F (A Child) (placement order and failure by local authority to contact wider birth family) [2025] EWFC 259 (B)

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.[2025] EWFC 259 (B)Case No BH24C50036
IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT BOURNEMOUTH
Date Date:
Between
BOURNEMOUTH, CHRISTCHURCH AND POOLE COUNCILApplicantDRespondent
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
B e f o r e
HIS HONOUR JUDGE DAVID WILLIAMS
ESecond RespondentF(by his children’s guardian)Third RespondentGFourth RespondentHFifth RespondentMr Krummins and Mrs Henstock-Turner for applicantMr Smith for first respondentMs Tarrant for second respondentMiss Hennessey for third respondentMiss Chapman for fourth respondentMr Lorie for fifth respondentAPPROVED JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down via email on 21 July 2025Introduction
[1]This is a case concerning a little boy called F who was born in early 2024 and is now aged 17 months.[2]In many respects the facts of this case are nothing out of the ordinary and reflect the type of cases which come before the family courts on a daily basis. But in other respects the facts are unusual, striking, and have given rise to consequences which can only be described as tragic.[3]The local authority, Bournemouth, Christchurch, and Poole (BCP) sought care and placement orders for F, a position supported by F’s guardian and his father, E. The Mother, D, opposed the making of those orders and supported her mother (the MGM), G, who sought an order for F to live with her and her partner.

Decision

[4]The parties are already aware of my decision as they were informed orally at the conclusion of the final hearing on 1st July. There was insufficient time that day for me to prepare a detailed judgment, so the parties were informed of the brief reasons for my decision with more detailed reasons in a full judgment to follow.[5]In short, I granted BCP’s applications for care and placement orders in respect of F. I also ordered post adoption direct contact between F and the MGM at a frequency of once per month and additional indirect contact at the discretion of F’s carers. I also made a number of findings against BCP and ordered BCP to pay the MGM’s costs in the summarily assessed sum of £15,987.60, payable within 28 days.[6]My reasons for this are set out below.

Background

[7]The background to this case goes some way to explaining the unusual, striking, and tragic facts to which I have referred.[8]In April 2022 the Mother gave birth to a little girl, X. BCP commenced care proceedings on 26 April 2023 within which they sought and obtained care and placement orders. Those orders were made on 18 September 2023, and as will become clear, it is relevant to note that the application for a placement order was made on 8 September 2023.[9]X was separated from her parents under the ICO and placed with foster carers/prospective adopters on 29 June 2023 and has remained there. An application for an adoption order was made on 6 August 2024 and an adoption order was made on 4 October 2024.[10]As stated above, the Mother gave birth in early 2024. F is a full sibling of X. BCP commenced care proceedings in respect of F on 29 February 2024 and the matter was listed for an urgent case management hearing on 1 March 2024.[11]On 1 March 2024 an interim care order was made by consent, on the basis that F would remain in hospital as he was not yet fit for discharge, and in the interim a search would be undertaken for a mother and child placement.[12]Paragraph 19 of the order of 1 March 2024 provided for the papers in the previous set of proceedings relating to X to be disclosed into these proceedings. Those papers should have included the placement application which was made in respect of X, but there is some doubt as to whether the placement application was actually included in the papers that were disclosed from the previous proceedings.[13]Paragraph 7 of the schedule to that order records that the parties had not identified any possible alternative carers.[14]The Mother subsequently went to a mother and child placement with F, but for reasons which I do not need to go into, that placement came to an end in June 2024 at which time the Mother consented to F being removed from her care and placed with foster carers.[15]Significantly, it was at this point in time, June 2024, that F was placed with the same foster carers/prospective adopters who at that time were foster parents to X and who went on to become X’s adoptive parents. This was what is known as an early permanence placement.[16]BCP initially made an application for a placement order in respect of F on 27 June 2024. Within that application BCP stated ‘there are no other family members or significant other people able to care for F.’[17]BCP filed a second application for a placement order in 2025. The paperwork supporting that application set out what had been contained in the paperwork for the previous application, what I will refer to as the ‘original’ section, and then included an updated section which contained the relevant information since the previous application in June 2024 (the updated section).[18]In the paperwork which BCP submitted to the Agency Decision Maker on 19 March 2025, the original section stated:
‘Regarding possible family members who can care for F, H advised that D does not have any contact with her family; there is no further information to follow up.’
[19]Reference to H in that paragraph is to the Social Worker for BCP.[20]Updating information was then provided in the updated section, which stated:
‘The social worker explained that during X’s care proceedings, no family members came forward for her. After F’s birth still no relatives came forward. At the final hearing for F in September the Judge ordered an updating parenting assessment of D [the mother] to be completed by an ISW. D made contact with G [MGM] on the day of X’s adoption order and G became aware of the potential plan for adoption for F and as a result, she put herself forward as an alternative carer.’
[21]The court has also had sight of the Annex B report relating to X in the previous set of proceedings. That report contained a genogram which clearly recorded G as the maternal grandmother. It also contained a passage which stated:
‘all paternal and maternal family members or significant other people have been ruled out, or have ruled themselves out, as possible long-term carers for X. In relation to D’s family, she has not provided any details of her family and we have no way of contacting them.’
[22]On 5 October 2024, the MGM contacted BCP. This was the first time there had been any contact between the MGM and BCP. There is no dispute between all parties that the MGM only became aware of the situation regarding X and F a matter of days after the adoption order was made in respect of X. At that time, and during the period covered by these and the previous proceedings, the relationship between the mother and the MGM had broken down and they were not in regular contact and were unaware of each other’s exact whereabouts.[23]Having made contact with BCP, the MGM was subsequently assessed as a potential carer for F, an assessment which was positive.[24]Notwithstanding this positive assessment, BCP continued to seek care and placement orders for F, arguing that it was in his best interests to remain living with his foster carers/prospective adopters with whom he had developed a strong attachment, and for him to grow up in the same home as X, his full sibling.[25]The MGM opposed BCP’s applications.[26]A significant feature of the background to this case is the timing of the involvement of the MGM in these proceedings.[27]During the course of submissions on day one of the final hearing (where all parties had agreed the matter could be dealt with by way of submissions only), BCP’s position on the MGM’s involvement was explained as follows.a. In the first set of proceedings the Mother refused to disclose any details of her parents or family;b. The Mother did not put forward any alternative/possible carers for X;c. Absent any details, including names, BCP was unable to trace or make any contact with the MGM and her partner;d. The Mother maintained a similar position – refusal to disclose details – in the current set of proceedings relating to F;e. No alternative carers were put forward;f. Again, BCP was unable to trace the MGM;g. It appears the Mother sent a photo to the MGM very shortly after the adoption order for X was made, which led to the MGM asking the Mother questions about X and F and the MGM then contacting the BCP;h. BCP also accepted that the MGM is a realistic option for F;i. BCP went so far as to accept that if the MGM had been contacted earlier – i.e. before F was placed with the foster carers/prospective adopters, they would not now be seeking care and placement orders for F;j. Further, if the MGM had been contacted earlier in the first set of proceedings, it is highly likely that the MGM would have been a realistic and viable option.[28]During the course of further submissions it became clear that this factual position which was presented to the court by counsel for BCP was not in fact correct.[29]At this stage I make it clear that no criticism is made of Ms Henstock Turner, counsel for BCP at that hearing, for any errors in the factual position which was presented to the court. There is no suggestion that Ms Henstock-Turner said or did anything wrong or that she in any way intended to mislead the court as to the correct position. She was clearly acting on and repeating instructions from BCP. But for reasons which are still not entirely clear to me, those instructions were wrong.[30]In short, by at least 8 September 2023 and possibly even as early as some time in 2022, BCP was aware of the names and geographical location of the MGM. This much is clear from the genogram I have referred to above which was prepared by BCP on 8 September 2023 in respect of X. The information as to MGM’s geographical location was also contained in a Psychiatric Report prepared in July 2023.[31]As mentioned above, BCP made an application for a placement order in respect of X on 8 September 2023. During the course of submissions on the afternoon of day one of the final hearing, solicitor for the Father alerted the court and the parties to the fact that having accessed the file from the previous proceedings, she was able to see that the placement application contained the names of the MGM. That placement application was not before the court in these proceedings and had not been seen by Ms Henstock-Turner.[32]It therefore became apparent that BCP must have known at least the names of the MGM by no later than 8 September 2023, the date of the placement application for X.[33]I will return to this issue below, but before doing so it will assist to set out details of the procedural history in this matter, the parties’ positions, and the matters which unfolded at the final hearing. Procedural History 28 Feb 24 BCP issue application for care order 29 Feb 24 Directions gatekeeping order – list for hearing on 1 March 1 March 24 Case management hearing. Court orders interim care order by consent i. Listed further case management hearing on 3 June (in fact took place on 10 June) ii. Listed Issues Resolution Hearing/Early Final Hearing on first available date after 15 July iii. Mother and baby placement found iv. Mother to move there on 14 March i. Ordered narrative statements to be filed ii. Issues Resolution Hearing remained listed for 19 July iii. F separated from the Mother and placed in foster care 27 June 24 BCP issue placement application for F i. Matter listed for final hearing 24-26 September 2024 ii. Order for updating parenting assessment of the Mother iii. The Father ruled himself out of caring for F but supported the Mother’s case. 10 Sept 24 Application to adjourn final hearing, as the Mother was scheduled for a surgical abortion on 20 September 24 i. Application adjourned generally with liberty to restore, and permission to renew the application if so advised on 24 Sept 2024 ii. Final hearing remain listed. iii. Allowed time to see how the Mother was after undergoing surgical procedure i. Mother was able to attend ii. Oral evidence from assessor, Mother, and Guardian iii. Adjourned for further PAMS assessment of the Mother iv. Adjourned final hearing listed on 11 December 2024 i. MGM details had been provided to BCP and the initial assessment was positive. ii. Referral had been made for a full Special Guardianship assessment. i. Ordered a sibling assessment, Special Guardianship assessment ii. Matter listed for Issues Resolution Hearing on 17 April 2025. iii. The Mother accepted the conclusions of the Independent Social Worker’s assessment of her, which was negative, and which the Mother was not seeking to challenge. iv. The Mother did not seek any further assessment of herself. 2 April 25 MGM applied for party status and to challenge the negative Special Guardianship assessment. i. MGM joined as a party. ii. Final hearing listed for 28 and 29 May 2025

Parties’ Positions

[34]At the commencement of the final hearing on 28 May 2025 the parties’ positions were as follows:a. Sought care and placement orders;b. The Father and the Mother were not putting themselves forward;c. Accepted the court had to choose between two realistic options, namely the MGM and the prospective adopters. The court should come down in favour of care and placement orders because: i. The welfare checklist comes down in favour of care and placement orders, with particular emphasis on the importance and strength of the sibling relationship throughout the whole of F’s life, and the strong attachment he has formed with his carers. ii. Any placement with the MGM would be untested.d. Accepted there should be direct post adoption contact with the MGM at a frequency of six times per year. 64. Mother a. Not putting herself forward; b. Accepts it will be a considerable period of time before she is in a place to care for F, which is not within his timeframe; c. Supports a placement with the MGM. 68. Father d. Not putting himself forward;e. Supports BCP’s position. i. Says sibling relationship comes down in favour of care and placement orders instead of placement with MGM. 71. MGM a. Opposes care and placement orders; b. Seeks placement with her and her partner under a Special Guardianship order or any other orders the courts considers appropriate. a. Supports BCP’s applications for care and placement orders. b. Agreed with direct post adoption contact at a frequency of six times per year and indirect contact to be determined by the prospective adopters.

Final Hearing

[35]All parties had the benefit of legal representation at the final hearing and all parties agreed that the hearing should proceed by way of submissions only. On day one I heard submissions on behalf of BCP, Mother, Father, and the MGM. During the course of those submissions, the issues I have already alluded to in respect of BCP’s knowledge of the MGM began to emerge.[36]The submissions continued on day two and the issues continued to grow, to the extent that it became apparent the court was not in a position to conclude matters that day. There was insufficient information before the court to enable it to determine exactly how and when BCP had become aware of the name of the MGM and further, what if anything BCP had done with that information once it had come into its possession.[37]In addition, it was unclear whether BCP were seeking to maintain a position that the Mother had refused to provide information in respect of her mother (MGM) to BCP when requested. That is certainly a position which had been adopted at times by BCP in its submissions, and it was a position which was denied by the Mother. The Mother's position was that she did not have full details of her mother's address, but that what information she did have she had given to BCP when requested.[38]Accordingly, the final hearing was adjourned and listed for a further day’s hearing on 1 July 2025. A directions order was made which included the following paragraphs: 5. The local authority must by 16:00 on 16 June 2025 send to the court and the other parties the following a statement from the social worker addressinga. what information the social worker was relying on when reaching the conclusion it did at paragraph 3 of page C375 [Electronic reference 499] and attach such documentary evidence to support this (whether by way of document, attendance note, telephone note or witness statement) and whether that continues to be the view of the social worker and local authority. If that continues to be the view, the statement must address why and if the view has changed, what is the view and what is the basis of this changed view.b. A chronology of when and how the local authority became aware of the name of the maternal grandmother [G] and what the local authority did with this information when they became aware of it. This is to be a full chronology exhibiting appropriately redacted recordings (removing all confidential information) and to consider proceedings in respect of F and the older sibling X;c. What is the local authority’s position with regard to the Mother, as to whether she wilfully refused providing information or provided what information she had with regards to G for the purpose of wider family tracing;d. The local authority’s position, including the proposed adopters view of indirect contact;e. The local authority’s policy or otherwise with regards to trace wider family for children 6. The parents and the MGM may respond to the documents set out above by 16:00 on 23 June 2025. 7. Any application for costs by the MGM, the schedule of costs is to be sent to the court and the other parties by 16:00 on 23 June 2025[39]In addition, at the hearing on 29 May 2025 I notified the parties that it appeared to me there was at least the possibility of critical findings being made against the social worker and/or BCP and that all parties would need to address me at the adjourned hearing on whether BCP and/or the social worker should be named in any published judgment.[40]Pursuant to the order of 29 May 2025, the social worker filed a statement dated 27 June 2025. The statement was comprehensive and set out a full chronology relating not only to the proceedings concerning F but also the previous proceedings relating to X. It also exhibited documents in forty-four appendices.[41]On 23 June 2025 Ms Chapman, counsel for the MGM, filed a skeleton argument in which she set out the position of the MGM and, in particular, the findings the MGM invited the court to make. Those findings were: 1. BCP had access to information as to the MGM’s whereabouts and her name from as early as November 2022 but no later than September 2023. 2. BCP did not follow the guidance in Re A (Relinquished baby: Risk of domestic abuse) [2018] EWHC 1981 (Fam), Re H (Care and Adoption: Assessment of Wider Family) [2019] EWFC 10, and Re A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41. 3. The Social worker and BCP misled the ADM when presenting the position that there were no other family members or friend who could offer a placement for Xand F 4. The Social worker and BCP misled the court when presenting the position that there were no other family members or friend who could offer a placement for Xand F at the time the placement applications were made. 5. The Social worker told the MGM in October 2024 that she was not aware of her name or geographical location and this was dishonest. 6. BCP unnecessarily delayed in completing assessments of the MGM. 7. BCP unnecessarily delayed in facilitating family time between F, X, and the MGM after MGM made contact in October 2024. 8. The MGM was a realistic placement option for both Xand F. 9. The MGM should have been contacted by BCP in 2022 prior to X’s birth so she could have been asked if she wanted to put herself forward to care for unborn X. 10. The MGM should have been contacted by BCP in 2023 prior to F’s birth so she could have been asked if she wanted to put herself forward to care for unborn F. 11. As a result of BCP’s failings both Xand F have been deprived of the opportunity to be placed with their biological family. 12. That BCP and the social worker should be identified in this judgment in line with the findings above.[42]On 27 June 2025 the social worker, H. applied for party status in order that she could be represented at the hearing on 1 July and make representations in respect of the findings the MGM was inviting the court to make against her and the proposed naming of her in any published judgment.

Parties’ Positions Revisited

[43]At the adjourned hearing on 1 July all parties continued to be legally represented. There was no objection to the social worker’s application for party status and she was separately represented by counsel, Mr Lorie. Ms Henstock-Turner was now led by Mr Krumins.[44]The parties’ updated positions were as follows:a. Unchanged in opposition to care and placement orders;b. In the event care and placement orders were made: 1. Agreed order for direct contact once per month 2. Sought orders for indirect contact once per monthc. Sought findings against BCP and the social worker as set out above.d. Sought an order for costs against BCP a. Still sought care and placement orders; b. Agreed an order of direct contact once per month; c. Agreed a recital for indirect contact on an as and when basis to be determined by the prospective adopters; d. Agreed BCP should be named in any published judgment;e. Opposed the naming of the social worker;f. Did not oppose the making of a costs order against BCP in respect of the MGM’s costs.[45]As to the findings which the MGM invited the court to make, I will first set out BCP’s position in general, as set out in the skeleton argument filed by Mr Krumins and Ms Henstock-Turner: The local authority begins this document and the continuation of the proceedings with a clear apology to the parties and the Court for its systemic failure to ensure the correct steps were taken in deciding whether or not extended family, in particular G, was contacted in respect of the plans for the children. In particular:a. First, a decision was not actively made within the proceedings for either X or F as to whether or not it was in X’s or F’s welfare best interests to contact G and that such a decision was not raised with the Court in either proceedings. The LA placed overreliance upon the Mother’s assertions in respect of the MGM. The LA should have robustly considered the position and made an active decision as to the approach it was taking to the MGM and communicated the same to the professionals, the parties and the Court. This is the clear guidance from the line of caselaw the Court has been referred to by counsel for G, which is not in dispute.b. Second, this is described as a systemic failure as it was not a single individual’s responsibility, but the collective responsibility of the professionals involved in this case to consider this matter and make a decision on this issue and review the same decision. This includes the social worker, the relevant managers, the IRO, the ADM, and the supporting legal teams.c. It recognises and apologises to G and the children for the impact this failure has had on her and her relationship with the children. The local authority accepts this is a very serious matter and is taking the following steps in response to this identified failing: a. The PLO team are working on changing the process to evidence attempts to contact and discussions had with extended family members. The consequences of this case will form important learning points as part of training for the staff within this service. b. The lessons from this case have been shared with the Independent Review service to review their processes and oversight. c. The lessons from this case have been shared within the legal team for them to review their processes and the process in which these matters are evidenced.d. The ADM has been informed and is considering their position as to reviewing its procedures.[46]Turning to the numbered findings sought by the MGM (as set out above) BCP’s position was again set out in their skeleton argument: Allegation 1: knowledge of MGMa. BCP accepts that it had both MGM’s name and the area within which she lived from September 2023. BCP did not have her date of birth or address, which would have limited the inquiries that could have been made. Allegations 2: BCP did not follow the guidance as within the identified case law. a. This is accepted as set out above and BCP is taking steps to alter its practices to avoid the same happening again. Allegation 3 and 4: BCP and the social worker misled the Court. a. BCP has set out its position above but reiterates that it accepts that it did not make the necessary decision as to whether or not to contact MGM, placing overreliance on the Mother’s assertions, and therefore did not adequately promote the child’s welfare needs when presenting the case to the ADM and this Court.b. BCP does not accept that it has misled the Court or the ADM. The Court will recognise that such an allegation is exceptionally serious. The information at the time was limited in respect of the MGM, it would have precluded the ability to apply for a DWP order or to make adequate inquiries via Facebook.c. The representations were made to the Court and the ADM in good faith and not based on dishonesty. BCP fully acknowledges it has made a serious mistake in the decision making and scrutiny of the children’s care plans. The local authority has sought to engage with the failure and be open in respect of the same, so that the important learning points for future practice can be reviewed and implemented. Allegation 5: the October 2024 conversation between the social worker and MGM a. The social worker does not recall the conversation had with the MGM. b. This is a matter now for the social worker and her separate representation. Allegations 6: BCP delayed in undertaking the assessment of the MGM a. This is not accepted. Once the MGM had come forward and wished to be assessed there was no significant delay in the assessment. b. This is not to dimmish the acceptance of BCP’s failings that have been outlined above. Allegation 7: BCP delayed in providing family time to the MGM a. This is not accepted by BCP. Allegation 8: The MGM was a realistic placement for the children. a. It is accepted that she is a realistic placement for F and the Court is assessing that as part of its welfare decision for F. b. In respect of X, it is accepted this is a possibility but of course the Court would have had to undertake a welfare analysis at the time for X. Allegation 9: The MGM should have been contacted prior to X’s birth a. The points as to the remit of the Court’s review of X’s cases are repeated in respect of this matter. b. This is not to dimmish BCP’s acceptance that it did not make, when it should have, an active decision as to whether or not X’s extended family should have been contacted and investigated. Allegation 10: The MGM should have been contacted prior to F’s birth. a. BCP repeats its acceptance as to the flaws in its decision making as set out above. Allegations 11: Xand F were deprived of an opportunity to be with their family a. BCP repeats the observations as to the limits of the Court’s role within these proceedings as to X’s plan. This is not a matter for this Court to determine. b. In respect of F, this is a matter that the Court must consider as part of the assessment of F’s welfare. BCP has identified the priority for F is his relationship with Xwhen considering the competing welfare factors for the care plan. The Court is of course the final arbiter of these matters and a response to this allegation can only be considered in light of the Court’s welfare determination, hence why this is likely to be a matter for another Court or claim. c. This again is not to diminish BCP’s acceptance of the failings as already outlined. Invitation for the judgment to be made public and BCP identified. a. BCP recognises that there is a critical point within these proceedings and that it has failed to undertake part of its function in analysing the children’s best interests which has had significant consequences. b. BCP does not oppose, if the Court deems it is appropriate, that a judgment should be published, and it should be identified (providing the facts and information therein cannot lead to identification or ‘jigsaw’ identification of the children). c. BCP recognises the importance of public scrutiny of these matters, and it is open to such scrutiny to improve its practice. Social Worker[47]The social worker’s position was limited to those matters which related directly to her, namely allegations 3,4,5 and 12. In respect of those allegations her position was: Allegations 3&4 Denied misleading the court and submitted that if the court considered it has been misled any such finding should be limited to being against BCP and not the social worker personally Allegation 5 Denied. The social worker has no recollection of making the statement alleged. Further, it is neither proportionate nor necessary for the court to make a finding on this allegation. Allegation 12 Opposed. The social worker does not oppose the publishing of any judgment and notes BCP do not object to being named as the local authority. There would be no purpose in naming the social worker and to do so would have an adverse impact on her professional and family life. Fathera. Continued to support the making of care and placement orders;b. Was neutral on all other issues. Motherc. Continued to oppose the making of care and placement orders;d. Supported the MGM on all other issues. GALe. Continued to support the making of care and placement orders;f. Agreed an order for contact once per month;g. Opposed an order for indirect contact once per month;h. Neutral on other findings sought by the MGM.

The Law

[48]Before I turn to the issues in dispute, I will deal first with the law. There is no dispute that the burden of proof is on BCP to prove the allegations which it makes, and the appropriate standard of proof is the civil standard on the simple balance of probabilities. I have reminded myself of the case of re B and particularly the speech of Baroness Hale.[49]In the present case, the central issue I have to decide in relation to F is whether I should approve BCP’s care plans for him to be placed for adoption, or whether I should place him with the MGM.[50]In determining that issue, I bear firmly in mind that F’s welfare is my paramount concern. I must also have regard to the provisions of the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act, what is known as the "no delay" principle set out at section 1(2), and the welfare checklist in section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. In that respect I must carefully consider and balance the competing welfare considerations within those two checklists when reaching my conclusions.[51]I approach BCP’s applications on the basis that the best place for any child is within their family of origin unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. My task is to consider whether F could be cared for by the MGM to a satisfactory or good enough standard. It is not to determine whether he might be better off being adopted.[52]Importantly, given that BCP advances a plan for adoption, I am obliged to consider whether it would accord with F’s welfare throughout his life to be made the subject of a placement order. In that exercise I am guided by the welfare checklist at section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. If I conclude that a placement order accords with F’s welfare, I will then have to determine whether his welfare requires me to dispense with the consent of his parents to the making of such an order. The statutory language in the Adoption and Children Act imposes a stringent test in terms of what must be shown in relation to the child's welfare requiring parental consent to adoption to be dispensed with, namely it has the Strasbourg meaning of necessity, i.e. in the imperative, what is demanded rather than merely optional or reasonable or desirable.[53]I must also be satisfied that any orders I make are a lawful, necessary, proportionate, and reasonable response to F’s predicament. The granting of a care order, let alone endorsing a plan for adoption, would represent a drastic curtailment of the rights of the parents and F under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which can only be justified by pressing concerns for his welfare.[54]In constructing both the Convention and also domestic law, I have the assistance of the Supreme Court in re B, a 2013 case, followed by the decisions of the Court of Appeal, particularly re B-S in 2013, and also re P and re G in the same year. All these cases firmly re-emphasise that a placement for adoption is a very extreme thing and a last resort, to be approved only when nothing else will do. Both domestic and Convention law require a high degree of justification before adoption can be endorsed if it is necessary for determining welfare as set out in the Adoption and Children Act.

Threshold

[55]Although not expressly stated above, it is implicit from all parties’ positions that the threshold for making a care order, as set out in s31 of the Children Act 1989 is met. The final agreed threshold document sets out the areas of concern and in respect of which the local authority rely in establishing the threshold. These include areas of neglect, emotional and physical harm, and lack of engagement.[56]It is accepted by the parents that they are unable to meet F's basic care needs, including the provision and maintaining of satisfactory home conditions. The parents also accept that they are unable to meet F's basic needs either together or with F in either of their sole care. In addition, the Mother accepts that she experiences issues with poor mental health which put F at risk of suffering neglect as well as emotional and physical harm. The Mother also failed to attend a number of appointments in the months following F's birth, which she accepts put F at risk of suffering neglect as well as emotional and physical harm.

Issues to determine

[57]Having accepted the threshold is met, neither parent put themselves forward as a potential carer for F. Both parents clearly love F, but they have had to make the difficult decision that they are not currently or for the foreseeable future in a position to care for him.[58]Accordingly, the issue the court had to decide was which of the two competing realistic options was in F’s best interests. Should F be made subject to care and placement orders, or should he be placed in the care of the MGM under a special guardianship order or some other form of order. For the reasons set out below, and applying the law as set out above, I was satisfied that the making of care and placement orders was in F's best interests.[59]The parties were agreed that in the event care and placement orders were made there should be ongoing contact, to include post adoption contact, between the MGM and F. It was also agreed that this should take place in the form of direct contact at a frequency of once per month. Although not party to these proceedings, the court was informed that this position was agreed by F’s carers and prospective adopters.[60]There was an issue between the parties on the question of indirect contact. BCP, the guardian, and the carers all supported indirect contact taking place on an as and when basis to be determined by the carers. This was opposed by the MGM who sought an order for indirect contact at a frequency of once per month.[61]There were also issues concerning the findings sought by the MGM against BCP and the social worker. Whilst some of the findings were conceded by BCP, others remained in dispute, namely: a) Allegations 3 and 4: BCP and the social worker misled the Court; b) Allegation 5: the October 2024 conversation between the social worker and the MGM; c) Allegations 6: BCP delayed in undertaking the assessment of the MGM; d) Allegation 7: BCP delayed in providing family time to the MGM; e) Allegation 8: The MGM was a realistic placement for the children; f) Allegation 9: The MGM and her partner should have been contacted prior to X’s birth; g) Allegations 11: Xand F were deprived of an opportunity to be with their family.[62]It should be noted that in respect of allegations 3 and 4, all parties accepted that reference to the social worker should be removed. The issue was therefore whether BCP had misled the court.[63]The next issue related to a paragraph in the social worker’s statement. The MGM objected to that paragraph as being wholly inaccurate and unjustified and sought for it to be deleted. Initially, BCP and the social worker were only prepared to delete the final sentence in the paragraph, but at the commencement of the hearing on 1 July 2025 they indicated a willingness to remove the whole paragraph subject to the court’s permission to do so.[64]The final issue on paper was the application by the MGM for an order for costs against BCP. I say on paper because in practice the application was not actively opposed by BCP both in respect of principle and quantum, although BCP did not go so far as to consent to the making of the order.

Hearing on 1 July 2025

[65]At the adjourned final hearing I heard submissions on behalf of all parties. I also had the benefit of reading the parties’ skeleton arguments. I was also able to read and consider the evidence contained in the main bundle (running to 1,162 pages) and the supplemental bundle containing statements and documents filed since the hearing in May (running to 612 pages).[66]As stated above, at the conclusion of the hearing there was insufficient time for me to consider, prepare, and deliver a judgment that day. However, I was conscious of the significant delay which had already occurred in this case and of the high levels of anxiety which the parties, particularly the parents, the MGM, and the prospective adopters were experiencing. Accordingly, I informed the parties that I was going to retire to consider my decision and would return later that afternoon to inform them of my decision on the issues in dispute, with my detailed reasons in the form of this judgment following at a later date.

Decision and Welfare Analysis

[67]In carrying out my welfare analysis I reminded myself of the following: a) The relevant provisions of the Children Act 1989; b) The relevant provisions of the Adoption and Children Act 2002; c) Re B [2013] UKSC 33; d) Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146; e) Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793; f) Re T (A Child) (Early Permanence Placement)[2015] EWCA Civ 983; g) Re B (A Child) (care proceedings) [2018] EWCA Civ 20; h) Article 8.[68]I also reminded myself of the principle of proportionality and that the court should make no more interventionist an order than is necessary to meet the needs of F.[69]All parties accepted there were only two options in this case. Either F is placed with his maternal grandparents under a special guardianship order or some other order, or the local authority is granted care and placement orders under which he would remain with his current carers. No one suggested that long term foster care or any other option would be in F's best interests.[70]In assessing the two options I took note that F has been placed with his current carers under what is known as an early permanence placement. Such a situation was considered in the case of Re T where at paragraphs 50-51 the then President of the Family Division, Sir James Munby stated:50. I agree, therefore, with the essential thrust of the submissions by Mr Donnelly, Mr Tyler and Miss Anning as I have summarised them in paragraphs 28-29 above. The care judge is concerned at most with consideration of adoption in principle, not with evaluating the merits of particular proposed adopters. There is no need for the prospective adopters to be joined, for it is the children's guardian (who will be aware of Mr and Mrs X's stance and can, if necessary, address their suitability) who has the task, indeed is under the duty, of subjecting the local authority's care plan to rigorous scrutiny and, where, appropriate, criticism. So, I agree, Mr and Mrs X's joinder to the care proceedings is inappropriate. Moreover, as was pointed out, and I agree, there is no need for Mr and Mrs X to be parties to the care proceedings to demonstrate that they are suitable prospective adopters for T, for they have already been positively assessed.51. The truth is, as Mr Tyler submitted, that, putting on one side Mr and Mrs X's role as early permanence placement foster carers, and, I emphasise, without in any way wishing to belittle or diminish all that they have done for T, this is a case where there has been an unexceptional period of time caring for an unexceptional child in an unexceptional case. This, in my judgment, is not an exceptional case justifying any departure from the general approach. For the reality is, as Mr Tyler correctly put it, that the 'status quo' and attachment on which Miss Scriven and Miss Fottrell placed such emphasis do not differ significantly from what is found in the many similar care cases where a child has been successfully fostered for a short period. Moreover, and to repeat, there is, in my judgment, nothing in the status or function of an early permanence placement foster carer which either justifies or requires any change in the hitherto conventional and long-established approach.[71]And also at paragraph 53 Moreover, there is, as Miss Anning pointed out, a very real risk that if, in a case such as this, the forensic process is allowed to become in effect a dispute between the prospective adopters and the birth family, the court will be diverted into an illegitimate inquiry as to which placement will be better for the child. That, it cannot be emphasised too much, is not the question before the court. 72. The ramifications of the decision in Re T were considered in the case of Re B, again a judgment of Sir James Munby. At paragraph 5, Sir James Munby addressed the judgment of Wilson LJ in Re A; Coventry County Council v CC and A[2007] EWCA Civ 1383, 5. The central principle was explained in the latter case by Wilson LJ (Re A, para 24):
"The application for a placement order required the magistrates to consider the principle whether the best interests of A required that she be adopted but not to determine the identity of the optimum adoptive home for her."
He continued (para 34):
"I do not agree with the judge that the proper forum for consideration of the identity of the optimum adopter or adopters for a child is the court which makes the care and placement orders. For, in terms of the adoption of the child and in contradistinction to the child's committal into care, the placement order is not the court's last word. Its last word is articulated when the adoption order is made; and any court which makes a placement order knows that any issue in relation to the identity of the optimum adopter or adopters of the child can be ventilated in an application for an adoption order … As a judge of the family justice system for almost 15 years, I have never encountered a case in which an aspiring adopter participated in the hearing of proceedings relating to whether a child should be placed for adoption, or should be freed for adoption under the old law set out in s 18 of the Adoption Act 1976. For the law provides a forum in which issues as to the identity of the optimum adopter can later be ventilated. In my view, therefore, the requirement for close scrutiny of the care plan should in principle not extend to an address of any issue as to the identity of the optimum adopter or adopters for the child." 73. And at paragraphs 6 and 7 he addressed his own judgment in Re T 6. I said much the same in Re T, para 50: "
The care judge is concerned at most with consideration of adoption in principle, not with evaluating the merits of particular proposed adopters. There is no need for the prospective adopters to be joined, for it is the children's guardian … who has the task, indeed is under the duty, of subjecting the local authority's care plan to rigorous scrutiny and, where appropriate, criticism." 7. I went on to recognise (Re T, para 51) that there might be "an exceptional case justifying [a] departure from the general approach", echoing in this respect what Wilson LJ had said in Re A, para 35:
"To say that the credentials of proposed adopters may exceptionally need to be considered in care proceedings in order that the court should better be able to reach the central decision whether the child should be removed from his family and adopted is not to say that care or indeed placement proceedings are an appropriate forum for resolution of an issue between a proposed adopter and the local authority as to the merits of her candidacy."
Waite LJ had similarly qualified the general principle when in Re G (page 846) he contrasted what was "normally" appropriate in "ordinary circumstances" with the circumstances in Re G itself, which he described as being "exceptional … with many unusual features." 74. There are similarities in the current case with the facts in both Re T and Re B. In Re T, the child who was subject to the proceedings had already been placed with the prospective adopters in an early permanence placement. Thus, when the court came to carry out the welfare analysis in respect of the care and placement applications, the child already had an established relationship with its carers. However, as was stated at paragraph 51, it was a case where: there has been an unexceptional period of time caring for an unexceptional child in an unexceptional case. 75. In Re B, the child subject to the proceedings (B) was a full sibling of a child who had already been adopted (H). The issue for the court in that case was whether B should be placed with those same adoptive parents and thus with her full sibling H, or with a paternal cousin. However, unlike in Re T and unlike in the current case, at the time of the court undertaking the welfare analysis, B had not been placed with the adoptive parents and thus had no established relationship or attachment with them. 76. In the current case, F has now been placed with his carers and prospective adopters for 13 months. They have already adopted his full sibling and he has therefore spent 13 months developing an attachment to both his carers and his full sibling. 77. It is certainly the case that the prospective adopters have been positively assessed. It is clear from Re T that the court should not allow the process at the welfare stage to become a dispute between prospective adopters and the birth family, in this case the MGM. To do so would be to divert the court into an ‘illegitimate inquiry as to which placement will be better for the child’. 78. Drawing together the judgments in Re B and Re T, the task for the court Is to consider the principle of adoption on the particular facts of the case and not to choose the better of two alternative placements. The court must therefore consider F’s welfare needs and how best they can be met. To do so will involve weighing up the pros and cons of each realistic option. 79. At this stage the court is still considering adoption in principle. However, the courts consideration is in the knowledge that the prospective adopters have already adopted F's full sibling, X, and that F has been living with his full sibling and the prospective adopters for 13 months. In that sense I am seeking to navigate the same course as was described by the first instance judge in Re B, HHJ George, as quoted at paragraph 9 of Re B: In weighing the pros and cons of each option the court must steer a course between the known fact that [H] has already been placed for adoption and trying to avoid it being a competition between two possible placements. The court must undertake the necessary balancing exercise, but in the knowledge that the adoption placement whilst still being considered in principle holds [H]. That is the approach I have attempted to take in this case." 80. At paragraph 10 of Re B Sir James Munby continues to quote from HHJ Geroge’s first instance judgment where, at paragraphs 25-27 she states: "25 There is no authority on all fours with this case where a sibling is already placed with prospective adopters. The case law, in my judgment, whilst making clear that the placement options are not to be seen as in competition requires the court to carry out a holistic global analysis of the pros and cons of each option. The adoption option in this case cannot ignore the fact that if placed with adopters [B] will be living with a full sibling. Beyond that fact the court seeks to resist being drawn into a comparison between the two placements and certainly is not asking the question of which is the better placement. 26 The question in this case is whether there is an over-riding requirement pertaining to [B]'s best interests which makes adoption the right outcome for her, despite the positive assessment and viable option of a placement within the family. The social worker, IRO and Guardian are all of the view that the benefits of [B] growing up with a full sibling outweigh the benefits of a family placement. 27 The question, therefore, is one of weight to be attached to the competing pros and cons of each option, whether on analysis the court concludes, as the local authority and Guardian invite it to, that [B]'s welfare interests throughout her life require her to be placed for adoption and outweigh other considerations. The pros and cons of the two realistic options involve an analysis of the placement with [I] and [R], what life would be like with them, the extent to which relationships with the birth family and the quality and nature of them would be maintained. The pros and cons of an adoptive placement must be considered in the context where two siblings would be placed together, even though they have no existing relationship, but where the social worker and Guardian say the enduring and lifelong nature of the sibling relationship is of such importance as to lead the court to conclude adoption is necessary. Specifically the court will need to carefully consider s1(4)(c) and (f) of the welfare checklist in the ACA 2002." 81. In considering the pros and cons of the two realistic options available for F there is little if any factual dispute between the parties. Dealing first with his current carers and the positives, I note that F has been living with them for 13 months and I have seen statements and reports which demonstrate he has formed a strong attachment to his carers. I have also seen a sibling report which provides a detailed and thorough sibling assessment. It is clear that F has developed a strong sibling relationship with Xand there are reports of them singing to each other and stroking each other’s hair. 82. Although I am only considering the principle of adoption, I cannot ignore the fact that if a placement order is made the plan of adoption is for F to remain with his current carers and his sibling. Indeed, if that were not going to happen neither the local authority nor the guardian would be seeking care and placement orders. 83. It is accepted that F is settled and thriving in his current placement. It is therefore a known, tried and tested placement. He has formed secure attachments and has developed strong relationships with all the individuals in the home. 84. I also note that sibling relationships are one of if not the most enduring relationship a child will have throughout its life. If F remains in his current placement, he will share his lived experiences with Xand they will grow up together. Not only are they full siblings but they are only 10 months apart in age. 85. As to the negatives, if F remains with his current carers he will be separated from his birth family, with the exception of X, and will be deprived of the opportunity to grow up in that birth family. This is likely to have an impact on his sense of belonging and his identity. 86. To a certain extent this can be ameliorated by the fact all parties agree F would continue to have direct contact with the MGM if he remains with his current carers. As I have stated, the parties have agreed direct contact at a frequency of once per month. Thus, F will have the opportunity to develop and maintain a relationship with the MGM and possibly in time the wider maternal family, although this will obviously not be to the same extent as it would be if he were to grow up in the care of the MGM. 87. The positives of F being placed with the MGM are obvious. He would remain in his birth family and would have the opportunity to develop strong relationships not only with the MGM but also the wider maternal family, including his uncles, aunts, and cousins. In time, and subject to her continuing to make progress with her own issues, this may also include developing a relationship with his mother. 88. It is also worth noting that no party raises any issues with the MGM and her ability to care for and meet F's needs. 89. There would undoubtedly also be some negative factors if F were to be placed with the MGM. It would mean him being separated from Xand from the carers with whom he has lived for the last 13 months. I am satisfied that separation at this stage is likely to cause F significant harm. It would mean the breaking of a secure attachment, and although that attachment could be transferred to the MGM, that would not avoid the negative impact that the loss of his primary attachment would cause. 90. As with his current carers, the MGM has confirmed she would agree to direct contact between F and X if F were to be placed with her. This would mean that F could still develop and maintain a relationship with his full sibling, but it would not be to the same extent as if he were living and growing up with her in the same household. 91. In addition, although no issues are raised with the MGM’s ability to care for F, it must be recognised that such a placement would be untested. Through no fault of her own, the MGM is in the early stages of developing a relationship with F and it is difficult to predict how easily or quickly F might settle in her care. Clearly, if for some reason a placement with the MGM was unstable or broke down, it would have a significant destabilising impact on F. 92. As already stated, all parties accept there are two realistic and viable options before the court. However, the Guardian, BCP, and the Father say the advantages for F of living with, developing, and maintaining a full sibling relationship with X, and maintaining his secure attachment with his carers, outweigh the advantages of him being placed within the maternal family. 93. Whilst I do not dismiss the strength of the attachment which F has developed with his carers, I do not consider that attachment to be so important as to tip the balance in favour of F remaining with his carers as opposed to moving to live with the MGM. It is undoubtedly the case that F would suffer some harm as a result of that attachment being broken, but such harm could be mitigated by ongoing contact and I am satisfied that in time he could transfer or build a new attachment with the MGM. 94. The fundamental issue in this case relates to F's relationship with X. The two viable options effectively amount to the court having to decide whether the benefits which F would enjoy as a result of living and growing up with X outweigh the benefits he would enjoy as a result of being brought up by the MGM, within his birth family. 95. As was said in the first instance decision in Re B, this issue is a balancing exercise between the factors set out in Sections 1(4)(c) and (f) of the 2002 Act, namely: (c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person, … (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court … considers the relationship to be relevant, including – (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child's needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child's relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child." 96. F is not going to be placed with either of his birth parents. Neither of them are in a position to care for him and meet his needs and there is no indication that either of them will be in a position to do so for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, his continuing relationship with his birth parents would be significantly limited even if he was placed in the care of the MGM. However, he would maintain a relationship with his wider birth family, being brought up with his maternal grandmother and her partner, and spending time and building relationships with his maternal uncles, aunts, and cousins. 97. But all of that would be at the expense of maintaining a close relationship with his sister, A relationship which has the potential to be one of the closest and long lasting relationships of his life. 98. When I consider the advantages and disadvantages of each option throughout F's life, I am driven to conclude that the making of care and placement orders best meet his welfare and are in his best interests. I consider there is an overriding requirement for F's strong relationship with his full sibling to be maintained and allowed to grow. Whilst this will have the effect of him ceasing to be a member of his original birth family, that effect will be ameliorated by his continuing to have direct contact with the MGM. 99. Accordingly I am satisfied that for the reasons I have set out above, care and placement orders are both necessary and proportionate. Not only will they secure the benefits I have set out but they will also bring an end to these lengthy proceedings and avoid the uncertainty of an untested placement with the MGM. 100. I recognise this is a decision which is not supported by F’s mother and accordingly I consider that F’s welfare requires me to dispense with his mother’s consent, his father having agreed to the orders sought.

Findings

[101]Turning to the allegations, I will deal first with those which concern BCP before dealing with the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker.[102]In respect of allegations 3 and 4, I am quite satisfied that BCP misled both the court and the agency decision maker. In respect of the court, this occurred on multiple occasions, namely various different hearings.[103]It was submitted on behalf of BCP that whilst there had been mistakes and systemic failings there was no evidence of dishonesty. Further, that a finding that BCP had misled the court included or implied an element of dishonesty and that therefore the findings should not be made.[104]I did not accept BCP’ submissions. A finding that someone has misled the court does not require a finding that there has been an element of dishonesty. A court could be misled for a number of different reasons including by an honest mistake, by carelessness, and of course deliberately. The dictionary definition of the word ‘mislead’ is: Mislead (verb) - cause (someone) to have a wrong idea or impression.[105]There can be no sensible dispute that this definition was met in the current case. At a number of different hearings, BCP put information before and made representations to the court which were incorrect. That is accepted by BCP. BCP also accept that this happened as a result of mistakes and systemic failings. It is clear that the incorrect information and representations caused the court and the agency decision maker to ‘have a wrong idea or impression’.[106]For the avoidance of doubt, I do not find that there was any element of dishonesty when BCP misled the court and the agency decision maker. But the absence of dishonesty should not be taken as minimising the seriousness of the issue. The agency decision maker and the court were being asked to make decisions of the utmost seriousness. It has often been said that short of imposing a sentence of capital punishment, removing someone's child and ordering non-consensual adoption is one of if not the most serious order a court can make. It is therefore essential that when a court or an agency decision maker is tasked with making that decision they must be able to have full confidence that they have been provided with full and accurate information on which to base their decision. That did not happen in this case. They were misled.[107]As to allegation 6, I find the allegation proven in respect of the period prior to October 2024. That must follow from the mistakes and failings which BCP have accepted. Those mistakes and failings resulted in a significant delay in the MGM being contacted. Clearly, had the MGM been contacted at an earlier stage the assessment of the MGM would also have been undertaken at an earlier stage. However, once the MGM made contact with BCP in October 2024 there was then no delay by BCP in undertaking the assessment of the MGM.[108]As to allegation 7, the dates speak for themselves. The MGM made contact with BCP at the beginning of October 2024. The first occasion on which BCP arranged and provided family time between F and the MGM was February 2025. In my view it is obvious that that period of approximately five months amounts to delay. The allegation is therefore proven.[109]As to allegation 8, it is important to distinguish between the position relating to F and the position relating to X. I am seized with the proceedings relating to F. In these proceedings there is no doubt that the MGM is a realistic placement for F. That is accepted by BCP. Further, it is clear from reading the statements and reports that the MGM would have been a realistic placement for F from the outset of these proceedings. Put another way, there is nothing in any of the evidence before the court to suggest there has been some change of circumstances during these proceedings which means the MGM is a realistic option now, but would not have been a realistic option earlier in the proceedings.[110]In respect of X, it is not possible nor indeed appropriate for me to make a finding in these proceedings as to whether the MGM was or would have been a realistic placement for X in the proceedings relating to her. However, I can and do observe that there is nothing in any of the evidence which has been put before the court in these proceedings which would suggest the conclusions of the assessment of the MGM (i.e. that the MGM is a realistic option) would have been any different had it been undertaken at any stage during the proceedings relating to X.[111]Turning to allegation 9, I repeat that I am not dealing with the proceedings relating to X. However, it is clear from the chronology contained in the social worker’s statement in these proceedings dated 27 June 2025 that BCP was aware of the name and geographical location of the MGM during the proceedings relating to X. This fact was not lost on BCP, as its position in respect of this allegation makes clear: This is not to dimmish the LA’s acceptance that it did not make, when it should have, an active decision as to whether or not X’s extended family should have been contacted and investigated.[112]As to allegation 11, I must again distinguish between the position relating to F in these proceedings and the position relating to X in the previous proceedings.[113]In respect of F it is clear that the chances of him being placed with the MGM were significantly reduced as a result of BCP’s failings. As set out above, BCP and the guardian place heavy reliance on the attachment that F has formed with his carers since being placed with them in these proceedings. Clearly, had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings, the strength of the argument relating to F's attachment with his carers would at the very least be significantly reduced if not eliminated.[114]It is beyond doubt that had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings the time it has taken for the matter to proceed to a final hearing would have been greatly reduced. Accordingly, even if F had still been placed with his carers, the time during which he has formed his strong attachment would also have been greatly reduced. Further, it is highly likely, that had the MGM being assessed at the outset of these proceedings, F would have been placed with the MGM when he was removed from his mother's care as opposed to being removed to foster care.[115]The attachment with his carers is not the only reason BCP and the Guardian relied on in support of the making of care and placement orders. BCP and the Guardian also relied on the importance of the sibling relationship between F and X.[116]It is not for me to make a finding as to what the court's decision would have been in relation to F had the MGM been contacted at the outset of these proceedings. However, it is clear that the factual basis of the welfare decision would have been significantly different. Not only would the attachment argument in favour of the carers have been weakened or eliminated, there would also have been an attachment argument in favour of the MGM, assuming F had been placed with the MGM when he was removed from the Mother, which as I have said above, would have been highly likely.[117]That would also have had a knock-on effect on the sibling relationship. F would not have spent the last 13 months living with and developing a close relationship with X.[118]Absent that close sibling relationship and absent an attachment with his carers, it is by no means certain the welfare decision would have resulted in care and placement orders being made.[119]In respect of X, I cannot second-guess what the welfare decision would have been had the MGM been contacted at the outset or during the course of those proceedings. However, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I can confirm that I am unaware of any evidence which would suggest the outcome of the assessment of the MGM would have been any different had it been undertaken at any stage during the proceedings relating to X. Without second-guessing what the welfare decision would have been, it is clear the court would have been undertaking its welfare decision on fundamentally different facts had it been doing so in the knowledge that the MGM was a realistic option for X.[120]I now turn to the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker.[121]In short, I make no finding in respect of that allegation. That is not to say the allegation is proven or not proven, but I am satisfied that it is neither necessary nor proportionate for me to make a finding on that allegation in order to determine the welfare issues which are before the court.[122]I accept the maternal grandmother says she has a clear recollection of the conversation which took place between her and the social worker at the beginning of October 2024. The maternal grandmother is clear that in the course of that conversation the social worker told her she had not known or been aware of the maternal grandmother’s name and geographical location. It is clear from the documents disclosed by BCP and indeed from the social worker's own statement that from at least September 2023 the social worker had been aware of the grandmother’s name and geographical location. The social worker does not accept that she told the maternal grandmother she was unaware of her name and geographical location during the telephone conversation at the beginning of October. The social worker's evidence in her written statement was that she has no recollection of saying that to the maternal grandmother.[123]In considering whether it was necessary or proportionate for me to make a finding in respect of this allegation, I took into account the date of the conversation in the context of these proceedings and the effect or consequences of the alleged words used in the conversation if they had in fact been used.[124]I was satisfied that when it came to making a welfare decision in respect of F, nothing turned on whether the social worker said what the maternal grandmother alleges. Regardless of what was or wasn't said in that conversation, it is common ground that following that conversation BCP took all appropriate steps to undertake an assessment of the MGM. Accordingly, I was satisfied it would be neither necessary nor proportionate to take up additional court time and cause further delay in these proceedings by hearing oral evidence from the social worker and the maternal grandmother in respect of this allegation.[125]That brings me to the final numbered allegation, which is more properly described as an invitation by the MGM for this judgment to be published and the social worker and BCP to be named.[126]All parties were content for this judgment to be published. BCP was content to be named in the published judgment. Accordingly, the only issue in dispute was whether the social worker should be named.[127]In fact, this issue fell away as a result of my finding in respect of the allegation of dishonesty against the social worker. It was accepted on behalf of the MGM that the social worker should only be named if a finding of dishonesty was made against her. Absent that finding, the MGM no longer sought the naming of the social worker in the published judgment.

Paragraph in Social Worker’s Statement

[128]The paragraph in question appears on page 10 of the social worker's statement (social work evidence template SWET) dated 20 March 2025. To provide context it needs to be read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, so both paragraphs are quoted below. Reference to G and her partner is to the MGM, reference to D is to the Mother: G and her partner have been put in a difficult position by D of not knowing the true extent of either of their grandchildren’s care plans, until very late on in these proceedings by which time it was too late for X, and she was adopted. There is still an element of wondering why they did not contact the Local Authority sooner, given they knew about the children and G was fully aware of the limitations of D’s struggles. G says they did not make contact before as when D was a child she was not always believed by social workers, and she felt this would be the same again. This is a poor and weak excuse in the view of the Local Authority.[129]As stated above, at the hearing in May, the social worker and BCP were prepared to delete the last sentence. This concession was not accepted by the MGM and the matter was left as an issue which would have to be dealt with at the adjourned hearing. At the hearing on 1 July, the social worker and BCP confirmed they were prepared either to replace the paragraph with an amended version or remove the paragraph entirely. But to do either required the permission of the court.[130]I do not see the need for the paragraph to be rewritten. The paragraph was both inaccurate and entirely unjustified. I have no hesitation in giving permission for the paragraph to be removed.[131]I am critical of BCP and the social worker both for including the paragraph in the first place and then for refusing to agree to its removal until the hearing on 1 July. At the hearing on 28 May it must have been obvious to the social worker that the paragraph was inaccurate and unjustified and yet she was only prepared to agree to the deletion of the final sentence with the rest of the paragraph remaining in place. That was an unreasonable position to adopt, particularly so when by then many of the mistakes and failings made by the social worker and BCP had come to light.[132]It is quite clear to me that the MGM contacted the local authority as soon as she was made aware of the proceedings concerning F and X. I'm also satisfied that had she known about the proceedings before October 2024 she would have contacted the BCP. For the social worker to say she questioned or wondered to the contrary was at best disingenuous and certainly ill-conceived.

Costs

[133]BCP were put on notice at the hearing in May that the MGM would be seeking an order for costs against BCP. That was again confirmed in the skeleton argument filed on behalf of the MGM prior to the hearing on 1 July. The MGM sought an order for costs in the sum of £15,987.60[134]At the hearing on 1 July counsel for BCP confirmed they were not actively opposing the application for costs and did not seek to put forward any submissions in response. BCP also elected not to make any submissions in respect of quantum.[135]Technically BCP was not consenting to an order for costs, but in view of their position and their very clear acceptance of their mistakes and systemic failings both before and during these proceedings, I am satisfied this is an appropriate case in which an order for costs should be made. Accordingly, I make an order for costs against BCP and order that they pay the MGM's costs which I summarily assessed in the sum of £15,987.60, payable within 28 days.

Reparative Work

[136]During the course of the hearing in May and July I became increasingly concerned at the potential for damage to be caused to the relationship between F's carers and the MGM. The carers are not parties to the proceedings and have not attended any of the court hearings nor had sight of any of the documents. They have therefore had to rely on third hand reports via BCP limited to the issues surrounding direct and indirect contact. All this in the context of knowing there were ongoing court proceedings within which the MGM was seeking to have F removed from their care and placed in the care of the MGM. The obvious tension and anxiety they would have been under would have been far from conducive to establishing and building a positive relationship with the MGM.[137]Notwithstanding this, I was very pleased to be informed at the hearing on 1 July that one session of direct contact had already taken place since the hearing at the end of May and that the carers had met with the MGM and the session had gone well. Indeed, that direct contact had been not just with F but also with X[138]Although not an issue for me to determine, it is important to record that BCP have confirmed a willingness and commitment to providing reparative work with the carers and the MGM in order to assist with the building of their relationship going forward. That work is to be outsourced and funded by BCP.

Disclosure of papers

[139]The final matter for me to deal with in this judgment is disclosure of papers, first in respect of a request by the MGM for permission to disclose the papers from these proceedings to their legal advisers in contemplation of bringing separate legal proceedings against BCP, and secondly in respect of the carers.[140]Initially the MGM’s request extended to permission to disclose the papers into any separate civil proceedings. I was not prepared to accede to that request as once disclosed into civil proceedings the papers would no longer benefit from the cloak of confidentiality. Accordingly, the request was amended to cover only their legal advisors, to which no other party objected.[141]As to the carers, I consider it essential they are provided with sufficient information to enable them to understand the issues which have arisen during these proceedings and the mistakes and failings of BCP which relate not just to F but also to X. In the first instance they should be provided with a copy of this judgment, but the parties will need to give careful thought to what other documentation should be disclosed to them so that an appropriate application or consent order can be filed with the court.

Conclusion

[142]Of necessity, much of this judgment has focused on mistakes and failings. However, these should not obscure the fact that both F and X are clearly deeply loved by the MGM and the carers.[143]I am conscious that orders for post adoption contact are relatively rare and certainly rare when contact is at a frequency of once per month. A huge amount of credit goes both to the carers and the MGM for agreeing this level of direct contact and in doing so demonstrating they are able to prioritise the best interests of F and indeed X.[144]The dignified and child focused way in which the MGM and the carers have conducted themselves have only served to fortify my view that the decisions I have made in respect of F are in his best interests and will ensure an upbringing in which he will be secure, will thrive, will enjoy a strong and close bond with his sibling, and will develop and maintain a strong relationship with the MGM.