“While it is true that the adoption in the present case, like the contested measures in the Johansen case, had the legal effect of totally depriving the applicant of family life with his daughter, the context differs significantly. It does not concern the severance of links between a mother and a child taken into public care but, rather, of links between a natural father and a child who had been in the care of her mother since she was born.”
“Where an adoption application is made by a step-parent, the approach of the ECHR in Söderbäck v Sweden should be applied according to the facts of each case. In doing so the following central points from the judgment in Söderbäck are likely to be important: (a) There is a distinction to be drawn between adoption in the context of compulsory, permanent placement outside the family against the wishes of parents (for example, as in Johansen v Norway) and a step-parent adoption where, by definition, the child is remaining in the care of one or other of his parents. (b) Factors which are likely to reduce the degree of interference with the Art 8 rights of the child and the non-consenting parent (Parent B), and thereby make it more likely that adoption is a proportionate measure are: i. where Parent B has not had the care of the child or otherwise asserted his or her responsibility for the child; ii. where Parent B has had only infrequent or no contact with the child; iii. where there is a particularly well-established family unit in the home of the parent and step-parent in which ‘de facto’ family ties have existed for a significant period.” (a) There is a distinction to be drawn between adoption in the context of compulsory, permanent placement outside the family against the wishes of parents (for example, as in Johansen v Norway) and a step-parent adoption where, by definition, the child is remaining in the care of one or other of his parents. (b) Factors which are likely to reduce the degree of interference with the Art 8 rights of the child and the non-consenting parent (Parent B), and thereby make it more likely that adoption is a proportionate measure are: i. where Parent B has not had the care of the child or otherwise asserted his or her responsibility for the child; ii. where Parent B has had only infrequent or no contact with the child; iii. where there is a particularly well-established family unit in the home of the parent and step-parent in which ‘de facto’ family ties have existed for a significant period.”
“The reason why context is important is that, in each case, it is necessary to evaluate the proportionality of the intervention in family life that is being proposed. For the child, and for the child’s welfare throughout his life, there will be a qualitative difference between adoption by strangers, with no continuing contact or legal relationship with any member of the birth family… and an adoption order which simply reflects in legal terms the reality in which the child’s family life and relationships have been conducted for some significant time.”
“I have read the documents provided to the court by the local authority and can understand their reasoning by the recommendation of a parental responsibility order. This would afford [AA] a level of responsibility for the children which he is seeking to give [sic] the children the level of permanence they are seeking from him.”