Orlanda Maria Lazcano Mendez v David John Haines [2026] EWFC 213

[2026] EWFC 213

Case No BV25N00237

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 17/07/26

IN THE FAMILY COURT

Venue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CUSWORTH

Between

ORLANDA MARIA LAZCANO MENDEZApplicant

DAVID JOHN HAINESRespondent

Lily Mottahedan (instructed by Farrer & Co) for Applicant

Katie Cowton KC and Joseph Rainer (instructed by Charles Russell Speechlys) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 9 - 11 June 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17/07/2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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This judgment was delivered in private [and a reporting restrictions order OR transparency order is in force]. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Cusworth J:

[1]I have had listed before me a hearing to determine whether the court has jurisdiction to consider the nullity petition of the applicant Orlanda Lazcano Mendez (‘Ms Lazcano’). The respondent is David Haines (‘Mr Haines’). The application was listed for three days, to include judicial reading and judgment writing time, although in fact significantly more time than that was properly required to consider the issues in the case. The bundle ran to 1,422 pages. In addition to the 20-page position statements filed by each side, the hearing began with an argument between experienced counsel over the admission of additional evidence, with each side claiming that the other’s legal team was behaving badly in terms of seeking to gain advantage by adding further documents. I was left in no doubt that both sides felt that the stakes were very high in relation to the outcome of the application.

[2]The reason for that is clear. On the basis that it is acknowledged that Ms Lazcano and Mr Haines were never validly married, it appears that her only realistic prospect of securing some form of substantial financial provision at the end of their relationship is dependent upon her establishing jurisdiction through the courts of England and Wales. The only jurisdictional argument on which Ms Lazcano relies is that Mr Haines ‘isdomiciled in England and Wales”. The relevant date on which to consider this question is 4 August 2025, when her nullity application was issued. Ms Lazcano’ clear case is that Mr Haines has never lost his domicile of origin in England and Wales, and, as Ms Cowton KC for Mr Haines characterises it, that ‘any assertion by him that he has is false, dishonest, and intended to “do her down” in these proceedings’. If this determination were to go against her client, Ms Cowton KC would then at a later hearing seek to argue that in any event, what passed between the couple in 2017 is when properly analysed a ‘non-qualifying ceremony’, which if established would mean that no relief for Ms Lazcano would anyway be available. That issue is currently listed to be determined over a further 4 days before me from 14 December 2026. Whilst I would normally have listed the two issues together, splitting them has proved the most efficient way of progressing the case, given the court’s otherwise full diary.

[3]Ms Lazcano is represented by Lily Mottahedan of counsel, instructed by Farrer & Co.; Mr Haines is represented by Katie Cowton KC and Joseph Rainer of counsel, instructed by Charles Russell Speechlys (‘CRS’). The hearing began with a complaint from Ms Cowton that LSO provision had been sought and obtained from her client on the basis that Ms Lazcano would at this hearing be represented by Simon Webster KC leading Ms Mottahedan, and that funds for his instruction had been provided. Whilst this was true, and also the case that Farrer & Co. acknowledge that those funds provided have all been spent elsewhere in case preparation, I cannot find that such a course was a deliberate ploy on Ms Lazcano’s solicitors’ behalf. I accept, as I am told, that they intended to instruct Mr Webster, had they secured his services. Once they realised that they could not, which may have been relatively recently, then of course they should have notified CRS as soon as possible. This is a matter which may have been relevant to the question of costs at the conclusion of the hearing but on behalf of Mr Haines, it was made clear he would not be pursuing his costs in the event that he was successful, and therefore I consider there is no need to explore this issue further.

[4]Beyond this entirely tangential issue (at least for the purposes of determining jurisdiction) Mr Haines’ team accused Ms Lazcano of:(i) Case-building since at least July 2022;

(ii) Multiple covert recordings of private conversations between the parties from 2022;

(iii) Covertly recording a Spanish notary in October 2022, only disclosing this in February 2026, and not disclosing a conflicting communication from the notary to Ms Lazcano’s Spanish lawyer;

(iv) Keeping Imerman documents, not providing them when sought, and then drip feeding them into the proceedings until just weeks before this hearing; and

(v) unedifying litigation tactics in relation to the admission and/or exclusion of evidence. For her part, Ms Mottahedan for Ms Lazcano accuses Mr Haines of stopping ‘at nothing to succeed in barring her claims (and remain consistent with his claims to HMRC)’; of (i) presenting a dishonest or misleading account to this court; (ii) launching eviction proceedings in Spain seeking to remove Ms Lazcano from the Mallorcan property Villa Rose, where she had been living; (iii) the use of third-parties to intimidate Ms Lazcano at the property, and banning the five full-time staff from assisting her; (iv) threats against her friends and family; (v) surveillance at Villa Rose; and

(vi) the complete withdrawal of financial support until the court made its MPS/LSPO orders. None of these issues go directly to the question which I have to determine at this hearing.

[5]Background. Mr Haines was born in 1960, in Wales. Ms Lazcano was born in Spain in 1970. They are therefore now 66 and 55 respectively. I will set out first what is a simple chronological account of Mr Haines’ life to this point, both apart from and then from the time of their meeting, together with Ms Lazcano, as seems relevant to the issue of jurisdiction. Mr Haines studied international marketing at Thames Polytechnic between 1978 and 1982, including a sandwich year internship in West Germany in 1980. There he met his first wife, A, a (West) German national, on his 20th birthday, and began a relationship with her. On completion of his degree, Mr Haines took a job with Gramm & Grey in West Germany, and moved there in August 1982. In 1983, Mr Haines and A acquired their first joint home in Dusseldorf. In 1985, Mr Haines and A became engaged, and purchased a property together in Hamburg. In the same year Mr Haines took a new job working as a brand manager for a subsidiary of Unilever in West Germany. In 1987, Mr Haines and A were married in Hamburg.

[6]In the summer of 1988, Mr Haines moved to work for Unilever’s London office as European marketing manager, he says on secondment. Mr Haines and A moved to a flat in London, rented for them by Unilever. In November 1989, however, Mr Haines left Unilever and took a position at Mars at their German office in Verden. He returned to West Germany with A, after about 16 months in England. Their son B was born in (united) Germany in 1991. In December 1992, Mr Haineswas offered a promotion within Mars to be General Manager in Sweden. He, A and B moved to Sweden. Their daughter C was born in Sweden in early 1994. In March 1994, Mr Haines and family returned to Germany, again after about 16 months. In January 1995, Mr Haines became Vice President at Mars in Russia, and the family moved there. However, in late 1995, after less than a year, they moved back to Germany and acquired a family home in Dusseldorf, and Mr Haines commuted to Russia from there until the end of his assignment in 1997.

[7]Between 1998 and 2000, Mr Haines was Deputy Division Vice President at Coca-Cola, in Germany, and then in 2000 he was appointed as Global Marketing Director for Vodafone based in Dusseldorf. Between 2000 and 2004, he purchased, renovated, rented and then sold a property in Chelsea, London (“the London flat”). In October 2002, he and A jointly purchased a property in Surrey. Between 2003 and 2004, Mr Haines worked at Vodafone HQ in Newbury, Berkshire, and for that period the family moved to England. In September 2004, Mr Haines resigned from Vodafone. He says that his children were unhappy in English schools, and his resignation came after the group CEO failed to identify a suitable relocation opportunity for him to Germany. Mr Haines then started a new role with Grohe AG (‘Grohe’), back in Dusseldorf, to where the family returned in early 2005, purchasing a new home. The children returned to their former schools. In September 2005, the Surrey property was sold.

[8]From 2005, Mr Haines came under significant pressure after instituting cost-cutting measures at Grohe, and he received both written and verbal threats. In 2007 a book was published which appears to imagine his assassination, as had happened to a neighbour of his in similar circumstances. From 2006, B attended school in Switzerland, where he was joined by C in 2008. Mr Haines and A started to rent a Swiss chalet in Gstaad, from 2006, whilst retaining their home in Dusseldorf. In 2009, Mr Haines says that he and his family decided to settle permanently in Switzerland, and in March 2010 he signed rental agreements for a serviced apartment in Luzern (from 14 April to the end of May), and for a flat on D Strasse, Luzern, for 2 years from 1 June of that year. The Gstaad chalet was still in use for weekends and holidays until 2011, when it was replaced by a further rented property in Gstaad, until 2014. In October 2010 and April 2011 two building plots were acquired in Luzern, Switzerland but never built on, and they were subsequently sold.

[9]Separately, from 2008, Mr Haines’ English accountants Hillier Hopkins, have been filing tax returns confirming that he was non-UK tax resident and non-domiciled. BDO Luzern began to act for Mr Haines in 2010, and filed Swiss tax returns on his behalf on the basis of his Swiss residence and domicile. He was registered as a Swiss resident subject to federal, cantonal and municipal Swiss tax from April 2010.

[10]From 2010 to 2013, B attended university in England, and from 2012 to 2015, C attended university in England. In June 2012, with both children at university in England, a property in Berkshire was purchased in A’s sole name. During 2013, Mr Haines’ relationship with A began to break down. In June 2013, a new rental was taken in Luzern in their joint names, on E Strasse. In December 2013, Mr Haines purchased Villa Rose in Majorca, via corporate structures. A tourist license was applied for, and the property was periodically rented out between 2015 and 2017.

[11]By September 2014, Mr Haines was considering a process to formalise his separation from A, and in October, he commenced separation proceedings in Switzerland as a prelude to divorce. He and A reached an agreement resolving their financial separation in October 2014. Meanwhile, Mr Haines and Ms Lazcano had begun their romantic relationship during the month of October 2014. Ms Lazcano has one child, a daughter, Y, born in 1999, so at this point just turning 15. It is agreed that from January 2015, Ms Lazcano spent at least some time at Villa Rose, although Mr Haines says that it was still rented out occasionally. He accepts that he spent time with her there, although he says that he continued to live primarily in Luzern. She says that they were living together at the property, and that Y would join them there in the school holidays. Mr Haines paid her school fees at an English boarding school.

[12]In April 2015, Mr Haines submitted an application for a Swiss “C” permanent residence permit, the highest tier of residence permit for non-Swiss nationals, and in the same month BDO Luzern prepared a draft will for him in which they were named as executors. In June 2015, a formal letter (containing narrative about his Swiss domicile) was sent by Mr Haines to the Swiss Migration Office in support of his residence permit application, which was subsequently granted. Meanwhile, in May 2015, Mr Haines and A filed a joint divorce petition in Switzerland, and modified their existing financial agreement.This required Mr Haines to withdraw his earlier application from October. There was a hearing in the divorce proceedings in June 2015, which Mr Haines attended in person, and on the next day a consent divorce judgment was handed down. The Swiss court accepted jurisdiction on the basis of its finding that Mr Haines was domiciled in Switzerland, and applied Swiss law to the divorce. In December 2015, Mr Haines loaned Ms Lazcano funds to buy an apartment in Palma, Mallorca.

[13]During 2016, Mr Haines’ role as CEO at Grohe came to an end, and he rented an apartment in London, whilst looking for a new role in Private Equity. He says that he undertook project work in Switzerland and London for European based Private Equity concerns. Ms Lazcano says that the couple became engaged in July 2016. During this time Ms Lazcano and Mr Haines viewed a number of properties in London with a view to purchasing. He sent her a WhatsApp message on 26 October 2016: ‘Our perfect scenario Landa and David forever: 300sqm London: 6 mio Mallorca : 6/7 mio Boat’.

[14]In Spring 2017, there were negotiations between representatives for each of them over a Pre-nuptial Agreement. On 7 April 2017, they signed a letter setting out some terms, which they both later sent on to their advisers. In May 2017, Mr Haines received notice in Switzerland of a multi-jurisdictional civil claim against him made by Joyou, a subsidiary of Grohe. In June 2017, he loaned Ms Lazcano funds. In August 2017, Mr Haines rented an apartment on F Strasse, Luzern, until January 2020. On 15 September 2017, the parties appeared to sign a document privately in front of a notary at Villa Rose. Ms Lazcano says that this was a Spanish marriage contract, but Mr Haines denies this. Both of their daughters and two witnesses (one of whom was Mr Haines’ sister) were present together with Mr Haines’s brother-in-law and nieces. On 16 September, the parties’ ‘marriage’ was blessed in a Church of England service in front of 120 guests conducted by an Anglican priest in Mallorca. The formalities of marriage were however never completed.

[15]In early 2018, Mr Haines purchased a house in Belgravia, London (“the London property”), initially through an offshore structure, and Ms Lazcano signed the occupier consent forms as his wife. In March 2018, Mr Haines renewed his UK driving license. In July 2018, Mr Haines started a new role as Group CEO of K Company. K Company was owned by a private equity company, and Mr Haines acquired an equity interest. In August 2018, his certificate of Swiss Residence was renewed.In December 2018, Mr Haines signed a notarial mortgage deed prepared by the Spanish Notary who conducted the ceremony referred to above as ‘Married under the separate property regime’.

[16]During 2019, there is evidence suggesting that whilst the couple held themselves out as married where they considered that this would be advantageous for them – for example where Mr Haines allowed a colleague to recommend Ms Lazcano for membership of Annabels as his wife – and there is also evidence that they proceeded otherwise on occasion. I accept that the parties have not had the opportunity to give evidence about what was in their minds at this time. In this regard, when Mr Haines loaned Ms Lazcano a further sum in March 2019 to purchase a second apartment in the same Mallorcan complex as her first, both the purchase deeds and the Special Power of Attorney executed describe her as ‘divorced’, not married. In December 2019, a credit facility agreement between the couple prepared by Ms Lazcano’s Spanish tax adviser was drawn up. Mr Haines says that they obtained Spanish tax advice as an unmarried couple, which Ms Lazcano does not accept.

[17]In January 2020, Mr Haines entered into a rental agreement for a different property on D Strasse, Luzern, from February 2020. In April 2020, Mr Haines says that he became eligible to naturalise as a Swiss Citizen after 10 years of continuous permanent residence in Canton Luzern. Shortly thereafter he received a letter from Canton Luzern inviting him to apply. He instructed BDO in relation to the Swiss naturalisation process later in that year. In August 2020, Ms Lazcano referred to the couple’s marriage as being as being ‘unregistered’ in a WhatsApp exchange between them. In September 2020, Mr Haines says that he asked her to join him in Luzern.

[18]During the Covid lockdown of January to March 2021, Mr Haines was in Luzern and Ms Lazcano in Mallorca. In March 2021, his pre-registration request for Swiss naturalisation along with the accompanying documents was submitted by BDO to Canton Luzern. At this time there were serious difficulties in the parties’ relationship, including Ms Lazcano expressing concern to Mr Haines about ‘3 years of being unmarried… and its never time to register?’. After a conversation between Ms Lazcano and Maria Dolores Lozano Ortiz (Mr Haines’ Spanish family lawyer) on 25 May 2021, the latter recounted:

‘In the conversation we had, Landa was aware that there was no marriage between you, a fact that I also confirmed to her, since no marriage had been contracted in accordance with Spanish law’

. I acknowledge that Ms Lazcano disputes the detail of her account. In the summer of 2021, there were attempts to reconcile, and discussions about the provision of additional financial security for Ms Lazcano. A process was begun to obtain settled status for Y in the UK, and pre-settled status for Ms Lazcano. Mr Haines says that it was at this time that a sale of K Company was first proposed, and in June 2021, he withdrew his Swiss naturalisation application. In September 2021 he instructed a buying agent to find a bigger house in London to buy when K Company sold, with a possible price of up to £20,000,000. In the same month Mr Haines moved to G Strasse, a serviced apartment in Luzern which he retained for two years until September 2023. He says that this was a transitional arrangement for him, prior to moving back to his original apartment on D Strasse, once the incumbent tenant left and works on that property were completed.

[19]There is evidence that in February 2022, Mr Haines remained on the electoral register for the London property, and that in May of that year he forwarded his property agent an alert for a house in H Square. In June, he arranged for Ms Lazcano to join the club ‘5 Hertford Street’ on a joint spousal membership. At about this time the Joyou litigation concluded without any liability for Mr Haines. It is Ms Lazcano’s case that it was only in July 2022 that was confirmed to her that the couple were not validly married. For two weeks in August 2022, Villa Rose was rented out for a substantial sum. In October 2022, in the context of negotiations about resolving their issues, Mr Haines wrote that:

‘We need to take tax advice regarding our tax positions and to avoid paying unnecessary tax on [K Company] shares in particular I have been advised to remain Swiss resident to April 6th, 2023 to give us sufficient time to implement some important planning. To deal with that we can sign now and marry, and both stay Swiss based (i.e. We spend about half our time in Switzerland between now and April 6th 2023) or we sign now and register the marriage on/after Friday April 7th 2023.’

Despite further discussions, no agreement was signed. Between December 2022 and February 2023, Mr Haines had conversations with a Swiss property agent about available properties in Luzern.

[20]In January 2023, Mr Haines signed an agreement to re-rent the original apartment in D Strasse, Luzern from September 2023 for up to 5 years, having indicated to his daughter that the owner would not sell the property to him. In February 2023 he entered into a search mandate agreement for a property in Luzern, initially with a budget of CHF2-5,000,000. This amount appears to have increased to CHF10m, and he later viewed two properties at CHF8-9,000,000. In February, Mr Haines signed a domicile statement for Hillier Hopkins, his English accountants and his executors, recording his burial wishes as being that his ashes should be scattered on Lake Luzern. In May 2023, the London property was transferred into Mr Haines’ sole name from a holding structure. In June 2023, he says that he and Ms Mendez again discussed moving to Luzern. There are emails between them and BDO, Hillier Hopkins and CRS about registering Ms Lazcano as Swiss resident, living in D Strasse , from September 2023. In July 2023, Ms Lazcano says that they viewed a property in Cornwall as a potential ‘bolt-hole’. From September 2023, the first D Strasse apartment became available, and the couple stayed a few days in a hotel whilst decorating the property ahead of moving in. Ms Lazcano says this was ahead of moving into the property for tax reasons, ahead of the anticipated K Company sale.

[21]In February 2024, the parties began couples’ therapy online. In December 2023, Mr Haines had received a letter from the City of Luzern inviting him as a 10-year plus Swiss Resident with a C Permit to apply for Swiss citizenship. In April 2024, he replied indicating his desire to acquire Swiss citizenship. In that same month the proposed K Company sale was called off. In June 2024, Ms Lazcano also called off the couples’ therapy and considers this to be the time of their separation. From September 2024, the parties tried to negotiate a financial settlement directly and using Spanish, Swiss and later (for Ms Lazcano) English advisers. In October 2024, Mr Haines met BDO in Luzern to discuss his renewed Swiss citizenship application, and in November 2024 spoke to agents about selling the London property. In a conversation on 18 December 2024, he said to Ms Lazcano that he’d ‘got to stay in Switzerland until I sell [K Company]’.

[22]In March 2025, Mr Haines signed the Swiss citizenship application but did not yet submit it. In that month he had become engaged to his current wife, Z, who is a German national. In May 2025, contracts were exchanged for the sale of the London property. On 2 June 2025, in an email exchange between the parties, Ms Lazcano suggested to Mr Haines that ‘Switzerland has always meant loneliness for you’, to which he replied ‘You are right it is loneliness’. On 4 July 2025, the sale of the London property completed for £2.5m net, without notice to Ms Lazcano. At this time, she was refusing to vacate Villa Rose in Mallorca. On 8 July 2025, Mr Haines received his Swiss Certificate of Individual Civil Status. On 16 July 2025, Ms Lazcano filed a nullity petition in England and Wales, which was issued on 4 August 2025, and sent to Mr Haines on 29 August. On 8 August, BDO had submitted Mr Haines’ application for Swiss citizenship, and on the same day Ms Lazcano’s application in Form A was filed on the court portal. In October 2025, Mr Haines and Z married in Luzern.

[23]Ms Lazcano’s case is that the couple spent very little time together at Mr Haines’ various properties, which Ms Mottahedan describes as ‘at times serviced corporate-style rental apartments’, in Switzerland. In fact, there are some that Ms Lazcano says that she never visited. During their years together, her case is that she only spent around 50 days in Switzerland. Ms Mottahedan asserts that Mr Haines’ life displays ‘a consistent pattern showing enduring attachment to England and an absence of any singular emotional identification with Switzerland’. She points out that the evidence suggests that despite his many years living in continental Europe, he still displays an evident attachment to the English way of life, and to English customs. She argues that his residence in Switzerland is explicable by tax (until sale of his K Company shares, discussed below); and suggests that his conduct, homes, attachments, future plans and contemporaneous statements point to him being anchored in England (and at times Spain). She denies that Mr Haines has ‘a singular and distinctive relationship with the country of supposed domicile of choice’, using the words of Arden LJ in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Henwood

[2008] EWCA Civ 577

, at [14], which brings me to the law which I must apply.

[24]The Law. The key legal propositions on domicile are those set out by Arden LJ at [8] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Henwood (above)(‘Barlow Clowes’) where she said: 8. The following principles of law, which are derived from Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (2006) are not in issue:(i) A person is, in general, domiciled in the country in which he is considered by English law to have his permanent home. A person may sometimes be domiciled in a country although he does not have his permanent home in it

(ii) No person can be without a domicile

(iii) No person can at the same time for the same purpose have more than one domicile

(iv) An existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proved that a new domicile has been acquired

(v) Every person receives at birth a domicile of origin

(vi) Every independent person can acquire a domicile of choice by the combination of residence and an intention of permanent or indefinite residence, but not otherwise

(vii) Any circumstance that is evidence of a person's residence, or of his intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in determining whether he has acquired a domicile of choice

(viii) In determining whether a person intends to reside permanently or indefinitely, the court may have regard to the motive for which residence was taken up, the fact that residence was not freely chosen, and the fact that residence was precarious

(ix) A person abandons a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently, or indefinitely, and not otherwise

(x) When a domicile of choice is abandoned, a new domicile of choice may be acquired, but, if it is not acquired, the domicile of origin revives”

[25]At [10] Arden LJ made clear that:

‘The intention of residence must be fixed and must be for the indefinite future. It is not enough for instance that at any given point in time its length has not been determined’

. She later explained at [14] that: 14. Given that a person can only have one domicile at any one time for the same purpose, he must in my judgment have a singular and distinctive relationship with the country of supposed domicile of choice. That means it must be his ultimate home or, as it has been put, the place where he would wish to spend his last days. Thus, in Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc and Div 307, 311, Lord Cairns, having held that it was unnecessary for him to examine the various definitions that have been given of the term "domicile", held that the question to be considered was in substance whether the appellant:

"had determined to make, and had made, Scotland his home, with the intention of establishing himself and his family there, and ending his days in that country?"

(emphasis added) 15. In my judgment this test by its reference to ending one's days usefully emphasises the need for the subject to have a fixed purpose that he will live in the country of his domicile of choice.

[26]Arden LJ then went on to consider the need for the court to have regard to all of the available evidence. She said at [16]: 16. A finding as to domicile requires a careful evaluation of all the facts. This point is illustrated by a memorable passage from the judgment of Mummery LJ in Agulian v Cyganik

[2006] EWCA Civ 129

(‘Agulian’) at [46(1)]:

"Positioned at the date of death in February 2003 the court must look back at the whole of the deceased's life, at what he had done with his life, at what life had done to him and at what were his inferred intentions in order to decide whether he had acquired a domicile of choice in England by the date of his death. Soren Kierkegaard's aphorism that "

Life must be lived forwards, but can only be understood backwards" resonates in the biographical data of domicile disputes."

[27]At [19] Arden LJ considered the value of declaratory statements, and made clear that:

‘Frequently the subject of a dispute as to domicile (often called "the propositus") will make statements or declarations as to what he intends. But the court should not rely on these statements unless corroborated by action consistent with the declaration’

. She then quoted a passage from Dicey [6-054], which cited the House of Lords in Ross v Ross [1930] A.C. 1, 6–7, as saying: ‘Declarations as to intention are rightly regarded in determining the question of a change of domicile, but they must be examined by considering the persons to whom, the purposes for which, and the circumstances in which they are made, and they must further be fortified and carried into effect by conduct and action consistent with the declared expressions.’.

[28]Domiciliaries may “tell different people different things”, but “the acquisition of a domicile of choice is a serious matter not to be lightly inferred from slight indications or casual words” (Agulian [26], [7]).

[29]The impact of giving up a domicile of choice was then considered by Arden LJ in Barlow Clowes, from [20] where she said:20. A domicile of choice is lost when the subject both ceases to reside in the relevant country and gives up the intention permanently or indefinitely to reside there. A domicile of choice in one place may be lost by acquiring a domicile of choice in another place, but it is not necessary to show that the subject has acquired a new domicile of choice because, as Dicey states: "On abandoning a domicile of choice, a person may acquire a new domicile of choice, or he may return to and settle in the country of his domicile of origin. He may also simply abandon his domicile of choice without acquiring a home in another country…”

21. The revival of the domicile of origin… occurs as a matter of law. As no person can be without a domicile, the law attributes a domicile to a person who does not have one. A domicile of origin provides the domicile if there is no clear evidence as to a domicile of choice elsewhere,,. The rule, that the domicile of origin revives where a domicile of choice has been abandoned and another domicile of choice has not yet been obtained, represents therefore a default rule.

[30]In Morina & Ors v Scherbakova & Ors

[2023] EWHC 3253 (Ch)

, Bacon J, having set out Arden LJ’s principles identified at [8] of Barlow Clowes, continued at [210]: 210. I have been referred to a number of further passages in Barlow Clowes as well as comments in various further authorities, in particular Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307; Huntly v Gaskell

[1906] AC 56

; Holliday v Musa

[2010] EWCA Civ 335

[2010] 2 FLR 702

; and CC v DD

[2014] EWHC 1307

. I also note, more recently, the discussion in Proles v Kohli

[2018] EWHC 767 (Ch)

. From these the following further principles may be drawn: i) A finding as to domicile requires a careful evaluation of all the facts: Barlow Clowes §16. ii) A person’s domicile of origin is “tenacious” and “less easily shaken off” than a domicile of choice: Huntly v Gaskell pp. 66–7; Barlow Clowes §85. If they have not made up their mind where to settle permanently, they retain their domicile of origin: Holliday v Musa §23. iii) Acquisition of a domicile of choice will not be “lightly inferred”: CC v DD §22. It requires both residence in the relevant jurisdiction, and an intention of permanent or indefinite residence there. That intention must be fixed and for the indefinite future. An intention to reside for an undetermined period of time but not permanently is not enough. What is required is for the person to have “a singular and distinctive relationship” with the country in which a domicile of choice is claimed, such that it is intended to be the person’s ultimate home or the place where they would wish to spend their last days: Barlow Clowes §§10–15; Holliday v Musa §74. iv) That intention must be directed exclusively towards one country: an intention to settle in one of several countries is not sufficient: Bell v Kennedy. v) Citizenship is not decisive. A person may acquire citizenship of a country without becoming domiciled there; and likewise a person may acquire a domicile of choice without being a naturalised citizen of the country in question: Barlow Clowes §18. vi) Statements or declarations as to intentions, and declarations of domicile or residence for tax purposes, should not be relied upon per se without consideration of whether they are corroborated by the actions of the relevant person: Barlow Clowes §19, Holliday v Musa §§66, 69. vii) It is relevant to consider where a person has their family life and emotional connections, as well as their other social ties and activities: Holliday v Musa §§23, 63, 71; Proles v Kohli §§114, 124–133. viii) Ownership of property is a relevant factor: Barlow Clowes §65. This may not, however, carry much weight where a wealthy individual owns and spends time in multiple properties in different countries: Huntly v Gaskell pp. 67–8, 70–1. For the same reason the place where a person is registered as resident, under national legal provisions, is likely to carry limited weight where the evidence indicates that they have registered as resident in multiple jurisdictions. ix) The length of time that a person spends in a particular place is not decisive. The more important factor is the quality of the person’s residence: Barlow Clowes §§103–4.

[31]The burden of proof: At [86] of Barlow Clowes, Arden LJ quoted Scarman J in Re Fuld (deceased) (No 3)

[1965] P 675

, making clear that the burden of proof lies with the person asserting a change of domicile: “It is beyond doubt that the burden of proving the abandonment of a domicile of origin and the acquisition of a domicile of choice is upon the party asserting the change.’

[32]Although the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction falls upon Ms Lazcano, the burden in consequence of the above immediately shifts to Mr Haines to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he had acquired a Swiss domicile of choice by the date of issue of her nullity application on 4 August 2025. In Barlow Clowes at [85], Arden LJ emphasised both the tenacity of the domicile of origin and the standard of evidence required to prove its abandonment:

“85. There is a strong line of case law, binding on this court, that the domicile of origin is tenacious. Thus, for example, Lord Macnaghten in Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287 at 290 held that the character of domicile of origin “is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off” than domicile of choice. Lord Macnaghten added at 291 that a change of domicile is a serious matter because the change may involve “far reaching consequences in regard to succession and distribution and other things which depend on domicile.”

At 292, he held that the question was whether it had “with perfect clearness and satisfaction” been shown that the testator had “a fixed and settled purpose” or “a determination” or “a fixed and deliberate intention” to abandon his American domicile and settle in England.” 33. ‘All the cases state that a domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear, cogent and compelling evidence that the relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of choice’

[33]Whilst a domicile of origin is therefore “tenacious” or “adhesive”, I accept that there is no difference in the burden of proof required to establish loss of a domicile of origin or a domicile of choice. The standard of proof is the civil standard. However, as was said by Arden LJ in Barlow Clowes: at [88]: ‘In essence there is no need for any higher standard of proof where more serious allegations are made in civil cases because the civil standard has the inbuilt flexibility to take the seriousness of an allegation into account. Accordingly the more serious an allegation the more substantial will need to be the evidence to prove it on a balance of probabilities’.

[34]She continued, from [94], to consider whether there was a difference in approach to cases where the change alleged was between domiciles of choice, or from a domicile of origin to one of choice. She was clear that:94. It seems to me that as a general proposition the acquisition of any new domicile should in general always be treated as a serious allegation because of its serious consequences. None of the authorities cited to us preclude that approach, and such an approach ensures logical consistency between two situations where the policy interest to be protected is (as demonstrated above) the same. However, what evidence is required in a particular case will depend on the application of common sense to the particular circumstances…

95. Accordingly… I do not consider that [the judge] had to consider whether evidence to meet a more serious case had been adduced if there was an interval of time when under the default rule his domicile of origin revived.

96. For the reasons given above, I would respectfully disagree with the following dictum of Longmore LJ in Agulian …in so far as it lays down any general rule of law: "….it is easier to show a change from one domicile of choice to another domicile of choice than it is to show a change to a domicile of choice from a domicile of origin." ([56])

[35]In determining intention, the court is examining the state of a person’s mind. It is a subjective, not objective assessment (i.e. what did the domiciliary actually intend, not what would a reasonable person in their shoes have intended). In Ramana v Kist-Ramana

[2025] EWCA Civ 1022

, Moylan LJ said: 39. As referred to above, Rule 12, the acquisition of a domicile of choice requires "a combination of residence and intention of permanent or indefinite residence". As referred to below, a domicile of choice is lost when these two elements are "given up". They are, therefore, the obverse of each other. Residence requires no elaboration. It is the latter element, intention, which requires further consideration. This is addressed in Dicey at [6-043]:

"A person who determines to spend the rest of their life in a country clearly has the necessary intention even though he or she does not consider that determination to be irrevocable. It is, however, rare for the animus manendi to exist in this positive form: more frequently a person simply resides in a country without any intention of leaving it, and such a state of mind may suffice for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. The fact that a person contemplates that he or she might move is not decisive: thus a person who intends to reside in a country indefinitely may be domiciled there although he or she envisages the possibility of returning one day to their native country. If they have in mind the possibility of such a return should a particular contingency occur, the possibility will be ignored if the contingency is vague and indefinite, for example making a fortune or suffering some ill-defined deterioration in health; but if it is a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency, for example the termination of employment, or the offer of an attractive post in the country of origin, succession to entailed property, a change in the relative levels of taxation as between two countries, or the death of one's spouse, it may prevent the acquisition of a domicile of choice. If a person intends to reside in a country for a fixed period only, they lack the animus manendi, however long that period may be. The same is true where a person intends to reside in a country for an indefinite time but clearly intends to leave the country at some time."

(emphasis added) It can be seen from this passage that, when determining whether a person has the requisite intention, at one end of the spectrum is a "vague or indefinite" occurrence and at the other end is a "clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated" one. 40. …I would first repeat… the note of caution sounded by Scarman J at the beginning of his judgment in Fuld, at p.682 F:

"This branch of the law is adorned by a great number of cases, not all of which is it easy to harmonise. The difficulty arises not from a lack of clarity in judicial thought but from the nature of the subject. Domicile cases require for their decision a detailed analysis and assessment of facts arising within that most subjective of all fields of legal inquiry - a man's mind."

(emphasis added) He then added, at p.682 G/p.683 A, that:

"[n]aturally enough in so subjective a field different judicial minds concerned with different factual situations have chosen different language to describe the law"

. It would, therefore, be unwise to suggest that the cases establish, or indeed to seek to craft, a clear rule or a prescribed approach when dealing with the issue of contingencies in the context of determining whether a person has the required intention. 41. Rule 13 addresses the scope of relevant evidence. The effect is that, when determining a person's domicile at a particular date, the court must look at the totality of the evidence: see, for example, Dicey, at [6-055] and Re Grove

(1888) 40 Ch D 216

in which Lopes LJ said, at p.242: "I have always understood the law to be, that in order to determine a person's intention at a given time, you may regard not only conduct and acts before and at the time, but also conduct and acts after the time, assigning to such conduct and acts their relative and proper weight and cogency".

[36]Moylan LJ then went on to consider a passage from Re Fuld (deceased) (above), where Scarman J had analysed the judicial task, and then cast those dicta in his own language. He said: 47. … Scarman J said, starting at p.684 F/p.685 A:

"a domicile of choice is acquired only if it be affirmatively shown that the propositus is resident within a territory subject to a distinctive legal system with the intention, formed independently of external pressures, of residing there indefinitely. If a man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency, e.g., the end of his job, the intention required by law is lacking; but, if he has in mind only a vague possibility, such as making a fortune (a modern example might be winning a football pool), or some sentiment about dying in the land of his fathers, such a state of mind is consistent with the intention required by law. But no clear line can be drawn: the ultimate decision in each case is one of fact - of the weight to be attached to the various factors and future contingencies in the contemplation of the propositus, their importance to him, and the probability, in his assessment, of the contingencies he has in contemplation being transformed into actualities."

(emphasis added) I would note four elements. The first connects with what Scarman J said, as quoted above, namely that the court is engaged in a subjective inquiry as to the person's "state of mind". Secondly, that a contingency can be relevant for the purposes of determining whether the person has the required intention but it is only one factor in that assessment. Thirdly, other relevant factors can include the importance of the contingency to the person and "his assessment" of its probability. Fourthly, there is "no clear line" and the "ultimate decision" will depend on the weight the court gives to the "various factors and future contingencies".

[37]Of the two components required to acquire a domicile of choice (simultaneous residence and intention), residence is not said by Ms Mottahedan to be in issue in this case. Ms Lazcano accepts that Mr Haines has been legitimately tax resident in Switzerland continuously since April 2010. “Residence in a country for the purposes of the law of domicile is physical presence in that country as an inhabitant of it” (IRC v Duchess of Portland

[1982] STC 149

[38]Further, Dicey addressed the significance of the length of residence: “The length of the residence is not important in itself: it is only important as evidence of animus manendi. A person may be resident in a country although he or she lives in hotels there or in the house of a friend, and although staying there for some particular purpose such as conducting business or taking part in legal proceedings. On the other hand, a person spending short periods in a house he or she owns may be held not to be resident there; he or she may be there as a visitor and not as an inhabitant.” (Dicey, §6-040).

[39]Length of residence may however be relevant evidence of intention. “It is best to regard residence simply as some evidence of animus manendi. As such evidence, it increases in cogency with the length of the residence… it is now settled that ‘‘mere length of residence by itself is insufficient evidence from which to infer the animus; but the quality of the residence may afford the necessary inference.”(Dicey, §6-050).

[40]The court may consider all acts and circumstances of a domiciliary’s life to gain insight into their intentions:

‘Most disputes as to domicile turn on the question of whether the necessary intention accompanied the residence; and this question often involves very complex and intricate issues of fact. This is because ‘‘there is no act, no circumstance in a man’s life, however trivial it may be in itself, which ought to be left out of consideration in trying the question whether there was an intention to change the domicile. A trivial act might possibly be of more weight with regard to determining this question than an act which was of more importance to a man in his life-time.’’

That said, ‘‘it is not a requirement that the trial judge should slavishly list each and every such factor. He has a responsibility to look at the contours of the case and highlight the prominent elements that, in his view, fall for consideration and which may be determinative of the outcome.’’ There is, furthermore, no circumstance or group of circumstances which furnishes any definite criterion of the existence of the intention. A circumstance which is treated as decisive in one case may be disregarded in another, or even relied upon to support a different conclusion’. (Dicey, §6-051) These last passages come from the judgment of MacFarlane LJ in Ray v Sekhri

[2014] EWCA Civ 119

. The list of factors that may be relevant to inferring such intent which follows this passage at 6-052 of Dicey demonstrates very clearly how fact specific the questions in these cases always are, and that there are very few if any hard and fast rules in identifying indices.

[41]Finally, in Ramana v Kist-Ramana (above), Moylan LJ considered the impact of a finding that intention may be impacted by the happening or otherwise of some contingency. He said:65. The further question which arises in this case is the manner in which the court considers the issue of intention when the intention is linked in some manner with a prospective event or a particular contingency. In particular, is there a threshold that has to be surmounted?

66. First, it is clear that the acquisition of a domicile of choice and its loss are two sides of the same coin. Adapting what Megarry J said in Flynn, at p.115 C, if both residence and intention "are each no more", a person loses or abandons their domicile of choice. This also means that, the "necessary animus", as it was put in Flynn, is the same. This is summarised in Dicey, at Rule 15(1), at [6R-077]:

"A person abandons [or loses] a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely, and not otherwise." 67. Secondly, as also summarised in Dicey, at [6-078], derived from what Megarry J said in Flynn and which was applied by Sir Jocelyn Simon P in Qureshi, at p.191 C/D: "

A domicile of choice is lost when both the residence and the intention which must exist for its acquisition are given up. It is not lost merely by giving up the residence nor merely by giving up the intention. It is not necessary to prove a positive intention not to return: it is sufficient to prove merely the absence of an intention to continue to reside." (emphasis added) 68. Thirdly, the issue of a person's intention is an issue of fact which requires the court to consider all the evidence. The court is determining, what Scarman described in Fuld, at p.682 F, as "that most subjective of all fields of legal inquiry - a man's mind." As Arden LJ emphasised in Barlow Clowes, at [68], the "ultimate fact in issue was [the person's] intention"; in order to "ascertain whether such an intention was shown on the evidence, the judge had to make primary findings of fact and then make a global evaluation of all the relevant facts". The evidential landscape is very wide and potentially includes "[a]ny circumstance which is evidence of a person's … intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country": Dicey, at [6R-049].

[42]If a domiciliary has residences in more than one country when he asserts a change of domicile, he is required (per Barlow Clowes) to establish which was his “chief” residence at the point of asserted acquisition of the new domicile. However, in this case, in 2010/11, the time when Mr Haines says that he was acquiring his Swiss domicile of choice, I accept that he did not have multiple residences in different countries. He and his then wife A had a home in Luzern (D Strasse), and another in Gstaad. They had sold their home in Germany and did not for the moment own or rent anywhere else. The focus I acknowledge will therefore be on whether Mr Haines’s intentions then, or since, were sufficient to acquire a domicile of choice.Ms Lazcano is not accepting that Mr Haines ever acquired a Swiss domicile of choice, but then subsequently lost or abandoned it. Indeed, she would have to concede that if he once had both the requisite intention and residence, he would inevitably have retained that domicile simply by remaining in residence, even if he had been contemplating possible future moves. The question is whether he ever truly had that intention, especially if his continuing residence now were determined to be contingent on future events.

[43]In Ramana v Kist-Ramana (above), Moylan LJ later said:73. In summary, an intention which is based on a contingency which is "much too indefinite" may not be "sufficient to outweigh actions which shew an intention of permanent residence" (Doucet). Also, as Buckley LJ said in IRC v Bullock, at p.1186 C, it may "be hard, if not impossible, to conclude that [a person] retained any real intention of … returning or removing" if that intention is based on "an event or condition of an indefinite kind". However, although an intention which is based on a contingency that is "vague and indefinite" (Fuld) might often be insufficient or "ignored", this is not a rule and does not mean that an intention based on such a contingency is necessarily insufficient to prevent the acquisition or the retention of a domicile of choice. In the particular circumstances it may be hard, or even impossible, but this will depend on the other facts in the case…

74. In conclusion, the nature of the contingency on which an intention is said to be based can, of course, be a relevant factor in the court's decision. No doubt, also, in some cases this issue will feature more prominently than in others which may justify the court conducting a more detailed investigation of the nature of the contingency. I would suggest, however, that this should be conducted with a relatively light touch in respect of the likelihood or otherwise of the contingency occurring. Apart from the fact that it is only one factor and that no clear line can be drawn, this reflects the fact that the court is considering the person's subjective intentions and determining whether it is "bona fide" as it was expressed in Mark or a "real intention" as it was expressed in IRC v Bullock.

75. I would further suggest that, if the court were to conclude that the intention was bona fide, it would be likely to require cogent evidence for a court to decide that the intention was not "real" because of the nature of the contingency or the likelihood of it occurring. This is because "cogent and clear evidence" is required to establish a change of domicile with the cases showing that, in general terms, if there is a threshold, it is a relatively high threshold before the court is likely to ignore or discount an intention because it is based on a vague or indefinite event. Or, to put it another way, before the court will decide that the intention is not sufficient to prevent the acquisition of a domicile of choice or not sufficient to prevent a domicile of choice being lost or abandoned.

[44]This case. Mr Haines’ case, as advanced by Ms Cowton KC, is that in truth he acquired a domicile of choice in West Germany, and lost his English domicile of origin, as long ago as in 1983, when he and his first wife A acquired their first home together in Dusseldorf. His case is that from that point on, until the late 2000s, he was committed to and established in his life there with A, and barring events which were then completely incapable of anticipation, he anticipated making his life there with her. The couple acquired a property there in 1985, in Hamburg, and married in 1987. He has to acknowledge that having originally acquired a job in West Germany with Unilever (albeit one offered after a drink in South London), that job then took him back to London in 1988. However, that he left that job in the following year to return to Germany to different employment is certainly supportive of his case. These events took place 37 years ago, and of course Ms Lazcano did not know Mr Haines then, so there is little on hand now to contradict his account.

[45]However, with a German spouse, and a son, B born in 1991, Mr Haines’ case about his commitment to German life is entirely plausible, and having heard his evidence, I accept it. There are no evident bases on which the chronology conflicts with Mr Haines’ case in this regard. When in 1992 his job with Mars took him to Sweden, it is noticeable that once more after less than 18 months the family were back in Germany, only a few weeks after the birth of their second child. After promotion to Vice President at Mars at the beginning of 1995, Mr Haines again had to take his family abroad, this time to Russia. Once more, they are soon back in Germany, this time before the end of the year with a family home purchased in Dusseldorf. Whilst he continued his assignment in Russia, he did so on the basis that he commuted to and from Germany, which is clear sign of commitment to his family and their German life. When his assignment ended in 1997, he returned to live and work in that country. Until 2000, there is little indication that Mr Haines still retained any sense of allegiance to life in England, or that he was anything other than ensconced in a German way of life. By now he had been living primarily in Germany for 18 years, nearly half of his life, and the whole of his adult life post-university. It is hard to imagine that at that point there would have been any credible evidence to gainsay an assertion that he had acquired a domicile of choice in Germany.

[46]In 2000, Mr Haines became (as explained) Global Marketing Director for Vodafone based in Dusseldorf. In the same year he acquired the London flat, which was renovated, rented and sold four years later. This does little to shift the established picture, especially as the prime London property market would have been a shrewd place to invest funds at that time for an English national. Two years later, Mr Haines relates that he addressed the former Bundestag in German for Vodafone, which might seem to be a very clear sign of integration, albeit one that could have been little more than a required act as part of his employment. In the same year, 2002, he and A did acquire a property in Surrey, whilst they still owned the London flat. This seems to have been the purchase of a home in anticipation of what came next, as in 2003, the family came to live in that property, as Mr Haines’ job with Vodafone took him to their Newbury headquarters, less than an hour’s drive away. However, this move away from Germany also failed to work out, and once again, in early 2005, the family returned to Dusseldorf and bought a new home there. Mr Haines puts this down in part to the children not then getting on at their English schools – they would have been 13 and rising 11 at the point of their return. He says that promises of a new role for him in Germany with Vodafone failed to materialise, and certainly, he began his new role as CEO of Grohe AG as early as September 2004.

[47]It can be imagined that, had the children settled, there might have been a chance that the family would have stayed, and that Mr Haines could have reverted back to his original English domicile, on the basis that he had by then lost it. But on balance, I am satisfied that the pattern which repeats itself over these years is that on each occasion when Mr Haines’ jobs with international companies have taken him away from Germany, it has been the calls of his family, and perhaps foremost his German wife, that have brought him back. Even though there may have been things about the English way of life that he missed, it is noticeable that having twice moved to this jurisdiction during these early years, a return to Germany was soon effected. There is no evidence that, had Mr Haines’ marriage to A endured, he would ever eventually have found his way back to England. By September 2005, both of the English properties had been sold, and the English experiment looked to have been over. Whether or not this was something that Mr Haines had some regrets about, it appears to have been a decision which he made willingly, at the very least in the interest of his marriage. There is no evidence of any longer-term plan, or hope, that a further effort would be made to move the family to England, nor either that he was planning to return to England in the event of marital breakdown.

[48]After this time, however, things in Germany became uncomfortable for Mr Haines. I accept that he could not have anticipated that things would turn sour for him at Grohe within the first year or so of taking up that position. Notwithstanding this, the reaction to the difficulties encountered in the wake of his attempted cost-cutting did not prompt any quick moving on, as had been the case when the family failed to settle in the UK, in Sweden or in Russia. Rather, the family did begin to rent in Gstaad, Switzerland, alongside retaining their primary home in Dusseldorf. Attempting to ride out this difficult time in Germany can be seen as a sharp contrast to their swift return from those other places, and where the difficulty now related to Mr Haines’ employment, rather than the happiness of his wife and family. As they soon had one child in school in Switzerland, and the other in Germany, and came to straddle a life in both countries, there is certainly no indication that the German problems being encountered might prompt another attempt to relocate to England or Wales.

[49]In fact, what happened next was that both children attended school in Switzerland, and, Mr Haines says, a family decision was made to relocate to that country. In April 2010, a first rented property in Luzern was acquired, and Mr Haines became tax resident in Switzerland. This was followed by the apartment on D Strasse, from the following June. The children now were 18 and 16, and so their school years were drawing to a close. The relocation at this time would therefore appear to have been about choices made by Mr Haines and A for their lives, rather than for the benefit of their children. That October, B attended university in England, but no property was acquired in England then or for another two years, when C also came to England for her university education. Instead, two plots were acquired in Switzerland, in October 2010 and April 2011. In fact, nothing came of any plan to build on them, and I have not derived any assistance from the artists impressions which Mr Haines has produced which may or may not relate to the plots which he purchased. It is however relevant that plots were being purchased in Switzerland at this time, whilst B was beginning his university career in England. There is no suggestion in this that Mr Haines was ever planning a return to live permanently in England, or anywhere else, in this period of his life.

[50]As indicated, there was obviously a reconsideration when C also came to the UK for her tertiary education in 2012. The acquisition of a property in Berkshire in June 2012, just up the road from where the family had briefly lived in 2004, presaged her attendance at an English university, just over 3 months later. However, the family continued to rent both in Gstaad and in Luzern, and I am not persuaded that the Berkshire purchase was any indication that Mr Haines was intending to effect a full relocation by this acquisition. The property was acquired in the name of A, but I assume this was for the purposes to tax efficiency, or perhaps to avoid any complication from Mr Haines owning a residential property outside Switzerland. A Swiss newspaper article from August 2013 talks of their move as confirmed and permanent. The fact that the properties in Switzerland were rented as opposed to purchased is not in this instance probative of any element of impermanence in the quality of the residence. At the same time there is evidence that Mr Haines was contemplating a purchase if the property he wanted became available; and also that he continued throughout to be tax resident in Switzerland.

[51]The retention of the Swiss properties is significant too in the context of the failing of Mr Haines’ marriage to A. That might have been a time for Mr Haines to have considered a move back to the UK, albeit he may also have felt himself then locked in by his job at Grohe. However, the acquisition in December 2013 of Villa Rose in Mallorca does indicate that he had both the means and the interest to buy attractive properties in a number of jurisdictions, whilst always retaining his Swiss base. There is no compelling evidence that he ever intended to make Mallorca a permanent home, even after his relationship with Ms Lazcano began after they met on the island in 2014. Indeed, Villa Rose was let out periodically during 2015 to 2017, and again in 2022.

[52]Whilst inevitably once the relationship with Ms Lazcano had begun, Mr Haines spent more time in Mallorca than he had previously, he also in April 2015 applied for his ‘C’ permanent residence permit in Switzerland, the month before he and A filed a joint Swiss divorce petition. He was thus committing to long term residence in Switzerland, notwithstanding a child at university in London, and a girlfriend in Mallorca. Of course, I accept that in part this may have been influenced by reasons of tax efficiency and expediency, but having taken the decision to relocate there from Germany a few years earlier, there is no evidence that his residence in Switzerland was not real or was somehow staged. And there is no evidence either at this stage that he was planning to return to England at some planned or even unidentified point in the future. The Swiss ‘C’ permit was obtained later in 2015, and in June of that year his divorce from A was finalised, on the basis of his Swiss domicile.

[53]Ms Mottahedan urges on me that Mr Haines has retained his essential ‘Englishness’, and that he still describes himself in interviews as a ‘boy from Chard’. Being a proud Englishman does not, in my judgment, preclude the surrendering of English domicile and the acquisition of a domicile of choice elsewhere. By marrying in West Germany, living and working there for three decades and always returning there with his family when foreign postings proved unsuccessful, Mr Haines, I am satisfied was demonstrating a long-term intention, at that stage, to retain a German domicile and to remain a German resident indefinitely. There is absolutely no evidence of any long-term plan to come back to Britain at any point in the future, as indeed he has not, nor to strike out elsewhere. That his children both chose a British university in due course is not probative of any change in his own life choices, nor is the purchase of a home in Berkshire whilst they were there. I accept that maintaining a domicile abroad for tax purposes alone may in some cases run hand in hand with a long-term intention to return home, and the fact of such intention may preclude a finding that a domicile of origin has been surrendered, despite appearances. However, I am not satisfied that this is such a case, which would essentially here have to amount to a subterfuge perpetrated over decades.

[54]Whilst Ms Cowton KC assures me that the concepts of domicile in England and Switzerland are sufficiently similar for that fact to be highly relevant to my enquiry, in the absence of any expert evidence to that effect I will apply the English test, set out above, and not be bound by the fact of the Swiss determination. I will take into account that Mr Haines appears to have remained a proud Englishman, but at the same time he is one whom by 2015 had not been primarily resident in England, other than for two brief unsuccessful periods in the late 1980s and the early/mid-2000s, for some 33 years. And whilst that longevity is not itself any determinative proof of his lack of intention to return to live in England, it is evidence that the prospect was not uppermost on his mind. On the basis that I find that he had, by the time of his marriage to A in 1987, committed to a life in West Germany without any intended or anticipated end date, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities, notwithstanding the distance now from those events, that he had acquired a domicile of choice in that country, and lost his domicile of origin in England and Wales. He could not then have foreseen the events that would drive him away from that country in the late 2000s, after the negative reaction to his cost-cutting at Grohe.

[55]Furthermore, when life in Germany came literally under threat after the difficulties encountered at Grohe, there was no point when Mr Haines seems to have been without a plan. Once his intention to remain in Germany was lost, he remained physically in residence there until the move to Switzerland, which I am satisfied was both planned and purposeful. The long-term plans which he and A had held for a life together in Germany were altered to the extent that that vision was now transferred to Switzerland. There was no point at which Mr Haines’ domicile of origin might be said to have revived.

[56]It is significant that before he gave up, as he evidently has, his domicile in Germany, he and A had for four years or so been renting in Switzerland, and that when they moved there fully, they did so consciously, to a country with which they were familiar. Despite the earlier failed attempts to break new ground in England, in Russia and in Sweden, which were cut short because of the family’s failure to settle, the Swiss move proved enduring, notwithstanding the eventual breakdown of Mr Haines’ marriage. This suggests that when the German domicile of choice was surrendered, the legal position of adopting Swiss domicile was also in fact reflected by the true underlying position, that this was where he was now intending to make his permanent and indefinite home. I am satisfied that his family was an international and European family, and that there is sufficient evidence that they chose consciously and for good cause to make what was intended to be a permanent switch of their lives, and with it his domicile, from Germany to Switzerland by the summer of 2010. It is relevant in this, although not I acknowledge determinative, that his divorce from A took place under Swiss law, and on the basis of that Swiss domicile. Other evidence may be gleaned by considering subsequent events.

[57]By the time that his marriage to A ended, and he met Ms Lazcano, I am therefore clear that Mr Haines had deliberately surrendered his German domicile of choice and replaced it with one in Switzerland, both in Swiss law and in fact. On that basis, I would need to be persuaded as explained above that he had subsequently given up both his intention to reside indefinitely in Switzerland, and also his actual residence there, for Mr Haines’ domicile of origin to have revived. Even if that were not the case, it became clear that meeting Ms Lazcano, soon after acquiring Villa Rose, was not to be enough to trigger a change of heart, notwithstanding her sustained dislike of his Swiss residence and her spending so few days there with him throughout their relationship – she says only around fifty such days.

[58]I acknowledge that the couple would spend time together at Villa Rose, and also that Mr Haines loaned funds to Ms Lazcano to enable her to purchase her own apartment in Mallorca in December 2015. It is also the case that from 2016, Mr Haines rented in Belgravia, London, whilst looking for a new job following the end of his position with Grohe, and that he and Ms Lazcano together looked at a series of properties to purchase in London. After the blessing ceremony in Mallorca in September 2017, Mr Haines did then purchase a property in London, where again the couple would spend time, but, I am satisfied, never enough to make that property their primary residence. Describing the property as ‘homey’ in 2019 after it had been refurbished and decorated by Ms Lazcano was clearly a compliment to her, but not evidence that Mr Haines had determined to surrender his Swiss domicile of choice, even though in these years it would not have been hard for him to do so if he had so elected.

[59]During the time that Mr Haines and Ms Lazcano were in a relationship, it was inevitable that their time when they were together would be spent predominantly in places where she was happy, which appear to have been Mallorca, and London. It is not surprising that he would have provided for her membership of London clubs like Oswald’s and Annabel’s. That was their milieu. He also loaned her funds for her acquisition of a second Mallorcan apartment, subject to an overarching loan agreement. However, Mr Haines’ underlying commitment to his Swiss domicile was maintained, I am satisfied, even though it must have required a concerted effort on his behalf to do so.

[60]Whilst Ms Lazcano says that the rental of D Strasse in Luzern in 2020 was to enable Mr Haines to spend more time there for tax reasons, what I am clear that this shows is his determination not to surrender his domicile of choice, but to maintain his actual residence in the country despite her reluctance to join him there. He was demonstrating a clear intention to maintain his domicile by his physical choices during a relationship which did not otherwise naturally propel him towards that course. He may always have retained a fondness for English life and things, but he has never chosen to reconnect properly with this jurisdiction. Instead, his choice has been to retain the Swiss domicile that he had adopted with A when they relocated there with their family.

[61]From 2021, there were serious issues in the relationship between Ms Lazcano and Mr Haines. From about the same time, there were proposals for the sale of K Company, in which by now Mr Haines had a valuable equity stake. Mr Haines also made for the first time, and then withdrew, an application for Swiss naturalisation. As part of an attempted reconciliation, there were discussions for Mr Haines to assist Ms Lazcano’s daughter Y to acquire settled status in the UK, and for Ms Lazcano herself to acquire pre-settled status, following Brexit. At the same time, Mr Haines was looking for a much bigger and more valuable house in London, with a view to a possible purchase after any K Company sale. It is clear that there was some possibility in these months that, if the relationship had survived, a condition of its continuing might have been a refocussing on a life in London, and Mallorca, and away from Switzerland, certainly once the K Company sale had concluded. However, at the same time, Mr Haines retained a serviced apartment in Luzern on G Strasse, he says, and I accept, until his former apartment on D Strasse became available again to rent from 2023.

[62]The financial threat from the Joyou litigation had disappeared in the summer of 2022. A letter from October 2022 from Mr Haines to Ms Lazcano certainly seemed to hold out a possibility that once any adverse tax consequences from the sale of K Company had passed, he could be willing to implement a change, provided they could reach an agreement about its terms, from April 2023. But, there was then no agreement concluded between them. In January 2023, Mr Haines signed a rental agreement for his former family home on D Strasse in Luzern from the following September for up to 5 years. In February 2023, Mr Haines commenced a search for a home to purchase in the Swiss city, which has not yet concluded. On 23 February he signed a domicile statement for his English accountants and his executors recording his burial wishes, those being that his ashes should be scattered in Lake Luzern. Any thoughts that he might have had of giving up his Swiss domicile for the sake of his relationship with Ms Lazcano appear to have receded from this point. Though he might at one point have been reconsidering his intentions, his actual residence was always maintained.

[63]The relationship between Mr Haines and Ms Lazcano was not yet over, and continued until about the end of 2023. She says that in the summer of that year the couple considered the purchase of a ‘bolt-hole’ in Cornwall. I am not satisfied that Mr Haines has ever harboured a serious intention for his ashes to be scattered there, despite it being the venue for childhood English holidays, and certainly not in circumstances where his relationship with Ms Lazcano has come to an end. She also says that she assisted with the decoration of the D Strasse apartment in the September of 2023, as a base for them in Switzerland until the sale of the K Company shares. This was a clear sign that Mr Haines was still making sure to maintain his Swiss residence, notwithstanding any mixed feelings about longer term plans that he might previously have exhibited.

[64]In the first half of 2024, the K Company sale was called off, and the relationship between the couple finally came to an end, with the calling off by Ms Lazcano of the couples’ therapy which had been ongoing, and the commencement of financial negotiations between them. Whilst it is the case that in December 2024 Ms Lazcano has covertly recorded Mr Haines telling her that he has ‘got to stay in Switzerland until I sell [K Company]’, this is not evidence that he had by then given up the Swiss residence that he has studiously maintained, regardless of any wavering of intention, nor is it persuasive evidence that he never acquired Swiss domicile in the first place in 2010. I am satisfied that he did not expect, after settling in Switzerland with A, that he would some years later find himself in a relationship with someone who did not enjoy Switzerland. I find that he had the requisite intention then to acquire a Swiss domicile of choice, which he has retained then by his continued residence in the country.

[65]I am not satisfied that throughout his life Mr Haines has harboured an intention to return to the UK, as Ms Mottahedan suggests. ‘Looking back through the whole of his life’, I am satisfied that he has intended to be domiciled first in Germany, and then in Switzerland indefinitely, and that whilst he has contemplated a change from time to time, and particularly if his relationship with Ms Lazcano had survived, he has never settled on a definite intention to make any further change, nor actually ceased his Swiss residence. He didn’t after all join K Company until 2018, after which the possibility of a further major liquidity event would have become a possibility. I find that he had acquired Swiss domicile long before then. Now that he has a new relationship with, and is married to, a German national, with whom he spends time predominantly in Switzerland, I am satisfied that any thoughts of a possible relocation and with it a rebasing of his domicile to the UK have receded. When he spoke in a WhatsApp of Switzerland as meaning ‘loneliness’ to him in a conversation with Ms Lazcano in June 2025, Mr Haines was already by then engaged to his now wife, Z. I am satisfied that he was dissembling then to avoid a more difficult conversation.

[66]I have, as I have made clear, formed the clear view having heard evidence from both parties that Mr Haines has discharged the burden of proof which is on him, on the balance of probabilities, to satisfy me that that he has lost his domicile of origin, and acquired successive domiciles of choice, in Germany and then in Switzerland. I apply the words of Scarman J in Re Fuld (above), that a ‘domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear, cogent and compelling evidence that the relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of choice’. I am satisfied to the required standard that Mr Haines did so intend, in West Germany, and then later in Switzerland. I am satisfied too that despite all he has determined to maintain his Swiss domicile, remaining resident there throughout since his relocation from Germany.

[67]This does mean that when Ms Lazcano’s nullity petition was issued in August 2025, with its jurisdiction based on Mr Haines’ domicile then in England and Wales, this Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain it.

[68]That is my judgment. 17 July 2026