Sofia Greenstein v Gennadiy Bogolyubov [2026] EWFC 190
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.[2026] EWFC 190Case No ZC17J00073
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice Strand,Date 14 July 2026
London, WC2A 2LL
MR JUSTICE PEEL
Between
SOFIA GREENSTEIN (FORMERLY BOGOLYUBOVA)ApplicantSimon Webster KC (instructed by Mishcon de Reya) for ApplicantAndrew Campbell (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) for RespondentLewis Marks KC (instructed by Hogan Lovells Cadwalader) for Proposed IntervenerHearing Hearing date: 3 July 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 14 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to National Archives.Mr Justice Peel :
[1]On 24 June 2022 I handed down judgment in these proceedings. I declined to approve a joint application by H and W for approval of a financial remedies consent order which reflected the terms of a separation agreement dated 20 February 2017. I did so because of the potential impact on the family resources of ongoing proceedings in the Chancery Division between PrivatBank and H. The judgment is published as Bogolyubova v Bogolyubov [2022] EWFC 199.[2]Essentially, H and W’s proposed consent order provided W with assets in excess of approximately £147m (as the figure now seems to have been; in 2022 I was under the impression it was more like £100m), a large proportion of which comprised the purported or intended assignment of loan notes granted to H from Channel Island trusts.[3]PrivatBank had in 2017 issued proceedings in the Chancery Division against H, Mr Igor Kolomoisky and companies owned or controlled by them. They had been shareholders and officers of the bank until December 2016 when it was declared insolvent by the National Bank of Ukraine, and subsequently nationalised. PrivatBank alleged that they had misappropriated billions of dollars by a series of fraudulent drawdowns during 2013 and 2014. By the time of the hearing before me in 2022, I was told that the sum claimed was $4.2bn. PrivatBank had secured a World Wide Freezing Order against H.[4]The application by H and W for the consent order to be made came before me for directions on 30 March 2022, and final determination on 9 June 2022.[5]Ahead of those hearings, PrivatBank applied on 17 March 2022 for the following: i) To be joined to the proceedings as Intervener. ii) For the financial remedies application to be stayed pending the outcome of the Chancery proceedings. iii) Disclosure of certain documents from the financial remedies proceedings.[6]At the hearing before me on 9 June 2022, H and W jointly urged me to approve the draft consent order. I was provided with a Form D81 which suggested that the parties’ assets (including assets in respect of which they were discretionary beneficiaries), were about £3.8bn, a very significant increase on the figure of £1bn in the separation agreement. Of that, W had £25m in her own name; the balance was in the name of H (or in trusts). Included in H’s assets were £122m of loan notes owed to him by two family trusts and which were, under the consent order, to be assigned to W, thereby providing her with an estimated £147m, of assets (her own £25m plus the loan notes).[7]W and H submitted that(i) there was no good reason not to make an order reflecting an agreement freely and at arm’s length agreed between H and W, and(ii) thereafter all matters of enforcement and implementation of the financial remedies order should be dealt with in the Chancery Division. They said that the draft consent order was expressly subject to the freezing order and therefore could not be implemented unless and until the freezing order was discharged or varied, which would be a matter for the trial judge in the Chancery proceedings.[8]PrivatBank submitted essentially that I should not make the proposed consent order until the outcome of the commercial litigation was clear. Only then could the court decide whether, exercising its s25 discretion, it was appropriate to approve the agreement and convert it into an order of the court.[9]I said this in my conclusion: “The fundamental question is this. Should I, in the exercise of my independent duty, approve the proposed consent order? The answer, I am satisfied, is no. If the bank succeeds against H, he will have a liability in damages of up to $4.2bn which, on the basis of the evidence before me, could wipe out the entirety of his assets……..That would, or could, place H in a position of inability to meet his obligations to W, both in terms of quantum and structure. It might, however theoretically, extinguish all but the £100m due to be paid to W leaving him with nil assets. It would be illogical and, in my judgment, wrong to approve an order which might subsequently be shown to be incapable of compliance, and potentially unfair to either or both parties. It would be illogical and, in my judgment, wrong to approve the consent order until the extent of H’s potentially massive liability is established”.[10]I made the following[11]W appealed against my order, supported by H. Permission to appeal was granted, but on 22 May 2023 the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.[12]On 30 July 2025, Trower J delivered judgment in the Chancery proceedings. He found in favour of PrivatBank on liability and adjourned the quantification of damages to a hearing date in October 2025.[13]On 22 September 2025, W applied to restore before me the application for approval of a consent order. In accordance with my order, she notified PrivatBank of the application. The hearing before me was listed on 6 February 2026.[14]On 10 November 2025, the Chancery claim was quantified by Trower J at about $1.9bn, owed jointly and severally by H and Mr Kolomoisky. With interest and costs, the present sum due is about $3.2bn.[15]H and Mr Kolomoisky appealed. On 14 January 2026, permission to appeal was given on one ground.[16]On 16 January 2026 PrivatBank applied within the financial remedy proceedings due to be heard by me on 6 February 2026 as follows: i) To be joined to the proceedings as Intervener. ii) For the listing of the hearing before me to be adjourned to a hearing date no later than 56 days after the hearing of the Chancery appeal. iii) If the appeal was dismissed, to dismiss the application for financial remedies. iv) If the application for financial remedies were to continue, for W and H to file Forms E.[17]Subsequently, I was informed by email that the parties had agreed the hearing before me on 6 February 2026 should be vacated and that within 7 days of the Court of Appeal judgment being served on her by PrivatBank, W should: i) Notify H and PrivatBank whether she intended to restore the proceedings to seek financial remedies; and ii) Restore her application for directions before me. I made a consent order to that effect.[18]On 22 May 2026, the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and the appeal judgment was served on W.[19]On 2 June 2026, W applied to restore the proceedings to seek a financial remedies order. Specifically, W in her D11 said that she accepted “it is not possible for an order to be made wholly in the terms of the draft consent order previously agreed between the Applicant and the Respondent and filed with the court in 2022, or the Separation Agreement executed by them in 2017. ….However, provision is still sought by the Applicant”.[20]I listed the hearing to take place before me on 3 July 2026.[21]On 22 June 2026, Mr Kolomoisky was refused permission to appeal to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeal. He was also refused a stay of execution pending appeal. H was given an extension of time to appeal to the Supreme Court, by no later than 14 days after a sealed order following determination of an application to be heard by Trower J on 24 and 25 June 2026 as to the source of funds to be used by H for legal fees and expenses. Judgment has been handed down but no final order has yet been sealed, and accordingly the time for applying for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court has not yet elapsed.[22]Separate to the main Chancery proceedings, there are a variety of other civil proceedings between PrivatBank and H and/or W: i) A claim dated 15 December 2022 under s423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 by which PrivatBank sought the setting aside of transactions by H, the substance of which was the transfer by him of a number of prime Central London properties (and chattels located at one of them) into family trusts in Jersey. ii) A claim dated 5 October 2023 under s423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 by which PrivatBank sought to set aside the transfers of money from H to W in 2017 to the tune of c.£7.5m. iii) A protective claim dated 23 February 2024 under s423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 by which PrivatBank sought to set aside the purported equitable assignment of the loan notes from H to W by operation of the separation agreement if, which PrivatBank denies, that assignment had in fact taken place. All of these proceedings (which are essentially enforcement related applications) are stayed pending conclusion of the Chancery proceedings, including any appellate process, or unless terminated by any party upon 28 days’ notice.[23]In addition, by application dated 15 April 2026, PrivatBank seeks enforcement of the judgment debt against H’s loan notes, due to be heard in the courts of Jersey on 7 August 2026. No defence to the application has yet been filed, but it is anticipated that H will raise a defence that the terms of the 2017 separation agreement included assignment of loan notes which was therefore effected in equity at the time of the agreement, or consequent on the trigger of the first freezing order in separate proceedings being lifted or discharged, and did not need the imprimatur of a financial remedies consent order and subsequent legal transfer. PrivatBank disputes that an equitable transfer took place in that way but, as a fall back, has issued the set aside application referred to above.[24]The consequence of all of this is that, subject to a successful appeal to the Supreme Court, PrivatBank is now established as a judgment creditor against H. It seems that H is de facto bankrupt and not in a position to pay W any monies due under the separation agreement. And, despite the tangled procedural web, I do not lose sight of the fact that, subject to a successful appeal to the Supreme Court, the stark reality is that H has been found liable for massive fraudulent conduct, and, as it seems to me, is now trying to protect as much as he can from the creditor (and W, of course, has a common interest in that aim).[25]W retains whatever is left of the £25m to which she deposed in June 2022, subject to a possible reduction of £7.5m by reason of the Insolvency Act set aside application referred to at 22(ii) above.[26]On the other hand, if H succeeds in his likely argument in Jersey that an equitable assignment of the loan notes to W has taken place, then it follows that the loan notes belong beneficially to her, thereby increasing her personal wealth by £122m. If not, then prima facie the loan notes are H’s both legally and beneficially, and are capable of enforcement by PrivatBank. The loan notes are payable by two trusts and are underpinned by: i) One registered title comprising a property in Belgrave Square and two properties in Belgrave Mews South (and chattels located there), all held by the Encony Trust. PrivatBank’s claim under 22(i) above includes that registered title. Thus, if the property transfers are set aside, it follows that the available assets to enable the loan notes to be redeemed will be reduced, and PrivatBank will be able to enforce directly against the properties. ii) A substantial sum of money (£61m was suggested) in the Enwards Trust.[27]Separately, PrivatBank’s application under 22(i) above encompasses four other properties transferred into the Bbay Trust which did not make loan notes in favour of H. If the application is granted, the transfers are set aside, the properties will be returned to H’s name and PrivatBank can enforce directly against them. If not, they remain within the trust.[28]Thus, W says that(i) she is entitled to the loan notes which were assigned to her in equity and(ii) she is entitled to apply for a variation of the trusts as nuptial settlements given that she is a beneficiary. The extent of the assets within the trusts would depend on the success or otherwise of the litigation about the loan notes and the properties. It is not presently clear to me what surplus funds there might be. Whether PrivatBank would embark on some form of enforcement against any of the trusts is at this stage a matter of conjecture and depends on the outcome of the various enforcement steps currently under way.
Conclusions
[29]I conclude as follows: i) PrivatBank is a judgment creditor and entitled to pursue enforcement against H. For the avoidance of doubt, the fact that there are ongoing financial remedies proceedings does not operate as some sort of de facto stay on enforcement. It seems to me that PrivatBank’s only real interest in the financial remedies proceedings is to oppose any attempt on the part of H and W to obtain a consent order enabling H to transfer assets to W against which PrivatBank would seek to enforce its debt. In that sense, the position now is not very different from that pertaining when the matter was before me in June 2022. ii) Enforcement of the debt owed by H to PrivatBank is prima facie a matter for the Chancery Division, or in Jersey. It is not a matter for the Family Court. iii) I do not have up to date financial details of W and H, but on the face of it W had £25m in 2022. As I have mentioned, PrivatBank seeks to set aside £7.5m which H transferred to her in 2017, which would, if successful, reduce the figure to about £17.5m. No doubt (as hinted at by her counsel in his Position Statement) she has continued to enjoy an expensive lifestyle. But it is hard to see what further provision can or should be made in her favour under the Harman v Glencross line of authorities against H whose net indebtedness is potentially in multiple billions of dollars. Any financial provision in W’s favour would reduce the assets against which the judgment creditor (which has been subject to fraudulent conduct on an epic scale) would seek to enforce. And if(a) H and W succeed in their argument that the loan notes belong to her, not H, and/or(b) they successfully resist the application to set aside the transfer of properties into the trusts, then a fortiori W’s financial remedies claims become even less promising. iv) W may have a claim for variation of a nuptial settlement, but only realistically to the extent of assets which are not caught by any enforcement claims, and subject to any enforcement actions which PrivatBank may pursue directly against the trusts. v) H has not indicated that he might seek financial remedies orders against W, no doubt because PrivatBank would immediately seek to enforce against any asset transfer made under a financial remedies order. vi) On any view, in my judgment, consideration of financial remedies should await the outcome of the attempted appeal to the Supreme Court which affects the substantive sums available to H. That is the stance being adopted in the Insolvency Act proceedings, and is a logical extension to the agreed decision to await the outcome of the initial trial and then the Court of Appeal decision. vii) I consider, however, that the same should not at this stage apply to the applications referred to at 22(i), 22(ii), 22(iii) and 23 above. These are matters of enforcement, rather than the substantive judgment. They potentially impact W in a direct way (see paras 26-28 above). They could take a lengthy time to resolve. In my judgment, the better approach is to consider after the Supreme Court process whether the financial remedies should await outcome of these enforcement proceedings. It therefore seems to me that the application for financial remedies should be brought back before me for directions after the appellate process is exhausted. To leave it until after conclusion of all the s423 proceedings, and other litigation, is to go too far into the future with no judicial oversight. viii) It is suggested by PrivatBank that any purported equitable assignment of the loan notes from H to W could only be effective if confirmed by a judge in the Family Court approving a consent order to that effect. Whether that is correct or not, I do not know as I have not had submissions on the point. But I have hitherto been careful to avoid making any order for financial remedies, in part so as to avoid prematurely compromising the claims of PrivatBank. In June 2022, I refused to make the proposed consent order at a time when the outcome of the Chancery proceedings was unknown. Now, PrivatBank is entitled to enforce an enormous judgment debt and is in a stronger position in the interplay between enforcement and financial remedies. I would be unlikely to approve an order which has the effect of putting an asset (the loan notes) beyond the reach of enforceability in circumstances where W on any view has had assets in her own name of £25m, and where the debt is owed pursuant to a vast fraud perpetrated by H. I am dubious as to whether to do so would be “equitable”, although I have not heard argument on it and this can be no more than an observation. As it happens I am not being asked to approve the separation agreement and convert it into a court order. Further, as I understand it, the argument of H and W is that the equitable assignment has already taken place and does not need the imprimatur of an English financial remedies order. For these reasons, I would not consider it necessary for the Jersey court to await the outcome of the financial remedies proceedings before determining the loan notes enforcement application. I add that when I was asked in June 2022 to approve the consent order, no suggestion of equitable assignment of the loan notes under the separation agreement was raised; had I approved the order, it is possible that the loan notes would now be beyond the reach of PrivatBank, subject to any set aside application. ix) I reject the suggestion that PrivatBank should be joined to the financial remedies proceedings for any reason other than attendance and representation at this hearing. I declined to do so in June 2022, and see no justification for doing so now. Beyond objecting to the making of a final consent order in financial remedies (and at present there is no proposed final order to object to), it is hard to see what interest PrivatBank has in the proceedings. I am not presently satisfied that it is “desirable” (Rule 9.26(B) (1)(a) of the FPR 2010) to add PrivatBank to the financial remedies proceedings other than for the specific purpose, as and when it arises, of making representations about any final order. x) I reject the suggestion by PrivatBank that I should make an order for W to file a Form E. I am not persuaded that PrivatBank has standing to seek such an order. In any event, I do not think it appropriate to do so. I do not know whether the financial remedies claims will in fact be revived and if so in what form. If PrivatBank’s interest is limited to objecting to a consent order which might harm any enforcement applications, I am not sure how the disclosure sought would assist. It is far better, in my view, to await an application by either party before considering disclosure. xi) However, I consider that W should set out at the end of the appellate process what financial remedies relief she seeks, including whether she seeks to uphold the separation agreement in whole or in part. This is not so as to assist the Jersey Court, but because in my view there needs to be some clarity about W’s case before considering further directions, including whether to await the outcome of the s423 proceedings.[30]My order is: i) PrivatBank to be joined solely for the purpose of this hearing and the drafting of an order. ii) PrivatBank to serve on W and H relevant orders from the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. iii) The application for financial remedies to be adjourned until the conclusion of the appellate process, whereupon it shall be restored before me for case management. iv) PrivatBank to be notified of the application to restore the financial remedy proceedings. v) By no later than 28 days after notification of the conclusion of the appellate proceedings, W to set out what financial remedies relief she seeks, including whether she seeks to uphold the separation agreement in whole or in part.
order
i) I joined PrivatBank solely for the purpose of(a) being heard at the hearing before me on 9 June 2022 and(b) making representations in respect of the order, whereupon they were discharged from the proceedings. ii) I adjourned generally the financial remedies application. iii) I dismissed PrivatBank’s application for specific disclosure. iv) I directed H and/or W to give 21 days notice of any renewed application for a consent order.