about whether or not to grant permission. I will make an order in those terms. 107. The Court cannot be prescriptive about the evidence that would be required to meet the test of a material change of circumstances before permission would be given to bring a fresh application. Whether permission is given will depend on the circumstances at the time. However, it may be of assistance to give an indication of the evidence that may reasonably be expected to accompany an application made in the future, in line with Mr Allen’s submissions rehearsed at paragraph 90 above. Disclosure of judgment to third parties 108. The mother applies for a copy of the judgments from these proceedings to be disclosed to the Child Maintenance Service Tribunal. She says the father has put her credibility in issue by alleging that she has made false accusations against him. In the circumstances, she says that she should be entitled to disclose judgments which establish that her allegations were found to be proved. 109. The father questions the need for any documents from the Family Court to be disclosed into the CMS proceedings. However, he says that if the judgments from the Children Act proceedings are to be disclosed, then so should the judgment on the preliminary issue in the financial remedies proceedings, and any subsequent judgment in those proceedings. 110. I accept the mother’s submission that she should be entitled to disclose the judgments into the CMS proceedings. I give permission. This permission is not conditional on permission being obtained for the judgments from the financial remedies proceedings to be disclosed; that will be a matter for the parties to raise with the judge. 111. I have previously decided that copies of the judgment and the orders of the court should be shared with the headteacher and safeguarding lead at any school the children attend. Publication of judgment 112. The mother seeks publication of the fact-finding and welfare judgments in anonymised form. The father opposes this. 113. I published the first judgment I prepared involving this family; MZA v FHB (private law -appeal – whether to hold fact-find); In the matter of J (a boy) and K (a girl) [2024] EWFC 77 (B). There was a dispute between the parties about whether or not it should be published, I resolved that dispute in favour of publication, giving reasons in a supplementary judgment which is annexed to Re J and K. 114. The father objects to publication for the following reasons:(i) He is worried that the mother will continue to make allegations against him, and that she will use the judgments as a means to paint him in a negative light;(ii) He doubts that the judgments can be properly anonymised so as to prevent members of the family being identified;(iii) He is concerned for the impact on the children of publication;(iv) He does not identify any public interest in publishing the judgments. 115. On behalf of the mother, Mr Allen submits: (i) guidance from the President of the Family Division encourages publication, so that should be the court’s starting position; (ii) there is public interest in publishing judgments – a general interest in transparency around court decisions, but in this particular case, around the court’s approach to domestic abuse, including coercive control; (iii) in the same way that the previous judgment was anonymised before publication, so can the subsequent judgments be anonymised to prevent identification of the children or any family members, and of any details that might enable their identities to be pieced together; (iv) the mother denies that she has been telling people about the case or contents of the judgments, and the father has not put any evidence before the court to establish that she has. 116. In deciding whether to publish a judgment, I must have regard to all the circumstances, the rights arising under any relevant provision of the European Convention on Human Rights, including Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing), 8 (respect for family and private life) and 10 (freedom of expression), and the effect of publication upon any current or potential criminal proceedings (Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments: Practice Guidance, issued on 16 January 2014 by Sir James Munby, then President of the Family Division). 117. I have had also had regard to Practice Guidance: Family Court – Anonymisation Guidance, issued on 18 December 2018 by Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the Family Division, as well as his report dated 28 October 2021, following work by the Transparency Review Panel, entitled ‘Confidence and Confidentiality: Transparency in the Family Courts’. 118. As Mr Allen says, the President’s guidance emphasises the ‘significant and important public interest in our society having and maintaining confidence in the work of the Family Court. …. Openness and accessibility to the work of the court may also enhance the ability for the system and those who work within it to learn and improve.’ 119. On the other hand, the President continues, there is a strong and important force in favour of maintaining ‘a cloak of confidentiality around the identity and personal information of the children and adult parties who come before the court. The voice of children and young people on this issue is strong and clear; they do not wish to have their personal information and the detail of their lives made public.’ 120. I have weighed the arguments, and concluded that the judgments should be published. My reasons are as follows: (i) The starting point is a presumption in favour of publication; (ii) Judgments at Circuit Judge level do not set a legal precedent, but nonetheless the President of the Family Division’s guidance is that publishing judgments which show the workings of the Family Court can enhance the ability for the system and those who work within it to learn and improve. The judgments I have written show the workings of the family court from the decision to hold the fact-find, the fact-find itself, and final welfare decisions. It is arguable that there may be some utility in that process being made transparent to inform discussions not necessarily about the decisions made, but the process by which the decisions were made; (iii) As happened previously, the judgments can be anonymised so that the names of the parties, their families, nationalities, places they live, work or have travelled to, are redacted or changed to prevent identification; (iv) There is no evidence that the mother has shared information about the case or the contents of the judgment with others. The judgments will carry a warning that the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved and failure to do so will be a contempt of court. This is a more proportionate response to a perceived risk than not publishing the judgments in the first place.[115]This is my judgment.[116]I have drafted a letter for the children to explain my decision and the reasons for it. HHJ Joanna Vincent Family Court, Oxford Draft sent by email: 23 June 2025 Approved judgment handed down: 2 July 2025