“33. The court was therefore called upon to evaluate a number of competing improbabilities. The first scenario involved C suffering injuries that were highly unlikely, individually and collectively, to have resulted from a banal domestic fall. The other two scenarios involved other kinds of improbability. In the second scenario, that of a child being shaken by an otherwise loving relative in the midst of a good-natured family gathering; in the last scenario, that of a sustained cover-up on the part of an entire family whose history contains none of the general risk factors that are associated with child mistreatment, while all of the protective factors are strongly present: cf. Re BR (Proof of Facts)[2015] EWFC 41 at para. 18. The court’s evaluation had to take account of the fact that unlikely events occur all the time, although the probability of them arising in any individual case is extremely low: ibid at para. 7. 34. I do not agree with the judge’s concept of speculation at paragraph 204. Of course he was right to say that the court’s task was to determine whether the local authority had proved its case on threshold on the balance of probability. However, that involved grappling with and drawing conclusions from all of the evidence, medical and lay. The medical appearances were clear and the explanation for them was highly likely; but it was not certain, as the judge acknowledged by his finding at paragraph 178i. Against that, the court had the accounts of six people who were with C at the time she was injured. It is wrong to describe the medical evidence as the canvas against which the other evidence was to be considered. Medical and non-medical evidence are both vital contributors in their own ways to these decisions and neither of them has precedence over the other.”
“39. Furthermore, the consequence of the judge’s finding was that she was left with a highly unusual medical picture. The child suffered a ruptured cortical bridging vein for which the likeliest cause was said to be impact. Yet it is striking that an impact sufficient to tear this major vein left no other sign of injury. I am not satisfied that the judge gave sufficient consideration to this conundrum before reaching her conclusion that the injury “must” have resulted from a traumatic event. 43. In this case, the medical evidence pointed to the injury having been sustained in a traumatic event. But before reaching a conclusion on that point – and even more importantly, before finding that the injury was inflicted abusively – it was incumbent on the judge to consider the totality of the evidence, including, as Mr Tillyard submitted, the wider canvas evidence relating to these parents and how likely it was that they would injure their child, how possible it would have been for either parent to have injured the child under the circumstances without the other knowing, and the overall credibility of the parents and their account of what had happened. Instead, she found that, on the basis of the expert evidence, the injury occurred because of a traumatic event and that it was abusive.”
“The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today's medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark.”
‘at the far end of complexity’ amongst a cohort of cases which are rarely straightforward. She agreed that it does not fall comfortably into the published literature or accepted constellation of symptoms which help to make a diagnosis, whether in an accidental or non-accidental scenario. Either way, she agreed with counsel that the case would be considered an ‘outlier’
‘Did you see what happened to Z?’