“128. The issue of the exercise of parental responsibility by local authority which had a care order in respect of a child was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re C (Children)[2016] EWCA 374 , where King LJ said the following at paragraphs 57-62 of the judgment: 57. It is common ground that the effect of the making of a care order or interim care order by virtue of section 33(3) CA 1989 grants a local authority parental responsibility. Section 33(3)(b) goes further, as it not only allows a local authority to share parental responsibility with a parent, but gives it the power to: “determine the extent to which a parent may meet his parental responsibility for the child.” 58. That power is however subject always to section 33(4) CA 1989 which states: “(4) The authority may not exercise the power in subsection (3)(b) unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.” 59. A local authority can, by virtue of the power conferred upon it by section 33(3) CA 1989, therefore limit the power of a parent to make major decisions regarding the child’s life. The local authority effectively holds a ‘trump’ card which it can choose to play, in the decision-making process in relation to a child in care subject to section 33(4) CA 1989. An example of the use to which this power is routinely (and appropriately) put is in deciding where a child in care is to live. 60. In private law cases, some issues are considered so fundamental to a child’s well-being that, even if a parent has child arrangements order stating that the child is to “live with” them (an old terms residence order), that parent cannot make certain decisions without the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility or the leave of the court, including, under section 13 CA 1989, changing a child surname. 61. Similarly, where there is a care order in place, the power conferred upon a local authority by section 33(3)(b) CA 1989 exclude certain circumstances where Parliament was of the view that the issue in question is too significant to be determined without either consent or a court order. These matters are set out in subsections (6) and (7) of section 33 CA 1989 and include at section 33(7)(a) CA 1989, causing the child to be known by a new surname. 62. Nowhere in the Act is there a similar restriction preventing the local authority from using its powers under section 33(7) CA 1989 to overrule a parent in relation to a forename, whether in relation to the naming of a newborn baby who has been taken into care shortly after his or her birth, or at all”. 129. A little later in the judgment, King LJ made the following observations at paragraphs 90 and 91: “90. Whilst I may not necessarily agree with the precise way that jurisdictional issues have been approached or expressed in these very difficult cases, what is clear is that there is a cohort of cases where the common theme is that a party (whether it be a local authority or, often, an NHS Trust) has sought to bring an issue before the court, believing it to be of too great a magnitude to be determined without the guidance of the court, and without all those with parental responsibility having an opportunity to express their view as a part of the decision-making process. 91. Most commonly, examples are found in the so-called “medical treatment” cases where, either an NHS Trust seeks a declaration from the court that they would not be acting unlawfully in pursuing or desisting from a form of treatment notwithstanding the parent’s refusal to consent, or alternatively, a local authority seeks to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court and thereby to submit to the court’s jurisdiction notwithstanding that care proceedings may have been open to them”. 130. She then noted that in requiring a local authority to invoke jurisdiction of the court in relation to a serious medical issue the court was not conferring power upon a local authority, rather that the High Court was using its inherent jurisdiction to limit, circumscribe or sanction the use of the power which the local authority already has by virtue of s.33(3)(b) of the 1989 Act 97. She concluded in paragraphs 98 and 104 as follows: “In the medical treatment cases the decisions to be made may well be a matter of life and death. In the present case, the limitation on the exercise of parental responsibility proposed by the local authority, whilst not life-threatening, is life affecting. Further such a decision potentially involves such a serious invasion of the Article 8 rights of the mother that I am satisfied that the court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction in order that it may either sanction the local authority’s proposed course of action is in the interests of the children or, alternatively, to refuse to sanction it as for example being in breach of Article 8. “I have reached the conclusion that there is a small category of cases where, notwithstanding the local authority’s powers under section 33(3)(b) CA 1989, the consequences of the exercise of a particular act of parental responsibility so profound and have such an impact on either the child his or herself, and/or the Article 8 rights of those other parties who share parental responsibility with the local authority, that the matter must come before the court for its consideration and determination.” 131. I was helpfully referred by Ms Meyer QC and Ms O’Malley to two later decisions of the Court of Appeal which approved and reinforce the observations of King LJ in Re C (above), namely: (i) Re E (A Child)[2018] EWCA Civ 550 ,[2019] 1 WLR 594 ; and (ii) Re H (A Child) (Parents Responsibility: Vaccination)[2020] EWCA Civ 664 . 132. I have taken account of all three cases and respectfully agree with the observations of the Court of Appeal on the proper and bits and use of powers granted to a local authority under a care order by virtue of the provisions of s.33(3) of the 1989 Act.”
“Before making any decision with respect to a child whom they are looking after, or proposing to look after, a local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, ascertain the wishes and feelings of (a) the child; (b) his parents (c) any person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; and (d) any other person whose wishes and feelings the authority consider to be relevant, regarding the matter to be decided.”