Y & Anor v London Borough of Hillingdon & Anor [2024] EWFC 452 (B)

IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2024] EWFC 452 (B)IN THE FAMILY COURT AT WEST LONDONWest London Family CourtGloucester House4 Dukes Green AvenueFelthamMiddlesex TW14 0LRDate of hearing: Tuesday 30 July 2024Start Time: 15:10 Finish Time: 15:53Page Count: 18 Word Count: 6466 Number of Folios: 90
Before
HER HONOUR JUDGE DOWNEY
Between
(1) YApplicants(2) XApplicant(1) LONDON BOROUGH OF HILLINGDONRespondents(2) THE CHILDRENRespondent(By their Children’s Guardian,RespondentHH)Respondent
THE FIRST AND SECOND APPLICANTS appeared In Person for in personMR HARRY SIMONS appeared for Respondent Local AuthorityMR JAMES HOLMES, Counsel, appeared for Children’s Guardian
JUDGMENTDigital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HPTel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDEEmail: info@martenwalshcherer.comWeb: www.martenwalshcherer.comHER HONOUR JUDGE DOWNEY:Date 2024-07-30
[1]This is an ex-tempore judgment, given at the conclusion of a half a day hearing on submissions this morning. It has not been an easy case to manage; again, because of the large volume of paperwork submitted by the Applicants. Neither Applicant is represented, and it has not been easy to be sure that I have access to all of the relevant material in relation to today’s application. There is no court bundle, as such, for today.[2]However the Court heard detailed submissions over three hours this morning, and then I rose to consider this judgment over the lunch adjournment, dealt with one other short matter, and I am giving judgment now, at three o’clock. I have done so, because I am very conscious that this is a case, which has already faced some delays, and so I did not want to cause any further delay.[3]The applications before the Court are Y and X’s applications: firstly, for permission to revoke a Placement Order, pursuant to section 24(3); and secondly, for an application for contact with their twin children, pursuant to section 26, both of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.[4]The parties to this application are the Applicant parents: mother, Y, and father, X, who have today been in person, but are assisted by McKenzie Friends. DD assists Y, and Commando G assists X.[5]The London Borough of Hillingdon is represented by counsel, Mr Simons, and the subject children – the twins, who I shall refer to as, “F” and “G” –born on 12 February 2022, are represented through their Guardian, HH, by counsel, Mr Holmes.[6]At the start of the hearing, mother requested that screens were erected between the parents and the Local Authority, which the Court accommodated. The McKenzie Friends have been able to assist the Applicants, and I have afforded as much time as the Court could allow, over the course of the morning, to the Applicant parents.[7]The background to this case is set out in Hussain DJ’s judgment, dated 2 May. But in short, there were pre-birth concerns about parental mental health issues, which concerns continued post-birth, and so the Local Authority became involved. Whilst initially there was a plan to place the parents at home with support, in time concerns escalated, such that it was the Local Authority view that the children could not be managed at home by the parents, and so they began care proceedings.[8]It was just about at the point of the children’s discharge from hospital, in or around June 2022, the Local Authority applied for interim Care Orders, which were granted, and the children have been in foster care ever since.[9]Parenting assessments were commissioned during the life of care proceedings, and various other assessments, and by the time of the final hearing, which took place in March and April 2024 – almost two years after the proceedings began – the Local Authority were inviting the court to make a Care Order and Placement Order. The Children’s Guardian supported that application, and the parents opposed the applications.[10]The Court heard evidence over eight days. But ultimately, DJ Hussain made a Care Order and Placement Order in relation to each of the children. An application for permission to appeal was made, and I heard arguments on the permission to appeal application on 24 July, and I refused that application for permission to appeal. I understand mother and father now seek to challenge that decision.[11]The children are now two-years-and-five-months old. They have been in foster care since June 2022 but are happily thriving and doing well. They continue to have weekly contact with the parents, which is a positive experience for the children.[12]The parties’ positions for today's hearing are that Y and X invite me to grant them leave to apply to revoke the Placement Orders, because they say there has been a change of circumstance since 2 May 2024, and that they deserve a chance to show that they can care for their children, ideally at home under what they term a “hybrid Supervision Order”.[13]Y pointed out that they have completed a form, C110A, in which they invite the Court to make a hybrid Supervision Order, and that that application has not yet been determined.[14]I identified that that application has, in fact, not yet been issued, because the proceedings – the care proceedings – at this court have now concluded. In any event, Y accepts that that application is not before me today, and she accepts that the two applications before me today are the applications for permission to apply for a revocation of Placement Order and for contact, under section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act.[15]There were a number of preliminary issues that arose today, and I allowed considerable latitude to the parents, given they are unrepresented, and sought to deal with those, as and when they arose.[16]The first issue that arose was that a journalist from the Independent, Ms Holly Evans, attended court today, at the request of the parents. She is an accredited journalist, and she was welcomed to West London Family Court.[17]Mother invited me to make a Transparency Order, to allow her attendance and to allow her to report, as appropriate. But it is clear from the rules – that is the Family Proceeding Rules, Rule 27(11) – that Part 14 applications, which includes an application to revoke a Placement Order and a section 26 contact application, are excluded from the transparency pilot.[18]So having heard brief submissions on the issue, and having given the parties time to consider the point, counsel for the Guardian, Mr Holmes, supported by Mr Simons, invited me to consider a pragmatic approach, whereby Ms Evans was permitted to attend court today, as an observer, on the understanding that she knew that she was not allowed to report anything she heard within the court hearing, unless (and until) an application was made to the High Court, to consider whether or not the reporting restrictions could be lifted and the exclusion in relation to Part 14 applications could be lifted.[19]I was satisfied with that approach and allowed Ms Evans to sit in throughout the morning’s hearing, although she has not been able to wait to hear this judgment.[20]The second issue that arose, at some point during the hearing, was that mother asked me to hear from a witness, who she said was crucial for the fair determination of her case. She referred to the witness as an “NN”, who she says has relevant information about her own difficulties in dealing with this same Local Authority, (London Borough of Hillingdon), and that I should hear from her, either privately or in the presence of all parties in court, and that without hearing from her, Y’s case could not be fairly determined.[21]I considered that application and brief submissions in response to it, and I am satisfied that it would not have been appropriate for me to have heard from NN and so I refused that application. It is clear to me that the relevant test for considering giving leave to revoke a Placement Order is whether or not there has been a change of circumstances in relation to these parents and this case, since 2 May, and NN’s view of this Local Authority and her own experiences were of no relevance, and so I refused that application.[22]The third matter that arose was that the Applicants had raised issues, both in the paperwork and orally, about the legitimacy of this Family Court and, in particular, my role. For example, in the position statement for today, the Applicants submitted that in the Family Court, the title of HHJ (Her Honour Judge) is an honorary title only, and that as a Family Judge, I am only able to act as an administrator and only able to determine matters in that administrative capacity on the papers.[23]Allied to that point, Commando G, the McKenzie Friend supporting X, raised an issue about my adjudicating on this case. He suggested I should recuse myself and that an application was to be made to remove me from public office, for fraud and misfeasance.[24]Upon clarification with Y, that application for recusal was not pursued but for the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that as a Circuit Judge, working in a Family Court, I do have the requisite jurisdiction to determine the applications before me.[25]I turn then to the legal framework that applies in relation to the first application before me, which is the application for permission to apply to revoke a Placement Order. The relevant legal framework is, of course, section 24 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which says that: “(1) The court may revoke a placement order on the application of any person [but the Court has to have given leave]. (2) [So] an application may not be made by [any] person other than the child or the local authority…unless—(a) the court has given leave…(b) … (3) The court cannot give leave under subsection (2)(a) unless satisfied…there has been a change in circumstances since the order was made.” (a) the court has given leave… (b) …[26]The Court has to adopt a two-stage approach to consider whether leave should be granted. Firstly: has there been a change in circumstance; and secondly, if so, is it in the child's welfare for leave to be granted?[27]When considering the first limb of change of circumstance, the Court is reminded by the higher courts, that the change does not have to be a significant change. It is a matter of fact to be decided by the court and the bar must not be set too high.[28]In Re P [2007] EWCA Civ 616, Wall J said:
“31. …in our judgment, the importation of the word "significant" [does put] the test too high. Self-evidently, a change in circumstances can embrace a wide range of different factual situations. Section 47(7) does not relate the change to the circumstances of the parents. The only limiting factor is that it must be a change in circumstances "since the placement order was made". Against this background, we do not think that any further definition of the change in circumstances involved is either possible or sensible.”
[29]Recent changes in circumstance may amount to changes sufficient to require the Court to then go on and look at welfare, and at the welfare stage, the Court has got to look at the overall welfare of the children.[30]In Re G [2015] EWCA Civ 119, Macur LJ said:
“21. I do not accept…that the nature and degree of the change of circumstances which a parent does successfully establish, is demoted by it being a recent change. This does add gloss to the words of the statute and should be resisted…the sustainability of the relevant change in circumstances and the impact that would have on the welfare of the child is open for consideration at the discretion stage.”
[31]So in short, for today’s application, the Court has got to be persuaded that there has been a change of circumstance since 2 May, when the judgment in this case was delivered.[32]On that substantive application, Y, supported by X, submits that there has been a change of circumstance in the following respects:a. Firstly, that the children have grown up further, they are now walking and talking. They identify their parents as mummy and daddy, and they will be, she says, “adversely affected emotionally now by any decision not to revoke the Placement Order because of their age and stage of increased development”.b. The second point is that the parents have now done a number of online courses and training. Those courses involve accessing general training and doing courses in relation to CBT and DBT, which were identified therapies during the care proceedings, and the parents submit that they have addressed a number of the issues, as were raised by the professionals and the Court, in the judgment, dated 2 May 2024.c. The third point is that contact is now going even better and that contact has moved on, such that the parenting assessments upon which the Court relied in its judgment on 2 May are no longer relevant and reliable, because they are so outdated.d. The fourth point is that both X and Y have clear DBS checks, which shows they would be able to care for children in another setting, and that is another change that they rely on.e. The fifth point was that X has undergone a Care Act assessment at home, and that Care Act assessment was completed in July 2024, and that Care Act assessment shows that X has no needs which warrant the provision of care in the community.f. Finally, the sixth point that they relied upon was that the contact workers and the contact sessions and the Care Act assessment are examples of how the parents can demonstrate that they are able to work with professionals.[33]I am going to pause there, to let Mr Holmes to rejoin.[34]Sorry, just to repeat that, the contact sessions and the Care Act assessment, the parents say show that they are now able to work with professionals, such that if there were to be a change in the current arrangements, they would be able to work with the Local Authority.[35]The Local Authority and the Children’s Guardian have responded to those arguments and have filed position statements for today, in which they oppose leave being granted, on the basis that they say such changes, as may have been made, are not of the degree and nature or relevance, as to warrant a reopening of the plan for adoption, and overall, it is not in the children’s welfare interests for contact to be increased.[36]So I consider then those individual factors that the parents rely upon:a. On the first point, of the children’s age, of course, in the three months that have elapsed since the Care Order and Placement Order were made, the twins have continued to grow and develop and they have now passed their due date birthdays, in May 2022, so that they are now chronologically over two years of age, and they are now naturally more aware of what is going on, and it is right that they will be emotionally impacted by any decision the Court makes. i. It is right that the children particularly have a close relationship with their mother and that they are affected by separation on contact, and it is a factor that DJ Hussain considered, very clearly, in her judgment, dated 2 May. For example, at paragraph 384, the Judge noted that the twins may feel a lifelong loss, that manifests as emotional issues, such as anxiety, upon being placed within an adoptive family, …. They may have questions about their identity and characteristics. ii. Specifically, at paragraph 517 and 518 of the judgment, DJ Hussain identified that for a placement to be successful, so that children become a permanent and stable family, contact has to be reduced, and that could impact the twins, given they will have reduced contact with their current foster carer and reduced contact with their parents, which can be a double sense of loss for the children. But on balance, she said, that does not outweigh the positives of adoption for the twins, as set out above. Her assessment was that the loss would be mitigated by a safe contact reduction plan, with both the foster carers and the parents. iii. In her judgment, DJ Hussain considers, in detail, the various observations that the professionals have made about the impact on the children, of understanding their adopted status in later life. iv. So of the parents’ point, that the children’s increased maturity over the last three months will further adversely affect the emotional impact on them of being adopted, I do not accept that. The considerations in relation to the emotional impact on the children were live in May 2022, and DJ Hussain considered them carefully then. Of course, they remain live now. It is a very important factor, that the Court has to have regard to the impact on the children of the various options available to it, but I am not persuaded that the fact that the children are now three months older and a little more developed is, in and of itself, a change of circumstance of the degree and nature that warrants a reopening of the issue. v. On an allied point, mother showed to the Court today very tiny babygrows and dummies, that the children used when they were first born, and this demonstration, very graphically, showed how tiny and vulnerable these children were in February 2022. Mother made the point that anyone would have struggled caring for children so tiny and vulnerable, and that now that the children are older and more robust, they – the parents – should be deemed able to manage them and should not be criticised for struggling when the babies were so small and vulnerable. vi. I accept that point, in principle. But DJ Hussain has already dealt with this. DJ Hussain dealt with this case in April of 2024, when these proceedings were almost two years old. The proceedings had been delayed, to allow a second parenting assessment, which had been sought by the Children’s Guardian, in 2023. The Court considered all of that evidence, and yet concluded that the parents, as at May 2024, were unable to meet the children’s needs, at that stage and not just as they were when born prematurely.b. The second point that the parents relied on was that they have done a number of courses and online training. i. They provided a huge number of certificates, showing that they had signed up with an agency, called “V”, and that through that agency, they had completed a number of online training courses and education programmes. For example, in May 2024, Y had completed a relationship coach diploma, over an hour-and-a-half online. X had completed a certificate in 21 days, for a “deeper connection with your children”, over two-and-a-half hours, online, and the certificate is dated 30 May. X had completed an EMDR therapy course, over one-and-a-half hours, again in May, and a fully accredited professional PTSD counselling diploma is said to have been completed by XX, as instructed by Dr LL, over 35 minutes on 30 May 2024. ii. I will not read each and every certificate. But for example, there was a cognitive behavioural therapy certificate, completed by BB, of J College, that X is said to have completed in April 2024, which lasted five-and-a-half hours. Likewise, in relation to DBT – that is dialectical behavioural therapy – on April 27th, X is said to have completed 11-and-a-half hours. Y is also said to have completed the same courses: that is 11-and-a-half hours of DBT and CBT. iii. Overall, it is as the Local Authority and Guardian identify, to the parents’ credit that despite the disappointment and distress they faced after the care proceedings concluded, they have continued to work on themselves and try to improve their parenting capabilities. These are positive steps. iv. But it is right to identify that the nature and content of these courses is not known to the Court. The course provider is unknown. The intensity and what is covered in these courses is not known. But as an example, in the judgment of DJ Hussain, at paragraph 115, she identified that Dr McEvedy had recommended that DBT and MBT were therapies that Y would benefit from, and he suggested that that therapy would take 12 to 24 months, and after that there would need to be a period of testing and embedding, to see if there was an improvement. Dr McEvedy had identified that Y appeared to have traits of abnormal personality, including faulty judgment, and that this particular therapy (DBT AND MBT) was needed, to address those particular traits. v. Whilst, as I say, it is a positive step that the parents have taken, an 11-and-a-half hour online course of DBT training, this falls well short of the 12 to 24 months of DBT training that Dr McEvedy recommended. vi. So as a general point – in relation to all of those courses and training – whilst it is, as I say, a positive step, I am not persuaded that those courses are courses which are of the type or nature of work that Dr McEvedy had in mind. Nor do I consider that, for example, spending 35 minutes on becoming a PTSD counsellor is of significance, in the general of context of this case. In short attending these online courses does not address the plethora of concerns raised by the professionals in this case.c. The third point raised by Y and X is that contact is now going even better, and that the parenting assessments are outdated. i. It is clear, throughout this judgment that contact, and how the parents manage in contact, was considered very thoroughly by all of the professionals and by the Court. There are examples, at paragraph 362, of the Guardian’s observations. There are further examples of the various social workers’ observations, and it was a common theme that mother was, in particular, very warm in contact, with a close attachment to the twins, and it is accepted that contact, even now, is a positive experience for the children. ii. But the issue in this case is not whether the parents can manage two hours, or even extended contact, but whether they could manage the children 24/7. For example, at paragraph 367 of the judgment of DJ Hussain, the Guardian indicated his view that he had spent a lot of time with the parents and formed a view about their parenting capabilities. He was clear that all options for parenting had been explored and there had not been any improvement in overall parenting, despite the good quality of contact. DJ Hussain relied on his views, as measured, and evidence-based given his contemporaneous observations. iii. At paragraph 398 of the judgment, the Judge emphasises that she considered the contact notes in detail and noted that the children do have an attachment to their parents and call them “Mumma” and “Dadda”, and she noted that the attachment to Y is likely to be stronger than their attachment to X, given his limited interaction with them at contact. DJ Hussain accepts there is an attachment and that they will be upset and hurt, by not seeing Y. iv. The theme of the judgment that emerges is that there is not an issue about how the parents might manage in contact or that contact can go well. The key concern for the professionals and for the Court was the ability to provide consistent parenting, and there was a consideration of all of the contact notes, from paragraph 404 onwards. v. In particular, at paragraph 411, the Judge identifies an example of poor judgment by the parents, which was that the Local Authority had been inviting the parents to agree to the twins accessing nursery. The foster carer felt they were ready. Dr OO thought they were ready. The Social Worker and the Guardian thought they were ready. But the parents refused because they wanted the twins to reach their gestational May birthday, and DJ Hussain thought that was an example of poor judgement on the part of the parents, failing to prioritise the children’s needs, and was an example of inconsistencies in their parenting. vi. Paragraphs 404 to 407 detail the concerns, even in contact, a lack of supervision and other concerns, and overall, the Court formed the view that despite the positives of contact, that there was not sufficient evidence that the parents could provide good enough consistent parenting over longer periods. Even if contact is going well now – which I accept it is –I am not persuaded that this is a sufficient change of circumstance to reopen the issue of a plan for adoption, in the context of all the other available evidence in this case.d. The fourth point was that the DBS checks are now available, which certificates show that both X and Y have clear DBS checks. i. In fact, this has not been an issue. It has always been accepted by the Court, that these are two educated, well-intentioned, loving parents, and there is no issue about them being involved in criminal, or other, activity. ii. So although it is, again, a positive – that we have clear DBS checks – these cannot be regarded as evidence that this is somehow evidence in support of the parents being able to care for children in another setting. These are DBS checks, which show that they do not have any criminal convictions, or any other concerns, that would stop them in employment, for example, involved in children. But it does not, in and of itself, go to the issues which gave rise to the orders made by the Court, on 2 May 2024. This point does not assist the parents in establishing a change of circumstance.e. The fifth point relied upon by the parents was the Care Act assessment , which was completed in July 2024 in relation to X. i. This showed that X was interviewed at home by a worker, and that during the course of that process, X confirmed he did not have any particular care needs at home, and that assessment concluded – happily – that he did not have care needs and, therefore, he was not eligible for care at home. ii. This simply confirms X’s self-reported view, that he is able to look after himself at home. But it takes the Court no further, in terms of changes made, or changes in circumstances since 2 May, and I note DJ Hussain’s judgment, at paragraph 316, that the issue for the Court was father’s own assessment of his ability to care for the children, that in his evidence he had said that he knows he cannot be left alone with the children, so that if there was an emergency, he would shout for neighbours. He accepted he cannot hold the twins, because of his elbows, and in his evidence, he accepted he could not be left alone with them. The Judge noted that concession, and indeed, it was accepted by the professionals. iii. So the fact that the Care Act assessment completed recently shows that he is able to care for himself at home is a positive step, in terms of X’s own daily life, but is not of direct relevance to his parenting, or the circumstances which gave rise to the judgment of DJ Hussain who concluded that the children could not safely be returned to the parents.f. The final point relied upon, in terms of change of circumstance, was that the contact workers work well with the parents, that the parents have been working well with them for many months now, and that they have been engaged with, for example, the online courses and the care assessment, and that goes against the assertion that these parents are not able to work with the London Borough of Hillingdon and the professionals there. i. It is clear, from the detailed judgment of DJ Hussain, that the parents’ ability to work with professionals has been a theme repeated throughout the LA involvement with this couple. ii. Over two years of litigation there have been many occasions when the parents have worked well with professionals up to a point. iii. At paragraph 375 of the judgment, the learned District Judge identifies that this is a case where the parents have decided to take on the system and use law to shift the agenda away from legitimate child protection concerns, and that this has posed exceptional challenges for social work, legal professionals, who have faced relentless unfair attacks on their integrity and judgement, purely to distract attention from matters related to welfare. iv. I note, throughout these proceedings, there are examples of the parents working well with professionals, at times. But there are also many examples of the parents being unable to continue to collaborate and work with professionals when challenged. For example the parents have taken issue with the following: Dr OO, at the hospital; Ms O’Callaghan; Ms Smith; the allocated social worker, Ms LL; HH (the Guardian); and judges, who have made decisions, which the parents disagreed with. I do not accept that there is new evidence that because the parents cooperate with contact supervisors, that this shows they will now work with professionals. It is clear even now that they do not accept the LA concerns, or the findings of the court.[37]So when I consider all of the available evidence and submissions and apply the law, I am not persuaded that either individually, or when taken together cumulatively, that the factors relied upon by the parents amount to sufficient evidence of a change in circumstance of a degree and nature, so as to warrant a reopening of the issue of whether or not adoption is the right plan for these children, particularly given that it is only three months after an eight-day hearing, which explored that issue, in detail. The parents are repeating the arguments they made at the final hearing to a large degree.[38]Therefore, I refuse the parents’ application for leave to apply to revoke the Placement Orders, on the basis that they have failed (on balance) to show a change of circumstances, that would enable that leave to be granted.[39]If I am wrong on that point, I go on then to consider whether the application has a real prospect of success, and whether it is in the interests of the children to grant leave. Given that this care case only concluded on 2 May, after eight days of evidence and two years of proceedings, and the Court carefully considered all of the available options in its judgment, dated 2 May, I am not persuaded that the parents do have real prospects of succeeding in revoking the Placement Order; nor do I consider it is in the interests of the children, given that they are now nearly two-and-a-half years old and have spent nearly all of their lives subject to litigation. Further delay, I consider would be harmful to them.[40]So I should go on then to consider ---[41]Y: Judge Downey, can I say something quickly?

JUDGE DOWNEY:

[42]I have not quite finished my judgment. Can I just finish my judgment, and then I will engage with you. All right?[43]Y: Yes, thank you.[44]X: It is not going to be accepted, regardless, anyway.

JUDGE DOWNEY:

[45]All right. Pause there, please. Let me just finish my judgment, sorry.[46]I add, as a final point, that the parents’ oral submissions and written documents all show that they consider threshold in this case has not been crossed. They consider that the Local Authority have wrongfully interfered in the twins’ lives, and in their lives, and that the Court’s decisions, both on 2 May 2024 and the appeal decision on 24 July 2024, were both incorrect and based on flimsy or non-existent evidence.[47]It is clear that the parents do not accept the Court’s findings as to threshold, or as to the assessment of their capabilities as parents. The parents are entitled to challenge the decisions of the Court, insofar as the process allows them to do so, and I have no doubt they will continue to challenge the decisions of the Court.[48]A further point, however, has been raised by the two McKenzie Friends at court today: DD on mother’s behalf, and Commando G, on father’s behalf:a. DD, on mother’s behalf, raised that he considered this to be a case of a black-market adoption. He considers that the Local Authority have acted as an agency engaged in selling children for profit.b. Commando G, on behalf of X, says, even more forcefully, that the Government and this Local Authority are stealing children in fast-tracked forced adoptions, and that they are doing so for profit, and that this Court is part of that fraudulent process.[49]For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that this is a wholly unfounded submission, made with no evidential basis, and I reject it.[50]COMMANDO G: You never allowed me to submit the evidence, and you never allowed it to be added to the evidence.

JUDGE DOWNEY: Sorry, please, pause, Mr G.

[52]I reject that as an argument, given the absence of evidence in support, and knowing as I do that the Court is not part of any process of selling children for profit. It seemed to me that particularly Commando G appeared to have an agenda of his own that relates to Covid vaccines and conspiracy theories…..[53]COMMANDO G: They are not vaccines. They are gene-edited bioweapons.

JUDGE DOWNEY:

[54]--- forced adoptions and that that agenda has no bearing on the applications before me today, and is not an agenda pursued by the applicant themselves directly.[55]COMMANDO G: Of course.

JUDGE DOWNEY:

[56]Regrettably, last week, at the appeal hearing and today, I had to ask Commando G to leave, because his interventions were unhelpful and disruptive to the proceedings and appeared to be unrelated to the applications before me.[57]So having dealt with the application in relation to the revocation of Placement Order, I turn then to deal with the application in relation to contact.[58]The parents have applied, under section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act, for further contact with their children. Contact had been three times weekly. But as part of the Care Plan, the Local Authority then reduced contact to once a week after the Care Order and Placement Order were made. But after the parents applied for a stay, I did stay any further reduction in the contact, pending the determination of the appeal and the determination of this application. So now, the children are enjoying contact with their parents once a week. But the parents understandably, and naturally, would like more time with the children and invite me to make an order that provides for them to have more contact sessions, and ideally in a different venue, including some outside time and to allow them to have some time at home with the children.[59]The legal framework in relation to whether or not to make such an order is simply the children’s welfare.[60]In this instance, the contact has now settled into a weekly regime, with the parents seeing the children once a week. The Care Plan remains a plan for adoption, and as I have refused the application for permission to apply to revoke the adoption, and as I dismissed the appeal application, it would not, in my judgement, be in the interests of the children for contact to be increased or moved to the parents’ home at this stage. To take such a step would be confusing and unsettling for the children.[61]It may be, however, that the contact venue could be changed. I understand that, at the moment, it takes place in a contact centre, and mother, in particular, says she sees other children playing outside, and she would like some outside time with her children.[62]So I invite the Local Authority to consider whether the contact venue could be changed, to allow the children to spend some time outside, particularly over the summer months.[63]I appreciate that, again, this is a difficult and distressing decision for the parents, and I know that they are likely to appeal this decision.[64]So I am going to order a transcript of this judgment at public expense, which is a rare decision to take. But I am satisfied that it is one that I should take, because I think it will help expedite any appeal process.[65]I am going to order that the Local Authority do not further reduce contact until such time as any application for permission to appeal this decision has been determined.[66]If an application to appeal this decision is not issued within 21 days, then the Local Authority will be able to revert to its Care Plan. But provided an application for permission to appeal this decision is made within 21 days, then the Local Authority should not make any change to the current contact regime of once a week and should consider whether or not there could be a change of venue, to include some outside time with the children.[67]So those are my decisions, and I will make a separate order in relation to Ms Evans’ attendance, which will say that Ms Evans was allowed to attend the hearing. But that until such time as any further order, she is not allowed to report anything that she heard during today’s hearing. - - - - - - - - - - - Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com

Cited in 1 later judgment