M v G [2026] EWFC 200

[2026] EWFC 200

Case No CM22P00728

Date 21 July 2026

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT CHELMSFORD

Before

MR JUSTICE HARRISON

Between

MApplicant

GRespondent

The applicant father appeared in person, for in person

assisted by a Qualified Legal Representative, Mr Kenneth Mgbokwe

Ms Charlotte Hughes (instructed by John Fowler Solicitors LLP) for respondent mother

Hearing Hearing dates: 13, 14 and 15 May 2026

APPROVED JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 21 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the parties, the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]I am concerned with two children: B aged 5 and M aged 3.

[2]In this judgment I shall refer to the applicant as ‘the father’ and to the respondent as ‘the mother’. The father has acted in person although he was assisted by a Qualified Legal Representative, Mr Kenneth Mgbokwe, in respect of the cross-examination of the mother. The mother has been represented by Ms Charlotte Hughes of counsel.

[3]The proceedings first started in July 2022 and have been ongoing for something approaching four years. It is no exaggeration to say that most of these children’s lives has been overshadowed by this litigation.

[4]In September and October 2024 HHJ Renvoize conducted a fact-finding hearing over five days in relation to the parties’ cross-allegations of domestic abuse. She gave judgment on 11 November 2024. The case is now listed for final determination.

Background Summary

[5]The father is aged 44 and the mother is 40. They are both UK nationals.

[6]The parties were involved in a relationship for approximately five years. It appears to have been unhappy at times and during 2021 the parties engaged in counselling to address the issues between them. They separated in May 2022.

[7]B was born in 2020 and was not yet two when her parents separated. It is common ground that she did not have contact with the father between July 2022 and June 2025. M was not yet born when the parties separated and did not have any contact with the father until June 2025.

[8]The father’s application for a child arrangements order was first issued on 14 July 2022. It is unnecessary for me to set out the full procedural history of the application as it is contained in the judgment dated 11 November 2024. Prior to that date, as set out by HHJ Renvoize, amongst other things, the father:(a) issued a number of contempt applications including against the mother and those described below;

(b) alleged that the mother was engaging in parental alienation and controlling and manipulative behaviour, struggled with her mental health, was a heavy drinker and had been sexually, physically and financially abusive to the father;

(c) applied for a transfer of residence of the children on four occasions and made further interim applications for shared care orders;

(d) alleged that the children were at risk of sexual exploitation for money from the mother and that they had been physically abused by her;

(e) made seven referrals to the local authority in the space of eight months making allegations that the mother had harmed the children (none of which were substantiated);

(f) made further referrals to the health visitor and the police making allegations also found to be unsubstantiated;

(g) caused Cafcass to raise concerns about his behaviour and presentation and his references to the mother in ‘degrading and negative terms’;

(h) refused suggestions of supervised contact, opting instead to have no contact with the children; he suggested in his evidence that the mother’s offer of supervised contact by was a form of abuse;

(i) issued a contempt application against two Cafcass Officers and a further such application against the mother for perjury, dishonesty and making false statements; the applications were struck out;

(j) made an application seeking to appeal all decisions to date made by all judges, which application was struck out;

(k) issued a contempt application against the mother’s solicitor which was struck out;

(l) issued an application alleging illegal and immoral activity by HMCTS, judges and Cafcass and that the court and various professionals had conspired against him; the application was refused on 5 June 2024;

(m) issued an application for judicial review alleging that judges in Chelmsford were corrupt and incompetent; this was followed by a further judicial review application making allegations of corruption and abuse of power by judges.

[9]The November 2024 judgment addressed allegations of domestic abuse which each party had made against the other. HHJ Renvoize rejected all of the allegations made by the father against the mother, save that the mother accepted that there had been some ‘minor incidents’ when B had been hurt by accident. The rejected allegations included claims by the father that:(a) the mother had alienated the children from him and failed to include him in decisions relating to his parental responsibility;

(b) the mother had caused the children physical harm or left them in the care of a third party who had done so;

(d) the mother had been abusive to the father during the relationship and since separation;

(e) the mother suffered from narcissistic parent syndrome and had used the proceedings to abuse him;

[10]Conversely, the judge made the following findings of domestic abuse against the father, accepting that the following ‘clusters’ of harmful behaviour were established on the basis of individual allegations:(a) The father sent messages to the mother the tone of which was abusive and humiliating;

(b) The father was unable to accept dissenting opinions and the proceedings had been conducted in a way which had caused the mother harassment and as a means to seek control.

[11]HHJ Renvoize also found that the father held very negative and unfounded beliefs about the mother and that his ability to shield the children from these required assessment.

[12]As well as addressing the specific allegations of domestic abuse raised by the parties, the judge made some general findings about the parties’ evidence. She found the mother to be ‘a straightforward witness who answered all the questions put to her in a direct and straightforward way’. Her evidence as to the impact upon her of the father’s abusive and harassing behaviours was ‘clear and compelling’. She had demonstrated an ability to recognise the benefits for the children of spending time with the father despite her concerns and despite Cafcass not making such a recommendation. Her evidence was to be preferred to that of the father on disputed allegations.

[13]HHJ Renvoize found the father to be ‘very combative’ when cross-examined about messages he had sent. He was ‘evasive and argued the point rather than simply answering the questions’.

The judge made a number of other findings of fact against the father, including:

[14]

(a) His misinterpretation of messages sent by the mother was ‘an illuminating example and one of many examples where the father characterises the mother and her behaviours very negatively when objectively that interpretation does not bear scrutiny’.

(b) The father’s inability to assess the mother’s behaviours objectively was a key marked feature of his evidence.

(d) His litigation conduct was ‘some of the most extreme I have had to deal with’. His behaviour was at times ‘relentless’;

(e) He struggles to control and conceal his views that the mother is ‘a narcissistic abuser of his children’;

(f) Messages showed a dynamic of the father seeking to control and dominate arrangements.

[15]In addressing the question of interim contact,

the judge held as follows:

“The risks to the children come from [the father]’s relationship to, his attitude to and his communication with [the mother]. If the children are exposed to one parent bullying or denigrating the other parent, that exposes the children to significant emotional harm. Contact arrangements causing one parent to feel pressured or harassed or controlled results in the children suffering significant harm and those, in my judgment, are the main areas of risks to the children.”

[16]Despite those risks, the judge determined that ‘whilst matters are investigated’ the children should have some professionally supervised contact with the father. She said:

“It does not necessarily need to be forever. It is a step forward. It would allow the children a relationship with their father in circumstances they have not seen him for two and a half years. It would give, importantly, the court, the parties and professionals independent contact notes as to how the children are responding and, crucially, allow [the father] the opportunity to show that he can move on from this judgment change his behaviour and shield the children from his negative views in relation to their mother. If he cannot, it allows a professional to step in and stop the session, thereby protecting the children.”

[17]The judge went to say that in making her decision about interim contact she had weighed up the risks of the father continuing his behaviour, stating:

“In the short-term, I am satisfied that the supervisor will be able to step in and stop the contact if negative views are being shared or contact is not being utilised as a positive experience for the children. In the longer term, there is a risk that they might never move away from supervision. There is a risk that contact may cease. But, on balance, I am satisfied the risk to children of no relationship outweighs those risks to them at this stage either by long-term supervision or contact ceasing after a period of it being re-established.”

[18]In the concluding paragraph of her judgment

the judge said as follows:

“Furthermore, I heard some glimmer of hope from [the father] in his closing submissions which did focus on a wish to move forward. I also recognise that [the mother] herself agrees to supervised contact and herself recognises the benefit that that would pose for the children.”

[19]The father sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision but this was refused.

[20]Regrettably, the judge’s optimism that the father would change his approach was not fulfilled. Since the fact-finding hearing he has continued to create difficulties in the litigation and outside it. In particular:(a) At the November 2024 hearing, a direction was given for Cafcass to file a section 7 report by 18 March 2025. The father had indicated that he wished to apply to instruct an independent social worker (‘ISW’) and he was directed to file any such application by 26 November 2024. No application was issued, but in any event there was no provision for the section 7 direction to be suspended pending determination of the prospective application by the father. Despite the court’s clear directions, the father made clear to the Cafcass Officer did he did not agree to work with her. He also made clear that he did not consent to Cafcass having any involvement or undertaking direct work with the children. He justified his stance on the basis that he was seeking the instruction of an ISW. As a result of the father’s stance, progress in the case was halted.

(b) The father did not co-operate with the mother in relation to B’s enrolment at school and as a consequence she issued an application for a specific issue order on 18 November 2024. This took a considerable time to be resolved. On 30 June 2025 HHJ Renvoize gave a direction permitting the mother to enrol B at a specific school.

(c) Following the November 2024 hearing, the parties were unable to agree upon the identity of a supervisor for contact. As a result of communications sent by the father, a contact centre which the father had identified refused to take on the family. The father put forward a particular individual as a supervisor, but the mother did not agree to this person as a result of certain posts made by them on social media. The issue was eventually resolved at the hearing on 30 June 2025 when HHJ Renvoize directed that the contact should be professionally supervised with the costs being met by the father.

(d) The father was dissatisfied with the court’s decisions on 30 June 2025 and left court before the conclusion of the hearing. He then issued an application seeking to withdraw his substantive application.

(e) On 10 September 2025 the father issued applications for a transfer of residence and to remove the supervision element from his contact. HHJ Renvoize declined to list a further interim hearing and directed that these applications be considered at the final hearing. An enforcement application was also directed to be heard at the final hearing.

(f) On 10 December 2025 the father was represented by counsel, but dispensed with his services mid-way through the hearing. At the hearing, HHJ Renvoize made an order permitting M to be enrolled at the same school as B. The court noted with concern the number of applications made by the father and dismissed his application for a transfer of residence as ‘totally without merit’. The father was unhappy with the court’s decision and left court before the conclusion of the hearing. At court the father stated that he would no longer engage in the proceedings, would not attend contact, would not engage with a psychological assessment and that he intended to appeal the court’s decision. He then declined to respond to attempts by the mother’s solicitors to establish, in accordance with the court’s directions, whether or not he would participate in a psychological assessment.

(g) Despite the court’s decision as to M’s schooling, the father made an application to the local authority seeking M’s enrolment at a different school. The mother had to provide the local authority with a copy of the court’s order.

(h) At the hearing on 10 December 2025 the court gave a direction for an addendum section 7 report to be prepared by Cafcass. On 5 February 2026 Cafcass wrote to the court stating that they were unable to appoint an officer to prepare a report. In subsequent representations, Cafcass Legal explained the reasons for its position. In summary, it said: “(i) [The father] has previously engaged in a pattern of harassment, and what are considered by Cafcass to be intimidatory behaviours towards three individual Cafcass employees. (ii) The impact on those staff members of [the father]’s behaviour has been significant. (iii) Having reviewed the findings made by the court, it appears that [the father]’s concerning behaviours are continuing. (iv) Cafcass has considered alternative ways of potentially working with [the father], however, none of the options are considered appropriate or proportionate to mitigate the concerns.

[21]More positively, following the hearing on 30 June 2025 the father started having contact with the children for two hours each fortnight. The sessions have been professionally supervised and latterly have been based at his home. I have seen the supervisor’s notes about contact. Although there have been some concerns about the father’s conduct during the contact which I highlight below, from the children’s perspective the contact has been a largely positive experience. The mother accepts that the children love the father and look forward to seeing him.

The evidence

[22]In making my decision I have taken into account the evidence which has been filed in bundles prepared by the mother’s solicitors and by the father as well as documents introduced by the father during the course of the hearing.

[23]I heard oral evidence from the parties as well as from two professional witnesses: Dr Mark Hardiman, Consultant Counselling Psychologist and the ISW, Ms Pauline Goff. Each of these professional witnesses had been jointly instructed by the parties pursuant to directions I gave at a case management hearing.

Dr Hardiman

[24]Dr Hardiman prepared a written report dated 7 May 2026 and gave oral evidence. In order to prepare the report he conducted three assessments of each parent (two online and one in person). During his in person assessments he was able to observe each parent interacting with the children. He also conducted brief assessments of each of the children.

[25]Of the father, he said (amongst other things) the following:

“[The father] presents a positive impression to others, whilst understanding the world in strict cognitive and temporal terms. He expects the social world to be rules based and ordered and that he will be able to understand those rules and processes in full. When the world does not work as he predicts it should, this can threaten his sense of emotional wellbeing and he will need to act to resolve the difference by learning more about the issue until he does understand it, or until events have conformed to his pre-existing predictions. When things are happening in the social world that he doesn’t have the information to be able to understand, this can be uncomfortable for him and potentially dysregulating. He is therefore driven to seek to resolve any such situation through an intense effort to establish knowledge and understanding, at times to impose his knowledge and understanding onto the situation even when perhaps the information he has may not always be a good fit for the situation around him. … Overall, and linking this understanding to some of his actions post separation, [the father] understands the world through the lens of his cognitively biased approach. He sees connections between events through the lens of what he already knows and understands. He finds it much harder to accept the perspectives of others unless he can first wholly understand their point of view. When faced with different views to his own, he seeks to impose his own views onto the situation since to him those views are obviously correct given the information he has available to him at that time. He can continue to press his views at times, driven by the need to understand in order to feel safe, both for himself and for the children. Solutions lie in courts, paperwork and agreements, concrete rational information which feels safe to him. They do not lie in feelings and relationships, which he tends to consider to much less. He may therefore at times risk being experienced by others as imposing and controlling, perhaps also quite relentless at times perhaps. He is unlikely to be aware of his impact on the other at these times since his motivation is in his view reasonable and appropriate given what he knows and needs to know. He can tend to see the world only through the lens of his own knowledge and understanding and he can find it much more difficult to accept information from others where it differs from his understanding. This can lead him to present with a degree of paranoia in his thinking, rejecting views other than his own. Finally and relatedly, [the father]’s bias towards understanding the world through his own knowledge and perception means that he will experience difficulty accepting any form of outside assistance or treatment since this at some level will require him to accept the perspective of the other in a way that he is not likely to want to do. It is also likely to mean that he will find some of what is written in this report about him and the family situation difficult to accept unfortunately.”

[26]In relation to the father’s approach to the court’s findings, Dr Hardiman said the following: “[the father] is able to acknowledge that his actions in the past have been seen as unacceptable. He does so by separating this acknowledgement from the present day self in several ways. He notes process issues related to the fact finding hearing itself, as well as to my letter of instruction and the request for me to explore this issue with him. He describes not his actions but their perception by others. He makes clear that what was found was related to the past. He highlights the need to look at the present and the future instead of the past. In doing so, he is able to both offer an acknowledgement of what was found, but also distance the self from those events and therefore from the findings. Looking at the present day, [the father] understands that his actions are reasonable and positive and that he is negotiating events today in the only way he can. Where his actions today may have negative impacts on others, he can appear to have limited or no recognition of this fact, or any recognition that he might want to change his approach. It is likely therefore, that any patterns that appear in his actions presently are most likely to continue in the future unless there is some other change. Therefore to be specific, if any of his actions are presently seen as being harmful to either mother or the children, then it is unlikely in my view that this will change in future unless [the father] himself makes underlying changes which will be discussed later.

[27]As for the dynamics of the father’s relationship with the mother, Dr Hardiman made the following observations: “[The father] now almost wholly understands his relationship with [the mother] in terms of the legal process. When pressed to focus on relational matters he is only able to do so for short periods of time before returning to legal matters. Underlying this, his generalised approach to relationships is almost wholly cognitive and procedural in nature, which would be consistent with prioritising legal process over interpersonal relationships and feelings. However, the extent to which he does so is in my view very marked and significant. In effect, his interpersonal relationships with [the mother] as the other parent to his children appears to have been lost in favour of a consuming and almost exclusive focus on the legal proceedings.

[28]Dr Hardiman was asked to comment upon the father’s ability to adhere to boundaries and reported: “[The father] understands that his actions, especially his legal actions for instance, are necessary and appropriate given the situation he finds himself in. He understands that others have found his past actions to be excessive, but as per my previous answer, he distances the present day self from this fact. [The father] does not therefore perceive his current actions to be at fault, and as discussed considers that he should therefore continue unchanged. Where it is perceived by others that [the father] may be transgressing boundaries presently, it is therefore most likely that such behaviour will continue unchanged in future in my view.

[29]Dr Hardiman was instructed to set out his recommendations in relation to contact between the father and the children and said:

“There are in my view two issues of concern with regards to contact. Firstly, the dynamics of contact suggest the presence of risk to the children in the event that they were to experience a significant and sustained increase in time spent with father. I have described this in response to previous questions. Secondly, the impact on [the mother] of the ongoing dynamics between the parents and the impact of legal proceedings. In the absence of meaningful change in [the father], it is difficult to imagine that meaningful and sustained change could be achieved in these issues. Bearing in mind the findings made and the relevant practice directions, it may be that the best interests of the children (and their mother) may require a fixed and limited level of contact to take place with clear and unambiguous boundaries in place. If this does not protect mother and the children, perhaps any level of contact may be too much for this family system as it is presently functioning to be able to manage without harm being caused.”

[30]Dr Hardiman considered that it is likely to be very difficult for the father to engage with and make use of therapy. He said that the father had reported attitudes consistent with treatment rejection and that he finds it generally very difficult to accept viewpoints which do not mirror his own pre-existing viewpoints.

[31]In his oral evidence, Dr Hardiman emphasised the need, as a priority, for ‘the family system to stabilise’. He said that at this juncture the focus should be on ‘stabilising the system’ before making changes to the children’s contact with the father. Once that stability has been achieved, there ‘may be space for the children to spend time between the parents’. His view was that if the court came to the conclusion that the necessary family stability was not going to be achieved it would not be fair for the children to be ‘left in the middle of a system which in the absence of change will have to come to an end at some point’. Expressed in ordinary language, he was suggesting that if the father was incapable of making changes to his behaviour it would not be in the interests of the children to continue to have direct contact with him.

[32]Dr Hardiman agreed with the suggestion by Ms Hughes that the father must recognise the need for him to stop criticising the mother’s parenting. He spoke about the ‘big picture’ being ‘a family system’ which could get to the stage where there is so much criticism and intrusion that he would worry about the children being in the middle of it.

[33]Dr Hardiman largely agreed with the proposition that the father needs to understand and accept the court’s findings before the necessary stability for the family can be achieved. He did, however, identify a potential ‘narrow pathway’, supported by the father’s Buddhist practice, in which it might be possible therapeutically for him to focus upon the present rather than acknowledging his past failings.

[34]As for the mother, Dr Hardiman’s evaluation was that while in some respect she sees the world in a similar way to the father, there are also significant differences. She can show a capacity to self-reflect and ‘to mentalise regarding the internal mental states of the other’. She seeks to present a positive self-impression. At times she can be ‘a relatively unimposing parent, seeking to work with collaboration and agreement when perhaps others might be more direct in their instructions’. She could be described as a ‘gentle’ parent. Her approach to parenting was challenged when B became dysregulated during the assessment. She ‘lacked strategies to restore control’ and was unable to offer B ‘an emotionally attuned caregiving experience’. Overall ‘she experiences as sense of hopelessness about the future and does not believe that things can get better’. She worries about being controlled if she were to resume having contact with the father.

[35]Dr Hardiman’s ‘chief area of concern' about the mother relates to ‘her capacity to offer the self to the children to the extent that they might need’. His evidence is that there is ‘clear evidence’ to suggest that she finds it challenging ‘to offer more to the children than an at times rather inhibited and reserved presence, despite the fact that they may clearly need more than this from her.’

[36]Dr Hardiman observed in his report that: “[The mother] feels imposed upon, bombarded and bullied by [the father]. He hates her. She understands that his actions are intended to exert control over her. She does not believe that he will change in future since she has seen similar behaviours from him towards others for a long time. His actions are therefore understood by her to be a reflection of his underlying personality and in that sense, unchangeable.

[37]In his oral evidence, Dr Hardiman acknowledged in response to questions from Ms Hughes that his observations of B’s meltdown, upon which some of his conclusions about the mother were in part based, could simply have been, as the mother suggested, ‘a bad day when B was throwing a strop’.

Pauline Goff

[38]Ms Goff prepared a report dated 6 May 2026. It had been intended that prior to completing her report she would have sight of Dr Hardiman’s assessment, but a delay in the instruction of the latter meant that this did not occur.

[39]In order to prepare her report Ms Goff contacted the children’s respective school and nursery. No safeguarding or welfare concerns were identified by either establishment.

[40]Ms Goff observed the mother with the children and considered that she demonstrated ‘warmth, emotional attunement, and appropriate boundary setting’. She recorded the mother’s preference for the children to have no contact with the father and considered that her position arose from ‘concern about [the children’s] emotional safety rather than an intention to obstruct the children’s relationship with the father’. As Ms Goff observed, the mother has complied with court orders and supported supervised contact.

[41]In considering the question of the father’s contact with the children, Ms Goff attached significance to the fact that, based upon her reading of the notes of supervised contact, ‘there has been no incident or event of significant harm which has resulted in the children being unable to attend the contact or enjoy the time with their father.’ While the mother had ‘shared some concerns’ about questions asked of B by the father, these were ‘insufficient to suggest emotional harm’. I note that the mother’s concerns were based upon matters raised by the contact supervisor and recorded in her notes. These included asking B who lives at the mother’s house, telling her that she only has one daddy and talking about the children staying overnight at his house.

[42]At paragraph 9 of her report, referring to what she described as the ‘historical’ findings of the court which the father disputes, Ms Goff stated that ‘my assessment is focussed on current functioning and the children’s welfare rather than contested history’. I find it surprising that she expressed herself in this way: given the court’s factual findings, the relevant factual matrix had been established and could not properly be described as ‘contested history’.

[43]Ms Goff noted that the father’s position was that he sought a shared care arrangement.

[44]During the session of contact Ms Goff was able to observe, she considered that the father ‘demonstrated affection and enthusiasm’. He provided snacks for the children, facilitated play and spoke positively to them. Ms Goff, however, considered that he presented as ‘chaotic’ in his approach, bombarding the children with questions and leaving them insufficient time to respond. She suggested that he needs to ‘slow down’ and spend time with the children in ‘a calm manner’.

[45]Ms Goff noted that the mother had placed B into a particular school. She observed that the father was in agreement with the school ‘at this time’ but that he had wanted her to attend a different school and that in due course he would like her to be home educated. She does not appear to have appreciated that the question of schooling for both children had been resolved by orders of the court, commenting that the children’s respective school and nursery were chosen by the mother ‘without consultation’ with the father. She made clear, however, that there is no reason for B to change school, given that she is happy and settled where she is.

[46]It is noteworthy that in her report Ms Goff does not appear to have addressed the significance of the court’s findings of domestic abuse other than very briefly and superficially. Towards the start of the report, she made reference to the finding about the father’s use of repeated litigation as a means of control or harassment. She made no mention of the other findings made against the father nor of his ongoing conduct since the date of the fact-finding hearing. There are sections of the report which suggest that she sought to maintain a neutral position between the parents rather than acknowledging the serious findings which had been made. In the section addressing parental communication, for example, she made reference to the ‘historic conflict or acrimony between the parents’. Addressing the issue of handovers she recommended that these be undertaken by a third party ‘to reduce the potential for further conflict or allegations’ given ‘the level of parental acrimony’. While I can understand Ms Goff’s wish to appear neutral, I do not consider these formulations to be appropriate as they suggest that, contrary to the court’s findings, the parents were equally to blame for the acrimony between them.

[47]Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 12J was substantively addressed by Ms Goff in just two short paragraphs as follows:

“While there is no finding of direct harm to the children, the Court has found controlling and coercive behaviour by [the father] towards [the mother]. Such dynamics remain relevant insofar as they may impact the children through exposure to conflict, undermining, or emotional distress. Structured and supervised contact arrangements are therefore proportionate and appropriate to safeguard the children’s emotional welfare.”

Structured and supervised contact arrangements are therefore proportionate and appropriate to safeguard the children’s emotional welfare.”

Structured and supervised contact arrangements are therefore proportionate

[48]In the analysis section of her report, when considering the mother’s position that direct contact should cease, Ms Goff said the following:

“At this time, there is no evidence to indicate that [the father] has caused, or is likely to cause, significant harm to the children. As such, the threshold for the cessation of contact on safeguarding grounds is not met, in my view.”

I consider that Ms Hughes is justified in her submission that this formulation suggests that Ms Goff failed to undertake a holistic welfare assessment which had proper regard to the findings made, when reaching her conclusions about contact. It is unclear to me on what basis she alighted upon there being a principle that contact should continue unless a threshold of significant harm is established. likely to cause, significant harm to the children. As such, the threshold for the cessation of contact on safeguarding grounds is not met, in my view.”

likely to cause, significant harm to the children. As such, the threshold for the

[49]Ms Goff did not support the father’s case that there should be a shared care arrangement, recommending that the children should remain living with the mother. In her written report she recommended that contact should initially continue to be supervised but increase first to four hours and then seven hours on the basis of the father providing ‘clear undertakings that the children do not experience distress or emotional harm by [him] being critical of [their] current situation.’ There should be a move to unsupervised contact following the increase to four hours. She suggested that the court may wish to consider the making of a section 91(14) order against the father for a period of three years. Were the father to revert to discrediting, undermining or complaining about the mother, the matter should be returned to court with an immediate cessation of contact.

[50]Before giving her oral evidence, Ms Goff was able to hear the evidence of Dr Hardiman. In the light of his evidence, she began by stating that she had changed her position and that the contact schedule should be slowed down. She continued to recommend that contact be increased to four hours but did not recommend any further increase at this stage. She said that it should continue to be professionally supervised. She further suggested that the school could be approached to initiate a Common Assessment Framework. She ventilated the potential for a review after six months when the progress of contact could be considered.

[51]Ms Goff expressed the opinion that were the father to disagree with the court’s decision and ‘walk away’ from the children, this would be very emotionally harmful for them.

[52]In answer to questions put to her in cross-examination by Ms Hughes, Ms Goff said that she had read the court’s judgment and was clear about what had been found, despite the omissions in her report. In response to the suggestion that her report did not reflect the severity of the findings about the father’s conduct, Ms Goff said that ‘at the risk of sounding naïve’ her focus was on the welfare of the children. Asked about the father having walked out of court hearings since the fact-finding hearing, Ms Goff simply said that this was something she had read in the position statement. I was left with the clear impression that Ms Goff had given insufficient weight to the serious findings made by the court in her analysis.

[53]Ms Goff did make the valid point, however, that although findings had been made against the father, the court had also decided to make an order for him to have supervised contact with the children. The children had been enjoying their time with the father and, as I have already observed, she considered it would be emotionally harmful for them were that to end if, for example, the father were to ‘walk away’. I accept her evidence about this.

The father

[54]The father filed a brief statement to which he exhibited a ‘parenting plan’ setting out that he seeks an increase in contact leading up to a shared care arrangement. He proposes that communication should take place using the parenting application ‘Our Family Wizard’.

[55]In his oral evidence, the father accepted that findings had been made against him by the court, although it was clear to me that he did not accept that he had behaved in a manner which justified the making of those findings. He said, for example, that he had not intended to control the mother through litigation; he had simply done what he thought was best and what his barristers had advised him to do.

[56]Similarly, in my view, the father struggled to accept the court’s rejection of allegations he had made against the mother. Asked whether he agreed with the court’s findings, he said that he had put forward a Scott Schedule and evidence and that ‘the Cafcass record’ showed that both parties had alleged domestic abuse. He referred also to the police having recorded several crimes of domestic abuse with the mother as the perpetrator and to his having been moved ‘for his safety’ in 2024. He did, however, say that he wanted to move forward for the sake of the children and that he believed his behaviour had changed since the fact-finding hearing.

[57]The father’s view was that HHJ Renvoize had determined that the supervision of his contact was to be an interim short-term measure and blamed the mother for her refusal to agree to end the supervision. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not consider there to be any justification in this complaint.

[58]In relation to the school’s letter raising concerns about his communications, the father said that he ‘apologised if he was out of turn’. He asserted that he had not known about the school enrolment and that he had become upset when he found out that he was not registered as the children’s father on the records. As for making referrals to social services, the father stated that as a holder of parental responsibility it was his right to do so. Similarly, when pressed about repeated applications he had made, he said that it was his right to do so. He sought to excuse any legal action he had taken on the basis that he was a litigant in person. As for walking out of court hearings, the father said that he had done so as he had been upset. He did not accept the reasons given by the contact centre for refusing to work with him.

[59]The father was asked about his decision to call family members during contact despite this not having been agreed. He said that there was no order to prevent the children from having calls with their extended family. He was unable to acknowledge that acting without the authority of the contact supervisor or the mother’s agreement was wrong. Rather he saw this as an example of the mother seeking to control the children’s time with him.

[60]The father accepted asking the children questions about their living arrangements but maintained that it was ‘a conversation’ and that he was not interrogating them. He accepted asking B if she lived with the mother’s partner. Even though B had not said that the partner lived at her home, the father accepted that he sent an email, including to the court, raising an ‘urgent safeguarding enquiry’ resulting from B’s purported disclosure that he did live there. While he accepted that it might ‘possibly’ have been an overreaction to send an email threatening to make a report to the police and social services, the father sought to excuse his actions on the basis that, as he perceived it, he had been excluded from the children’s lives.

[61]The father said that he had attended online domestic abuser perpetrator courses and had been to counselling. He said that he had learned about how to behave and the importance of self-reflection and taking a step back before replying to things. He was unable to identify how his behaviour might have had an impact on the mother. Asked whether it was having a negative impact on her and the children, he responded that the issue was ‘more nuanced’ and that the proceedings had had a negative impact on ‘everybody’. He did not accept that he undermines the mother to the children, maintaining that it was the other way round.

[62]My overall impression of the father is that he is incredibly self-centred and feels a burning sense of injustice about the limited relationship he has with his children. He cannot see that he is substantially to blame for this and attributes his predicament to the mother’s actions. He has no ability to see things from her perspective and is wholly lacking in insight about the impact of his behaviour upon her and upon the children. The father was determined to present the mother as being at least equally to blame for the children’s situation. He has no regard or respect for her as a parent. As part of his closing submissions he invited the court to consider a transfer of residence, demonstrating a wholesale lack of comprehension about how such a monumental change might affect the children. I find it staggering that he should advance such an application yet again when a few months ago an identical application was rejected by HHJ Renvoize as being totally without merit.

[63]The father was almost child-like in complaining to Dr Hardiman about the unfairness of his contact continuing to be supervised if the mother was not to be subject also to supervision. The paranoia identified by Dr Hardiman was evident during the hearing when he reacted with great suspicion upon learning that the mother was giving her evidence from the same room as her counsel.

[64]Overall, I find that the father has a wholly distorted perception of events which means that it is difficult to rely upon assertions he makes which lack corroboration from an independent source.

[65]I do, however, accept that the father loves his children and that he has a genuine desire to have a full relationship with them. He been able to make his sessions of supervised contact an experience for the children which they have largely enjoyed, even though he has not been able to restrain himself from asking inappropriate questions at times.

[66]From the children’s perspective it is hugely regrettable that the father continues obsessively to view their mother as an inadequate parent who is responsible for harming their relationship with him. It is a view which I find to be entrenched. I accept Dr Hardiman’s opinion that the father is unlikely to be receptive to therapy and that he is unable to accept views which differ from his own. I consider it likely that he will continue to make and threaten to make complaints about the mother to professionals such as social services and the police and that he will continue to make applications to court, unable to appreciate that such conduct is harmful to his children and, from his own perspective, wholly counter-productive to his ambition of having a fuller relationship with them. I also consider that in the absence of supervision the father is likely to communicate his views about the mother to the children and question them about her parenting and their living arrangements more than he has done while his contact has been supervised.

The mother

[67]The mother has prepared a statement dated 24 March 2026 which she adopted as her evidence in chief. She said in evidence that she feels scared about having contact with the father around arrangements for the children. Looking back, she said that she had ‘really struggled’ at times, especially in the aftermath of the parties’ separation. She worried that she would not be able to cope with having to deal with the father as she had done previously. She was also worried that the father would use communications with her to harass her and to be difficult and condescending.

[68]The mother proposed that there should be indirect contact only in the form of letters, cards and small gifts. Communication should be via a dedicated email account. She said that she was willing to engage in therapy as recommended by Dr Hardiman.

[69]The mother was cross-examined on the father’s behalf by his QLR. I found the manner in which she was cross-examined to be revealing. Contrary to the father’s stated desire to focus on moving forward, some of the questioning on his behalf related to past events and reflected the father’s case that the mother is a parent who is deficient to an extent which would justify a transfer of residence. The father went so far as to suggest that M had been born on a psychiatric ward, an assertion based upon a medical record which was clearly a mistake.

[70]The mother did fairly accept that the children are always pleased to see their father and that they loved him. She said that she supported the children to have contact and that they always asked when they were due to see their father again. She nevertheless considered that continuing contact was not in their interests.

[71]The mother did not accept the suggestion that she was alienating the children by preventing them from bringing items home from their father, making the fair point that he has previously threatened to charge her for items if they were not returned to him.

[72]The mother was clear in her evidence that she has not allowed the children to call her partner ‘Dad’ and that the children do not live with him. Nor had she said to the children that she does not like the father.

[73]I found the mother’s evidence to be balanced and truthful and I accept it. I consider that she would ideally like the children to have a full relationship with their father and that it is only with considerable sadness that she has come to the conclusion that as a result of his behaviour this would not be in their interests. The fact that the children have had positive experiences during contact is to her credit and demonstrates that, contrary to the father’s belief, she has sought to promote a positive image of him. It is noteworthy that in the past she has agreed to the children having direct contact, even though this was not recommended by Cafcass. I also find that the mother is vulnerable and feels anxious, insecure and even frightened as a consequence of the father’s relentless behaviour, in particular the repeated steps he has taken to undermine her care of the children by making applications to court and complaints to social services and the police. In my view, this vulnerability is likely to be reflected in her parenting style, which was raised as an issue by Dr Hardiman.

Legal Principles

[74]In determining this application, the children’s welfare is my paramount consideration. I must have regard to the welfare checklist contained in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.

[75]It is also relevant to consider the presumption in section 1(2A) of the 1989 Act that it will further the welfare of a child for a parent to have ‘involvement’ in the life of the child. As set out in subsection (2B) ‘involvement’ in this context means ‘involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but not any particular division of a child’s time’. A parent will fall within these provisions if they can be involved in a child’s life in a way that does not put the child at risk of significant harm (section 1(6)(a)).

[76]It is further necessary for me to have regard to Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 12J. Paragraph 35 of this practice direction provides that:

“When deciding the issue of child arrangements the court should ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm and will be in the best interests of the child.”

[77]Paragraph 36 requires the court to apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist with reference to any domestic abuse which has occurred and to any expert risk assessment obtained. Paragraph 36(2) provides that:

“In particular, the court should in every case consider any harm- (a) which the child as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse; and (b) which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering, if a child arrangements order is made.” (a) which the child as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse; and (b) which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering, if a child arrangements order is made.”

[78]Paragraph 36(3) provides that:

“The court should make an order for contact only if it is satisfied- (a) that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact; and (b) that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent.” (a) that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact; and (b) that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent.”

[79]Paragraph 37 provides that:

“In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider – (a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living; (b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents; (c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent; (d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and (e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.” (a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living; (b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents; (c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent; (d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and (e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.”

[80]The father referred me to reported authorities which establish the importance for a child of having contact with a parent with whom they do not live. These include the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re C (A Child) (Direct Contact: Suspension)

[2011] EWCA Civ 521

, where Munby LJ set out the relevant principles at paragraph 37 onwards, beginning with some of the jurisprudence from Strasburg. As summarised by Munby LJ at paragraph 38:

“The principles are not in doubt. The starting point (see Gnahoré v France [2004] 1 FLR 800, para [50]) is that: ‘The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of family life.’ and (see Görgülü v Germany [2004] 1 FLR 894, para [48]) that: ‘it is in a child's interest for its family ties to be maintained, as severing such ties means cutting a child off from its roots, which can only be justified in very exceptional circumstances.’” ‘The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of family life.’ ‘it is in a child's interest for its family ties to be maintained, as severing such ties means cutting a child off from its roots, which can only be justified in very exceptional circumstances.’”

[81]These principles apply in both public and private law cases. They do not, however, mean that a parent is entitled to contact with a child irrespective of the circumstances. As Munby LJ explained at para 40: “The point about the child's welfare is crucial. It reflects the settled Strasbourg jurisprudence (see for example Scozzari and Giunta v Italy

(2002) 35 EHRR 12

[2000] 2 FLR 771

, para [169]) that a parent: ‘cannot be entitled under Article 8 … to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health and development.’ The point was elaborated in Gnahoré v France

(2002) 34 EHRR 38

, para [59]: "The Court strongly emphasises that in cases of this kind the child's interest must have precedence over any other consideration. It must point out, however, that there is of course a double aspect to this interest. On the one hand, there is no doubt that ensuring that the child grows up in a healthy environment falls within this interest and that Article 8 cannot in any way entitle a parent to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health and development. On the other hand, it is clear that it is nevertheless in the child's interest that the links between him and his family should be maintained except where the family is shown to be especially unworthy for that purpose; to break that link amounts to cutting the child off from his roots. It follows that the child's interest necessitates that only wholly exceptional circumstances may lead to a breaking of the family bond and that everything should be done to maintain personal relations and, where possible and when the occasion arises, to "reconstitute" the family.’ ‘cannot be entitled under Article 8 … to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health and development.’ "The Court strongly emphasises that in cases of this kind the child's interest must have precedence over any other consideration. It must point out, however, that there is of course a double aspect to this interest. On the one hand, there is no doubt that ensuring that the child grows up in a healthy environment falls within this interest and that Article 8 cannot in any way entitle a parent to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health and development. On the other hand, it is clear that it is nevertheless in the child's interest that the links between him and his family should be maintained except where the family is shown to be especially unworthy for that purpose; to break that link amounts to cutting the child off from his roots. It follows that the child's interest necessitates that only wholly exceptional circumstances may lead to a breaking of the family bond and that everything should be done to maintain personal relations and, where possible and when the occasion arises, to "reconstitute" the family.’

[82]As Munby LJ went on to explain the domestic law of England and Wales is to the same effect. For example, at paragraph 44 he said:

“In Re M (Contact: Supervision) [1998] 1 FLR 727, Ward LJ said (at 730) that: ‘contact is almost always in the interests of a child and should not be prevented unless the order would hinder the welfare of the child … contact should not be prevented unless there are cogent reasons for doing so.’ He referred (at 733) to the observation of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124, at 129, that: ‘The courts should not at all readily accept that the child's welfare will be injured by direct contact. Judging that question the court should take a medium-term and long-term view of the child's development and not accord excessive weight to what appear likely to be short-term or transient problems.’” ‘contact is almost always in the interests of a child and should not be prevented unless the order would hinder the welfare of the child … contact should not be prevented unless there are cogent reasons for doing so.’ ‘The courts should not at all readily accept that the child's welfare will be injured by direct contact. Judging that question the court should take a medium-term and long-term view of the child's development and not accord excessive weight to what appear likely to be short-term or transient problems.’”

Analysis and conclusions

[83]In making my decision I have taken into account all of the matters in the welfare checklist as well as the factors identified in PD12J. The principles highlighted by Munby LJ in Re C remain valid today but need to be applied in the light of the courts’ enhanced understanding of the harmful impact of domestic abuse upon children, which is reflected in PD12J.

[84]First of all, I have no hesitation in rejecting the father’s suggestion that there should be a transfer of residence. In common with HHJ Renvoize, I consider it to be totally without merit. In my view, the fact that the father advanced it at all is evidence that his thinking is divorced from reality.

[85]These children have lived with their mother for all of their lives. In my judgment, she is a good mother who parents them well and has gone out of her way to promote the children’s relationship with their father, making offers to facilitate contact even when this was not recommended by professionals. Although she is a ‘gentle’ parent, I do not share the concerns expressed about her parenting by Dr Hardiman. I consider that he has overstated the position as a result of witnessing what I accept was a tantrum by one of the children and the mother’s attempts to deal with it in a situation when she will have felt under pressure because she was under observation. I accept Ms Goff’s evidence that she observed the mother demonstrating ‘warmth, emotional attunement, and appropriate boundary setting’ towards the children and I find that this more accurately reflects her qualities as a parent. Ms Goff’s assessment chimes with the findings previously made by HHJ Renvoize and with my own impressions of the mother based upon her evidence.

[86]The notion that the children should be moved away from their mother to live with a father who has only had limited contact with them and has been found to have perpetrated domestic abuse against the mother is utterly fanciful. I also consider his proposal that there should be a shared care arrangement to be very wide of the mark. He simply does not appreciate the effect of his behaviour on the mother and indirectly the children.

[87]The more difficult question, in my view, is whether I should allow the direct contact to continue or, as the mother proposes, restrict the father to indirect contact only. As for this issue, there is a tension between the father’s inability to appreciate the harmful nature of his behaviour and the fact that he has been able to make contact a largely positive experience for the children.

[88]It is clear from the evidence that the children enjoy their contact and would like it to continue. On the mother’s own evidence, they love their father and look forward to seeing him. I am prepared to accept that they would wish to develop their relationship with their father. I take their wishes into account, although inevitably, given their young ages and their inability to comprehend the wider issues, these can only carry limited weight.

[89]The children’s physical needs are being met by their mother and their educational needs are also met as a consequence of decisions made by the court. Their emotional needs can best be met by them feeling secure in their mother’s care and enjoying a good, loving relationship with their father, provided that the latter can be safely achieved. As Dr Hardiman has identified, in order for their emotional needs properly to be met it is essential that the family system should stabilise. At the moment they are caught in the middle of a parental dynamic in which their father has perpetrated abuse against their mother and continues to denigrate and undermine her. He has failed adequately to acknowledge this and lacks any appreciation of the impact which his conduct has had and is having upon the mother and the children. She is vulnerable and feels insecure as a parent, an insecurity which is magnified by the repeated steps taken by the father to undermine her.

[90]I do consider that the father is motivated to a significant extent by a genuine desire to develop his relationship with his children. However, the family can only achieve the stability by Dr Hardiman identified as necessary for the children if he desists from behaving as he has done. In my judgment, without any acknowledgement by him that his ongoing behaviour has been abusive, there remains a substantial risk that he will continue to seek information about the mother’s living arrangements, to criticise her, to make reports about her to the authorities and, in particular, to make applications to court with the object of removing the children from her care. The latter risk can be substantially mitigated by the making of a section 91(14) order. The risk that he will question the children can be tempered, but not eliminated, by the supervision of contact. There is little that can be done to prevent him from making reports to the authorities, but I propose to give the mother leave to disclose this judgment to both the police and the local authority. This will reduce the likelihood of those authorities taking complaints raised by the father at face value.

[91]I consider the mother to be vulnerable. The impact of the father’s behaviour upon her has been considerable. In my view it has affected her relationship with the children and contributed to the manner in which parents them. It is inevitable that the children will be affected by her anxieties about the father’s relentless behaviour. She is the children’s primary carer and needs to be supported in that role, whereas the father has taken steps to undermine her to a degree which I consider to be quite exceptional. I have already expressed my view about the fact that in his closing submissions to me he felt it appropriate to invite me to consider a transfer of residence.

[92]I find that Ms Hughes makes a powerful submission when she says that the father’s relentless and ongoing behaviour means that it is no longer in the children’s interests to continue having direct contact with the children. Dr Hardiman, albeit using the technical language of a psychologist, has suggested that the contact should cease were I to conclude that the father was unlikely to change his behaviour.

[93]On the other hand, despite the limitations in Ms Goff’s analysis, I found persuasive the point she makes about the emotional harm the children are likely to suffer if the father is removed from their lives having now been seeing them on a regular basis for the best part of a year. Ms Goff’s observations are fortified by the mother’s own evidence about the enjoyment the children derive from contact.

[94]I have reflected on these competing considerations and on narrow balance I have come to the conclusion that it would not be in the children’s interests to terminate direct contact. I do, however, consider that it should be reduced in frequency from fortnightly to monthly. Such a reduction is likely to reduce the level of anxiety felt by the mother and, as Dr Hardiman might put it, to help stabilise the family system. I have also taken on board some of Ms Goff’s observations about the fraught nature of the contact which is likely to arise from the sessions having been limited to two hours each. I propose to increase the sessions to four hours which will mean that the overall amount of contact remains the same.

[95]The contact must continue to be professionally supervised with the costs met by the father. At this stage I do not consider that the father should include other relatives in the contact. He must focus on his own relationship with the children before family members are introduced.

[96]I propose to make a final order. I reject Ms Goff’s suggestion that I might bring the matter back for a review. The litigation has been going on for a long time and has been harmful for the children. It should not be prolonged.

[97]I do not consider that it would be in the children’s interests for me to terminate the father’s parental responsibility. The issue of schooling has been resolved and there are unlikely to be any significant issues of dispute arising from his holding parental responsibility. To avoid any potential dispute, I will make an order that the mother should be solely responsible for choosing any extra-curricular activities at school and outside school.

[98]The father’s attendance at school events has been a contentious issue. I consider that he should be able to attend no more than one meeting a term per child with teachers to find out about the children’s progress. He should not attend at the children’s school otherwise including for plays or sporting events. His presence on such occasions will prevent the mother from attending and is likely to be a source of anxiety for her and indirectly for the children, undermining the enjoyment they would otherwise derive from such occasions.

[99]The father should additionally have indirect contact with the children by sending them one short card or letter a month to which the children should be encouraged to respond.

[100]As for parental communication, I accept the mother’s suggestion that this should take place via a dedicated email account which the mother can use to keep the father updated about the children’s welfare. She should send him updates once a month.

[101]I have no hesitation in accepting Ms Goff’s suggestion that this is a case in which I should impose a section 91(14) order in relation to applications from the father. I recently set out my understanding of the relevant principles in Re A (Children) (Appeal: Duration of Section 91(14) Order)

[2025] EWHC 3052 (Fam)

and it is unnecessary for me to repeat them. The father’s extreme litigation conduct and its impact on the mother and the children clearly justifies the making of such an order.

[102]As for the duration of the order, I consider that the father’s repeated and wholly unmeritorious applications for a transfer of residence mean that it is proportionate for the order to last for four years in relation to applications for ‘lives with’ orders. The father’s persistent applications for lives with orders and shared lives with orders have undermined the mother, damaged her self-confidence, fuelled her anxieties and been harmful for the children.

[103]For other applications, I propose to direct that the section 91(14) order should last for two years.

[104]It is my hope that, if nothing else, the father will finally come to realise that if he seeks to have a fuller relationship with his children he needs to take a step back and support their home with their mother rather than undermining her. If he can demonstrate over the next two years that he is capable of doing this, it may well be appropriate after two years to consider increasing the contact he has with them. Conversely, if the notes of the contact supervisor reveal that the father continues to undermine the mother during contact it may be necessary for her to restore the matter to court to bring the contact to an end.

[105]That is my judgment.

Postscript

[106]After I circulated my judgment in draft, the father drew to my attention that there were some outstanding issues I had not addressed. I invited the parties to send me written submissions on those issues and now record my decision in relation to them.

Children’s surnames

[107]The father seeks a specific issue order whereby the children should be known by a double-barrelled surname combining both parent’ surnames. He says that B was registered by the mother with her surname without his consent and that M was registered without consultation.

[108]In considering this issue I have revisited the leading House of Lords authority, Dawson v Wearmouth

[1999] 2 AC 308

. The court examined the provisions of the Births and Death Registration Act 1953 which requires a child to be registered within 42 days of birth. Where the parents are unmarried, the responsibility for registration lies solely with the mother.

[109]In giving the judgment of the majority, Lord MacKay of Clashfern made clear that a child’s surname is a matter of importance. On an application for a change of surname, the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration. The court is required to apply the criteria in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, including section 1(5); it should not make an order ‘unless there is some evidence that this would lead to an improvement from the point of view of the child’. The registered name is a relevant consideration, one reason for this being that making a specific issue order would result in the child being known by a surname different from their name as recorded on the birth certificate (a specific issue order does not cause a registered name to change). The registered name is not, however, conclusive of the issue. On the facts of the case, the House of Lords dismissed an appeal brought by a father who complained that the surname chosen by the mother was that of her former husband. It pointed out that it had been natural for the mother to chose that surname as it was also her own as well as that of her other children.

[110]In Re R (A Child)

[2001] EWCA Civ 1344

, albeit obiter dicta, Hale LJ (as she then was) encouraged parents to resolve disputes of this type by imitating the Spanish custom of conferring both a maternal and a paternal surname on a child. She said that the courts should be much more prepared to contemplate the use of both surnames ‘in an appropriate case’. I am aware that since that decision it has become relatively common for courts to determine on a welfare basis that a child should combine both parents’ surnames into a double-barrelled name, the outcome for which the father contends.

[111]In my judgment, however, given the findings made by HHJ Renvoize and those which I have made, such an outcome would be not be consistent with the children’s welfare on the facts of this case. The mother fulfilled her legal obligation to register the children and selected a surname which was her name. The children have become used to having that surname for all purposes. Any order I made would not cause their registered names to change.

[112]I am unable to find that changing the names at this juncture would lead to an improvement in the children’s lives from their perspective. On the contrary, I consider that compelling the mother to adopt a new surname for the children contrary to her wishes would serve as a constant reminder to her of the person responsible for perpetrating domestic abuse. This would risk unsettling her and in turn making the children’s lives less stable. It would impede the fulfilment of the children’s overriding need for their family system to stabilise and would not be in their interests. Accordingly, I reject this application.

Prohibition against leaving the children on their own with certain individuals

[113]The father asks the court to make a prohibited steps order preventing the mother from leaving the children unsupervised with certain individuals. I understand that the mother previously agreed that she would not do so and this is reflected in a recital to a previous order.

[114]The father says that individual A, the mother’s brother, was formerly a gang member. He pleaded guilty to offences of armed robbery and was sentenced in 2011 to a lengthy term of imprisonment. He was later recalled to prison during his licence period after perpetrating domestic abuse against his former partner who was pregnant at the time.

[115]Individual B is a woman whose children have been subject to public law proceedings and who does not now have any contact with them.

[116]There is no evidence to suggest that the mother breached her agreement not to facilitate unsupervised contact. She is willing to maintain that agreement and for it to be reflected in a further recital. In my view, that is an appropriate way forward.

The father’s enforcement application

[117]The father has issued an enforcement application asserting that the mother has acted in breach of the order for contact made by HHJ Renvoize in November 2024.

[118]Section 11J allows the court to make an enforcement order where it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person has failed to comply with a child arrangements order, but not if the person in question has a reasonable excuse for failing to comply.

[119]The burden of proof is on the applicant to demonstrate to the criminal standard that there has been a breach. If demonstrated, the burden falls upon the respondent to establish on the balance of probabilities that she has a reasonable excuse.

[120]Paragraph 4 of the order made on 11 November 2024 required the mother to make sure that the children spent time with father every fortnight for up to two hours commencing ‘as soon as a suitable professional contact supervisor is identified’. It did not specify which of the parties was to identify the supervisor and in my judgment this required the parties to agree upon the supervisor’s identity or, in default of agreement, to restore the matter to court for a decision.

[121]In the absence of agreement, the matter was restored before the court and a further order was made on 30 June 2026. Since that date the contact for which that order provided has been taking place.

[122]In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the mother is in breach of the order on 11 November 2024 and I dismiss the father’s application.