"impacts causing focal brain injuries in adults may yield diffuse injuries in children, due to the more compliant braincase"
‘[16] … We were only referred to one case in which the provision has been considered by this Court, in the early days of the Act – London Borough of Southwark v B[1993] 2 FLR 559 in which at page 573 Waite LJ set out the following approach: "The paramount consideration for any court dealing with [an application to withdraw care proceedings] is accordingly the question whether the withdrawal of the care proceedings will promote or conflict with the welfare of the child concerned. It is not to be assumed, when determining that question, that every child who is made the subject of care proceedings derives an automatic advantage from having them continued. There is no advantage to any child in being maintained as the subject of proceedings that have become redundant in purpose or ineffective in result. It is a matter of looking at each case to see whether there is some solid advantage to the child to be derived from continuing the proceedings." This approach is consistent with s.1(5) of the Act, which provides that: "where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Act with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all." ‘[19] …. In the first, the local authority will be unable to satisfy the threshold criteria for making a care or supervision order under s.31(2) of the Act. In such cases, the application must succeed. But for cases to fall into this first category, the inability to satisfy the criteria must, in the words of Cobb J in Re J, A, M and X (Children), be "obvious". [20] …. In the second category, there will be cases where on the evidence it is possible for the local authority to satisfy the threshold criteria. In those circumstances, an application to withdraw the proceedings must be determined by considering (1) whether withdrawal of the care proceedings will promote or conflict with the welfare of the child concerned, and (2) the overriding objective under the Family Procedure Rules. The relevant factors will include those identified by McFarlane J in A County Council v DP which, having regard to the paramountcy of the child's welfare and the overriding objective in the FPR, can be restated in these terms: (a) the necessity of the investigation and the relevance of the potential result to the future care plans for the child; (b) the obligation to deal with cases justly; (c) whether the hearing would be proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues; (d) the prospects of a fair trial of the issues and the impact of any fact-finding process on other parties; (e) the time the investigation would take and the likely cost to public funds.’
“(95) Where during the course of a hearing, it becomes clear to the parties and/or the judge that adverse findings of significance outside the known parameters of the case may be made against a party or a witness consideration should be given to the following: a) Ensuring that the case in support of such adverse findings is adequately 'put' to the relevant witness(es), if necessary by recalling them to give further evidence; b) Prior to the case being put in cross examination, providing disclosure of relevant court documents or other material to the witness and allowing sufficient time for the witness to reflect on the material; c) Investigating the need for, and if there is a need the provision of, adequate legal advice, support in court and/or representation for the witness” “(101) It is, unfortunately, sometimes the case that a judge in civil or family proceedings may be driven to criticise the professional practice or expertise of an expert witness in the case. Although what I have said with regard to a right to fair process under ECHR, Art 8 or the common law may in principle apply to such an expert witness, it will, I would suggest, be very rare that such a witness' fair trial rights will be in danger of breach to the extent that he or she would be entitled to some form of additional process, such as legal advice or representation during the hearing. That this is so is, I suspect, obvious. The expert witness should normally have had full disclosure of all relevant documents. Their evidence will only have been commissioned, in a family case, if it is 'necessary' for the court to 'resolve the proceedings justly' [Children and Families Act 2014, s 13(6) ], as a result their evidence and their involvement in the case are likely to be entirely within the four corners of the case. If criticism is to be made, it is likely that the critical matters will have been fully canvassed by one or more of the parties in cross examination. I have raised the question of expert witnesses at this point as part of the strong caveat that I am attempting to attach to this judgment as to the highly unusual circumstances of this case and absence of any need, as I see it, for the profession and the judges to do anything to alter the approach to witnesses in general, and expert witnesses in particular.”
“Although uncommon, bilateral and/or complex skull fractures have been documented as following falls from carer’s arms, particularly in infants below 6 months of age. Therefore, the explanation as given by his parents MAY have resulted in the identified fractures i.e., I cannot determine whether the Child’s skull fractures were accidental or inflicted – from my perspective as a paediatric radiologist, either is possible.”
“In conclusion, based on the current radiological literature on impact head trauma, in my opinion, radiological findings of bilateral parietal fractures and underlying brain injury is compatible with the mechanism described (i.e., fall of the child from a height of about 5.5ft while being carried by the father). These findings are compatible with a single high impact direct contact trauma to the right side of head.”