A and B No 3 (care : further welfare hearing), Re [2026] EWFC 248

Neutral citation number: Re A and B No 3 (care – further welfare hearing)[2026] EWFC 248
IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT READING
Date 24 August 2026
IN THE MATTER OF [A] (A GIRL) AND [B] (A GIRL)
Before
HHJ Vincent sitting as a section 9 Deputy High Court Judge
Between
SLOUGH BOROUGH COUNCILApplicant[MS X]RespondentRespondent motherRespondent[MR Y]RespondentSecond respondent father of [A]Respondent[MR Z]RespondentThird respondent father of [B]Respondent[A]Respondent[B]Respondent(through her Children’s Guardian SARAH-JAYNE LAWRENCE)Respondent[MR & MRS W]RespondentSixth and Seventh respondent grandparentsRespondentSLOUGH BOROUGH COUNCILApplicant[MS X]Respondent mother[MR Y]Second respondent father of [A][MR Z]Third respondent father of [B][A]Fourth respondent child[B](through her Children’s Guardian SARAH-JAYNE LAWRENCE)Fifth respondent child[MR & MRS W]Sixth and Seventh respondent grandparents
Corinne Iten i nstructed by Slough Borough Council, the Applicant local authorityOliver Powell instructed by Careys Law, solicitors for first respondent motherThe second respondent father did not participate in the fact-finding hearingCatherine Purdy, instructed by the Child Law Partnership, solicitors for third respondent father of [B]Matthew Brookes-Baker, instructed by Griffiths Robertson, solicitors for fourth respondent childFazeela Ishmael, instructed by Oxford Law Group solicitors for fifth respondent childThe maternal grandparents represented themselves at the hearingHearing Hearing dates: 13 August 2026
JudgmentThis judgment was handed down on 24 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and was subsequently released to the National Archives.............................This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]On 1 June 2026 I handed down judgment following a fact-finding hearing. I found that [A] had been sexually abused by her step-father, including repeated sexual assaults and rape.[2]I found that [Mr Z] had accessed and shared indecent images and videos of [A]. He used his access to her social media accounts to obtain and exercise control over highly personal and intimate images of her.[3]This conduct formed part of a wider pattern of sexual abuse, intimidation and control. His possession of intimate images, coupled with threats to kill [A] and her mother if she disclosed the abuse, worked together to intimidate her, silence her and maintain his power over her.[4]These actions amount to coercive and controlling behaviour designed to dominate [A], enable the continuation of the abuse, and prevent her from telling anyone about it.[5]On 8 June 2026 I handed down a welfare judgment in respect of [A]. She was days away from her seventeenth birthday, and wanted to return home to her mother. However, given her experiences, I considered that [A] should be afforded the opportunity to have a high level of stability and support. [A]’s mother loves her, is committed to caring for her, and they remain close. However, her own vulnerabilities, particularly around misuse of alcohol, and continuing issues relating to [Mr Z], led me to conclude that [A]’s welfare interest required that she remained in the care of the local authority.[6]I made a final care order for [A]. In the short time between the fact-finding hearing and the welfare hearing, the local authority had not been able to conclude its assessment and planning around contact. [A] made an application for a section 34(4) contact order, which was adjourned to this final hearing, which is principally concerned with welfare decisions for [B].[7]In my judgment I levelled some criticism at the local authority for failing to support [A] in maintaining relationships with her family, and asked the local authority to make a greater effort towards that end.[8]Since the hearing in June [A] has moved to a foster placement much closer to her maternal grandparents’ home. She sees her maternal grandparents, brother [C] and her younger sister [B] daily. She is seeing her mother once a week, supervised by the local authority.[9][B] continues to live with her grandparents and older brother. She is happy and thriving in their care. She has not seen her father [Mr Z] for two years, and at this time is clear that she does not want to see him. Careful thought will need to be given to how and when she is to be told about the abuse he has inflicted upon her older sister, and how she is supported to understand the impact that his actions have had on her family, and will no doubt have on her own identity.

Issues for determination

[10]Issues for determination At the adjourned final hearing on Thursday 13 August 2026, I heard submissions on behalf of all parties in respect of the following issues:(i) Final orders for [B];(ii) [Mr Z]’s applications for the proceedings to be extended and for an expert to be instructed to carry out an assessment of the risk of sexual harm that he may pose to [B] and how those risks might be mitigated;(iii) Whether [B] should have any direct or indirect contact with her father, [Mr Z], and if so, what form should that contact take, at what frequency, and with what safeguards in place;(iv) Whether [B]’s surname should be changed from [Z] to her mother’s surname [X];(v) Whether a section 91(14) order should be made restricting [Mr Z] from making applications to the Court without first obtaining the Court’s permission;(vi) Contact arrangements; between [B] and her mother, and [A] and other family members, including [A]’s application pursuant to section 34Children Act 1989 for overnight contact with the maternal grandparents;(vii) Publication and anonymisation of judgments.[11]I reserved judgment over the weekend and sent a draft to the parties on Wednesday 19 August 2026. I now deal with each of the issues in the order set out above.[12](i). Final orders for [B] All parties are agreed that [B] should remain in the care of her grandparents, with whom she has lived since she was a baby. They are devoted to her. The special guardianship assessment of them by Ms S is positive and concludes that they are able to meet [B]’s needs throughout her childhood and provide her with long-term stability and security. [B]’s mother has had significant struggles in her life, and continues to have much to contend with. She accepts that she is not able to provide [B] with the care that she needs, and that [B] is best placed to remain in the care of her grandparents.[13][B] has not seen [Mr Z] for two years. He too agrees that she should continue to live with her grandparents.[14][B]’s welfare requires that she remains living with her grandparents throughout her childhood. I am satisfied that Special Guardianship Orders are required to secure her welfare. There will be important decisions about [B]’s education, welfare and upbringing which her grandparents should be empowered to make as her guardians, without the risk of conflict or obstruction from her parents. The enhanced parental responsibility that comes with Special Guardianship Orders will achieve this. In addition, a Special Guardianship Order comes with a special guardianship support plan from the local authority, which is a good means of ensuring that [B] and her grandparents continue to receive support as and when required throughout her childhood.[15](ii). Application for risk assessment of [Mr Z] I gave an ex tempore judgment at the hearing on 13 August 2026, in which I dismissed [Mr Z]’s application for an expert assessment. My reasoning was as follows:(i) Neither the local authority nor the guardian supports direct contact between [B] and [Mr Z]. [A], her mother and maternal grandparents do not consider direct contact is in [B]’s welfare interest. It was accepted by [Mr Z] that it was not realistic for him to have direct contact with [B] at this time. [Mr Z] however says that he will always be [B]’s father, and suggested that within these proceedings the Court should be considering steps that could be taken towards re-establishing contact with her;(ii) [Mr Z] does not accept any of the findings that have been made against him, nor has he acknowledged the impact of these proceedings on [A] or [B] or their mother;(iii) It is unclear whether the further assessment sought is to be a psychological assessment or social work assessment. If the latter, it is not clear that the expert would be bringing skills outwith the expertise of the existing social work team. The assessment may tell us more about [Mr Z]’s thinking and motivations, but given his clear position that he does not accept any of the findings, it is unclear from the application what he says the assessment will achieve, or what gap in the evidence it is to fill. The Court must be satisfied that the assessment is necessary to resolve proceedings justly;(iv) What is proposed is an assessment of risk, which would be a precursor to any work that [Mr Z] may be advised to do to bring about change in his behaviour and insight. The assessment is said to take eight weeks but then would be followed up by a fresh round of final evidence from the parties and a further hearing. If he then wishes to embark on such work to bring about change in his approach, it will extend the proceedings far beyond that timescale. Further delay of these proceedings, now in their sixty-third week is contrary to [B]’s welfare interest;(v) In any event, the question of contact does not depend only on an assessment of the risks [Mr Z] poses, and what measures could be put in place to mitigate them. The Court must consider the wishes and feelings of the child concerned. [B] has not seen her father for two years and has consistently said that she does not wish to see him. The Court must also consider the impact of contact upon the other parent, or other relevant individuals. In this case as well as [B]’s mother, the wishes and feelings of [A] herself, and the maternal grandparents are crucial;(vi) The risks to [B] of contact come from a number of factors: (i) a direct risk that [Mr Z] will cause her harm either by his actions or by what he says to her, given the harm he has caused her sister, and the findings of his manipulative and controlling behaviour; (ii) a risk of emotional harm if she is required to have contact against her wishes; (iii) a risk of emotional harm stemming from the impact to her sister, her mother and other family members of knowing that [Mr Z]’s wishes for contact are being promoted before their own emotional and psychological welfare, and from their fears of the harm that may be caused to [B] from having contact with her father. [B] does not currently know that her father has been found by this Court to have sexually abused her sister. She will need to be supported through careful life story work to understand the reasons she is not being raised in the care of either parent. It is not likely that their wishes and feelings, or the assessment of those risks will reduce within the period of months that [Mr Z] hopes it might;(vii) In the circumstances, whatever progress [Mr Z] may make as a result of an assessment of the risk he poses, there would remain a number of other factors which prevent him from having contact with [B]. Whether professionally supervised or not, those risks of harm are currently too high and cannot be safely managed at this time;(viii) The proceedings started on 30 May 2025 and have been traumatic for all. In all the circumstances it is manifestly against [B]’s welfare to adjourn her proceedings further for the purpose of obtaining the expert assessment proposed. There is sufficient information to enable an assessment to be made now;(ix) It is neither necessary, nor proportionate, to extend proceedings for the purpose of an assessment which will feed in to just one element of the risk assessment. Given that [Mr Z] does not accept any of the findings and that [A], [B] and members of the family need time to process their experiences and recover from them, the assessment is unlikely to result in the Court making a different assessment about contact by the conclusion of these proceedings. (iii). Contact between [Mr Z] and [B][16]Following the court’s decision on the risk assessment, Ms Purdy sought orders for indirect contact on [Mr Z]’s behalf.[17]It was agreed that there could be indirect contact in the form of letters and cards for [B], sent twice a year. The maternal grandparents agreed to receive the letters and to keep them for [B]. It will be a matter for them to decide whether and when to share the letters with her, or to keep them for her so that she can read them at a time she is ready to do so.[18]I heard submissions about whether the maternal grandparents should be required to send regular updates to [Mr Z] about [B]’s progress at school, and whether they should provide him with photographs of her.[19]On behalf of [Mr Z], Ms Purdy submitted that there was no application to remove [Mr Z]’s parental responsibility before the Court, that he would always be [B]’s father, and that it may well be in her welfare interests to know that her father loves her and is interested in her life.[20]The decisions I am being asked to make about contact, name change, and limiting applications to the court, separately have the effect of limiting [Mr Z]’s parental responsibility. I am mindful that the collective impact of the orders sought could restrict [Mr Z]’s parental responsibility so much that it amounts to preventing him from exercising it at all.[21]I have regard to Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689, in which the Court of Appeal held that where parents are married or in a civil partnership, there is no power to revoke the parental responsibility of a father. However, the court ‘may control and limit a parent’s ability to exercise parental responsibility through the making of prohibited steps orders, and may enhance the ability of the other parent to exercise parental responsibility with respect to specific issues.’[22]In the leading judgment, the then President of the Family Division referred to a number of cases where this course had been taken, including H v A (No 1)[2015] EWFC 58, in which Mr Justice Macdonald said:55. Finally, it is important to note that, however extreme or exceptional the facts of a particular case, a prohibited steps order is a statutory restriction on the exercise by a parent of their parental responsibility. Any such order made by the court must accordingly be based on objective evidence. There is a high responsibility on the court not to impose such a restriction without good cause and reasons for imposing a restriction must be given (see Re C (Due Process) [2014] 1 FLR 1239). Specific consideration must be given to the duration of the prohibition (see R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin) at [38]).56. Within this context, and in circumstances where a prohibited steps order constitutes an interference with the Art 8 rights of both the parent against whom the order is made and the child who is the subject of the order, the making of, the terms of, and the duration of a prohibited steps order must be proportionate to the mischief that the order is designed to address.[23]Having considered the submissions I read and heard, and for the reasons given above, I concluded that there should be no direct contact.[24]There was some debate at the hearing about whether there should be a formal ‘no contact’ order. The purpose of the order is to record accurately the arrangements for the child and to enable those who are responsible for her welfare to understand those arrangements, and for them to be enforceable.[25]The order should state that [B] is to live with her maternal grandparents as her special guardians. The order could simply make it clear that there is no obligation upon the special guardians to make [B] available to have contact with her father. However, in my judgment the order should go further and specify ‘no contact’. The order should state that such contact is prohibited and should not take place without consent of the special guardians, or permission of the Court. That accurately reflects the decision of the Court following analysis of the risk in light of the findings made.[26]The order shall provide that [B]’s contact with her mother is to be supervised for now. The local authority will arrange and supervise contact for now, thereafter it will be supervised by the special guardians. The question of whether the mother may have unsupervised contact will be subject to review, and will ultimately be at the discretion of the special guardians.[27]This reflects the mother’s continuing vulnerability to [Mr Z], and the risks that arise as a result. It may be that in the future the special guardians consider that she is able to spend more time unsupervised, but it must be clear that she should not be a means of [Mr Z] having contact with [B]. I know that this is firmly not the mother’s position today, but given her relatively recent contact with him in the months leading up to the fact-finding hearing, it remains a risk.[28]I agree that it is appropriate to afford [Mr Z] the opportunity to write to [B] twice a year. I agree that the maternal grandparents should not be compelled to share letters with her upon arrival, but it is for them, as [B]’s special guardians, to make their own decisions about that.[29][Mr Z] does remain a parent with parental responsibility and on the face of it should be able to receive information about [B]’s education and progress, or of significant events in her life.[30]Given the abuse that they know he has perpetrated against their older granddaughter, and his continued denials of that, the special guardians should not be compelled to send him regular updates. The special guardians should be required to inform [Mr Z] where [B] is at school, and to let him know of major events in her life, for example if she required significant medical intervention, or if they are proposing to move abroad.[31]Responsibility for providing updates about [B]’s education and progress should fall on the school, and [Mr Z] is entitled to make contact with any school to receive such information.[32]Given the findings that I have made regarding [Mr Z]’s use of social media and digital information, and how he manipulated and controlled [A], it may well be assessed that information shared about [B] should not include photos, or comes in the form of a summary from a teacher rather than full reports.[33]I am reluctant to issue an order now which says no photos, as I would not want [B] to be in the position of being singled out from other classmates and excluded from being photographed with them at assemblies or on school trips. She is entitled to have the experiences in her life recorded, celebrated, and shared as other children do.[34]It is my view that a cautious approach should be adopted. I consider the question of what is shared with [Mr Z] will be a matter for the school to determine, having been given sufficient information to enable them to carry out a risk assessment of what is appropriate, in consultation with [B]’s special guardians. The school will no doubt take into account the nature of the request from [Mr Z], [B]’s wishes and feelings, her emotional well-being, and the views of the special guardians.[35]I appreciate that this leaves a risk that [Mr Z] may not receive the information at all. However, there is also a risk that [B] may be distressed and suffer emotional harm if she knows that information about her is being regularly sent to her father. For this reason, I do not consider it is appropriate for me to decide now what must happen throughout her childhood; a more nuanced approach is required, each request considered in light of [B]’s situation at the time.[36]To this end I propose to direct that final orders are shared with the headteacher and designated safeguarding lead, and that, as part of the child in need plan which is proposed to remain in place at least for the next few months, the local authority, school and special guardians consider the nature and extent of information to be provided to [Mr Z], and with what regularity.[37](iv). Whether [B]’s surname should be changed from her father’s to her mother’s surname; The children’s guardian, the mother, the maternal grandparents and [A] seek a change of surname for [B]. The Court has power to change a child’s surname when making a Special Guardianship Order pursuant to section 14B(2) of the Children Act 1989.[38]They argue that [B]’s sense of identity and belonging is within the maternal family. She has repeatedly said that she does not wish to use the surname [Z], and reacts strongly to seeing it written down in school-related contexts, leading her to erase or deface it.[39][Mr Z] opposed the application. He said that changing [B]’s surname would further sever her connection with him and her paternal identity and heritage. He said that he remains her father, notwithstanding the findings that have been made, and that this aspect of his and her identity should not be taken away from [B].[40][B]’s welfare is my paramount concern.[41]I acknowledge the importance of preserving [B]’s understanding that she has a father who loves her, that she was born to married parents and given her father’s name, and that her name connects her to her heritage from her father’s side of the family.[42]However, on balance, I have concluded that in the particular circumstances of this case, the application for a change of surname should be granted. My reasons are as follows.[43][B] has expressed a clear wish not to use the surname [Z].[44]The use of the surname is associated for her with significant distress. In her persuasive submissions, Ms Ishmael describes the risk of emotional harm to [B] from continuing to have the name [Z]: [B]'s distress about her surname is quite striking, and it may become an increasingly destabilising factor. [B] has already requested to not be referred to as [Z] at school, and becomes distressed when this cannot be avoided as it is currently her legal surname as evidenced by her defacing of her award certificate. Under a Special Guardianship Order, the maternal grandparents will be expressly forbidden from allowing [B] to be known by another surname without both parents’ consent or an order of the court. The Father has expressed he will not consent. Therefore, if no order is made by the court, [B] will be forced to continue to be known by a surname she is already rejecting and exhibiting distress about, without yet having a full understanding of the harm her Father has caused her sibling [A], who is an incredibly important person to [B]. The impact of this will only deepen over time, rather than reduce.[45]If this application is not dealt with now, and the maternal grandparents wish the Court to revisit it in the future, they would need to obtain the consent of both parents with parental responsibility, or apply to the Court. They are likely to be unwilling to return to Court, particularly where they are unlikely to be represented. There is a substantial risk that further court proceedings will be extremely difficult for mother and maternal grandparents, as well as for [B] and [A].[46][B]’s sense of security and belonging to the maternal family carries significant weight.[47]The maternal family remains connected to the paternal family through a wider family network. [B] will grow up with an understanding of her paternal family network. She does not need to carry a particular name to understand that.[48]The local authority has already started sensitive life story work with [B] which can reinforce her understanding of her name and her identity.[49]I have concluded that [B]’s surname should be changed to her mother’s name, [X]. This respects [B]'s wishes and safeguards her from further emotional harm arising from this enforced connection to her father, without restricting any future potential for [B] to build a relationship with her father if this is in line with her wishes and assessed as able to be safely managed.[50](v). Section 91(14) Given the findings of abuse and the making of private law orders, I am required to consider whether or not to make a section 91(14) order. Section 91A Children Act 1989 provides that where the court is satisfied the making of an application would put the child concerned or another individual at risk of harm, the court may make a section 91(14) order, which would require [Mr Z] to obtain the court’s permission before issuing any application for an order under the Children Act 1989.[51]The mother, supported by [A] and the maternal grandparents, sought a section 91(14) order. The local authority took a neutral stance on the question, and questioned whether it was necessary. Similarly, while the guardian accepted there was a need for the family to have a period of respite from litigation, she stopped short of submitting that a section 91(14) order was necessary.[52][Mr Z] opposed the making of a section 91(14) order. He said he had not made repeated applications to the court, and that it was unfair to restrict his ability to bring an application to the Court in future where these proceedings were concluding with no orders for direct contact, and no positive obligation on the special guardians to give him updates.[53]In the case of F v M[2023] EWFC 5 there were findings that the applicant father had coercively controlled the mother throughout the relationship by preventing her access to ante-natal care, isolating her from her family, friends and peers, controlling her money and food and deliberately curtailing her freedom, also amounting to emotional abuse. The Court found that the father had raped the mother. The Court found that the father had caused emotional harm to the child of the relationship and that it would not be possible to safeguard the child from his emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviours until he had undertaken work to change his behaviour.[54]The order made was for indirect contact once a year. A section 91(14) order was made. In his judgment, Hayden J at paragraph 18 he said: ‘Section 91A was inserted into the Children Act on the 19th May 2022 pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021ss. 67(3), 90(6), SI 2022/553, Regs 1(2), 2(1)(b). In Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact) (Section 91(14)Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749, King LJ referred to a prevailing and "changed landscape", not least in consequence of social media and wide access to smart phones. She considered that this opened considerably wider scope for the greater use of Section 91(14) which, to my mind, had always been intended to provide a protective filter from inappropriate applications. The filter exists to protect the child and, not infrequently, the parent with whom the child lives. It is not a punitive measure towards a recalcitrant parent. Neither is it a bar on access to justice. Where a Court identifies an issue that requires to be resolved, the case will proceed but where it does not, the child and the primary carer are protected from the stress and uncertainty of a misconceived or vexatious application. Anticipating the introduction of the amended Section 91A reforms, which had received Royal Assent, but not yet come into force at the time of her judgment, King LJ said: "[45] …It is worth however noting that the proposed new section 91A dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s91(14) orders. In particular the provision at section 91A(2), if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of Re P (see para 39 above) by permitting a s91(14) order to be made where the making of an application under the Children Act 1989 would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm."[55]At paragraph 20 of his judgment, Hayden J said as follows:
‘The provisions within Section 91A are transformative. The section provides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm. This amended provision strikes me as properly recognising the very significant toll protracted litigation can take on children and individuals who may already have become vulnerable, for a variety of reasons. It also dovetails with our enhanced understanding of the nature of controlling and coercive behaviour. When all other avenues are lost, too often the Court process becomes the only weapon available. Lawyers and Judges must be assiduous to identify when this occurs, in order to ensure that the Court is not manipulated into becoming a source of harm but a guarantee of protection.’
[56]These proceedings have taken some time and followed on from criminal proceedings which were traumatic for [A] and for her mother.[57]All members of the family need time to process and recover from their experiences of the court proceedings and of the abuse suffered at the hands of [Mr Z] by [A], which has profoundly affected the whole family.[58][A] had to relive her experiences when giving her own evidence, be subjected to cross-examination, and listen to [Mr Z]’s denials and attempts to shame and humiliate her in the evidence he gave. [A] and her mother cannot conceive that [Mr Z] should have contact with [B] at this time, because they are fearful of the emotional and psychological harm it would cause her. [Mr Z] has not accepted any responsibility for his actions, nor acknowledged the impact of his actions upon [A], her mother, and on [B].[59]If [Mr Z] were permitted to issue further applications in respect of [B], before he has demonstrated that he has understood both the nature of his actions towards [A] and to the mother, understood what that means for [B], taken responsibility, and shown that he has changed, then the mother and children would be subjected to the risk of further harm from [Mr Z]’s behaviour towards them. Further litigation will be experienced as a continuation of his abuse.[60]The maternal grandparents would be the respondents to any application. They too have had a very difficult time as a consequence of [Mr Z]’s abuse of their granddaughter and his relationship with their daughter. Their priority now must be their three grandchildren, primarily [B]’s care as she is still a minor and they will be her special guardians. It is not reasonable to ask them to defend an application for child arrangements orders while they focus on that task.[61]I accept Mr Powell’s submission on behalf of the mother that there are solid grounds to consider that without a section 91(14) in place there is a substantial risk that [Mr Z] would apply to the Court for a child arrangements[62]Having regard to all the circumstances, I have determined that it is appropriate to impose a filter on any future applications by means of an order pursuant to section 91(14).[63]The Court must consider the length of time of any section 91(14) order. Any interference with a parent’s unfettered right of access to the Court must be proportionate to the harm the Court is seeking to avoid.[64][B] is only six years old. She has not seen her father for two years. The longer he is restricted in his ability to apply to the Court, the greater the risk to their relationship.[65]However, the imposition of a section 91(14) acts as a filter, not a bar. [Mr Z] would not be prevented from making applications to the Court for a variation to the existing child arrangements orders at any time. But the onus would be upon him to establish, with evidence, that there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made.[66]The impact of abuse is not time-limited, and can be lifelong. By imposing an arbitrary period of time of a number of years, the Court would be inviting the mother, children and grandparents to take that time to recover themselves sufficiently so that they may then be in a position to face any future applications that come their way, irrespective of whether or not [Mr Z] has changed his attitude towards them or his behaviours.[67]It has been suggested to me that the restriction should be in place only for a couple of years or until [B] goes to secondary school in five years’ time. But I do not see why the passage of time should remove the essential need for [Mr Z] to demonstrate that he has brought about change in his life before he can bring an application to the Court.[68]The nature of the abuse in this case is extreme, and includes manipulative and controlling behaviour. In my judgement he should not be permitted at any time in [B]’s childhood to bring an application to the Court for contact, unless he has demonstrated that he has taken responsibility for his actions, has understood the impact of them upon [A], [B] and her mother, and has demonstrated an ability to change. The onus is on him to change, not upon them to recover within his timescale.[69]In all the circumstances, I consider that it is reasonable to impose a section 91(14) order until [B] has reached the age of sixteen.[70](vi). Contact arrangements between [B] and her mother, and [A] and other family members. By the time of the final hearing there remained some frustration with the local authority’s planning around contact. However, the parties had some constructive and fruitful discussions before the hearing started.[71]There was broad agreement that [B] should continue to see her mother regularly and that this could move from the contact centre into the community, with a period of monitoring, and further discussions if needed, before responsibility for deciding when contact should happen and for supervising it passed fully to the grandparents under the Special Guardianship Orders.[72][A] is currently seeing her grandparents, her brother [C], and [B], most days. I am pleased that the local authority has now arranged for [A] to be spending time with her family. I recognise the strength of the relationship between [A] and her grandparents, and what a source of love and stability they are for her.[73][A] is keen for this contact to progress so that she can stay overnight with her grandparents, and has applied for a contact order pursuant to section 34 of the Children Act 1989. She seeks an order for staying contact twice a week.[74]For the reasons given in my earlier judgment, I decided that [A] does need to live with her foster carers, to receive consistent, trauma informed care, and structured support. Those carers are providing more to her than a place to be a lodger, and they should be afforded the opportunity to provide to her the care and attention that she needs and deserves, and which will ensure she can derive the most from the placement.[75]While there are a lot of positives in the assessments of the grandparents, the evidence from professionals is that the grandparents do not always fully appreciate some of the more complex emotional and psychological issues in this case. An understandable wish for the family to move forward, has perhaps led them to express matters in terms which can seem overly simplistic. For example, they seem to regard the mother’s alcohol misuse as an issue that will be combatted simply by her abstaining from alcohol, without acknowledging the complex factors and vulnerabilities underlying her addiction. Similarly, there is a tendency to require [A] to behave according to their expectations, but she is likely to need a lot of support and a trauma-informed approach to manage safe relationships and regulate her behaviours.[76]Ultimately the decision about whether [A] should stay overnight with her grandparents is one for the local authority; [A] is in their care. I appreciate that in my earlier judgment I indicated that I could see no reason against staying contact. However, having read and reflected on all the final evidence and heard submissions, I do not consider that an order for regular overnight contact should be made. It may well be that things can progress to her staying over on some weekends or for family celebrations, and then progress further next year, as she starts to plan for her future after she turns eighteen. For now, I support the local authority’s plan to keep overnight contact under review and to more formally review arrangements in December.[77]Following positive discussions before Court it was agreed that [A] should continue to see her mother regularly, sometimes with [B] too, and that this contact should be progressing to unsupervised contact in the community.[78]Significant progress has been made since the last hearing, and contact is likely to evolve further as [A] approaches her eighteenth birthday. At the same time the mother remains vulnerable in a number of ways which will require contact arrangements to be carefully monitored and regularly reviewed. In these circumstances, it is not in [A]’s welfare interest for the Court to make a defined contact order for her pursuant to section 34(4)Children Act 1989.[79](vii). Publication and anonymisation of judgment All parties are either actively in favour of, or not opposed, to all three judgments being published. All agree that the judgments should be anonymised to protect the identity of [A], [B] and family members being discovered.[80]The only outstanding issue is that [A], supported by her mother, her grandparents and by the guardian, wishes the local authority to be identified by name. [A] feels strongly that it is important that the public can understand what has happened in their area, and the role that their local authority has played. She feels that in some way this might ensure other people do not have the same experience that she has had.[81]On behalf of the local authority, it is submitted that there is a real risk of the family being identified if the local authority were named in the published judgments.[82]I have had regard to the Practice Guidance issued on 19 June 2024 by the then President of the Family Division on transparency in the family courts and publication of judgments at paragraph 4.1 and 4.2, ‘What should be anonymised or redacted?’ There is little point in publishing a judgment if it is so heavily redacted that it is unintelligible or its integrity is lost or distorted. … Some thought may need to be given to what is meant by identification or anonymisation. Is the court dealing with a generalised risk of identification, a risk of identification by peers or in the child’s local community, or a risk of the child identifying him/herself as the subject of a published judgment? The court will need to consider the nature, likelihood and severity of any such risk and any potential mitigations in making a decision. … Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient.[83]The guidance suggests that the name of the local authority should generally be included:
‘The identity of the arm of the state bringing an application is a matter of public interest. If the inclusion of the identity of the local authority is likely to be identifying (for example in a very small or rural local authority) consider removing – but consider whether the removal of other less important potentially identifying information about the characteristics / history of the family could mitigate / reduce the risks.’
[84]I have gone through the judgment and carried out a provisional anonymisation exercise. The case was heard in Reading so it is already known that the case came from Berkshire. This local authority covers a small area, but has a large and diverse population. The events which are described are intimate and shocking, but once anonymised, there are no particular characteristics of this family which stand out from other families within this region. Neither [A] nor the members of her family are urging me to redact the name of the local authority for their own protection; in the circumstances, they have the better knowledge of the likely impact upon them were their identities and connection to this case be discovered within their community.[85]On balance, I am not persuaded that there are good reasons to depart from the general rule of naming the local authority within the judgment.[86]Having reviewed the guidelines, I am cautious about publishing the details of the sexual abuse that has been inflicted upon [A]. However, my understanding is that [A] considers it important that the specific details of what happened to her is set out in black and white and reported. So having considered carefully, I have ultimately come to the conclusion that respect should be accorded to her views, and for the judgment to remain as it was drafted, with none of the details of her experience being redacted or paraphrased.[87]However, in line with the guidance, I will circulate draft copies of the judgments to the parties, and if [A] or any other party considers further redaction is required, I will of course consider that.[88]This concludes my judgment in respect of all outstanding issues.[89]I wish [A], [B] and their families the best for the future. HHJ Joanna Vincent Family Court, Reading Draft judgment sent: 19 August 2026 Judgment handed down: 24 August 2026

order

- He does not accept the findings of this Court; - He does consider he has a right to a relationship with his daughter and may conclude it is worth submitting a fresh application to a different court or different judge; - His immigration status is uncertain. The last information we had was that his leave to remain expired at the end of 2025. He may be motivated to apply for a child arrangements order in order to support any applications for his leave to remain to be extended.