Venue SITTING IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 26/06/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE TROWELL
Between
TPApplicantOPRespondentThe Applicant appeared in person for in personMs Jones (instructed by Edwards Family Law) appeared for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 16 th and 17 th June 2026JudgmentThis judgment was sent out by e-mail on the 26 June 2026..............................This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has not given leave for this version of the judgment to be published. Nobody may be identified by name or location. The anonymity of everyone other than the lawyers must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
[1]This matter was before me for 2 days on the 16th and 17th June 2026 for the determination of the parties’ cross financial remedy claims ancillary to their divorce.[2]The applicant, TP, represented himself. For the first day of the hearing he asked, and, it being contested, I ruled that he could have a McKenzie friend with him. He was unaccompanied on the second day. I shall refer to him as the husband.[3]The respondent, OP, was represented by Hannah Jones and Edwards Family Law Solicitors. I shall refer to her as the wife.
Summary Background
[4]The parties married in late 2012, having started cohabiting earlier that year. They separated about 12 years later in April 2024. A final order of divorce was made in January 2026.[5]They have three minor children: The eldest has recently been diagnosed with a neurodevelopment condition and the middle child has been diagnosed with an autoimmune condition. The children all attend private school, in London.[6]All three children, I am told, currently refuse to see their father. Social Services have become involved and said in the light of accounts that the children give of their father being physical towards them, their views should be respected. Previously the husband had had significant time with them (each Wednesday and alternate weekends).[7]This matter was before this court on the 23rd to the 27th March 2026 for the determination of a preliminary issue, namely whether the wife owed her brother, ST, some £3.5 million. That was money originally advanced to her by her parents. I found that she did, and declined an application to set aside a charge on property X (a property in her name and for a brief time these parties’ matrimonial home) which she had executed in favour of her brother. The husband has appealed my decision but as yet the Court of Appeal have not materially responded to his application. This hearing proceeds on the basis that the debt is real. The husband has made clear that although he will work on the basis of my findings for this hearing (as he must) he in no way concedes that appeal.[8]Prior to the preliminary issue hearing there had been a First Appointment in the Central Family Court in February 2025, a private FDR in April 2025, a post FDR directions hearing in the Central Family Court in June 2025 (which resulted in reallocation to a High Court Judge) and a pretrial review before me on the 16 February 2026.[9]Property X is worth according to the joint expert appointed to value it in these proceedings some £4.75 million. A charge of £3.5 million very much reduces its net value and thereby the value of the assets in this case. They are further reduced by the costs incurred in the litigation of the preliminary issue. I am told that the total costs incurred on the husband’s side as at this hearing are £412,528, of which £228,254 remains outstanding. On the wife’s side £652,245 has been incurred of which £259,478 remains outstanding.[10]It should further be noted that there are outstanding costs orders:a. The husband owes ST £300,000, arising from the preliminary issue hearing.b. The husband owes the wife about £156,000, arising from the preliminary issue hearing and the costs of a failed application for MPS and LSPO.[11]Further, by way of the charge on property X, the wife says she effectively owes ST the difference between his total costs in relation to enforcing the charge (currently £524,108 according to his solicitors, Withers) and what the husband pays him pursuant to my costs order. She estimates that at £224,108 on the basis that the £300,000 costs order is paid.[12]The assets that remain for the court to distribute in this case are very much reduced from the figures in the parties’ Forms E. Indeed, subject to what I say below, the debts outweigh the assets.
The Husband
[13]The husband is in his 40’s. He lives in his parents’ home, in London. He has lived there since the parties’ separation in June 2024. His parents rent the property on favourable terms following some litigation. It is clear that his family has some wealth. There is a property in France and other family property interests.[14]He has a gross income of £60,000 pa, working for a family business. His net income is about £38,000 pa. He accepts that he could increase his income to about £100,000 pa. That is about £66,000 net pa. The wife argues for a higher figure, and put job particulars to him in cross examination at some £250,000 pa. I consider about £100,000 pa gross is what I can reasonably predict in the short to medium term.[15]The husband largely presented himself to me in a measured and calm manner. There were moments when his submissions did appear far-fetched, but I will deal with them on their merits when considering them below.[16]Further, I will comment on his cross examination of the wife immediately below.
The Wife
[17]The wife is in her 40’s. Her father was a successful businessman and she enjoyed for her early adult life very significant wealth deriving from her family. However her father suffered a major reversal of fortunes following the Irish property and banking crisis and he was subsequently embroiled in extensive litigation with Bank A.[18]She had a number of management and client relations jobs from about 2005 after leaving university until October 2014 when she became a property developer, working in part with money advanced to her by her parents. From about 2019, property X was her development project.[19]She does not currently have any earned income. It is her case that she hopes to return to work but having been out of formal employment for 15 years and as sole carer of the children she does not think she will be able to generate a significant income in the near future. She anticipates in the new year, once she has sold property X and moved with her children to a new (rental) home, which is likely to be in a less expensive area of London, she might be able to generate an income of about £60,000 pa (gross). She hopes to increase this over time to about £100,000. The husband says she has an earning capacity equal to his now. I consider her case more realistic. His work for the family company enables him to put something on his CV which she cannot do, and albeit with the likely assistance of a nanny, she will be shouldering more of the care of the children.[20]The wife has a new partner, P. She tells me that they do not live together but he has provided her with financial assistance, not least by meeting the children’s school fees, paying for a nanny, and paying for many smart international holidays for her and the children.[21]The wife was cross-examined by the husband in person. Shortly before the hearing she had made an application for participation directions to enable her to give her best evidence. She did not pursue that application at the beginning of the hearing because she recognised that the likely effect of pursuing it (if successful) would be to delay the hearing and because of an assurance I gave that I would require the cross examination to be courteous.[22]I further note that her objection to the McKenzie friend was that he was a family friend and one of the children’s godparents. She was concerned that his presence would prevent her giving her best evidence. In fact, as matters unfolded, there were occasions when I asked if she would like him to leave during the cross-examination and she pressed on.[23]The cross-examination of the wife by the husband did degenerate towards its end into something more akin to a family row. I stopped it at least twice. I do not consider that I can usefully apportion blame more one way than the other: each side were making points as much to upset the other and justify themselves to the other as to advance my understanding of the case. What it did underline to me is that I cannot have any hope of these parties being able to work together in their mutual best interest.[24]Further, when I need to consider the wife’s evidence below I should bear in mind that her oral evidence was given in difficult circumstances.
The assets
[25]Property X: A single joint expert, (the valuer), had prepared an updated report on the 18 May 2026 valuing it at £4.75 million. The husband raised arguments that this is too low.[26]The valuer was not called to give oral evidence. The husband put written questions to him, all of which he had rejected. The husband had requested to see working spreadsheets which the valuer had made reference to in his report. The valuer was reluctant to provide them. He eventually agreed to do so, but only to produce them the day before the hearing. It was not at all clear to me why, if he had agreed to produce them, he held them back to the day before the hearing. I can speculate that he may have wanted to tidy them up – but that would just be guessing on my part.[27]At core the husband’s request was made because he did not consider that the valuer had justified the adjustments he had made to comparables in the report and was looking for the calculations in the spreadsheet. He says that was lacking. Further he says that there is other evidence as to valuation that I could rely on (such as one he obtained some time ago which was not admitted into evidence, and representations in mortgage applications as to which the wife says he is confused) to see that this value was too low.[28]Further still, he said that he was concerned that the valuer might wish to advance a low valuation to assist the wife because he was aware that her father was a significant businessman. He only stated this tentatively and accepted that this allegation had not been put to the valuer.[29]I am aware that the up-to-date valuation was a marginal reduction from the original valuation of £4.8m by the valuer. That is justified by a change in the market. I am aware that there was a Daniels v Walker application prepared by the husband in relation to that value which was not pursued. I see no reason therefore not to rely on the valuer expertise.[30]I do however note(i) that insofar as I make an order for sale and allow for division of the proceeds by percentage the value will be determined by the market,(ii) the suspicion that the husband demonstrated as to the valuer bona fides must be held in mind when it comes to the working out of any order I make.[31]After payment of costs of sale (estimated at 3%) and the £3.5 million charge there will be £1,107,500 left from a sale of that property on the valuer valuation. I will round that to £1,108,000.[32]Property Y: This was the wife’s parents’ house. Her mother has now died and her father, who suffers from a cognitive impairment, is in a care home. It is owned by the wife who bought it in 2013 for some £1.4 million when her parents were facing litigation. A right of residence was granted to them, which by the terms of the agreement they are able to pass on to another brother of the wife’s, FT. The mother indicated by a written document dated February 2025 that she was passing the right of residence on. (Formally this only takes place on the death of the last surviving parent, and FT acknowledging the terms of the agreement.) The property had, I had thought, an agreed value of £150,000 in the light of the right of residence. Were it not subject to a right of residence it would be worth, according to the valuation prepared, £1.55 million.[33]I have advice from a single joint expert (Douglas Stevenson) who tells me the right of residence cannot be revoked, including some elaborations as to FT’s position, namely that he will enjoy a right of residence, subject to conditions precedent that(i) one of the parents give notice (which has happened) and(ii) that he acknowledges that he is bound by the terms of the agreement (which I shall assume will happen).[34]As an agreed recital to an order made by me on the 29 April 2026 it was recorded that the value of this property would be treated as £150,000 ‘for final hearing purposes’. Ms Jones invited me to treat it as worth nothing in the ES2 on the basis that the wife could not sell it given that the right of residence carries a right to block a sale. That had been considered by Douglas Stevenson and it appears from his advice that he was saying that the wife had ‘reasonable, but no better than reasonable, prospects of success’ on forcing a sale of her interest subject to the right of residence.[35]The husband relied on the agreed figure as to how things stood now but also developed another point.[36]What he put to me is that this is another example of how the wife’s family are coming together to reduce the value of her resources. (The first example being the debt which ST is enforcing.) FT has another house (which is accepted) that he could have remained living in. The reason why in 2025 the wife’s mother took the preliminary step to assign the right of residence to FT was to devalue the wife’s assets in these proceedings. He says to me that when these proceedings are over the wife’s family will provide financial assistance to the wife.[37]As to the current value I will work on £150,000. That had been agreed. The agreement cannot just be revoked at the hearing with no good reason.[38]As to the husband’s second point, Ms Jones tells me that no section 37 application has been brought and the husband cannot run it. I disagree. He can run it. He is not making an application to set anything aside; he is asking me to take note of the way assets are being dealt with once these proceedings are afoot, and asking me to draw an inference as to what might happen after my judgment.[39]I need to bear in mind that the right of residence agreement was entered into as long ago as 2013. I pressed the wife as to why she agreed to allow her parents to pass on the right of residence to FT. I put to her that I could understand why she might want to advance funds to them and take ownership of their home, given the litigation that her father was involved in, but I could not understand why she would agree to allowing FT to live there after her parents were dead. Her first response was that she couldn’t remember, and she might just have signed what was put in front of her. This I consider unlikely. Her second response, as amplified by Ms Jones in her submissions, was to remind me that it was a feature of the preliminary issue hearing that there was significant tension in the wife’s family in that funds had been advanced to the wife and to ST but funds had not been advanced to FT. The wife had been under pressure to find funds for FT. This provision, in 2013, reflects that.[40]At this point I hold in mind that the wife can say with some force that her evidence was not given in the best of circumstances.[41]The husband did point out that we know ST had lent money to FT because that was part of his claim which led to the transfer of the ‘promissory notes’ which were the subject of the preliminary issue hearing. No one explained to me whether that loan was before or after this 2013 agreement.[42]On balance I find the pressure to sort things out for FT explains the provision in the 2013 agreement that the right of residence can pass on to him on the death of his last surviving parent.[43]What however still needs explanation is why the mother chose to pass on the right of residence in 2025, after these proceedings had commenced. The wife pointed to the mother’s long held desire to let FT have her home after her. I pressed the wife as to what conversations she had had with FT as to whether given the circumstances she now found herself in, and, whether given FT had another property in which he lived, he might be prepared to assist her, perhaps by not taking up his right of residence.[44]Her answer to me was she had had a short conversation but he was not yielding. He took the view that she had lived the high life for many years with the assistance of their parents and it was fair enough that he was now getting some advantage. She told me again that her family have very bad relationships.[45]It is not difficult for me to conclude that in the light of the 2013 agreement FT has the right of residence. He can insist on it. What I have to consider, which I shall do having gone through all the evidence, is what weight I can put on the possibility of family support when it comes to considering the orders that I might make.[46]The Z Trust: this is a trust of which the wife is a discretionary beneficiary. I had been aware that it has assets of about £6 million but the wife had never received anything from it.[47]I am told at this hearing that following the sale of an asset, in which the trust had an interest, it has recently advanced £5.8 million in gilts and £200,000 in cash to the wife’s father. That leaves some £300,000 to be distributed by the trust. The wife repeats, and it is confirmed by professional trustees that she has never received anything from the trust.[48]She tells me that she does not know what she might inherit from her father when he dies, but draws attention to his care costs, and taxation as well as potential other beneficiaries of his estate and of the trust.[49]The husband says that the wife did not disclose the sale at the preliminary issue hearing. He has made an application complaining about that to the Court of Appeal. No set aside application is made to me in relation to this so I will say nothing further on this point.[50]The husband says that it is a piece with the conduct of the wife’s family that all the money was advanced to the father when some might have been advanced to the wife.[51]I put to the wife that it seemed odd to advance this much money to an incapacitated old man. It would appear that there was a likelihood of generating inheritance tax which might have been avoided if the money was distributed to her generation. It was her case that she did not know why the trustees had allocated the money as they had. She had not known that the transaction had taken place. She understood that FT managed the money for her father and she was aware that her father had very high care costs.[52]On the evidence before me I have no reason to believe that the trustees did not act properly in their allocation of the funds to the wife’s father. I again note that I will need to consider what weight I can put on the possibility of family support once I have considered all the evidence.[53]Husband’s business interests: In his Form E the husband gives details of interests in the following 3 businesses:a. Company A: his 27% said to be worth net of tax £47,009b. Company B: his 27% is said to be 0 but in reality it appears to be the holding company for Company A and Company C, and so contains their value. The husband’s shares in this have recently been charged to his father as security for his debt to him.c. Company C: his 27% is said to be worth £75,694[54]The wife told me at the start of the case that these businesses are cumulatively worth some £505,000 by proportional division of the net book value from the accounts. The husband tells me he has asked an accountant to help him estimate the value but has had no reply.[55]After some debate in submissions, during which the husband accepted that he had not provided updating business accounts as he was required to do, what emerged was that the process by which the husband had valued his shares in the Form E was the process by which the wife’s team had intended to value them in the ES2, but that they failed to provide for CGT and they used a wrong figure from the accounts.[56]The wife had obtained the publicly available accounts for Company C. That showed a revaluation of land and property increasing the value by a little over £1 million. (The value of Company A should have been unaltered once the CGT point is taken into account.)[57]Applying to the new net book value the methodology used by the husband in his Form E valuation (i.e. a proportionate division of net asset value and allowing for CGT) that would take the value to £282,390 (£1,361,049 x .273 x (1-.24)).[58]That therefore means that I should increase the value of his business interests to £329,399, say £330,000. (I acknowledge that I am not here going to bother to debate the arguments over minority interests. It is not necessary to have that fine tuning.)[59]The wife points to the fact that the husband is a director of this business and to the charge to argue that the husband has been deliberately withholding these accounts. He says he was overwhelmed by managing the proceedings. I agree with the wife. If he had time to write to an accountant about the value he had time to produce the accounts which he had been directed to produce. He knew there was a revaluation and wanted to conceal what would look like a growth in his assets.[60]Other assets: The ES2 shows modest assets elsewhere:a. Minimal amounts in bank accountsb.£20,000 in investment on the husband’s sidec. An argument over chattels – which I have no valuation evidence to help me through and heard no argument on. I shall ignore this on the basis resale of chattels is likely to produce little. I will however return to when I consider an issue between the parties at the end.d. Modest pensions – which I will ignore.[61]Liabilities: There are numerous and cumulatively large. I am going to set them out summarily below: Husband:a. Costs orders made by me: i. To ST £300,000 ii. To the wife £155,772 (being £141,000 and £14,772)b. To his former solicitors: i. Hamblin Family Law: £119,131 (this was disputed but I take from a letter of 21 January 2026) ii. Wallace: £114,488 (these are the non-matrimonial solicitors for the preliminary issue) iii. BLB Studio Legale: £1,130 (Italian lawyers arising from a threat made by ST).c. Family and friends: £305,426. £217,391 to his father is secured by a charge on his shares. The wife considers these are soft loan and does not accept they need to be repaid. There are documents supporting the debts and the husband’s case is that he needs to repay the money, albeit he accepts he will not be sued by the creditors.d. Credit card: £56,766 (accepted) Total £1,052,713. I shall say in round terms £1,050,000. Wife:e. To her solicitors: £267,078f. P, her partner: £68,480. Similarly these are considered soft by the husband. They are supported by documents but the wife accepts she is not going to be sued by P.g. Tax: £87,899. I heard no argument on this but I accept it despite noting that the husband says it requires reconciliation. It is supported by draft tax calculations.h. Credit card: £17,647i. A party wall payment of £15,000 and a handrail cost of £1,173j.£224,108: this is what the wife says she will need to pay to ST if he takes all the costs he has incurred enforcing the charge but the husband pays the £300,000 costs order. That requires further consideration which I set out below. Total: £681,385. I shall say in round terms some £680,000. (Subject to what I have to say about the money due to ST under the charge.)[62]It is the husband’s case that ST will not seek that extra £224,108. The wife disagrees. I have already found in the preliminary issue hearing that ST will seek recovery of the £3.5 million. In principle I consider the same arguments as led me to that conclusion then lead me to the conclusion that he will seek to recover his costs on enforcing the charge. There is however this point to consider: I have already, in the context of the costs order I have made, ruled that the appropriate amount for him to recover in relation to the preliminary issue is £300,000 rather than the £486,606 which is set out in the letter from Withers. (There are two further items that are sought as costs: Chancery Proceedings costs as to some £29,000 and appeal costs as to £8,364.) It is acknowledged by Ms Jones that it is open to her client to seek an assessment of the level of costs that ST claims. My order is not the same as what might result from such an assessment but I consider that it is a good starting point so I shall substitute £300,000 for £486,606. That reduces this figure by £186,606 to £37,502.[63]That takes her liability figure down to £495,000 in round terms.[64]The assets that I have found on the wife’s side are £1,258,000 (the two properties). The assets on the husband’s side are £350,000 (business interests and investments). The liabilities on the wife’s side are £495,000 and on the husband’s side are £1,050,000. I should also note(a) that if the husband does not pay the £300,000 costs order to ST this will fall to be met by the wife under the charge, and(b) the approximately £156,000 of costs that the husband is to pay the wife will increase her assets by that amount.[65]It is apparent to me that what I am doing in this case is dividing the parties’ financial misery as equitably as I can. There is no possibility of making provision for their property needs. Both parties are going to be dependent on the generosity of others to continue to live a shadow of the lives they have up to now enjoyed.
The parties’ proposals
[66]The wife says that she will waive her costs claims against the husband, she will sell property X and she will retain the proceeds. She says there should be a clean break.[67]The husband says that the wife should pay him £2 million and put £550,000 in a fund for school fees. He too says that there should be a clean break.[68]Both parties want the appeal to stop, on their terms.[69]There is an issue as to who retains a particular painting by Max Hembrow which I shall deal with separately.[70]The husband’s proposal is premised on the appeal being effectively allowed. That is not a route open to me.[71]The wife’s proposal leaves the obvious problem that the husband will have no funds to meet the £300,000 costs order to ST (given he has charged his shares) so that will fall to her to meet under the charge.
Equitable division of the misery
[72]I consider that there are in this case 3 steps that I need to consider:a. The fact that the parties have ended up with a lot of this debt because of the husband pursuing a preliminary issue that he lost.b. Sharing the matrimonial assets.c. Needs.[73]I would make the following preliminary points:a. That my analysis of the figures is going to need to be rough and ready, in accordance with the information that I have.b. My needs analysis is going to have to be carried out in circumstances where there is not enough money to go round.
Considering the debt
[74]Ms Jones has reminded me that PD 28A says at paragraph 4.4 that ‘Where an order for costs has been made at an interim stage the court will not usually allow any resulting liability to be reckoned as a debt in the computation of the assets’. I consider that I should hold that approach in mind here when considering what is a fair division. Where I have ordered that the husband should pay costs to the wife and her brother because he has brought and lost litigation against them, then I should consider that as a debt that should be left with him.[75]Further it seems to me that the same policy should apply here to the amount that he has spent on his solicitors on the preliminary issue. He had separate solicitors for that issue, Wallace LLP. Hamblin Family Law had acted for him in the family proceedings until, at the husband’s application I agreed to deal with the charge issue as a preliminary issue in these proceedings. Logically I should take out not merely his remaining debt to Wallace LLP but all that he has paid them. From the Form H submitted to me by Wallace LLP in May 2026 I can see that he had incurred costs with them of £161,661.[76]If I deduct the two costs orders (and the smaller one from the MPS & LSPO hearing) and the costs incurred with Wallace LLP from the husband’s total debt I am left with £432,000 (£1,050,000 – (£456,000 +162,000)).[77]That is the level of debt that I should be comparing with the debt on the Wife’s side, recorded above at £495,000.
Considering the sharing claim
[78]The £1,108,000 is the equity that remains in the matrimonial home after deduction of the charge repaying the money owed to ST and deriving from family loans. At first blush it looks like a matrimonial asset.[79]Ms Jones tells me it is not. The money to buy it she says comes from pre-marital properties. I am not convinced that is right. The money to purchase it came from another property (in which the husband lived) and preceding that a flat (in which the husband also lived). The wife had had funds from her parents but(i) they are reflected in the charge, and(ii) she also made payments to support her parents (such as the purchase of their home). Further over the course of a 12-year marriage cohabitation in a property is likely to render it matrimonial. Ms Jones tells me that the husband didn’t live in property X for very long, but I do not see this as a persuasive argument when he had lived in the two previous properties which were sold to allow this to be purchased and for 5 months while this property was being developed the parties were accommodated in his parents’ home. Ms Jones tells me that I should treat it as non-matrimonial because the wife paid for all the work on it (save for a minor item). I do not see this point having the force she thinks it does. Often one spouse will have money and pay bills. That does not render a matrimonial home non-matrimonial.[80]Ms Jones refers me to the recent case of Cusworth J LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473. I do not see that case as greatly assisting her. It does say that there may be circumstances (in that case conduct primarily) which would allow matrimonial property to be shared unequally. The passage that she sets out for me however also embraces the words of Lord Nicholls in Miller, McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 that the matrimonial home should normally be treated as matrimonial property and Lord Stephens in Standish [2025] UKSC 26 that the sharing of matrimonial property should normally be on an equal basis.[81]The two principal arguments against sharing this equally are(i) that money came from the wife’s’ parents and(ii) that the husband did not live there long. I do not consider they rebut the normal approach when the money from her parents is reflected in the charge, and (ii) the husband lived with the wife in matrimonial property for some 12 years.[82]I do not consider there is a sharing argument in relation to the husband’s interest in his family business or the wife’s interest in property Y.
Needs
[83]As I have said I am portioning out debt as fairly as I can because I cannot meet needs in a conventional sense.[84]If I were to make an order for sale of property X, allowing for the £3.5 m charge, but working on what must be a hypothetical footing that the costs element of the charge does not fall in then I would be looking at funds of about £1,108,000. (The reason I say that this is hypothetical is that ST has the power under the charge to take his costs.)[85]If I divide that in 2 then each party will have approximately £554,000. If I require the husband to meet the costs order to the wife and ST from his notional half share he will have £98,000 (£554,000-£456,000) as well as his other assets of £350,000. He will however in reality have the rest of his debts. They amount to £594,000 (£1,050,000-£456,000). The debts clearly exceed the assets. However, as I have said already, in fairness I should ignore the costs orders and the total costs (whether paid or not) of Wallace LLP. If I do that, as I have recorded above, his notional debt figure is reduced to £432,000. Then he would notionally have £472,000 (£554,000 + £350,000 – £432,000). I remind myself that the reality will be different. The reality is that he will have -£146,000 (£98,000 + £350,000 – £594,000). He will not be able to meet his debts to his family and friends.[86]Working out where this takes me on the wife’s side. Her half share is £554,000. Her other asset is the other property at £150,000. Her debts are £495,000. She is to get £156,000 as the payment to her costs. She then is at £365,000 (£554,000 + £150,000 -£495,000 + £156,000). Of course, this is subject to persuading ST to accept the £300,000 for his costs of the preliminary issue.[87]Where does this take me on needs. In the longer term both parties will need to rent. The husband may be able to stay in his parents’ home for a while longer. I do not consider it appropriate for a man in his 40’s to be living in his parents’ home but needs must until he can sort himself out. The wife will have a small capital sum to tide her over till she can earn sufficient money. The husband will not be able to clear his debts. I ask myself is it appropriate to give him money to clear his debts, and leave the wife with less than the £365,000. I remind myself that by bringing and pursuing the preliminary issue the husband caused the expenditure of £162,000 by him with Wallace LLP and inflicted on himself the two costs orders of £300,000 and £141,000 (and there is then the c. £15,000 on the failed LSPO & MPS). That is £603,000 on the preliminary issue hearing that he lost. I consider it fair that he should carry the burden of debt in these circumstances rather than requiring the wife to fund his decisions. He has debt because he chose to litigate the preliminary issue and lost on it.[88]I stand back and consider what I should make of the husband’s argument that the wife’s family will rally round the wife. I remind myself of the wife’s mother providing FT with the right of residence blocking the wife from realising the value of the Irish property. I remind myself that I found that in the preliminary issue that her brother is suing her for the return of £3.5 m. I remind myself that her elderly father has just had £6 m advanced to him from a trust of which she is a beneficiary, and FT is to manage that. It is not argued that I can compel any of her family to help her. I do not have evidence to conclude that I can reasonably expect any to help her – beyond what I have already factored in namely that ST will be satisfied with £300,000 for his costs of the preliminary issue and will not push for full recovery as the charge allows him to do. The evidence that I have is that this is a very difficult family.[89]I ask myself what role the wife’s partner P might play in my thinking. I can see force in the husband’s submission that P’s apparent wealth means that the wife continues to live a nice life. The husband acknowledges that he is grateful that P pays the school fees. He reminds me that the wife can still have a nanny and gets to go on nice holidays. That is true. I cannot however consider P as a resource. He is a newish boyfriend. He cannot carry the burden of responsibility here. If he meets the school fees that is good. If he helps in other ways that is also good. The wife will need support to rebuild. I cannot see that P should be a good reason to transfer resources to the husband above those that I have considered appropriate above.[90]I draw to my mind that the children are my first consideration. They primarily reside with the mother. I would like to provide both parties with resources such that they can accommodate the children; here I am unable to do that. The children are a factor, as matters stand, to leave the wife with more money than the husband.[91]I remind myself of section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. I shall not recite the various considerations set out there but I have held them in mind.
Outcome
[92]For these reasons I consider that the order I should make is for a lump sum to be paid to the husband from the proceeds of sale of property X, calculated as 50 per cent of the notional net proceeds of sale (which allows for the £3.5m principal secured by the charge but not the enforcement costs secured by the charge) less the costs orders that he owes to ST and to the wife.[93]So, to be clear, there should be the following deductions from the gross proceeds, to generate net proceeds of sale:a. The estate agent and conveyancing costs and other necessary selling costs;b. The principal of £3.5m owing under the charge (which I believe to be interest free) owing to ST. Then, from 50 per cent of the net proceeds of sale, there are to be the following further deductions:c. In so far as the husband has not already paid the £300,000 costs order made by me for ST that (and any interest thereon) is to be deducted and is to be paid to the wife (or more accurately retained by the wife, given the property is in her name) on the basis she pays it to ST in satisfaction of the costs order.d. In so far as the husband has not already paid the two costs orders owing to the wife they (and any interest thereon) are to be deducted and paid to her (or more accurately retained by her) in satisfaction of those orders. What remains is the lump sum that should be paid to the husband. 94. I had some discussion at the conclusion of the hearing with the parties as to incidental matters. I want the property to be marketed as soon as practicable – giving time to prepare it for the market. I consider it entirely unrealistic to think that the parties can act jointly on the sale. Bearing in mind that the wife is in the property, it is in her name, she is the property developer and she is going to benefit at least as much from the sale as the husband, I will give her sole conduct of the sale. The husband however must be entitled to know what is going on in relation to a sale because he needs the money too. I would want the wife to inform him promptly of all material developments and decisions she makes on the sale. I look to counsel to provide appropriate directions. 95. It is sensibly agreed that there should be no spousal maintenance. Child maintenance is squarely in the hands of the CMS. I am not of course requiring a school fees fund to be established. 96. Finally, I have to deal with a painting. It is the wife’s case that she paid for it, about £8000. It is agreed that it was spotted by the husband. It is her case that the husband was keen to get it because it was blue and she loves blues. It is his case that it was bought for him for his birthday. The wife denies this. The wife wanted me to look at the proposed chattel division. I have done so and note she is to retain the contents of the home save for some specified items that include art works. I determine that the husband should have the painting. I do so because even on the wife’s case the value of chattels that she is retaining exceeds the value that the husband is retaining and that is likely to be increased in so far as she is retaining most of the contents of property X. Conclusion 97. In so far as there are any costs applications I invite the parties to agree a timetable as to written submissions. Mr Justice Trowell 26 June 2026