“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.” 98. The decision in R v Lucas has been the subject of a number of further decisions of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division over the years, however the core conditions set out by Lord Lane remain authoritative. The approach in R v Lucas is not confined, as it was on the facts of Lucas itself, to a statement made out of court and can apply to a “lie” made in the course of the court proceedings and the approach is not limited solely to evidence concerning accomplices. 99. In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of R v Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the “lie” has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice. 100. One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the “lie” is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane’s judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is “capable of amounting to a corroboration”
“The court’s view of a witness’s overall credibility and reliability will naturally contribute to its evaluation of whether it can accept their evidence on the critical issues. If it concludes that lies have been told, it will consider what weight, if any, should be given to that aspect of the matter, after due consideration of any explanations have been offered. That is part of the normal process of sifting and weighing the evidence, and explaining the result. The family courts encounter many forms of bad behaviour and they are used to assessing their true significance for the issue in hand. There is no special rule of evidence for lies.”
“Relying on a literal reading of Re A, B and C, Mr Barnes further argues that the court is required to exclude a lie from consideration altogether in any case where it cannot be satisfied (to whatever standard) that the only explanation for it is to conceal guilt. I do not accept that submission. There will be some cases where the ultimate finding is so critically dependent on the assessment of the particular lie – that the court may out of caution wish to direct itself in accordance with Re A, B and C. ….. It will be sufficient for the judge to recall that the true significance of a lie must be carefully assessed, for all the well-known reasons noted by the judge in the present case. A general exclusionary rule, exclusively directed at lies, would be inconsistent with the duty on the court to consider all the evidence. Once it has done that, its conclusion in an individual case may be that the lie was told to conceal guilt, but that is a conclusion, not a test…Any other approach would hamper the court in carrying out its important assessment of credibility and its evaluation of particular issues of fact. 21). The dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Re BR (Proof of Facts)[2015] EWFC 41 . In particular paragraphs 4-7: The court acts on evidence, not speculation or assumption. It acts on facts, not worries or concerns. Evidence comes in many forms. It can be live, written, direct, hearsay, electronic, photographic, circumstantial, factual, or by way of expert opinion. It can concern major topics and small details, things that are important and things that are trivial. The burden of proving a fact rests on the person who asserts it. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: Is it more likely than not that the event occurred? Neither the seriousness of the allegation, nor the seriousness of the consequences, nor the inherent probabilities alters this. Where an allegation is a serious one, there is no requirement that the evidence must be of a special quality. The court will consider grave allegations with proper care, but evidence is evidence and the approach to analysing it remains the same in every case. In my view, statements of principle (some relied on in this case) that suggest that an enhanced level of evidential cogency or clarity is required in order to prove a very serious allegation do not assist and may lead a fact-finder into error. Despite all disclaimers, reference to qualitative concepts such as cogency and clarity may wrongly be taken to imply that some elevated standard of proof is called for. Nor does the seriousness of the consequences of a finding of fact affect the standard to which it must be proved. Whether a man was in a London street at a particular time might be of no great consequence if the issue is whether he was rightly issued with a parking ticket, but it might be of huge consequence if he has been charged with a murder that occurred that day in Paris. The evidential standard to which his presence in the street must be proved is nonetheless the same. The court takes account of any inherent probability or improbability of an event having occurred as part of a natural process of reasoning. But the fact that an event is a very common one does not lower the standard of probability to which it must be proved. Nor does the fact that an event is very uncommon raise the standard of proof that must be satisfied before it can be said to have occurred. Similarly, the frequency or infrequency with which an event generally occurs cannot divert attention from the question of whether it actually occurred … 22). The court must guard against the danger of reversing the burden of proof. The burden remains at all times upon the local authority to prove the facts alleged to the requisite standard, and it is not for a parent to disprove facts or present an alternative explanation for events. The risk of inadvertently reversing the burden of proof by according improper weight to a parent’s inability to provide an explanation for these serious allegations is particularly acute. Re M (Fact-finding: Burden of Proof)[2013] 2 FLR 874 at 881: ‘The burden of proof lies on the local authority to prove the case against the parents. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that means the same in this kind of case as in every other, a simple balance of probability. Suspicion is not proof, and the burden must always remain on the local authority and should not be reversed…’ and ‘That, too, was the effect of the judge's view of the case: that absent a parental explanation, there was no satisfactory benign explanation, ergo there must be a malevolent explanation. And it is that leap which troubles me. It does not seem to me that the conclusion necessarily follows unless, wrongly, the burden of proof has been reversed, and the parents were required to satisfy the court that this is not a non-accidental injury.’ 23). In respect of similar fact evidence, I have applied the principles identified in R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence)[2020] EWCA Civ 1088 and the analysis from the criminal case of R v Mitchell(2016) UKSC 55 . The principles from that criminal case apply to family cases and establish that a court has to be satisfied that a propensity for certain conduct has been proved to the civil standard. It was stated “ Where similar fact evidence comprises an alleged pattern of behaviour, the assertion is that a core allegation is more likely to be true because of the character of the person accused as shown by the conduct on other occasions”
“ an accident which is unexpected and unintentional and an injury which involves an element of wrong. That element of wrong my involve a lack of care and/or an intent of a greater or lesser degree that may amount to negligence, recklessness or deliberate infliction”. 25). As Ryder LJ pointed out, whilst it may be useful to distinguish deliberate infliction from say negligence, it is unnecessary in any consideration of whether the threshold criteria are satisfied because what the statute requires is something different namely, findings of fact that at least satisfy the significant harm, attributability and objective standard of care elements of section 31(2). 26). In respect of the welfare considerations, I have directed myself in accordance withsection 1 of the Children Act 1989 and had regard to the welfare checklist in section 1(3). I have reminded myself of the principle contained in section 1(2) in respect of delay, and of the need for it to be better for the child to make an order than no order as set out in section 1(5). I have also had regard to the interference with family life which must be proportionate to the risks which exist, and the necessity for compliance with the ECHR. The Background and Allegations 27). The following facts are set out to understand the context of this judgment and are agreed or unopposed unless stated otherwise. 28). Z is the first child of her parents who are married. There is one full sibling who has been born during the course of these proceedings called [redacted], born in October 2024. He is not the subject of these or any proceedings. 29). The mother told the local authority she moved with her family from Afghanistan to live in the UK in 2007. Her date of birth is [redacted] so she would have been around 13 years old at the time and she is now 30. She returned to Afghanistan in 2019 for a while. 30). The parents are first cousins, the maternal grandmother and paternal grandfather are siblings. The parents met as children and after a period when there was no contact between them until they were adults, they were re-introduced in a video call and were subsequently married. In their parenting assessment they struggled to recall the exact dates of their engagement and marriage but agreed it was a marriage of love and not simply arranged by the family which surrounds them. 31). The mother returned to the UK following her marriage but the father was unable to accompany her due to problems with obtaining a visa. Instead, the mother visited the father in Afghanistan in 2020 and 2021 and it was during one of her visits that Z was conceived. Z was born in the UK. 32). The father was eventually able to come to the UK and he met his daughter for the first time in October 2023. It follows he was not responsible for any care provided to Z prior to that date. 33). In May 2023, whilst the father was still in Afghanistan, Z was admitted to Sheffield Children’s Hospital (SCH) because she was unwell. Following diagnostic tests she was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukaemia. In June 2023 her condition deteriorated and sadly, she suffered a cardiac arrest and required 12 minutes of CPR. As a result of her cardiac arrest she sustained a hypoxic brain injury and a subsequent diagnosis of cerebral palsy. Z now requires a feeding tube known as a PEG (Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy), she is visually impaired and cannot move unassisted. It is likely she will have long term mobility and other developmental difficulties. 34). While Z was in hospital between May and October 2023, she was cared for by her mother, who relied upon and was supported by her younger sister [name redacted]. Z remained in hospital until June 2024. 35). From around August 2023, medical staff employed by SCH became increasingly concerned about the care the mother, and subsequently the father, were providing to Z. 36). Between August and December 2023, the local authority asserts the hospital noted that on at least 11 occasions, the mother paused the child’s feeds, meaning that Z’s fluids were not at the required level and thereby placing her at risk of harm from inadequate nutrition and hydration. The mother denies these allegations. Following the completion of the oral evidence the local authority conceded the father was not involved in the feeding regime because at the relevant time he had not been given the necessary training. He accepts the mother did turn the feed off on occasions but he agrees with her evidence that this was only after she followed medical advice to do so. 37). The hospital staff also noted that the child was left alone on the ward by the parents on multiple occasions when she requires 24 hour care. The parents accept Z requires 24 hour care and that there were occasions when they both left the ward but they assert they only did so after informing hospital staff of their departure and deny it was on multiple occasions. 38). Due to Z’s cerebral palsy, a 24-hour postural management programme was put in place by the hospital to assist her physical development with seating, standing, personal care, positioning, play and future interaction. The local authority asserts the parents received training and were able to demonstrate they knew how to use the equipment but they were observed not to follow this advice consistently. The parents deny this. The father also asserts he was not given any training in a language he could understand and if this allegation did happen it was not his fault. 39). On the1st December 2023 , Z was found by hospital staff to be lying in her own vomit and left by the father for 30 minutes without being changed. On the25th January 2024 , she was found in a similar state for up to four hours. The parents deny this. 40). On the 5th, 22nd, 24th and26th February 2024 , Z was seen by hospital staff with a dummy taped to her mouth, notwithstanding that advice had been given to the parents on the first occasion it happened about how dangerous this was due to the risk of Z choking by the aspiration of vomit with potentially fatal consequences. 41). On the26th February 2024 , ward manager, W1 spoke to the parents about the incident on that date where the local authority asserts the parents had done this, and before W1 entered the room she observed the father, through a window, forcibly holding a dummy in Z’s mouth with his thumbs. Z looked visibly distressed and was trying to spit the dummy out. The parents deny this happened. The parents accept a dummy was taped to the child’s mouth on one occasion on the5th February 2024 but they assert they were advised by a nurse to do this who also provided them with the tape. They deny doing it on any further occasion or behaving as alleged by W1 on the 26th February. 42). Hospital staff also reported their observations of poor stimulation and poor attachment between them and Z, with the parents being overly reliant on use of a dummy rather than attempting to bond with their daughter and providing emotional support to her. 43). In December 2023 concerns were raised by social care about the parents not following advice about their housing situation. At that point in the chronology the parents were living in the property of a family member and this property was not suitable for Z’s discharge from hospital as it did not have wheelchair access. Rather than working collaboratively with social care to find a solution, the parents made themselves intentionally homeless on the10th January 2024 and were residing in emergency accommodation. At this final hearing they still do not have suitable accommodation in which to care for their daughter’s disabilities. 44). On the11th March 2024 , both parents were arrested on suspicion of child cruelty arising from the observations of medical professionals outlined above. Bail conditions were put in place until April 2024 and these have subsequently been extended and remain in place until May 2025. They preclude unsupervised contact between Z and her parents. Following their arrest, the parents’ contact with Z in hospital was reduced to 2 hours per day and supervised by a support worker. In March 2024, the father was observed telling Z to ‘shut up baby, shut up’ whilst being preoccupied by his FaceTime conversation rather than comforting his daughter who was crying. This is not pleaded against the father and was not put to him in evidence and I have not considered it further for that reason. 45). As a result of the accumulating concerns, an initial child protection case conference was convened in March 2024 and Z was made the subject of a child protection plan under the category of neglect. 46). In April 2024, Z was ready for discharge from hospital but could not be discharged to the care of her parents, not least due to the bail conditions which are in place. This led to the issuing of this application on the12th April 2024 and Z was made the subject of an interim care order without any opposition from her parents on the3rd May 2024 . On the18th June 2024 she was discharged from SCH and placed in the care of the maternal grandparents where she remains. It is agreed by all parties Z is thriving in their care and this is where she should continue to be cared for at the conclusion of these proceedings. The Evidence of the Local Authority 47). Witness 1 confirmed the veracity of her written statements and gave evidence consistent with them. Her evidence supports that given by W2 relating to the26th February 2024 where W2 witnessed Z to have a dummy taped to her face. When W1 went to speak to the parents about the incident on the 26th February she told the court she first observed them through a window in their room which she described in her oral evidence as being about 30cm x 30cm in size. She confirmed she saw the father sitting at Z’s head with his hands on either side of her face holding the dummy in Z’s mouth and using his thumbs to anchor the dummy in place. Z was crying and visibly distressed. In her oral evidence W1 described it as being a similar to a grip used by nursing staff when they firmly hold an oxygen mask over a child’s face whilst conducting CPR. 48). W1 told the court that when she entered the room, the father immediately removed his hands from Z’s face and removed the dummy “because he knew it wasn’t the right thing to be doing and it alarmed me”
“No. It is definitely that date, 26 February. I witnessed the incident and spoke to the nurse in charge and wrote the safeguarding contact sheet there and then”. 56). Witness 3 confirmed the veracity of her written statement she gave to the Police on the10th April 2024 and gave evidence consistent with it. The redacted statement the court has from the Police does not identify the date of the incident W3 is referring to but she is clear there was only one occasion when she saw Z with a dummy taped to her face and that was the incident she reported to W2. There is no evidence to contradict this and I infer from it that the date she is referring to is the26 February 2024 which is the date given to the court by W2. With respect to the remainder of her oral evidence, W3 supported the evidence given by W2 relating to the26th February 2024 . W3 was very clear she saw Z with a dummy taped to her face on that occasion. 57). Witness 4 confirmed the veracity of her written statements and gave evidence consistent with them save and except the date in her statement she gave to the Police on the18 April 2024 has a typing error in it and the incident date should read the 24 February not the22 February 2024 . She also confirmed the truth of the contents of the SCS she prepared dated24 February 2024 . 58). W4 is a staff nurse and told the court she saw Z with a dummy taped to her cheeks on the24th February 2024 . In her written evidence it is described as ‘one piece of thin white medical tape approximately 4cm long was stuck to each side of the dummy to stick it down to the cheek”
“I haven’t given them any tape and I haven’t told them to tape the dummy to her face so why would I apologise for the advice?” 66). Ms Laura Egan is the child’s allocated social worker and she has submitted a number of statements, assessments and the amended support plan for the proposed supervision order. It remains the local authority’s intention to support the maternal grandparents to care for Z throughout the duration of the supervision order whilst further assessing the parents’ ability to meet Z’s needs outside of the timeframe of these proceedings. The assessment of the parents’ ability to care for Z has been limited by their bail conditions and by their inadequate accommodation. Ms Egan has no concerns about the ability of the maternal grandparents and extended family to meet Z’s holistic needs and described Z as ‘flourishing’ in their care. I accept that opinion as it was not challenged by any party. The grandparents have ensured appropriate medical attention has been sought for Z when needed during these proceedings, they have ensured Z attends all of her health appointments, and the parents have been included by them in those health appointments and kept informed. Ms Lindsey Wright 67). The children’s guardian agreed with the evidence of the social worker about the high level of care being provided by the grandparents to Z. Ms Wright had spoken to them last week and seen Z in a videocall at the same time. Z “was alert and awake, she has grown a lot since I last saw her in September, and she looked happy and settled. She has a lovely bond with her grandmother. Z likes to be held and touched, it was a lovely observation, she also has a lovely bond with her (maternal) aunt who was also there. I was very pleased by what I saw, Z is receiving excellent care by them”
“At the start the nurse told me they will be passing a pipe in her tummy and I didn’t know how that would take place and after that they would arrange an interpreter”
“I understood the advice that was given to me about the feeding and not taping the dummy” but she denied having been given advice ‘3, 4 or 5 times’ not to tape the dummy in place and maintained her account it had only happened on one occasion and this had been on the advice of Witness 6 who provided the tape for this purpose. She denied doing this on any other occasion. 74). In respect of Z’s feeding regime, the mother accepted she had received and understood the training for carrying out Z’s feeds and stated she always spoke to the nurses if she encountered any problems and strictly followed their advice. The mother agreed the nursing note entries for the occasions she had stopped or paused the feeds were likely to be correct but maintained she had done this following the advice of nursing staff and it hadn’t been her decision. Her evidence is: “I stopped (the feeds) after being advised by staff, I have never taken any decision by myself”. 75). The mother was cross examined about an entry in the nursing notes dated27 November 2023 where she had left the ward and needed to be summoned by staff to return to start the feed. The mother denied this to be the case and said: “I have never delayed the feeding, if it was delayed it was because of the nursing staff. This entry is obviously incorrect because I stayed with my daughter 24 hours and whenever I went to (the hospital’s on-site accommodation) I would go after informing them and asking permission. I never went making my own decision”. 76). When asked about other occasions in the nursing notes when it is recorded the mother had left the ward for 2-3 hours and returned to [the on-site accommodation], thereby delaying Z’s feeding regime, the mother continued to deny this had happened. 77). The mother was asked about the observations of the dietician on the29th January 2024 who witnessed the father looking at his phone on a bed whilst Z was left crying and distressed on the bed with her dummy having fallen out. The mother denied the father would have behaved in this way and told the court, “I have never seen him with a mobile phone and we have never left Z alone on the bed”. 78). The mother denied ever leaving Z on her own on the ward at any time without nursing permission, and denied the occasion where it is recorded they did so because the father was ‘bored’. Her initial oral evidence is that she only left the ward once with the permission of nursing staff, and this occasion was to facilitate the father’s registration with a G.P. Later in her evidence she admitted to leaving the ward twice, once as above and a second occasion with the father to address their housing situation. I pause to note the father, in his oral evidence, admitted to three occasions when they left the ward together whilst Z remained in the hospital and in his Police interview he conceded there were four occasions. 79). The mother maintains her denial that Z was left lying in wet and vomit soaked clothing and bedding or that she ever had to be prompted to change her. She maintained her account that Witness 6 had told them to tape the dummy to Z’s face on the5th February 2024 and provided the parents with the tape to do this. The mother denied witnessing the father firmly holding the dummy in Z’s mouth with both thumbs on the 26th February and maintained that incident never happened. The Father’s Case 80). Similarly, I have borne in mind there is no responsibility upon the father to provide any explanation or to the disprove the facts alleged by the local authority. With that important proposition in mind, his evidence, following translation, included the following. 81). The father’s case mirrored that of the mother’s and he confirmed there was nothing in the mother’s evidence to the court which he disagreed with. 82). The father explained he relied on the mother to explain things to him because she spoke better English than he did. He denied he was given any training by the hospital and stated “Since I came to the UK I have no idea about the medicine or anything else, I wasn’t given any information in that regard”
“My wife would tell me things in Pashto…they (his wife and the nurse/s) would speak to each other and then she would do that”
“If she had seen me she would tell me that it is wrong. I did not do this” and he suggested W1 should have got him an interpreter. Neither parent had any explanation for why W1 should make any false allegations against them. Analysis of the Credibility and Reliability of the Parents and Other Witnesses 87). There is a stark contrast between the evidence given to the court by the hospital staff and that given by the parents. It is not possible for both versions to be correct and the court must decide who is more likely to be telling the truth. 88). Having considered the totality of the evidence available to the court, I am persuaded there has been no evidence adduced from which this court could conclude any of the medical professionals from SCH are not telling the truth. I do know, and have considered, that even an honest and truthful witness may make a mistake and whether this may provide an explanation for any of the disputed facts in this case. However, I have been persuaded it does not, and the evidence of witnesses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 is entirely truthful and reliable. I find it to be reliable because it is all contemporaneously recorded in Z’s nursing notes and in the SCS each nurse completed on each incident date. I cannot identify any evidence for why different nursing staff would have completed a SCS if no incident had occurred or why they would falsify any date when they made the notes at the time the incident occurred. 89). When I turn to consider the credibility and reliability of the local authority’s witnesses as a whole, I am also persuaded by the striking similarities in the evidence of its accuracy and veracity for the following reasons. 90). Firstly, there are striking similarities in their evidence when they each speak of the parents taping Z’s dummy to her face or cheeks on different dates; when W1 speaks of the father using his thumbs to anchor Z’s dummy in her mouth which is a similar mechanism to the tape used to fix the dummy in place; and the parents’ understanding of medical advice but failing to follow it consistently. I cannot identify any reason why so many different people on different dates would give a similar account about the parenting Z received unless it were the truth. 91). Secondly, I also find their evidence entirely credible because each witness corroborates the account of the others and there is no evidence at all that any of them have colluded or conspired together to present the court with a false narrative. To be fair to the parents, they have not actively suggested this to have been the case other than submitting the medical records and SCS are wrong, but it is quite simply implausible that so many witnesses could give such consistent evidence unless it is the truth and the parents are being dishonest about it. 92). In contrast, the parents have not always given a consistent account. The mother admitted to leaving Z on the ward on only two occasions whereas the father admitted they left on three occasions and in his Police interview admitted to four. The mother asserted the father did not own a mobile phone whereas the father admitted he did have one. I am persuaded their evidence is less reliable than the very clear recollection and contemporaneously recorded evidence from SCH. 93). In conclusion, where any conflict in the evidence arises between that given or recorded by members of the hospital staff in this case and the evidence of the parents, I prefer the evidence of the hospital employees and the contemporaneous hospital records to be more reliable. The Court’s Findings 94). The local authority initially pleaded the threshold against both parents equally but they are entitled to be considered separately in each finding sought. 95). Paragraph (1) is accepted by the parents but it is not, in my judgment, a finding to satisfy the statutory threshold. It is factually accurate that Z suffered a hypoxic brain injury and has a diagnosis of cerebral palsy which causes her to require a level of care which is greater than a different child of the same age, but the parents are not responsible for Z’s health situation arising and it is relevance is limited to Z’s future care needs. The local authority concedes this, and it has been removed from the schedule I have approved below. 96). I find paragraph (2) to be satisfied and I approve it but not all of the sub-paragraphs in their entirety against both parents. 97). In submissions, the local authority seeks the Finding in paragraph 2(a) against the mother only. It is right to do so because the father was not in the country between August - October 2023 and the local authority has failed to persuade me he received the appropriate training in respect of Z’s feeding regime when he did meet Z after October 2023. It is correct he cannot be held responsible for any failure to follow a feeding regime he was not trained in. 98). In contrast, the mother was trained to be responsible for the child’s feeding regime and failed to follow the medical advice consistently by pausing the child’s feeds for longer than advised, by failing to notify nursing staff when she had done so, and by delaying the start of feeds by being absent from the ward. I accept the evidence in the child’s hospital notes and from W1 in this regard about the many occasions when this happened. I do not accept the mother’s suggestion the staff at SCH have consistently failed to record their own advice about when they told the mother to pause the feed because this would be in direct conflict with the nursing note entries. One example of which states in the unchallenged notes of the dietician that Z “has been struggling over the past couple of mornings as is vomiting when waking up. Staff having to give feeds overnight as mum has been turning the feed off at random points in the day”
“Mum and dad left [Z] alone from 12.00 to 15.00 missing her 14.00 medication. Mum was aware before she left about the medication time. They left because dad was ‘bored’”
“Z’s parents were not there from around 13.30. She was with the play team for a while then she was crying badly and could not settle for a long time. Called mum’s number and dad answered the call. Informed him that she is crying and required them to come back, he agreed to it. After a while mum called back and reported that they will be late and dad does not understand English.” 103). I do not accept the parents’ assertion the father did not understand the contents of the call or the need for them to be on the ward caring for their daughter. The reason I don’t accept this is because the hospital did provide the services of an interpreter and this was available to them by telephone. There are references to an interpreter for the father being used by the hospital on the17th November 2023 I1016 , and the unchallenged evidence of Nurse [X] is : “Mum and dad have had extensive training and education to be able to care for [Z] and her complex needs. Information has been provided in many forms, verbal (with interpreter for dad), written (in English and in Urdu) and visual (with picture charts and instructions). I also take into account the father’s evidence that he would ask the mother for explanations if he was unsure. 104). There are further examples of Z being left alone on the ward overnight on the 4/5 December 2023 between 22.00 and 02.00 hours; and a physiotherapy report confirming ‘mum and dad are not always present on the ward when we go to deliver therapy sessions’ which I accept because it refers to the mother having a good relationship with them and I cannot identify any reason for why they would say this if it were untrue. 105). Finally, the conflicting accounts given by the parents about the number of occasions they accept leaving Z on the ward persuades me they are not telling the truth about it. 106). I find Paragraph 2(c) proved against both parents. This relates to the postural management programme which they failed to implement consistently. I am persuaded that they were given, and understood, the necessary training and equipment they needed to use because the evidence of the physiotherapy team confirms this, and there were many occasions when the mother in particular demonstrated her ability to use these safely to Z’s benefit. The finding is that they did not do so consistently, and there were occasions when they were not present to facilitate physiotherapy sessions. I also make this Finding against the father because there is evidence to prove he was provided with pictorial aids to support both parents to follow the therapy advice, and the physiotherapy report confirms their attempts to involve him: “Dad will only get involved in therapy sessions when explained to him that he needs to know how to use equipment and be involved in Z’s care to support mum. Dad is rarely actively engaged with Z and is often using his phone throughout sessions when not prompted to be actively involved”. 107). Paragraph 2 (d) relates to Z being left lying in wet and vomit covered clothes or bedding for longer than a reasonable parent would leave her in that condition. In respect of the incident pleaded on the1st December 2023 the parents accepted this in part in their oral evidence but their evidence is that the father tried his best to clean Z up. I do not accept this and prefer the medical notes which confirm the following: “At approx. 12 noon mum said [Z] had been sick. I offered to help change the bed with her but mum confirmed she was okay as she would give Z a bed bath with dad’s help. Approx 30 mins later the O.T. said that Dad was in the room and Z was laying in sick and Dad wouldn’t clean her as he said mum would do it. Myself and [a staff nurse] went in to change the bed and I explained to Dad it is not acceptable to leave [Z ]laying in sick and she needs changing. As we began changing the bed, Dad did not offer to help us.” 108). The other date pleaded and found proved relates to the25 January 2024 and an entry made at 19.00 hours: “At 15.00 mum reported that [Z] had vomited earlier but Z had not been changed. She was still wearing the wet and vomit covered top. I suggested to mum that she should change her. Mum subsequently did”