AT v NT (No. 2) [2026] EWFC 161

Neutral Citation Number: 2026 EWFC 161Case No 1755-7739-1353-0439
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Venue SITTING IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 24 June 2026
Before
SIMON COLTON KCSITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
Between
ATApplicantNTRespondent
Lily Mottahedan (instructed by Mishcon de Reya LLP) for ApplicantThe Respondent in person for in personHearing Hearing date: 22 June 2026
Approved Judgment
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.Simon Colton KC:Introduction
[1]The applicant wife (to whom I shall refer as ‘W’) has applied for an order for financial relief after an overseas divorce under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (the ‘MFPA 1984’).[2]This judgment concerns W’s application for an interim order for maintenance and for payment in respect of legal services (the ‘interim payment application’), which is resisted by the respondent husband (‘H’).[3]At the end of the hearing of this application I provided brief oral reasons for granting the application in part, but said I would provide more detailed reasons in writing. These are those reasons.

Factual and procedural background

[4]For the purposes of this interim application, I need not make any findings of fact. However, to a great extent the history of this matter does not seem to be significantly in dispute.[5]H and W are both Russian nationals, both aged 51. They married in 2003, and moved to live in England in 2007. In 2013, they purchased a property in London (the ‘London flat’) as their family home. They have two children, aged 23 and 17, who are both dual British and Russian nationals. In 2018, H and W separated and each began divorce proceedings, W in England, and H in Russia.[6]The family has, or had, the benefit of an offshore family settlement (the ‘Trust’). Assets were misappropriated from the Trust by a dishonest trustee, but that was not known to the parties when, in October 2018, they entered into an agreement in England regarding their finances on separation. That agreement (the ‘2018 Agreement’) provided for:(i) the sale of the London flat with W to receive the greater of 40% of the proceeds or £2 million;(ii) H to pay all the outgoings on the London flat, and any replacement property where W would live following sale until the younger son (‘S’) turned 21;(iii) W and the children to retain a property in Moscow (the ‘Moscow house’);(iv) W to receive 1.5 million roubles per month from H until her remarriage, topped up to £17,000 per month from the Trust if the RUR-GBP conversion rate required it;(v) H to pay W a lump sum of $1 million within 6 months;(vi) W to receive 20% of Trust assets, which W says were at that time estimated to be worth $8-20 million;(vii) W to have the use of certain corporate support services controlled by H;(viii) H to pay for the children’s education and maintenance until they reached the age of 21;(ix) W to retain the contents of the London flat.[7]According to W, in light of the 2018 Agreement, W withdrew the English divorce petition, which was in due course dismissed by the English court. The parties were divorced in Russia. With the parties’ consent, the Russian court dealt only with two Russian properties, with each party receiving one, plus a balancing payment, to be made from W to H, to enable assets of equal value to be received by both parties.[8]W says the 2018 Agreement has been implemented only in part. W says:(1) As a result of fraudulent dealings by a trustee of the Trust, there were no proceeds from the sale of the London flat. There was prolonged litigation concerning this property, and in the meantime H bought another flat (the ‘Penthouse’) in his sole name. When it became clear that W would have to leave the London flat, she moved into the Penthouse, and has been living there with H paying the outgoings on the Penthouse.(2) W did retain the Moscow house, which she later sold. Some of the proceeds have been spent, with the remainder currently held by in bank accounts in Turkey in the name of W and of her sister.(3) W has received some maintenance payments from H since 2018 but she says there has been “a significant deficit” against the agreement, with the last payment made in June 2025. (This element of W’s evidence appears to be disputed by H, although it appears to be common ground that there has been no payment since some time in 2025.)(4) W received £50,000 towards the agreed $1m lump sum in February 2019, but has received nothing further.(5) W has received no proceeds from the Trust assets.[9]W first sought leave to bring her application under the MFPA 1984 without notice to H. Her application came before Peel J, who declined to grant leave without an on notice hearing, and adjourned the application for leave to an on notice hearing: AT v NT [2025] EWFC 456.[10]As directed by Peel J, an on notice hearing was listed for 5 December 2025. On 24 November 2025, solicitors came on the record for H, and the parties agreed an adjournment of the leave hearing to 16 March 2026. On 29 January 2026, W made the present interim payment application. On 2 February 2026, H confirmed that he did not oppose the granting of leave. On 27 February 2026 Peel J granted leave by consent, vacated the 16 March hearing, and fixed a First Appointment before me on 22 April 2026, with directions which included the exchange and filing of Form Es by 31 March 2026. Peel J indicated that the interim payment application might be dealt with at this First Appointment, if time allowed.[11]H failed to file his Form E as directed. On 13 April 2026, his solicitors wrote to W’s solicitors proposing an adjournment to the First Appointment “on the basis that our client files his Form E by the end of this month”. That was not consented to by W, and on 20 April 2026, H issued an application to adjourn the First Appointment, on the grounds that he had been unable to pay his solicitors because it was impossible to remit funds to the UK from Russia. He sought more time to file his Form E. At the hearing on 22 April 2026, at which both parties were represented by solicitors and counsel, I declined to adjourn the First Appointment, and made directions up to a final hearing early in 2027, including a direction that H file his Form E by 18 May 2026. I did not consider the interim payment application, but gave directions for each party to file further evidence in that application. I also made a costs order in favour of W in the sum of £21,365, in essence reflecting the wasted costs of that hearing which resulted from H’s failure to file a Form E.[12]H failed to pay the costs I had ordered to be paid when they fell due on 13 May 2026. He also failed to file his Form E when it was due on 18 May 2026, and failed to serve any evidence in response to the interim payment application, when it was due on 1 June 2026. Emails and letters from W’s solicitors to H’s solicitors were met by silence. On Thursday 18 June, two working days before the present hearing, H served, without warning or explanation, notice that he would now be acting in person.[13]On Sunday 22 June, the evening before the present hearing, H emailed W’s solicitors, stating that W’s case “is based almost entirely on lies and false statements”; that he had not filed a Form E and would not be doing so “before the hearing against me in Russia”; and that “due to current regulatory restrictions on Russian banks I am unable to make transfers to the UK”. H attached a document with comments on W’s witness statement from August 2025, in which, among other matters, he said he had paid W at least 156 million roubles (perhaps £1.3-£1.9 million) since 2018. He also attached a ‘Draft Position’, in which, he made a similar point, while explaining, “My office will calculate it maximum precisely later”. Still, however, H filed no Form E, which he remains obliged to file, and of which obligation he remains in breach. The legal framework for the present application The application for an interim order for maintenance

The legal framework for the present application

[14]By s.14(1) of the MFPA 1984, “Where leave is granted under section 13 above for the making of an application for an order for financial relief and it appears to the court that the applicant or any child of the family is in immediate need of financial assistance, the court may make an interim order for maintenance, that is to say, an order requiring the other party to the marriage to make to the applicant or to the child such periodical payments, and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the grant of leave and ending with the date of the determination of the application for an order for financial relief, as the court thinks reasonable.”[15]In M v M (Financial Provision) [2010] EWHC 2817 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 1773, Eleanor King J held (at [46]) that although the language of s.14 is different to the analogous power in s.22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (the ‘MCA 1973’), “the approach described in the authorities in relation to applications for interim maintenance under the MCA 1973 applies also to section 14”, and (at [45]-[50]) that “immediate need” should be construed to mean ‘current need’, rather than ‘urgent need’ (although it could be both).[16]In Rattan v Kuwad [2021] EWCA Civ 1, [2021] 1 WLR 3141, a case concerning s.22 of the MCA 1973, Moylan LJ observed at [31] that this is a “very broad statutory power which extends to the court making such order as the judge ‘thinks reasonable’”. ‘Reasonable’ in this context means ‘fair’ (at [32]). The purpose is to meet “immediate” needs (at [33]). This means (at [49]) “that the court is concerned with an order for maintenance pending the final resolution of the financial dispute between the parties”, but, “The fact that some items of expenditure are not incurred every month does not mean they should be excluded for the purposes of determining what maintenance is reasonable”. The key factors are the parties’ respective needs and resources and the marital standard of living (at [33]). ‘Needs’ must be understood in that context. What rich people ‘need’ to maintain their previous standard of living may be rather different to what less well-off people ‘need’, but it is that benchmark of need, the comparison with the marital standard of living, which should be applied.[17]In Rattan v Kuwad at [38], Moylan LJ quoted the summary of principles given by Nicholas Mostyn QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) in TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 1263. Those include:
“(ii) A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard. (iii) In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration. (iv) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.”
[18]Moylan LJ held (at [38]) that “as with all guidance”, these principles “have to be applied in the particular circumstances of the individual case”. In the case before him, no critical analysis was required of the budget – it was a “straightforward list of income needs which were easily appraised”.[19]Alongside these general principles, Ms Mottahedan on behalf of W drew particular attention to the existence of the 2018 Agreement. In BN v MA [2013] EWHC 4250 (Fam), Mostyn J at [26] cited the general proposition approved by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2010] 2 FLR 1900 that “The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement”. Mostyn J continued, at [33]:
“In my judgment, when adjudicating a question of interim maintenance, where there has been a prenuptial agreement, the court should seek to apply the terms of the prenuptial agreement as closely and as practically as it can, unless the evidence of the wife in support of her application demonstrates, to a convincing standard, that she has a likely prospect of satisfying the court that this agreement should not be upheld. In the absence of any evidence of that nature from the wife, it is my judgment that it is appropriate for me to seek to apply the agreement to this case as closely as I can, provided that the wife is not left in any real predicament of need.”
[20]Relying on this, Ms Mottahedan submitted in her Note for this hearing:
“However, this is not an ordinary interim maintenance case. There is a concluded agreement, and the interim maintenance order W seeks is pursuant to that agreement… … Here there is a separation agreement which compromised a financial remedy application. Radmacher is clear that whilst the ultimate “test” to be applied to whether a nuptial agreement should be upheld will be the same across the board (see para 171) such agreements are likely to be more difficult to resile from than a PNA [pre-nuptial agreement]. It therefore follows, if a PNA must be followed as closely and practically as possible at the interim stage, then it is doubly so in the case of a separation agreement. For this reason, the interim budget filed by W … which amounts to £17kpcm is somewhat academic as there is no reason for the court to consider, let alone attempt to trim-down this budget. The interim budget is already a trimmed down version of W’s Form E budget which represents what she truly needs and in reality, it is W’s attempt to budget within the provision the parties had agreed to be faithful to the agreement. Even absent the separation agreement, this is [a] reasonable sum in the context of the marital standard of living and the information the court does have about the parties’ financial resources.”
[21]I do not agree, however, that where there is a nuptial agreement, an interim budget filed in support of an application for interim maintenance is “somewhat academic”. Contrary to Ms Mottahedan’s submission, I consider that, even where there is a nuptial agreement, any application for interim maintenance must begin by considering the applicant’s ‘immediate need’, as that concept has been explained in the authorities. Where there is a nuptial agreement, that agreement may serve to reduce the interim maintenance which it is reasonable to order; but a nuptial agreement cannot justify the court ordering more than immediate need. An interim maintenance order is not made pursuant to a nuptial agreement; it is made pursuant to s.14 of the MFPA 1984 (or s.22 of the MCA 1973), and subject to the statutory conditions there set out.[22]I consider that this analysis is supported by the authorities. I do not consider that BN v MA, supports the contrary view. Although the figures are not given in the judgment, it is plain that BN v MA was a case where the party seeking interim maintenance, the wife, was seeking interim maintenance at a higher level than would be permitted under the nuptial agreement. Mostyn J’s decision was that the nuptial agreement acted to limit any interim order he might make, and he approved the sum for which the husband contended, which was the same as the amount in the nuptial agreement (at [16] and [34]).[23]The proposition stated by Mostyn J in BN v MA at [33] has been cited and followed in a number of cases. In each case, so far as I can tell, the nuptial agreement has been regarded as relevant in limiting the interim maintenance application. In YM v NM [2020] EWFC 13, [2020] 1 WLR 3723, [2020] 1 FLR 1246, MacDonald J followed the BN v MA approach in the different context of an earlier consent order, holding that in order for a wife to succeed in her application for maintenance pending suit, she would need to demonstrate that she was likely to succeed in setting aside the consent order (at [46]). In HAT v LAT [2023] EWFC 162, Peel J distinguished BN v MA on the facts, awarding more than was provided for in the nuptial agreement, holding that, on the case before him, “it would be unfair on this interim application to hold [the wife] too closely to the deed of separation”. In A v Z [2026] EWFC 64, McKendrick J held, following BN v MA that he “must be cautious” in the order he would make (at [30]), although in that case the respondent did not suggest that the agreement be followed (at [43]).[24]It follows, in my judgment, that the existence of the 2018 Agreement does not change the overall test for the granting of an interim order for maintenance. Rather, the statutory standard of ‘immediate need’ ordering only what is ‘reasonable’, as explained in TL v ML and in Rattan v Kuwad, remains the applicable test. The 2018 Agreement may, however, provide some evidential support either as to the marital standard of living, or as to what, more broadly, would be fair as between the parties.[25]Separately, an issue arose in the course of submissions as to the relevance, if any, of the merits of W’s application for financial relief overall.(1) As an application for financial relief under Part III of the MFPA 1984, the court at the final hearing will be bound by s.16(1) of the MFPA 1984 to consider “whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales”. A number of particular matters to which the court shall have regard are set out in s.16(2).(2) Ms Mottahedan on behalf of W submitted that the overall merits, including the s.16(2) matters, are irrelevant to my decision at this interim stage. Ms Mottahedan submitted that this followed both from the absence of any reference to overall merits in s.14 of the MFPA 1984, and because the approach under s.14 is (as was held by Eleanor King J in M v M (Financial Provision)) the same as under s.22 of the MCA 1973.(3) However, as a matter of general principle, it seems to me that an assessment of fairness for the purposes of an interim maintenance application under s.14 ought to have regard, at least at a high level, to the merits of the application for financial relief overall. If the overall application seems weak, then the court should treat with some caution any application for an interim payment. However, both as a matter of proportionality, and to avoid the appearance of pre-judging the case, the court should be wary of enquiring too deeply into disputed questions of fact or law at an interim stage.(4) In CW v CH [2022] EWFC B1, where interim maintenance was sought in the context of a Part III application, Recorder Allen QC considered at [42]-[54] the question whether it was appropriate to have regard to overall merits in the context of an application for interim maintenance. Recorder Allen QC cited a number of authorities under both s.14 of the MFPA 1984, and s.22 and ss.22ZA-22ZB of the MCA 1973. He concluded at [54]: “I therefore consider (adopting the words used in S v S (Ancillary Relief)) that it is permissible (and indeed appropriate) for me “to consider in broad terms” the strength of W’s claim at this interim hearing.”(5) I respectfully agree. In my judgment, too, it is permissible and appropriate to consider in broad terms the strength of W’s application for financial relief at this interim hearing.

The application for payment in respect of legal services

[26]Under the MFPA 1984, there is no equivalent of ss.22ZA-22ZB of the MCA 1973, which are the provisions dealing with orders for payment in respect of legal services. However, as Peel J held in J v J [2021] EWFC 78 at [33], such orders can be made at common law and there can be little doubt that similar principles apply as apply to applications under the MCA 1973. In so holding, Peel J followed Rubin v Rubin [2014] EWHC 611 (Fam), [2014] 1 WLR 3289, [2014] 2 FLR 1018 at [13] to [15]. Mostyn J there held: “13. I have recently had to deal with a flurry of such applications and there is no reason to suppose that courts up and down the country are not doing likewise. Therefore it may be helpful and convenient if I were to set out my attempt to summarise the applicable principles both substantive and procedural. i) When considering the overall merits of the application for a LSPO the court is required to have regard to all the matters mentioned in s22ZB(1) – (3). ii) Without derogating from that requirement, the ability of the respondent to pay should be judged by reference to the principles summarised in TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam) [2006] 1 FCR 465 [2006] 1 FLR 1263 at para 124 (iv) and (v),where it was stated "iv) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee. v) Where the paying party has historically been supported through the bounty of an outsider, and where the payer is asserting that the bounty had been curtailed but where the position of the outsider is ambiguous or unclear, then the court is justified in assuming that the third party will continue to supply the bounty, at least until final trial." iii) Where the claim for substantive relief appears doubtful, whether by virtue of a challenge to the jurisdiction, or otherwise having regard to its subject matter, the court should judge the application with caution. The more doubtful it is, the more cautious it should be. iv) The court cannot make an order unless it is satisfied that without the payment the applicant would not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the proceedings. Therefore, the exercise essentially looks to the future. It is important that the jurisdiction is not used to outflank or supplant the powers and principles governing an award of costs in CPR Part 44. It is not a surrogate inter partes costs jurisdiction. Thus a LSPO should only be awarded to cover historic unpaid costs where the court is satisfied that without such a payment the applicant will not reasonably be able to obtain in the future appropriate legal services for the proceedings. v) In determining whether the applicant can reasonably obtain funding from another source the court would be unlikely to expect her to sell or charge her home or to deplete a modest fund of savings. This aspect is however highly fact-specific. If the home is of such a value that it appears likely that it will be sold at the conclusion of the proceedings then it may well be reasonable to expect the applicant to charge her interest in it. vi) Evidence of refusals by two commercial lenders of repute will normally dispose of any issue under s22ZA(4)(a) whether a litigation loan is or is not available. vii) In determining under s22ZA(4)(b)whether a Sears Tooth arrangement can be entered into a statement of refusal by the applicant's solicitors should normally answer the question. viii) If a litigation loan is offered at a very high rate of interest it would be unlikely to be reasonable to expect the applicant to take it unless the respondent offered an undertaking to meet that interest, if the court later considered it just so to order. ix) The order should normally contain an undertaking by the applicant that she will repay to the respondent such part of the amount ordered if, and to the extent that, the court is of the opinion, when considering costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, that she ought to do so. If such an undertaking is refused the court will want to think twice before making the order. x) The court should make clear in its ruling or judgment which of the legal services mentioned in s22ZA(10) the payment is for; it is not however necessary to spell this out in the order. A LSPO may be made for the purposes, in particular, of advice and assistance in the form of representation and any form of dispute resolution, including mediation. Thus the power may be exercised before any financial remedy proceedings have been commenced in order to finance any form of alternative dispute resolution, which plainly would include arbitration proceedings. xi) Generally speaking, the court should not fund the applicant beyond the FDR, but the court should readily grant a hearing date for further funding to be fixed shortly after the FDR. This is a better course than ordering a sum for the whole proceedings of which part is deferred under s22ZA(7). The court will be better placed to assess accurately the true costs of taking the matter to trial after a failed FDR when the final hearing is relatively imminent, and the issues to be tried are more clearly defined. xii) When ordering costs funding for a specified period, monthly instalments are to be preferred to a single lump sum payment. It is true that a single payment avoids anxiety on the part of the applicant as to whether the monthly sums will actually be paid as well as the annoyance inflicted on the respondent in having to make monthly payments. However, monthly payments more accurately reflects what would happen if the applicant were paying her lawyers from her own resources, and very likely will mirror the position of the respondent. If both sets of lawyers are having their fees met monthly this puts them on an equal footing both in the conduct of the case and in any dialogue about settlement. Further, monthly payments are more readily susceptible to variation under s22ZA(8) should circumstances change. xiii) If the application for a LSPO seeks an award including the costs of that very application the court should bear in mind s22ZA(9) whereby a party's bill of costs in assessment proceedings is treated as reduced by the amount of any LSPO made in his or her favour. Thus, if an LSPO is made in an amount which includes the anticipated costs of that very application for the LSPO, then an order for the costs of that application will not bite save to the extent that the actual costs of the application may exceed such part of the LSPO as is referable thereto. xiv) A LSPO is designated as an interim order and is to be made under the Part 18 procedure (see FPR rule 9.7(1)(da) and (2)). 14 days' notice must be given (see FPR rule 18.8(b)(i) and PD9A para12.1 ). The application must be supported by written evidence (see FPR rule 18.8(2) and PD9A para12.2 ). That evidence must not only address the matters in s22ZB(1)-(3) but must include a detailed estimate of the costs both incurred and to be incurred. If the application seeks a hearing sooner than 14 days from the date of issue of the application pursuant to FPR rule 18.8(4) then the written evidence in support must explain why it is fair and just that the time should be abridged. Other orders for legal costs funding 14. Curiously, the new statutory provisions do not extend to proceedings under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 or Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. In such proceedings the application will continue to be for an interim order for this purpose (see, in relation to Schedule 1 proceedings, M-T v T [2007] 2 FLR 925, G v G (Child Maintenance: Interim Costs Provision) [2009] EWHC 2080 (Fam), [2010] 2 FLR 1264 and CF v KM [2011] 1 FLR 208), and the principles in Currey v Currey (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 1338, [2007] 1 FLR 946 will continue to apply. In that case Wilson LJ stated at para 21 that the applicant must show that he or she cannot reasonably procure legal advice and representation by any other means. Moreover, the subject matter of the application will always be relevant as will be the reasonableness of the applicant's stance in the proceedings. 15. In my opinion the principles set out in para 13 ought to apply, with the necessary modifications, where an order is sought for costs funding in proceedings under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 or Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. Obviously, the first sentence of principle (x) will not apply. Whether in these proceedings there is power to make an award for costs funding for ADR is an open question on which I do not venture an opinion here. As regards principle (xii) while there is power under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 and under s5 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 to award a lump sum for costs funding the usual and traditional order is for monthly payments. Under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 monthly payments is the only permissible order. Under each statute there is little scope for a single payment, whether or not deferred in part.” i) When considering the overall merits of the application for a LSPO the court is required to have regard to all the matters mentioned in s22ZB(1) – (3). ii) Without derogating from that requirement, the ability of the respondent to pay should be judged by reference to the principles summarised in TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam) [2006] 1 FCR 465 [2006] 1 FLR 1263 at para 124 (iv) and (v),where it was stated "iv) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee. v) Where the paying party has historically been supported through the bounty of an outsider, and where the payer is asserting that the bounty had been curtailed but where the position of the outsider is ambiguous or unclear, then the court is justified in assuming that the third party will continue to supply the bounty, at least until final trial." iii) Where the claim for substantive relief appears doubtful, whether by virtue of a challenge to the jurisdiction, or otherwise having regard to its subject matter, the court should judge the application with caution. The more doubtful it is, the more cautious it should be. iv) The court cannot make an order unless it is satisfied that without the payment the applicant would not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the proceedings. Therefore, the exercise essentially looks to the future. It is important that the jurisdiction is not used to outflank or supplant the powers and principles governing an award of costs in CPR Part 44. It is not a surrogate inter partes costs jurisdiction. Thus a LSPO should only be awarded to cover historic unpaid costs where the court is satisfied that without such a payment the applicant will not reasonably be able to obtain in the future appropriate legal services for the proceedings. v) In determining whether the applicant can reasonably obtain funding from another source the court would be unlikely to expect her to sell or charge her home or to deplete a modest fund of savings. This aspect is however highly fact-specific. If the home is of such a value that it appears likely that it will be sold at the conclusion of the proceedings then it may well be reasonable to expect the applicant to charge her interest in it. vi) Evidence of refusals by two commercial lenders of repute will normally dispose of any issue under s22ZA(4)(a) whether a litigation loan is or is not available. vii) In determining under s22ZA(4)(b)whether a Sears Tooth arrangement can be entered into a statement of refusal by the applicant's solicitors should normally answer the question. viii) If a litigation loan is offered at a very high rate of interest it would be unlikely to be reasonable to expect the applicant to take it unless the respondent offered an undertaking to meet that interest, if the court later considered it just so to order. ix) The order should normally contain an undertaking by the applicant that she will repay to the respondent such part of the amount ordered if, and to the extent that, the court is of the opinion, when considering costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, that she ought to do so. If such an undertaking is refused the court will want to think twice before making the order. x) The court should make clear in its ruling or judgment which of the legal services mentioned in s22ZA(10) the payment is for; it is not however necessary to spell this out in the order. A LSPO may be made for the purposes, in particular, of advice and assistance in the form of representation and any form of dispute resolution, including mediation. Thus the power may be exercised before any financial remedy proceedings have been commenced in order to finance any form of alternative dispute resolution, which plainly would include arbitration proceedings. xi) Generally speaking, the court should not fund the applicant beyond the FDR, but the court should readily grant a hearing date for further funding to be fixed shortly after the FDR. This is a better course than ordering a sum for the whole proceedings of which part is deferred under s22ZA(7). The court will be better placed to assess accurately the true costs of taking the matter to trial after a failed FDR when the final hearing is relatively imminent, and the issues to be tried are more clearly defined. xii) When ordering costs funding for a specified period, monthly instalments are to be preferred to a single lump sum payment. It is true that a single payment avoids anxiety on the part of the applicant as to whether the monthly sums will actually be paid as well as the annoyance inflicted on the respondent in having to make monthly payments. However, monthly payments more accurately reflects what would happen if the applicant were paying her lawyers from her own resources, and very likely will mirror the position of the respondent. If both sets of lawyers are having their fees met monthly this puts them on an equal footing both in the conduct of the case and in any dialogue about settlement. Further, monthly payments are more readily susceptible to variation under s22ZA(8) should circumstances change. xiii) If the application for a LSPO seeks an award including the costs of that very application the court should bear in mind s22ZA(9) whereby a party's bill of costs in assessment proceedings is treated as reduced by the amount of any LSPO made in his or her favour. Thus, if an LSPO is made in an amount which includes the anticipated costs of that very application for the LSPO, then an order for the costs of that application will not bite save to the extent that the actual costs of the application may exceed such part of the LSPO as is referable thereto. xiv) A LSPO is designated as an interim order and is to be made under the Part 18 procedure (see FPR rule 9.7(1)(da) and (2)). 14 days' notice must be given (see FPR rule 18.8(b)(i) and PD9A para 12.1). The application must be supported by written evidence (see FPR rule 18.8(2) and PD9A para 12.2). That evidence must not only address the matters in s22ZB(1)-(3) but must include a detailed estimate of the costs both incurred and to be incurred. If the application seeks a hearing sooner than 14 days from the date of issue of the application pursuant to FPR rule 18.8(4) then the written evidence in support must explain why it is fair and just that the time should be abridged.

Applying the law to the facts: interim maintenance generally

[27]Turning to the application for interim maintenance generally, W’s Form E, which for present purposes I have no reason to doubt and accept as accurate, is that the marital standard of living was very high. During their marriage, the parties lived in a very valuable London property. They travelled regularly, either by private jet or by first class long-haul. They employed bodyguards, drivers, a PA, nanny, cook, chef and housekeeper. They regularly ate in Michelin-starred restaurants and hosted catered dinner parties at home. Since their divorce, H continues to live what W describes as an “extravagant lifestyle”, much as before.[28]Regarding H’s financial position, W’s evidence is that he is “enormously wealthy”. While unaware of the full extent of H’s wealth, W in her evidence has identified Russian assets which she believes to be worth at least $50 million, of which she believes H holds 40%. She does not believe he has any significant liabilities. H has not put in evidence disputing this. He appears to have gone through some form of personal bankruptcy, but plainly has access to substantial other assets. In the course of his submissions before me, H said that he moved assets out of the Trust when he discovered that assets were being misappropriated by the trustee, but did not say what those assets were or how much they were worth. H claims to be unable to get money to the UK from Russia by reason of Russian banking regulations, but it is notable that where it has suited H to pay money – an offer of £3.5 million in June 2025 to avoid W’s eviction from the London flat; paying S’s school fees or giving him other money; or paying H’s own legal fees or invoices in his name relating to the Penthouse – H has found ways of achieving this.[29]I bear in mind that H has had every opportunity to provide a Form E, but declined to do so. The original deadline was 31 March 2026. He missed that deadline, claiming that it was because he had been unable to get money to England from Russia with which to pay his lawyers. He proposed to file his Form E by the end of April, but did not do so. At the hearing on 22 April 2026, I ordered provision of Form E by 18 May 2026, making clear that H was to do this even if he had to do so without the assistance of solicitors, noting that he had the support of his own family office. H missed that deadline too, without an explanation. A further month has now passed, and still there is no Form E. H’s only explanation for this, for which there is no documentary evidence, is that a court order in Russia, made in late May 2026, inhibits him from providing any information. I note, however, that that would have been after the most recent extended deadline for provision of a Form E.[30]H is a sophisticated businessman, who has an excellent level of English having lived in England for many years. In my judgment, he would have been well able to serve a Form E, even without the assistance of solicitors, had he wished to do so. I consider his choice not to do so has been deliberate and tactical, and I can and should draw adverse inferences against him as a result. Specifically, given what I know about H from W’s evidence, I infer that H has more than sufficient assets to meet his own needs, and more than sufficient assets to satisfy the interim payment application that W makes, should he wish to do so, without any, or any real, inconvenience to himself. This includes the ability, should H wish to do so, to get whatever sums I might order to W in England, despite the present challenges for Russian nationals seeking to transfer monies.[31]W’s evidence as to her own finances, which I have no reason to doubt, is that she has no income; she lives alone with S, her 17 year old son; she owns no real property. She lives in the Penthouse in London which belongs to H. She has approximately £810,000 in cash, part of the proceeds of sale of the Moscow house, held in two banks in Turkey, which she could, over time, probably transfer in small chunks to England, albeit with some significant bank charges. W has liabilities in the form of loans she has received from two friends in order to fund her living expenses and the proceedings to date. W’s evidence is that she owes £322,000 or so under one such loan, and £310,000 under the other, but she has no obligation to repay these loans other than out of funds as may be awarded in this litigation.[32]W’s Form E attaches an interim schedule of annual expenditure. It shows a total of £34,700 odd per month, excluding the running costs of the Penthouse in which W is living (costs which H had been paying, but which W says he has recently stopped paying). The significant elements of this budget include staff and other help, clothing and handbags, and leisure activities including holidays. For the purposes of this interim maintenance application, W has produced a trimmed-down version of this schedule, limiting what she claims as her immediate need to £17,000 per month, to reflect the 2018 Agreement. I have reviewed this trimmed-down schedule and I am satisfied that it is sufficient for present purposes, and, having regard to the marital standard of living, I am satisfied that this sum is a fair reflection of W’s immediate needs.[33]I do not consider that I need reduce this amount, at this interim stage, by reference to any particular doubts as to the strength of W’s Part III application generally. Without pre-judging the application overall, there is nothing that stands out as making the application a particularly doubtful one. H told me in submissions that he did not dispute that the 2018 Agreement had been made. He said that W had agreed in a telephone call at some point in 2025 to stop receiving monthly amounts from him, but this was the first time he made such a suggestion: it was not even mentioned in his documents served the day before the hearing. And, while there may be doubts whether it will be possible to enforce against H’s assets in Russia any order ultimately made, which is a relevant consideration under s.16(2)(h) of the MFPA 1984, it is too soon to say whether H may have assets in more friendly jurisdictions, and in any event the other considerations under s.16(2) of the MFPA 1984 appear to point more in favour of it being appropriate for a court in England and Wales to make an order for financial relief.[34]In all the circumstances, I am satisfied, for the reasons I have given, that it is reasonable to make an order for interim maintenance for the benefit of W in the sum of £17,000 per month, back-dated to the date when leave was given on 27 February 2026. On top of that sum, I consider it reasonable to order that H will continue to pay the outgoings on the Penthouse, which I understood him to agree to do in any event.[35]I do not, however, make an order for payment of an additional £6,000 per month which is sought by W, as maintenance for S. Applying the same standard of immediate need under s.14 of the MFPA 1984, I am not satisfied that it is reasonable to make any separate or additional order. W herself accepted that £3,000 per month would be “workable”, which sits uneasily with her claim that £6,000 per month is an immediate need. But even £3,000 does not seem to me to represent a need which it is reasonable to order H to meet. The interim schedule includes only small sums relating to S’s food and clothing with £4,650 per month for ‘miscellaneous’, which is largely for holidays. To the extent that any such expenses in fact fall on W, I am satisfied that these can be met from within the sum I have ordered for W’s own maintenance. I also do not have the impression that S is lacking in support from H. H told me that he gives S what he needs, and, having seen (for example) that in recent months H paid S’s English school fees even while claiming to be unable to make payments in England, I have no reason to doubt that this is so. I also note that the 2018 Agreement appears to have provided that the Moscow house would be held for W and the two children, but W has apparently been treating the proceeds of the Moscow house as being her own. I make no finding in this regard at this interim stage, but that is a further reason why I do not consider it reasonable to order H to make additional interim payments to W in respect of S’s maintenance.

Applying the law to the facts: payment in respect of legal costs

[36]As for the application for payment in respect of legal costs, I need not repeat what I have held regarding the evidence I presently have as to the parties’ needs and resources. Again, for present purposes, I draw the inference that H can meet any order I might make regarding W’s legal costs, should he choose to do so.[37]Regarding the subject matter of the proceedings, as I have held, this is not a case where the claim for substantive relief appears doubtful.[38]Turning next to legal representation, I note that, although H was represented at the last hearing, since last Thursday H is no longer legally represented. I have received no evidence as to why this is. Before the last hearing, on 22 April 2026, I did receive a witness statement from H in which he claimed it was “impossible” for him to remit funds to the UK, and a statement from his solicitor in which it was said that her firm had only been able to undertake legal work sporadically, “due to the difficulty he has had in funding his legal fees”. However, I indicated then that the evidence of impossibility was lacking, and that I would require further evidence to support H’s case in this regard, and none has been provided. I am accordingly satisfied, for the purposes of today’s application, that I can treat H as voluntarily lacking in legal representation, rather than being unable to pay for legal representation.[39]Regarding W’s ability to fund her own legal costs, I have received evidence that W has tried and failed to obtain a litigation loan, and that her solicitors are unwilling to enter into a Sears Tooth agreement to fund the provision of their services in these proceedings. As for W’s own funds, and her ability to borrow from friends, Ms Mottahedan drew to my attention a passage in the decision of Eleanor King J in M v M [2010] EWHC 2817 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 1773, where it was held that it was not reasonable to expect an applicant wife to depend on the continuing generosity of her friend for funding. While every case turns on its own facts, I take the same view of the present facts. I also do not regard it as reasonable for W to deplete further the relatively small sum held for her in bank accounts in Turkey, especially where, as H pointed out, there may be an argument that some substantial portion of this money is held for the benefit of the two children. Accordingly, I do not consider that W is reasonably able to obtain appropriate legal services between now and the FDR without an order made against H.[40]Overall, I consider it fair to order that H make a payment to cover W’s legal costs of these proceedings, including both advice and representation, between now and the FDR. Having considered a budget prepared by W’s solicitors, I consider that £90,000 is a reasonable sum. That is slightly less than was sought, to reflect the hourly rates which seem to me to be higher than is proportionate to the amounts in issue. This will be paid in three monthly tranches of £30,000.[41]I will require, as a condition of this element of my order, that W undertakes that she will repay to H such part of the amount ordered if, and to the extent that, the court is of the opinion, when considering costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, that she ought to do so.

Conclusion

[42]For these extended reasons, I indicated at the hearing that I would grant W’s application in part.