JC v MC [2026] EWFC 145

[2026] EWFC 145Case No 1731-7645-8480-7163
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Venue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 22/06/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE MACDONALD
Between
JCApplicantMCRespondent
Miss Amber Sheridan (instructed by Expatriate Law) for ApplicantMiss Nicola Gray KC (instructed by Withers) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 10 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 23 June 2026..............................MR JUSTICE MACDONALD
[1]The court is concerned with applications made by JC (hereafter, by convention, “the husband”) for relief from sanction under FPR 2010 r.4.6 and to vary the interim provisions in force in these proceedings. The respondent to those applications is MC (hereafter, by convention, “the wife”). In addition, the husband makes an application under s.37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (hereafter “the 1973 Act”) for an injunction to prevent the disposal of one of the parties’ properties and the wife makes what is described as an application for enforcement, albeit by way of variation of the terms a previous enforcement order agreed by consent. Each party resists the applications of the other.[2]The husband is represented by Miss Amber Sheridan of counsel. The wife is represented by Miss Nichola Gray of King’s Counsel.[3]At the end of the hearing I announced that the application for relief from sanction would be refused, that the application to vary the interim provisions would be dismissed and that the husband should pay the wife’s costs of that application. Further, I am satisfied that the husband’s application for inunction relief under s.37 of the 1973 Act, and the wife’s application for enforcement should be dismissed. I now set out my reasons for those decisions.

BACKGROUND

[4]Almost every relevant fact in these proceedings is in dispute between the parties. The litigation is characterised by a tendency on the part of both parties to fight every issue, however small, to a standstill. Considered compromise is almost completely absent, and when it appears it does so only at the door of the court. For the purposes of this judgment, however, the background to the matter can be set out relatively shortly.[5]The husband is 54 and the wife is 57. They are both French nationals, albeit the husband was born in Switzerland. They married in 1998. The wife moved to live in Switzerland with the husband. The parties entered into a post-marriage contract before a notary, whereby they submitted to the Swiss matrimonial regime of separation of property. There are two children of the marriage, now young adults, who each live and study abroad. The parties separated, on the husband’s case, in January 2023 or, on the wife’s case, in May 2024.[6]Either in their individual names or through property holding corporate structures, the parties own properties in England, Switzerland and France, all of which are mortgaged. The parties also own two apartments in France, one of which is unencumbered. There is also a property in Spain that is the subject of a dispute regarding its beneficial ownership. There remain significant disputes of varying degrees of intensity regarding a number of the other properties.[7]The husband heads a complex business structure spanning multiple jurisdictions. These corporate entities are being valued and assessed for liquidity / cashflow by Mr Thomas Rodwell of RDA, pursuant to a direction of this court made on 27 March 2026.[8]A Foundation established in 2009 also features in the parties’ finances. It is a non-profit entity. Its liabilities and commitments include the funding of an academic chair. The Foundation also holds an art collection, about which there is, inevitably, an ongoing dispute between the husband and the wife.[9]The wife has her own resources held in offshore bonds and within trust structures. The wife has majority shareholdings in the two French SCIs that hold the apartments, her part ownership of one of the French properties and her own art collection. The wife also has an art event business, which she utilises to subsidise her living expenses. In addition she owns, indirectly, shares in three private companies.[10]In broad terms, the husband contends that the matrimonial assets comprise some £19.9M. The wife contends that the matrimonial assets comprise some £44.3M. The difference between those two figures derives largely from a disagreement as to the value of the husband’s business interests, which issue the expert report of Mr Rodwell will address.[11]On 23 July 2025 this court made an MPS order in favour of the wife in the following terms:
“13. The applicant shall pay to the respondent maintenance pending suit at the rate of £12,000 per month from 1 September 2025 (provided the respondent has secured a London rental property commencing then or earlier) and otherwise from the date of commencement of the tenancy and such payments shall continue until further order.”
[12]It is important to note that the husband consented to the MPS order being made and to the quantum of MPS that is stipulated in that order. At the time the parties agreed the principle and the quantum of MPS the husband was represented by specialist financial remedy solicitors and counsel.[13]The order of 23 July 2025 also required the husband to reimburse the wife for her moving and storage costs within 14 days of the presentation of the invoice(s) for those costs. On 20 October 2025, the wife applied to enforce this order after the husband had failed to reimburse the wife as ordered. The court made a without notice third party debt order in the sum of £38,989.51 on the same date.[14]On 15 December 2025, the wife’s enforcement application was compromised. The order of 15 December 2025 provided for the wife’s enforcement application to be withdrawn and included the following provisions regarding the sale of certain pieces of art:
“9. The Agreed Collection shall be sold forthwith on the open market for sale and the following conditions will apply: a. the respondent shall have sole conduct of the sales including as to timing, mechanism for sale and sale price, strictly on the basis that: i. each item shall sell for no less than the minimum price referred to above, unless agreed otherwise, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld; ii. MP shall not be moved from its current position without the parties' prior agreement or further order; iii. the respondent shall endeavour to achieve a fair sale price assuming a sale within 28 days of marketing; and iv. the respondent shall not receive a commission from any sale. b. the proceeds of sale shall be applied as follows: i. in payment of any costs of sale, including but not limited to commission; ii. £47,631.02 to the respondent to discharge the sums owed to her pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 as at the date of this order; iii. a further £8,000 to the respondent pursuant to paragraph 16 below; iv. a further £72,000 to the respondent, such sum being agreed to reflect the £12,000 per month maintenance pending suit to be paid pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 for a period of 6 months, it being recorded that this sum shall be payable even if the respondent has not yet secured a formal tenancy, strictly on the basis that the respondent shall only then use the funds received towards her housing (to include rent, agency fees and a deposit), on the basis that such sum as the respondent receives pursuant to this sub- paragraph is on account of her entitlement pursuant to the Order dated 23 July 2025; v. to the respondent to offset any further sums owed to her pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 after the date of this order; and vi. in the event that the applicant is agreed to be in compliance with the interim financial obligations recorded in the Order dated 23 July 2025 and this order, in payment of the balance to the applicant, for him to pay any taxes arising on said sales promptly when the same shall fall due, in default of which the balance shall be held by the respondent until further order.” i. each item shall sell for no less than the minimum price referred to above, unless agreed otherwise, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld; ii. MP shall not be moved from its current position without the parties' prior agreement or further order; iii. the respondent shall endeavour to achieve a fair sale price assuming a sale within 28 days of marketing; and iv. the respondent shall not receive a commission from any sale. i. in payment of any costs of sale, including but not limited to commission; ii. £47,631.02 to the respondent to discharge the sums owed to her pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 as at the date of this order; iii. a further £8,000 to the respondent pursuant to paragraph 16 below; iv. a further £72,000 to the respondent, such sum being agreed to reflect the £12,000 per month maintenance pending suit to be paid pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 for a period of 6 months, it being recorded that this sum shall be payable even if the respondent has not yet secured a formal tenancy, strictly on the basis that the respondent shall only then use the funds received towards her housing (to include rent, agency fees and a deposit), on the basis that such sum as the respondent receives pursuant to this sub- paragraph is on account of her entitlement pursuant to the Order dated 23 July 2025; v. to the respondent to offset any further sums owed to her pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Order dated 23 July 2025 after the date of this order; and vi. in the event that the applicant is agreed to be in compliance with the interim financial obligations recorded in the Order dated 23 July 2025 and this order, in payment of the balance to the applicant, for him to pay any taxes arising on said sales promptly when the same shall fall due, in default of which the balance shall be held by the respondent until further order.”
[15]Once again, the husband consented to these terms, including those which reiterated the principle and quantum of MPS contained in the order dated 23 July 2025. Again, at the time the parties reiterated, by consent, the principle and quantum of MPS in the order of 15 December 2025 the husband was represented by specialist financial remedy solicitors and counsel.[16]On 16 March 2026, the wife issued an application to enforce the order of 15 December 2026 in respect of the order for sale of the art collection, the bulk of the proceeds of which were to be applied to funding arrears of the MPS provided for in the order of 23 July 2025 and reiterated in the order of 15 December 2026. On 28 May 2026, the wife also issued an application to vary the orders of the court of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025. At this hearing, in circumstances where there are now no arrears, Miss Gray has characterised the wife’s application as “enforcement by variation”, characterising the order of 15 December 2025 as a “rolling enforcement order”.[17]The matter came before the court again on 27 March 2026 following an unsuccessful private FDR. At that hearing, the husband signalled his intention to make an application to vary the interim provisions that he had consented to on 23 July 2025. In the circumstances, in addition to listing the wife’s application, the court made the following case management[18]When issued, the husband’s application in fact sought to range much wider than an application to vary the interim provisions, including the MPS figure of £12,000 per month. The husband’s application to vary the orders of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025 was filed on 29 May 2026 and issued on 7 May 2026. In the rider to the D11 application form, the scope of the husband’s application to vary was set out as follows:
“The applicant seeks to clarify and, to the extent necessary, vary the orders of 23 July 2025, 15 December 2025 and 27 March 2026 to regulate the interim position pending the final hearing of the financial remedy proceedings, currently listed for 10 days commencing 25 January 2027. Whilst the applicant accepts that the July and December orders were made by consent, prior to the instruction of the applicant’s current legal team, it is the case that in a number of material respects the current provisions are unclear, internally inconsistent and have proved unworkable in practice. In addition, when the overall effect of the orders is analysed properly in the context of the applicant’s current financial position, they are unsustainable and unfair.”
[19]The rider to the husband’s D11 goes on to assert unfairness and a lack of specificity and clarity with respect to the orders concerning the one of the French properties, to seek additional orders in respect of another of the French properties, to assert that the order dealing with the wife’s housing provision is unaffordable and excessive and should be met at a lower level of provision, to seek a more proportionate and controlled approach to the storage and insurance costs for the art and to vary the order for the payment of the expert’s fees. Nowhere does the rider to the application expressly seek a reduction in the MPS payments of £12,000 per month and set out clearly, or at all, the change of circumstances on which the husband relies to justify the variation to the interim order that he consented to on 23 July 2025 (although the effect of draft order accompanying the husband’s application was to reduce the MPS from £12,000 per month to £8,333 per month).[20]As set out above, on 27 March 2026 the court directed the husband to file and serve a statement, limited to 15 pages in length, in support of the application to vary interim provision that he intended to issue. That statement was directed to be filed and served on 6 May 2026. On 11 May 2026, five days late, the husband filed and served a 47 page statement, with exhibits running to 134 pages. In addition, the Note prepared by Miss Sheridan for this hearing was accompanied by a tabulated document into which the husband inserted his position on his application to vary, and his comments on the wife’s position with respect to the draft order provided with the husband’s application to vary. That document, runs to 25 pages. In the circumstances, as against the statement of 15 pages directed by the court, the husband has provided a total of 206 pages of material on his application to vary, the application itself ranging far wider than the variation of interim provision as I have described.[21]The husband’s 47 page statement in support of his application runs to 212 paragraphs of single spaced text. The statement ranges far beyond matters relevant to an application to vary made at an interim stage. I agree with the submission of Miss Gray that the statement has all the characteristics of a s.25 statement drafted for a final hearing. By way of examples, the statement deals with the history of the litigation, provides a detailed account of the staff arrangements at one of the French properties and the workings of the SCI bank account, deals with the historical management practices for the holding company for the another of the French properties, covers issues concerning the wife’s sister and gives an extensive account of the ‘background’ to the sale and storage of art across 25 paragraphs complete with quotations of entire emails.[22]By contrast, the fundamental question for the court on a variation application, namely whether there has been a change of circumstances in the 5 months since the husband agreed an order reiterating the terms of the interim provision on 15 December 2025, is dealt with in only six paragraphs. The asserted changes comprise the fact of the husband’s involvement in other, commercial, litigation (which in fact commenced prior to the agreed orders of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025), an asserted reduction in business income consequent upon that commercial litigation (which appears to have occurred prior to the agreed order of 15 December 2025) and the resumption of mortgage payments on one of the French properties (the parties having been aware that the payment holiday was due to end in December 2025). Against these deficits, the husband acknowledges the commencement of rental income on one of their properties of £52,000 per month.[23]The wife, by contrast, complied with the order of the court of 27 March 2026, filing and serving as directed her statement in reply limited to 10 pages on 27 May 2026.[24]The husband’s application for relief from sanction was filed on 1 June 2026. The rider to that applications seeks to explain the husband’s failure to comply with the directions of the court as follows:
“The applicant’s variation application was two days late and his statement in support of his application and in response to the respondent’s enforcement application was three working days late. The statement also exceeds the page limit. The applicant’s finances are complicated and to date, the respondent has refused to engage in any meaningful way when the applicant has explained that he simply cannot sustain the interim commitments, nor work with the current orders which given the respondent control over jointly owned real estate, as well as the applicant’s own art. In order for the applicant and the court to fully understand the extent and seriousness of the financial predicament he is and now the current mechanisms need to change in order to be workable, his position has been set out in detail. It is the applicant’s position that the court requires this information to deal with his variation application and that there is not prejudice to the respondent who has had plenty of time to file a statement in response in advance of the hearing on 10 June. As such, there should be no impact upon this hearing.”

RELEVANT LAW

[25]FPR r.4.6 provides as follows with respect to the principles governing relief from sanctions in proceedings to which the FPR apply:
“Relief from sanctions 4.6.—(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order the court will consider all the circumstances including— (a) the interests of the administration of justice; (b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly; (c) whether the failure to comply was intentional; (d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure; (e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules, practice directions, court orders and any relevant pre-action protocol (GL); (f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or the party's legal representative; (g) whether the hearing date or the likely hearing date can still be met if relief is granted; (h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and (i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party or a child whose interest the court considers relevant. (2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence.”
[26]In Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 the Court of Appeal, in the context of civil proceedings, formulated a three stage test for determining whether relief from sanctions should be granted. The three stage test in Denton v TH White Ltd was further illuminated in EXN v Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust & Anor [2022] EWHC 872 (QB). The three stages are as follows: i) The court should first identify and assess the seriousness or significance of any failure to comply with any rule, Practice Direction or court order. If the breach is not serious or significant, then relief from sanction will usually be granted. If, however, the breach is serious or significant then the second and third stages assume greater importance. ii) Having identified and assessed the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply, the court should then consider why the default occurred and whether there was a good reason for the default. At one end of the spectrum will be those cases in which a party has acted in contumelious disregard of an order of the court in order to gain an unfair procedural advantage. At the other will be those cases in which non-compliance was unavoidable through no fault of either party. In between, will be those cases non-compliance is culpable but accidental and based on flawed understanding. iii) Finally, the court should evaluate all the circumstances of the case so as to enable it to deal justly with the application. The relevant factors will vary from case to case. The promptness of the application for relief from sanctions will be a relevant circumstance. Other past or current breaches of the rules, Practice Directions and court orders may be taken into account as relevant circumstances as will the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and the need to enforce compliance with rules, Practice Directions and court orders.[27]When considering the question of relief from sanctions in this case, in line with the factors set out in FPR 2010 r.4.6 and the three stage test articulated in Denton, it is important to be clear on the legal principles the court applies when dealing with substantive application to vary interim provision, i.e. to be clear as to the question which the statements directed by the court on 27 March 2026 were intended to answer.[28]To be justified, a variation to an MPS order requires a material change of circumstances since the making of the original order, in this case an order made and reiterated by consent. As Ms Sheridan acknowledges in her note, in DH v RH [2023] EWFC 210, this court confirmed that, on an application to vary an MPS order, the court must first consider whether there has been a change of circumstances since the order was made. If there has, the court applies the usual MPS test to those changed circumstances, namely whether the level of provision sought is reasonable. The court's task on a variation application must remain proportionate to the requirements of the case (see Morris v Morris [2017] 1 WLR 554). A variation application is not an appeal by another route. Where an order has not been appealed, the starting point is that it was correct when made. In Garner v Garner [1992] 1 FLR 573 the Court of Appeal observed as follows at 581, albeit in the context of a periodical payments[29]The correct approach to an application for a freezing injunction is set out in Les Ambassadeurs Club Ltd v Yu [2022] 4 WLR 1. In that case, Andrews LJ made clear that the focus should be on whether, on the facts of the case, the evidence before the court demonstrates objectively a real risk of unjustified dissipation which is sufficient in all the circumstances to render it just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction.

DISCUSSION

[30]I am satisfied that the husband’s application for relief from sanctions should be refused. In circumstances where, in consequence, the husband has no evidence before the court in support of his application to vary, and no application to adjourn was advanced by him following the refusal of relief from sanctions, I am satisfied that the husband’s application to vary the interim provisions should be dismissed. With respect to the husband’s application for injunctive relief under s.37 of the 1973 Act and the applications for enforcement and variation made by the wife, I am satisfied that those applications too should be dismissed. My reasons for so deciding are as follows:

Relief from Sanctions

[31]In her Note on behalf of the husband, Miss Sheridan seeks to distinguish DH v RH on the basis that the order of 23 July 2025, and the order of 15 December 2025 reiterating its terms, were made by consent. Accordingly, Miss Sheridan submits that there is no original assessment by the court circumstances against which to measure change and, thus, the question for the court is “whether the present circumstances justify a variation of orders that were reached by agreement on assumptions that have subsequently proved unsustainable.” I am not able to accept that submission.[32]The order of 23 July 2025 was consented to by the husband based on the circumstances set out in the evidence before the court at that date. In approving a consent order, the court is not a rubber stamp. Before endorsing the order, the court assesses whether what the parties have agreed is fair and just as between them based on the evidence. Accordingly, there is little material difference between a court deciding an application to vary an MPS order made by the court and approving an order dealing with interim provision achieved by consent, save for the absence of a judgment in the latter situation and the parties consenting being assumed themselves to have been satisfied that the circumstances merited the order.[33]Accordingly, the question in this case on the application to vary the interim provision in this case is the same as in any other. Namely, the court must first consider whether there has been a change of circumstances since the order was made. If there has, the court will then apply the usual test to those changed circumstances, namely whether the level of interim provision sought is reasonable, being in mind that this is an interim position pending the final hearing and that, as yet, the structure and quantum of the parties assets and the disputes of fact that underpin that question have yet to be determined.[34]It is in this context that the court set the page limits it did on the parties’ statements in support, and in reply to the application in its order of 27 March 2026. Five months after consenting to the principle and quantum of MPS, and having regard to the narrow task of the court at this interim stage, it should be possible for a party seeking the variation to set out what has changed and what effect that change has on the interim arrangements in 15 pages number of pages. That having been done, it follows that the party replying will need a similarly constrained number of pages to respond fairly to what has been said.[35]I deal first with the identification and assessment of the seriousness or significance of the husband’s failure to comply with the order of the court of 27 March 2026.[36]In the context of an indicated application to vary, the court gave clear directions as to the evidence it required to determine that application, having regard to the legal test it is required to apply when doing so. Further, the court gave a time estimate for the hearing commensurate with the nature and extent of the task consequent on the husband indicating that he intended to make an application to the interim arrangements. Having directed the husband to file and serve a statement of no more than 15 pages, the husband issued an application that went well beyond the application he had indicated and filed documentation in support of his application that exceeded the page limit set by the court by well over ten orders of magnitude, using it as a vehicle for seeking a wholesale revision of the mechanics for payment of household outgoings, the sale of artwork and multiple other aspects of the interim arrangements between the parties. As I noted, as a result the husband’s default, in order to comply with the direction of the court, the wife was forced to address the extended scope of the husband’s application, and the vastly enlarged material in support of it, in the 10 page limit imposed by the court. In this case I am satisfied that the husband’s breach is both significant and serious.[37]As to why the default occurred and whether there was a good reason for it, I am satisfied that the husband’s default is properly characterised as one of contumelious disregard for an order of the court in order to gain an unfair procedural advantage.[38]Notwithstanding the order of the court that he file and serve a statement of 15 pages in length, the husband chose to file a statement of 47 pages with 134 pages of exhibits and a tabulated document providing his views on the application and his comments on the wife’s position running to 25 pages. That the husband, as opposed to his lawyers, intended this course is indicated by the husband’s D11 seeking relief from sanction, in which it is said that “It is the applicant’s position that the court requires this information to deal with his variation application...” I am accordingly satisfied that the husband’s failure to comply with the order of the court was intentional. This conclusion is reinforced by the flippant manner in which the husband asserts in his D11 that the wife had “plenty of time to file a statement” and that “there should be no impact upon this hearing.” Further, in circumstances where the husband took these actions in the knowledge that the wife was required to file and serve a statement of reply limited to 10 pages in length, I am satisfied that the husband was seeking an unfair procedural advantage by his failure to comply with the direction of the court.[39]There is no good explanation for the husband’s failure to comply with the order. This was not a case of a filing date missed due to circumstances outside a parties control. It was a deliberate decision not to comply with an order made by the court by a party who had decided that the terms of the order no longer suited them.[40]Finally, I turn to evaluate all the circumstances of the case to enable the court to deal justly with the application.[41]The effect which the husband’s failure to comply has had on the wife is a weighty factor in this case. As I have noted, the husband blithely states that no prejudice is caused to the wife by his contumelious disregard for an order of the court because she has had “plenty of time to file a statement.” However, the issue is not one of time but one of space. Because the wife, properly, complied with the direction of the court, the consequence of the husband’s contumelious default is that she was required to respond in 10 pages to what the husband set out, late, in 206 pages. I accept the submission of Miss Gray that, as a result of the husband’s intentional default, the wife has had no fair or realistic opportunity to address in evidence the complex of multifarious points raised by the husband in the lengthy statement, exhibits and table of comments and responses. By reason of the husband’s contumelious default, the wife’s dutiful compliance was turned into a source of unfairness.[42]I accept Ms Gray’s submission that the husband’s conduct amounts to “forensic cheating”. The husband’s conduct placed the wife in the wholly invidious position of either complying with the court order and risking not addressing points raised by the husband, or addressing each point made by the husband in his vastly enlarged documentation and breaching the order of the court. In short, it would be unfair to permit the husband to be excused his default but expect the wife to meet the consequences of that default within the constraints imposed by the court on both parties. The rules of court and the court’s directions are not mere agents of pedantry. The are at the very heart of ensuring that each party to proceedings benefits from a fair hearing at a proportionate cost.[43]The promptness, or otherwise, of the application for relief from sanctions is also a relevant circumstance in this case. To be considered “prompt”, the application should ordinarily be made immediately it becomes apparent that the direction of the court will not be complied with. In this case, the husband made no application to vary the direction with respect to the length of the statement prior to filing the same, even though it was plain that he was in serious and significant breach of the court’s order. Rather, an application for relief from sanctions was made nearly a month after the default and only just prior to the hearing.[44]The concept of relief from sanctions does not embody a principle of ‘breach now repent later’. If he sought to file and serve a longer statement, the husband should have applied to the court to vary the direction before the deadline for that statement, thereby allowing the wife to make representations and to remain on a level playing field if the court granted the husband’s application to vary the case management direction. Instead, the husband chose unilaterally to move the goal posts and expected the wife to cope with the situation that he thereby imposed. Such conduct is both unfair and antithetic to the proper administration of justice.[45]It is plain that, were the court to grant the husband’s application for relief from sanction, the hearing of the husband’s application to vary the interim provisions could not fairly proceed. Again, the issue is one of space not time. Whilst the wife may have had time to prepare her statement, in circumstances where the wife obeyed the order of the court and the husband breached it by orders of magnitude, the wife has not had an opportunity to answer the myriad of issues, including complex disputes of fact, raised in the husband’s statement. Were the court to grant the husband relief from sanction and accept the statement, fairness demands that the wife be given an opportunity to respond.[46]This hearing was listed with a one day time estimate on the basis that the court would be hearing a contested application to vary an MPS order according to the legal principles I have described. The husband’s default has resulted in a statement that raises a large number of issues and disputes of fact. During her opening submissions, Miss Sheridan told the court that some of these involve excavation of layers of correspondence between a range of individuals, some involved in other complex litigation. In the circumstances, in ignoring the directions of the court, the husband appeared to have given little thought to how the court could be expected to deal with the application in the time estimate accorded to it on the basis of the length of statements directed.[47]In considering the husband’s application for relief from sanctions, I have also borne in mind the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost.[48]The need to ensure that applications are dealt with in a manner that is proportionate to the requirements of the case applies with equal force to application to vary MPS (see Morris v Morris [2017] 1 WLR 554). The reason the court directed the length of statements it did was because the issues required to be dealt with in those statements are straightforward. Namely, has there been a change of circumstances since the order was made and in those changed circumstances is the level of provision sought reasonable. The statement filed and served by the husband in breach of the order of the court contains a level of detail that obscures rather than illuminates the matters dealt with in it and, as I have noted, ranges well beyond that which the court requires to determine an application to vary MPS. It was not necessary to deal extensively with the underlying asset structure, the history of the factual landscape and disputes, the extensive correspondence between the parties and the minute complexities of the case. As such it, it militates against, rather than facilitates, the efficient disposal of the application to vary. It does not permit the court at an interim hearing to decide whether, on “a broad assessment, the court's intervention is manifestly required” (see BD v FD [2016] EWHC 594 (Fam) at [34] per Moylan J (as he then was)).[49]Further, the husband has already incurred legal costs of £952,173. The husband’s costs of preparing the application to vary are £89,162, almost 10% of the total. That figure includes nearly £20,000 of costs on preparing the nearly 50 page statement. These figures are entirely disproportionate to the issues the court is required to decide on an application to vary MPS. The disproportionate nature of those costs is reinforced by the fact that £89,162 would fund seven months of maintenance payments at the current level, sufficient to reach the final hearing of this matter, listed in January 2027.[50]Whilst not a determinative factor, I am further satisfied that the need to enforce compliance with rules, Practice Directions and court orders is a relevant factor when determining the outcome of the husband’s application for relief from sanction. The rules of court and the orders of the court only maintain their authority if they are policed and any breaches sanctioned where appropriate. Granting relief from sanctions in an egregious cases of contumelious default of court orders sends entirely the wrong message to litigants in general. Parties to financial remedy proceedings are mistaken if they believe that they can breach case management directions deliberately in order to obtain a litigation advantage and then present the court with a fait accompli in the form of an application for relief from sanction.[51]Finally, I have borne in mind the effect which the granting of relief from sanctions sought by the husband would have on each party. Granting such relief would allow the husband to place evidence before the court in support of his application to vary MPS in circumstances where that application would be otherwise unevidenced. However, in the circumstances set out above, to grant the husband’s application for relief from sanctions would leave the wife in the same unfair position of having to contest the application to vary MPS without the opportunity to respond in full to the husband’s evidence or to an adjournment with the costs risks attendant thereon.[52]Having evaluated all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the husband’s application for relief from sanction, I am satisfied that the husband’s application for relief should be refused. I decline to give permission to the husband to file and serve his statement out of time in circumstances where it deliberately fails to comply with the case management directions given by the court.

Application to Vary MPS

[53]In circumstances where the court has refused relief from sanctions with respect to the husband’s statement in support of his application to vary interim provision, he has no evidence before the court in support of that application. The husband made no application to the court for an adjournment and further directions. In light of the costs incurred by the husband on this application, that is perhaps unsurprising. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the husband’s application to vary the orders of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025, both of which he consented to at a time when he was in receipt of specialist legal advice, should be dismissed.

Application for Injunction

[54]The husband seeks an injunction pursuant to s.37 of the 1973 Act restraining the wife from selling one of the French properties. In part, the husband application seeks what might be considered a relatively standard injunctive order preventing the wife from selling, transferring, charging, leasing or disposing of, diminishing the value of, or otherwise dealing with one of the property. However, in addition, the husband also seeks an order that purports to regulate the parties’ occupation of the property by ensuring it is available for dates the husband wishes to utilise it.[55]To secure an injunction, the husband must demonstrate to the court that the evidence before the court demonstrates objectively a real risk of unjustified dissipation which is sufficient in all the circumstances to render it just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction. In this regard, the husband relies on emails sent by the wife that he contends indicate the wife’s intention, in her role as manager of SCI, to market the property and to rent it out for the entire summer. In this regard, the husband relies on an email sent to him on 31 March 2026 in which the wife complains that SCI is “constantly in deficit” due to him failing to pay the full mortgage on the property. The wife goes on to state that:
“Given the constant stress you impose on me regarding this shared house, and especially because the financial balance of the SCI is not maintained and you refuse me access despite my 60% usufruct, I am left with no choice but to put the property up for sale. In the meantime, as manager of SCI, I will rent it out for the entire summer in order to pay the expenses and the mortgage.”
[56]I am not satisfied that the wife’s email of 31 March 2026 evidences a real risk of unjustified dissipation of the property by the wife which is sufficient in all the circumstances to render it just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction.[57]Whilst the wife does stated that if that if the financial obligations on the property cannot be met then the property will need to be sold, this statement is made in the context of the wife seeking generate liquidity in the face of the husband’s claim that he has insufficient funds to comply with meet interim obligations on the property. Further, the wife’s proposal that the parties maximise the rental income on the property over the summer period is not consistent with a real risk of dissipation, and certainly not immediately. Finally, whilst in her statement the wife reiterates her view that if the financial obligations on the property cannot be met then the property will need to be sold, she also makes clear that she accepts that the property should not be sold without the agreement of the husband or the order of the English court and that she is content for that to be recorded on the face of the order made by the court at this hearing.[58]Finally, I am not satisfied that the second order sought by the husband pursuant to s.37 of the 1973 Act is a proper order to be made under that statute. The terms of the order seek to ensure that the property is available for rental by the husband over the summer by injuncting the wife from renting out the property to others on the dates specified in the draft order. Despite Ms Sheridan’s best efforts by reference to the case law, the wish of the wife to rent out the property over the summer in the face of the husband’s wish to occupy it over the same period does not amount to a real risk of unjustified dissipation of the property (and arguably the opposite) which is sufficient in all the circumstances to render it just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction against the wife. I am confident that Parliament did not intend s.37 of the 1973 Act to be used to regulate which divorcing spouse has use of their house on the Gulf of St Tropez over the summer.[59]In the circumstances set out above, I am satisfied the husband’s application for a freezing injunction should be dismissed. The wife’s agreement that the property should not be sold without the agreement of the husband or the order of the English court should be recorded on the face of the order that results from this hearing.

Application for Enforcement / Variation of MPS

[60]On 20 October 2025, the wife applied to enforce the order of 23 July 2025 after the husband had failed to reimburse the wife as provided for in that order. The court made a without notice third party debt order in the sum of £38,989.51. On 15 December 2025, the wife’s enforcement application was compromised by the agreed order of that date. The application notice issued on 15 December 2025 enclosing the draft order of that date made clear that the order was agreed in order to compromise the wife’s enforcement application with respect to the order of 23 July 2026:
“The respondent obtained an interim third party debt order on an ex parte basis on 21 November 2025. A hearing is listed on 17 December 2025 to consider whether to make the interim third party debt order final. The respondent also filed a D50K application on 3 December 2025 on the basis that the Third Party Debt Order would not cover the total amount due. The parties have agreed the attached draft order in lieu of the respondent pursuing the Third Party Debt Order of the D50K enforcement applications. The parties request that the attached draft order is made and the hearing on 17 December 2025 is vacated.”
[61]As further noted, on 16 March 2026, the wife issued an application to enforce the order of 15 December 2026 in respect of the order for sale of the art collection, the bulk of the proceeds of which were to be applied to funding maintenance pending suite pursuant to the orders of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2026. On 2 June 2026, the husband paid £38,000 towards the Wife’s interim housing costs (an earlier sum of £34,000 having been received by her following sale of artwork). The wife has now received the £72,000 interim housing fund to which she is entitled under the order dated 15 December 2025.[62]In the circumstances, as at the date of this hearing, there are no arrears to enforce under the wife’s application of 16 March 2026.[63]Notwithstanding the absence of arrears, the wife pursues her application of 28 May 2026 to vary the orders of 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025. Those variations provide, first, that any rental received for one of the French properties can be used to discharge the mortgage instalments for the property and, second, that any sums received from the sale of artwork pursuant to the December 2025 order can be used to defray any of the sums payable under the MPS order and not just the storage costs for the artwork. The application to vary is accordingly described in the Wife’s note as “an aid to enforcement”. The precise terms of the order sought by the wife are as follows:
“2. The references to 'running costs' and 'outgoings' at paragraph 10 of the July order (against which rental income at the property is to be applied) shall include the monthly mortgage repayments to BNP Paribas. For the avoidance of doubt, the applicant's obligations relating to these costs pursuant to the July and December orders is only insofar as rental income does not cover the same. 3. Paragraph 9.b.v. of the December order shall be varied as follows: ‘v. to the respondent to offset any further sums owed to her by the applicant pursuant to the Orders of Mr Justice MacDonald dated 23 July 2025, 15 December 2025, 27 March 2026 and 10 June 2026, to include any outstanding or future liabilities pursuant to those orders.’ 4. The applicant shall, by 4pm on [Date] 2026 provide documentary evidence of the ownership and provenance of any item which has not already been sold from the “Agreed Collection” as defined in paragraph 2 of the December order. 5. In the event that the applicant is unable to provide the documentary evidence referred to at paragraph 4 above or the total value of the items that have the necessary documentation to be sold is less than the sums owed to the respondent: a. The applicant shall, by 4pm on [Date] 2026, provide such evidence in relation to substitute items of artwork that are agreed to belong to him and are not within the “Agreed Collection”; and b. The substitute items shall be sold and paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the December order (as varied) shall apply to the sales.”
[64]Dealing first with the order of 15 December 2025, as the application notice of the same date demonstrates, that order was agreed for a very specific purpose, namely in lieu of the respondent pursuing the Third Party Debt Order of the D50K enforcement applications in respect of specified sums that had been owing under the order of 23 July 2025. The order of 15 December 2025 therefore had a specific purpose, which has been met. In the circumstances, the wife’s application to vary the order of 15 December 2025 seeks to vary an order that has already served its specific purpose at a time there are no outstanding arrears. In short, the wife’s application to vary the order of 15 December 2025 is an attempt to use a prior enforcement order directed to a previous default to set the terms of enforcement for a future default that has not yet occurred. I am satisfied that that is not an appropriate use of an application to vary. If future arrears arise then they fall to be enforced by way of an application at that time, at which time the court will consider the merits of the enforcement application and the appropriate method of enforcement if the application is granted.[65]With respect to the application to vary the order dated 23 July 2026, this is an application to vary a substantive order. Having regard to the evidence before the court, and in particular to the degree of acrimony and disagreement being generated by the discharge of the parties’ respective obligations with respect to the property I am satisfied that it is appropriate to vary paragraph 10 of the order of 23 July to make clear that the references to 'running costs' and 'outgoings' against which the rental income is to be applied shall include the monthly mortgage repayments and that, for the avoidance of doubt, the applicant's obligations relating to these costs pursuant to the July and December orders is only insofar as rental income does not cover the same.[66]In the circumstances, the wife’s application for enforcement and her application to vary are dismissed save as to the matters set out in the foregoing paragraph.

Costs

[67]As to costs, I am satisfied that the wife is entitled to her costs of responding to the husband’s application to vary MPS, his application for relief from sanction and his application for a freezing order. Taking a broad view of the costs contained in the wife’s form N260 that are attributable to responding to those applications, I summarily assess those costs in the sum of £60,000 plus VAT and will order the husband to pay the wife’s costs in that sum within 28 days.

CONCLUSION

[68]For the reasons set out above, the husband’s application for relief from sanctions is refused. His application to vary the interim provisions and his application for injunctive relief are dismissed. The wife’s applications for enforcement and variation are dismissed save as set out above. I make an order that the husband shall pay the wife’s costs of resisting the application to vary, for relief from sanctions and for a freezing order, summarily assessed in the sum of £60,000 plus VAT. I will ask counsel to submit a draft order accordingly.[69]In her Note, Miss Sheridan submits that “justice cannot be sacrificed on the high altar of case management efficiency.” Whilst that is a correct statement of principle, it is not any answer to the husband’s conduct. The court takes account of that principle when it makes the case management orders, having listened to the parties representations on that issue. Once those case management orders have been made, having balanced justice and efficiency in the context of the Overriding Objective, they must be obeyed. If a party seeks to vary the case management directions, then that party must apply to the court before the deadline for complying has passed. It is adherence to the rules, and to the case management directions made by the court pursuant to those rules, that ensures a just and efficient outcome, not a party deciding deliberately to breach a court order because it suits their formulation of what is required.

order

“34. On the basis that the applicant intends to issue an application to vary the interim provisions set out in the orders dated 23 July 2025 and 15 December 2025 (“the applicant’s variation application”) and shall do so by 27 April 2026, the applicant’s variation application and the respondent’s enforcement application shall be listed together in accordance with paragraph 36 below and the following consequential provisions shall apply— i. The applicant shall file and serve a statement in response to the respondent’s enforcement application and in support of his variation application by 16:00 on 6 May 2026 (limited to 15 pages); ii. The respondent shall file and serve a statement in response by 16:00 on 27 May 2026 (limited to 10 pages).” order: “Almost invariably, an application to vary an earlier periodical payments order will be brought on the basis that there has been some change in the circumstances since the original order was made; otherwise, except in exceptional circumstances, the application will, in effect, be an appeal. If an order is not appealed against, or is made by consent, then the presumption must be that the order was correct when made. If it was correct when made, then there will usually be no justification for varying it unless there has been a material change in the circumstances.”