TH v AR & Anor (No. 1: Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) [2026] EWFC 220

[2026] EWFC 220Case No 1747-9192-2056-7223
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Venue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 3 rd August 2026
Before
MR. NICHOLAS ALLEN KC(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
THApplicant(No. 1: Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction)
Mr. Brent Molyneux KC and Mr. Nicholas Chapman(instructed by Hall Brown LLP) for Applicant for The First Respondent did not appear and was not represented for The Second Respondent did not appear and was not representedHearing Hearing dates: 27 th July 2026 – 31 st July 2026
Judgment
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
[1]1). I am concerned with the final hearing of financial remedy proceedings brought by TH against AR. KK is AR’s father.[2]2). In this judgment I shall refer to the parties as ‘H’, ‘W’ and ‘W’s father’ respectively. This is just a convenient shorthand and no disrespect is intended.[3]3). I heard the final hearing over five days from 27th July 2026 – 31st July 2026. H was represented by Mr. Brent Molyneux KC leading Mr. Nicholas Chapman, instructed by Hall Brown LLP. Neither W nor W’s father attended the final hearing.[4]4). This judgment concerns H’s application for an interim anti-suit injunction. I have reserved my substantive judgment in respect of the financial remedy proceedings which will follow in due course.[6]5). I shall set out full details of W’s non-attendance at the final hearing in my substantive judgment. For present purposes I need only record that:[7]a) W’s divorce order application was issued on 28th March 2025. At that stage she instructed Branch Austin McCormick LLP. She subsequently instructed Sears Tooth and Irwin Mitchell;[8]b) she retained solicitors upto and including a combined First Appointment and return date of a freezing order which I heard on 22nd October 2025 and at that hearing was represented by Tim Amos KC;[9]c) W filed a Notice of Acting in Person on 1st December 2025;[10]d) there has been minimal engagement from W with the proceedings since that date. She has sent the occasional email to H’s solicitors and the court about why she would not engage in a pFDR Appointment or criticising the selection of SJE valuers of the parties’ assets. She has criticised the valuations themselves when received. But these communications have been few and far between;[11]e) W did not attend a hearing on 30th January 2026 (when I finalised the First Appointment order and listed the case for pre-trial review and final hearing), nor the pre-trial review on 1st May 2026;[12]f) by email dated 14th June 2026 and by way of a D11 application dated 26th June 2026 – filed after I directed on 17th June 2026 that she so apply - W sought permission to attend the final hearing remotely via video or telephone link from the Moscow Region (village of D) or the Vologda Region (village of F), depending on her location at the time. Regrettably the formal application was never referred to me and I saw it for the first time on 27th July 2026 (my reading day);[13]g) on 25th July 2026 (i.e. the Saturday before the start of the final hearing) W emailed the court setting out her reasons for non-participation which included her ill-health and allegations of domestic abuse by H. That email was forwarded to me on 27th July 2026. W and/or the parties two adult children sent further communications to the court and/or to me on 27th July 2026, 28th July 2026, 29th July 2026, 30th July 2026 and 31st July 2026 setting out additional reasons for W’s non-participation in the final hearing;[14]h) on 28th July 2026 I made an order granting permission to W to attend the final hearing remotely by video-link or telephone from Russia (taking account of Potanina v Potanin (No. 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) per MacDonald J which considered the position in family proceedings in the Family Division of the High Court and the family court in respect of parties or witnesses who volunteer to given direct evidence by way of video-link from abroad), set out possible participation directions in accordance with FPR 2010 Part 3A and PDs 3AA and 3AB, and adjourned the final hearing to commence on 29th July 2026. This order was served on W unsealed by H’s solicitors and as sealed by the court office;[15]i) W sent further emails to the court and H’s solicitors thereafter (as set out above) which continued to state she was unable to participate in the final hearing and continued to refer to her ill-health; and[16]j) on 29th July 2026 I deemed W’s emails of 25th July 2026 and 27th July 2026 (and those received from the parties’ adult children) to be an application to adjourn the final hearing and gave an extempore judgment in which I refused the same. None of the subsequent emails received caused me to reconsider my decision.[17]6). W’s father, who was joined as Second Respondent by order of Peel J dated 9th October 2025, has never taken any part in the proceedings.[19]7). Again, I shall set out full details of the background in my substantive judgment. However, in brief H is aged 84. He is a dual British and Russian citizen. He presently lives at the parties’ family home in Odintsovo, near Moscow. W is aged 52. She is also a dual British and Russian citizen. W has lived in England since August 2014. Her present address is not entirely clear but it is understood that she may presently be living in Russia at her parents’ address having travelled there in order (she says) to provide post-operative care to her mother (who she has said suffers from Alzheimer’s disease).[20]8). The parties married in Moscow, Russia on 4th August 2000 and separated in December 2024/January 2025. It was therefore a marriage of 24 years to separation.[21]9). There are two adult children of the marriage – X (aged 25) and Y (aged 23). Both parties also have children from previous relationships.[22]10). W filed an application for a divorce order dated 21st March 2025. The Conditional Order was made on 7th October 2025 and the Final Order on 20th November 2025.[23]11). H’s Form A was issued on 12th June 2025 (dated 23rd May 2025). A freezing order against W and her father was made by Peel J on 9th October 2025 which I continued on 22nd October 2025. I gave further directions on 30th January 2026, I made an order on paper on 7th April 2026, the pre-trial review was held on 1st May 2026, and the final hearing was heard between 27th – 31st July 2026.[24]12). The ES2 (which has been prepared solely on H’s side without any input from W) shows resources totalling £47.5 million net. It is populated with the product of the SJE expert evidence. H does not believe that it represents the totality of the resources available to W and this will be a matter for determination in my substantive judgment.[26]13). On 29th July 2026 H’s solicitors filed an application for an anti-suit injunction. H sought to restrain W from commencing, pursuing, procuring or voluntarily participating in any proceedings in Russia (or elsewhere outside England and Wales) by which she asserts, or seeks to establish or enforce, any legal or beneficial interest in the parties’ property in Russia or any other financial or proprietary claim arising out of the marriage (including in relation to valuable artwork held in their Russian and London properties), save for the purpose of enforcing such orders as this court may make.[27]14). H seeks an interim injunction at this stage and, if I order (as he seeks) that the parties’ Russian property is retained by him, that the injunction be made final.[28]15). I abridged time for service on W and listed the application for hearing on 31st July 2026. My order to this effect was served on W by email to the address at which she communicated to the court and in relation to which there is an order that such is good service. Although W continued to send emails to the court she did not engage substantively with the application.[29]16). After hearing the application I said I would make the order in the terms sought with my reasons to follow in writing. I did so because(i) I anticipate there is the possibility that this judgment may need to be translated into Russian and be considered by the Russian courts in due course; and(ii) I am told that H will apply to commit W to prison for breach of earlier orders in this case (but this application was not before me as issues in relation to (personal) service needed to be resolved). As a consequence a fuller and more reasoned judgment than that which would have been possible had it been delivered extempore was to be preferred.[30]17). The application is said to be made because under the matrimonial property regime available to W in Russia, it is submitted she may seek to assert a claim to a 50% interest in the property at Odintsovo (which has been valued by the SJE at 391,879,000 Roubles (c. £4,036,353) – an asset which is legally and beneficially owned by H, which is fully disclosed within the financial remedy proceedings, and which therefore stands to be taken into account and distributed (in specie or by value) in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction under MCA 1973.[31]18). H’s concern is said to arise as a consequence of W’s actions (and those of her father) during the currency of this litigation. During the course of the parties’ marriage the ownership of several properties were transferred from their names to those of W’s father. H states that the parties retained the beneficial ownership thereof. W disputes this stating that the assets belong to her father. This is one of the factual issues that I shall have to determine in my substantive judgment. The assets transferred include Flat 12 BL and Flat 15 BL both of which were purchased in H’s sole name on 27th June 2001 and transferred to W’s father on 20th July 2012 pursuant to agreements dated 8th July 2012. Both properties also have associated car parking spaces purchased subsequently by H and also transferred to W’s father on the same date. On 20th June 2025 (i.e. six months after the parties’ separation) W’s father sold Flat 12 BL for 530 million Roubles (c. £4.9 million at the then fx rate) and on 1st October 2025 he sold Flat 15 BL for 570 million Roubles (c. £5.14 million at the then fx rate). He sold the parking spaces at the same time (for 20,600,000 Roubles and 30 million Roubles respectively (c. £189,000 and c. £270,000 respectively at the then fx rates).[32]19). It is said on H’s behalf that the sale of Flat 15 BL on 1st October 2025 was particularly egregious as on 5th August 2025 he had filed an application for a freezing order – prompted by the sale of Flat 12 BL on 20th June 2025 - which had been served on both W and her father on the same date and which was to be sought in relation to the very same property (amongst others). This application had been refused by Deputy District Judge Handa (sitting in the Family Court at East London) on 8th August 2025 on the basis that the court was not satisfied that such an order was required at a hearing on short informal notice to W and W’s father (and when a further hearing was listed on 9th October 2025 when the freezing order was made by Peel J and which I then continued on 22nd October 2025).[33]20). One of the most valuable assets in this case is the A shopping centre in Moscow which is owned by a Russian company, B, which in turn is (or at least was) owned by CD which was incorporated in Cyprus on 17th June 2008. CD has been valued by an SJE at 2,292,459,000 Roubles (c. £23.6 million) gross before tax. On 9th July 2024 W transferred her shareholding in CD to her father. Again H states the parties retained the beneficial ownership thereof, again W disputes this and states it is owned by her father, and again this is one of the factual issues that I shall have to determine in my substantive judgment.[34]21). On 15th June 2026 the Russian assets of CD, i.e. company B, were redomiciled in Russia. H discovered this much later. The effect of this is to denude the shares in CD – which H has sought within the financial remedy proceedings be transferred back to W pursuant to MCA 1973 s37 (and the statutory presumption at s37(5) applies thereto) and thereafter transferred to him - of their entire value as it has been shorn of the company it owned.[35]22). On H’s behalf it is said that this act was an egregious breach of the extant freezing order by W and/or her father and of the mirror order that had been made final in Cyprus on 8th May 2026.[36]23). In W’s email to the court dated 27th July 2026 at 10.51 am she stated inter alia as follows:[37]I learned of the Second Respondent's actions in relation to the company only from the Applicant's most recent statement. I had no information about this prior to that moment. I asked him why he had done this and whether it was true. He confirmed that it was true, and said that he "acted within the framework of Russian law, and did so because, owing to the sanctions imposed, working with Cyprus had become impossible — even simple company payments could not be made. He said that he did not breach the freezing order and did not deal with the asset as described in the order — he did not sell it, charge it, or otherwise dispose of it. He said that he changed the legal registration of the company, carried out a redomiciliation of the registered legal address, and that this is not addressed in the court injunction." Therefore, the Applicant's allegation of so-called fraud is unfounded. The Second Respondent told me that he acts in accordance with the laws of Russia, that he answers with his freedom for any breach of Russian law, and that no one in the world can force him to break the law — not even his own daughter.[38]I cannot answer for the actions and conduct of another person, whoever he may be to me. Neither my children nor my parents are subject to my control. The Applicant's assertion that I control something is false and has no basis other than his own assumptions.[39]24). In light of the above H states that without an anti-suit injunction W may seek to assert a claim to a 50% interest in the Odintsovo property irrespective of any order the English court may make in relation thereto.[41]25). The High Court’s power to grant an anti-suit injunction, whether interlocutory or final, derives from the Senior Courts Act 1981. By virtue of s37(1) an order may be granted “in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so” and by s37(2) any such order “may be made unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.”[42]26). An anti-suit injunction operates in personam. The order “is directed not against the foreign court but against the parties so proceeding or threatening to proceed” (Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v Lee Kui Jakand Another [1987] AC 871 per Lord Goff of Chieveley at p892). The order therefore does not purport to direct, restrain or disrespect the foreign court.[43]27). The situs of the property in a foreign country is no obstacle to the making of such an order per se. As the injunction acts in personam against a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, the court is not being asked to adjudicate title to foreign land against the world. The court is therefore acting as it routinely does when exercising its MCA 1973 powers in respect of foreign property (Hamlin v Hamlin [1986] Fam 41).[44]28). In Re CB (Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) (also reported as VC v DB and Others) [2025] EWHC 427 (Fam), HHJ Moradifar, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, stated at [11] that “[a]lthough the authorities that provide invaluable guidance on the powers of the court have developed mainly in the Civil jurisdiction and in particularly in the Admiralty and Commercial courts, they apply across other areas of the law that include family”.[45]29). Of course in financial remedy cases a specific form of interim anti-suit injunction in relation to foreign proceedings is the Hemain injunction (named after Hemain v Hemain [1988] 2 FLR 388), the nature of which was fully described in Magomedov v PJSC Transneft [2024] EWHC 1176 (Comm) per Bright J at [88].[46]30). In Re CB (Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction)HHJ Moradifar continued as follows:[47][11] … Examples of its use in family cases include a helpful analysis by McFarlane LJ in Mustafa v Ahmed [2014] EWCA Civ277and S v S [2010] 2 FLR 502 where a ‘Hemain injunction’ which is a species of the antisuit injunction was used as an interim remedy to prevent a party pursuing divorce proceedings in another jurisdiction until the question of the court’s jurisdiction was determined (and E v E [(Anti-Suit Injunction: Children [2021] EWHC 956 (Fam)] above).[48][12] The court’s approach to such an application is dictated by which of the two broad categories the case falls into. The first is commonly referred to as the ‘single forum’ cases. These are usually identified by a contractual arrangement by the parties in which they agree to be bound a particular jurisdiction (a jurisdiction or arbitration clause) or a course of conduct that presupposes exclusive jurisdiction. The second category is the ‘alternative forum’ cases where there is no agreement as to jurisdiction and the courts of different countries may exercise jurisdiction that are often founded upon the local laws to that court. As the authorities have developed, the term ‘unconscionable’ conduct on the part of the defendant has become associated with the former categories, whereas the terms ‘vexatious or oppressive’ conduct are commonly associated with the latter.[49][13] Ordinarily in alternative forum cases an application to the courts of England Wales should only be made if the courts of England and Wales are the natural forum. This is closely connected with the doctrine of comity that requires the courts of England and Wales to determine if it has sufficient ‘interest’ or ‘connection’ to the case that it is the ‘natural forum’ (see Airbus Industrie [GIE v Patel and Others [1999] 1 AC 119] above per Lord Goff of Chieveley also quoting from Sopinka J in Amchem Products (1993) 102 D.L.R (4th) 96 in the Supreme Court of Canada). …[50]31). This is an “alternative forum” case using the taxonomy adopted in Re CB (Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction).[51]32). In addition to the above authorities, Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman referred me to authorities including Cadre SA v Astra Asigurari SA [2005] EWHC 2626 (Comm),Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd and Others (No. 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 625,Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v Lee Kui Jakand Another, Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel, Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725, Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 14, ADM Asia Pacific Trading Pte Ltd (formerly known as Toepfer International Asia Pte Ltd) v PT Budi Semesta Satria [2016] EWHC 1427 (Comm), and E v E (Anti-suit Injunction: Children) [2021] EWHC 956 (Fam).[52]33). Drawing in particular on E v E (Anti-suit Injunction: Children) per Peel J at [33]-[36], I consider the principles that apply to an application for an anti-suit injunction sought in financial remedy proceedings in alternative forum cases may be summarised as follows:[53]a) England must be the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute, such that the English court has a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter in question to justify the indirect interference with the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails (Airbus v Patel);[54]b) the English court must have personal jurisdiction over the respondent in relation to the dispute. If the English court has jurisdiction over the substance of a dispute to which the respondent is a party, then it will ordinarily have personal jurisdiction over the respondent (Masri v CCI). Relief cannot be granted unless valid service on the respondent can be effected (Airbus v Patel);[55]c) there must be an appropriate ground for obtaining relief. The conduct of the respondent in commencing or pursuing (or, in a quia timet case, threatening) the foreign proceedings must be vexatious, oppressive or otherwise unconscionable(Cadre v Astra Asigurari);[56]d) the injunction must be required by the ends of justice, and must not unjustly deprive the respondent of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage in the foreign forum of which it would be unfair to deprive them(Société Nationale v Lee Kui Jak); and[57]e) if all of the above are satisfied, the court must then exercise a discretion whether or not to grant the injunction (Star Reefers v JFC Group). In so doing the court will have regard to all the circumstances which include(i) whether the application has been brought with appropriate promptness (ADM Asia Pacific v PT Budi);(ii) the facts upon which the application is based;(iii) the connections with each jurisdiction;(iv) the nature of the substantive proceedings both in this jurisdiction and in the foreign jurisdiction (if any) and the stage they have both reached;(v) the principles of judicial comity;(vi) the circumstances in which the foreign proceedings (if any) are brought;(vii) the balance of prejudice to each party depending upon whether the injunctive relief is or is not granted; and(viii) and any other relevant matters (E v E).[58]34). In relation to conduct which is properly described as “vexatious, oppressive or otherwise unconscionable”, the authorities recognise as classic instances of vexatious or oppressive foreign proceedings(i) proceedings brought to relitigate matters which have been, or are in the course of being, determined by the English court(Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd and Others (No. 3)); and(ii) proceedings whose object or effect is to circumvent or undermine the integrity of an English order or the English court’s process (Glencore International AG v Exter Shipping Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 528).[61]a) England is unquestionably the natural forum.This is not a contested-forum case at all. All of the parties’ financial claims are being determined here; W has submitted to and in her divorce order application invoked this jurisdiction; she has never suggested any other forum is appropriate. The English court is not merely the natural forum: it is the only forum seised of the financial remedy application, and it is seised of the whole of them, including the Odintsovo property. The Airbus v Patel requirement of sufficient interest or connection is satisfied to the highest degree: the court is protecting the integrity of its own extant process and prospective order;[62]b) the English court has personal jurisdiction over W in relation to the dispute;[63]c) pursuit of a Russian claim would be vexatious and oppressive.The vice of the threatened claim does not depend on its prospects under Russian law. Its vice lies in what it would do to these English proceedings;[64]d) no legitimate legal or juridical advantage is lost.The only “advantage” the injunction removes is the prospect of a second, inconsistent determination of an asset already before this court. That is not a legitimate advantage of which it would be unjust to deprive W: it is the very vexation complained of. W loses no substantive right: every claim she has in respect of the property – sharing, needs, or otherwise – is fully justiciable, and is in fact being determined, in the English proceedings. If, contrary to H’s primary case, W contends that the Russian claim would secure her something these proceedings cannot, that is a matter she can and should argue within the s25 exercise, not by collateral foreign process;[65]e) the application is prompt and H comes with ‘clean hands’.He has moved as soon as the threat crystallised (as evidenced by W’s and/or her father’s alleged unconscionable conduct in Cyprus) and before any Russian process has issued. The features fatal to the application in Re CB (Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) – delay, the applicant’s own litigation conduct, and a foreign application that was understandable and non-duplicative – are absent; and[66]f) comity is respected, not offended.The injunction binds W personally; it makes no order directed to the Russian court and expresses no view on Russian law. Comity considerations are at their weakest where - as here -(i) no foreign proceedings are yet on foot, so no foreign court is asked to stay its hand (cf. the emphasis on promptness and the stage of the foreign proceedings in Re CB (Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) and ADM Asia-Pacific Trading PTE v PT Budi Semesta Satria); and(ii) the English court acts to protect its own process in a matter over which both parties agree it has, and has always had, jurisdiction.[68]a) the Odintsovo property is a single asset within a single matrimonial estate falling for distribution once, by this court. A Russian claim to a 50% interest would place the same asset before two courts consecutively, with the inherent risk of inconsistent outcomes;[69]b) W’s sharing and needs claims before this court already comprehend the full value of the property. A Russian half-share claim would give W two bites at the same asset: its value (or the asset itself) in the English distribution, and a proprietary half-interest abroad. H would be exposed twice in respect of one asset;[70]c) were the Russian claim to succeed in whole or in part, it would forcibly re-write the asset schedule on which this court’s s25 exercise proceeds, and would hollow out whatever order this court makes in respect of, or however it treats, the property. That is precisely the “relitigation” mischief identified in Masri. The court does not have to wait until its order is made and then flouted before acting: the jurisdiction is protective and prospective, and is properly engaged quia timet;[71]d) having initially elected to have all financial claims determined in England, and having taken the benefit of that process (disclosure and – for her – delay), W cannot in conscience simultaneously prosecute abroad a claim to the very property committed to this court’s adjudication. Litigants cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate; the principle in Glencore International AG v Exter Shipping Ltd applies a fortiori to a spouse who has submitted the entirety of the marital finances to this court; and[72]e) no expert evidence in respect of Russian law is required. The court is not asked to determine the content of Russian matrimonial property law, nor the merits of the putative Russian claim. Three points are said to follow:[73]i) the touchstone is W’s conduct, judged by English equitable standards on an in personam basis: whether the pursuit of the foreign claim would be vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable in the light of the English proceedings. That question is governed by English law and is answerable on the undisputed procedural facts alone;[74]ii) the vexation identified above – duplication, double recovery – exists whatever the precise content of Russian law and whether the Russian claim would succeed or fail. If it would fail, it is additionally pointless; if it would succeed, the subversion of this court’s distribution is all the greater. On no view does the analysis require proof of foreign law; and[75]iii) this court’s s25 powers in respect of the Odintsovo property are exercisable in personam against W and H regardless of Russian law (Hamlin v Hamlin). The injunction sought is the mirror of that jurisdiction: it restrains W personally from acting abroad inconsistently with the adjudication she has invoked here.[77]37). As W took no part in the final hearing (other than send the occasional email to H’s solicitors and/or the court) I do not know what submissions would have been made by her or on her behalf if she had been present.[78]38). I therefore asked Mr. Molyneux what it is likely W would have argued. Although understandably reluctant to speculate, he said she may have argued that she was a Russian national and therefore if she wanted to litigate in Russia, she should be permitted to so. In addition, the property was in Russia and therefore it would not be vexatious or oppressive for her to litigate there. Further, although she had submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court, she had not significantly or actively participated in the proceedings therein (at least for some considerable time). In short, as a Russian citizen, she ought not to be restrained from litigating in relation to Russian property in Russia if she so wished. In addition, there was no evidential basis to suggest she would make the application with which H was concerned in any event.[79]39). Mr. Molyneux submitted that if W had made this last submission - I have not issued proceedings in Russia and I will not do so – then she should have no objection to an order being made in the terms sought. However he said there was clear evidence that she was prepared to take steps by way of ‘self-help’ – demonstrated most recently by the redomiciling in Russia of the assets that had previously been held by CD in Cyprus in a prima facie breach of the current freezing injunction. Even if W could successfully argue that it was not ‘self help’ – in that the action had been taken with the approval of the Russian authorities – it was clear evidence that whilst W had chosen to litigate here and take advantage of procedure here, she was willing to take steps there to put assets beyond H’s reach. In other words W was ‘riding two horses’ and choosing which was the most beneficial to ride at any one time. It was said that this was evidence – even if no proceedings had been issued in Russia to date - of what she may do.[80]40). Mr. Molyneux also submitted that(i) where the court forms view that a party is about to or is likely to commence proceedings overseas then the fact that they are not before the English court to be asked questions in relation thereto should not be a reason not to prevent the issue of those proceedings; and(ii) to await the issue of such proceedings is both unnecessary and engenders delay which is usually something to be guarded against.[82]41). I remind myself that the jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction must always be exercised with a degree of caution because by definition it involves interference with the process or potential process of a foreign court.[83]42). In my judgment the following matters are established:[84]a) the parties’ financial remedy proceedings are before this court. W has participated in them and has at no stage disputed that England is the appropriate forum for the determination of all financial claims arising from the marriage;[85]b) the property is situated in Russia. It is legally and beneficially owned by H alone and registered in his sole name under Russian law;[86]c) the property has been disclosed and is included in the schedule of assets before this court. Both parties’ Forms E treat it as an asset falling for consideration under MCA 1973 s25; and[87]d) H fears that W will pursue a claim in Russia for a 50% interest in the property. I consider this to be a well-grounded fear given W’s alleged conduct in relation to CD.[88]43). As Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Chapman submitted, the essential point is a short one. W has invoked (through her divorce application), engaged with, and never once disputed or otherwise challenged the jurisdiction of the English court to determine all of the parties’ financial remedy claims (and claiming in her most recent correspondence with the court that her participation in Cypriot proceedings brought by H to seek a mirror injunction to that granted in England was in effect involuntary). Those claims include the Odintsovo property. England is therefore the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute.[89]44). The English court has jurisdiction over the substance of a dispute to which W is a party. This court therefore has personal jurisdiction over W.[90]45). Pursuit of a claim in Russia by W would be unconscionable and no legitimate legal or juridical advantage is lost by restraining her from doing so. A parallel or subsequent claim to a half share in the property would not vindicate any right left unaddressed by these proceedings: it would relitigate or subvert this court’s distribution and expose H to double jeopardy in respect of a single asset within a single matrimonial estate. That is the paradigm of vexatious, oppressive and unconscionable conduct against which the anti-suit jurisdiction protects. The order sought protects the integrity of proceedings W herself commenced, and it deprives her of nothing to which she is in conscience entitled.[91]46). A consideration of all the circumstances of the case include that(i) H has applied promptly upon the threat of Russian proceedings emerging, and before any such proceedings have been issued or advanced;(ii) I consider H’s fears that such proceedings may be brought to be well-grounded (as I have said above); and(iii) the order sought would offend no principle of comity. It would not be directed to the Russian court nor express a view on Russian law. I also accept the submission that in any event this is a case in which the comity considerations are (in relative terms) weak. Many of the other relevant circumstances are in practice subsumed within the other applicable principles.[92]47). In my judgment the principles for the grant of an anti-suit injunction are satisfied on the facts of this case. In the exercise of my discretion I therefore consider it is just and convenient, and the ends of justice require it, for such an injunction to be made in the terms sought.[93]48). Such an order will, however, be made on an interim basis at this stage in order to ‘hold the ring’.[94]49). As was accepted by Mr. Molyneux, to make the order permanent at this stage would be to pre-empt my substantive judgment which will include a determination of which party should retain the property.[95]50). Mr. Molyneux submits that a final injunction will be appropriate if (as H seeks) I order that he is to retain the Odintsovo property. It is said that there is no jurisdiction dispute to abide (so Hemain relief is not the right vehicle), and the mischief is not temporal but absolute: at no point – before, during or after this court’s final order – could W’s Russian half-share claim be anything other than a collateral attack on the English adjudication. A final injunction, with a penal notice and liberty to apply, will provide certainty to both parties and to any Russian lawyer or court to whom the order is shown, while leaving W free to apply to vary or discharge upon any material change of circumstances, and expressly carving out steps taken to enforce this court’s orders.[96]51). I note these submissions and will consider them in due course depending on the terms my substantive judgment.