ED v AP [2025] EWFC 399

[2025] EWFC 399B E T W E E N:ED Applicant- and -AP RespondentIMPORTANT NOTICE The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.Mr Daniel Bentham KC, Ms Emma Chamberlain and Mr Phillip Blatchly (Counsel instructed by Kingsley Napley, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Applicant Wife.Mr Geoffrey Kingscote KC and Ms Kyra Cornwall (Counsel instructed by Mishcon De Reya, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Respondent Husband.Written Judgment of His Honour Judge Edward HessDate 23 rd September 2025
Between
Applicant WifeApplicantRespondent HusbandRespondent

INTRODUCTION

[1]This case concerns the financial remedies proceedings arising out of the divorce between ED to whom I shall refer as “the wife”) and AP (to whom I shall refer as “the husband”).[2]The case proceeded to a final hearing over six days in September 2025.[3]Mr Daniel Bentham KC, Ms Emma Chamberlain and Mr Philip Blatchly (Counsel instructed by Kingsley Napley, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the wife. Mr Geoffrey Kingscote KC and Ms Kyra Cornwall (Counsel instructed by Mishcon De Reya, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the husband.[4]I want to thank all Counsel and their supporting legal teams for their hard work and helpful and clear presentations on the case. Both parties have been represented at a very high level, and the advocacy has been of the finest quality, but it has of course come at a cost. The wife has incurred costs of £1,156,990, of which £315,664 remains outstanding. The husband has incurred costs of £1,188,246, of which £258,087 remains outstanding. A total of £2,345,236 has been spent in legal costs by this family on this dispute and has been lost to the family forever.[5]The court was presented with three electronic bundles: a core bundle running to 699 pages (referenced as Cp.X), a library bundle running to 5,195 pages (referenced as Lp.X) and an additional bundle running to 301 pages (referenced as Ap.X). In addition, a number of documents were produced during the hearing. I have considered the material presented to me, in particular I have considered:-(i) A collection of applications and court orders.(ii) Material from the wife including her Form E dated 3rd April 2024 and her witness statements dated 16th April 2025 and 4th July 2025.(iii) Material from the husband including his Form E dated 13th April 2024, his various answers to questionnaire and his witness statements dated 14th May 2025 and 16th July 2025.(iv) Material from SA on real property valuation issues dealing with Property B.(v) Material from Ms Hannah Keens of KPMG and Mr Daniel Sladen of K3 Tax Advisory Ltd on taxation issues.(vi) Material from Mr SG of Savills on real property valuation issues dealing with the family home.(vii) Completed ES1 and ES2 documents.(viii) Selected correspondence and disclosure material.[6]I have also heard oral evidence from the wife and the husband, subjected to appropriate and skilful cross-examination. At one stage it was thought that I might also hear from BN, SA and Mr Daniel Sladen, but (for various different reasons) I did not in the end hear from any of them and the court day set aside for their evidence was not used for this case, hence the gap in the sequence of trial dates.[7]I have received excellent written opening notes and closing (partly oral and partly written) submissions from Counsel.

THE MARRIAGE AND THE DIVORCE

[8]The history of the marriage is as follows.[9]The wife is aged 60. She was born and brought up in a foreign country X and is a citizen of X by origin, although later became a dual UK and X citizen. She identifies herself as a homemaker and housewife. She has not had remunerative employment since becoming pregnant with her first child nearly 30 years ago. She has some health issues. Her case is that she suffers from three autoimmune diseases as well as Osteoporosis and Post-traumatic Stress Disordered Anxiety and Depression; but these issues (while no doubt difficult) do not at present prevent her from living a full life.[10]The husband is aged 65. He was born in country Y but later moved to country X. He retains his X citizenship. He has had, and continues to have, a high-flying career in the world of finance. His current position is as senior manager of Company A, a private equity firm.His case is that he suffers from some cardiovascular issues and also has problems with his left knee; but, again, these issues (while no doubt difficult) do not at present prevent him from living a full life.[11]Both parties have X Nationality. They met in X in 1992, became engaged in 1994 and were married in X in August 1995 (it is common ground that they did not cohabit prior to the marriage). Soon after the marriage they moved to England, where they have lived ever since, a period that now adds up to about 30 years.[12]Since 2002 the family home has been in city F, which was initially rented but in 2012 was purchased and is owned in the joint names of the parties. Both parties continue to live in the family home. One of the controversial issues in the case is whether it should be retained by the wife (as she wishes) or sold and the proceeds of sale divided (as the husband wishes). The wife has described it as “my domain”.[13]The marriage produced four children aged between 20 and 28.[14]All four children happily have good and loving relationships with both their parents, notwithstanding the unhappy situation created by the divorce. All four children have been privately educated. All have attended university, all of which has been completed save that the youngest has one more year at University to complete his degree. All are in good health, though at the moment none of them have really worked out an orthodox career path for themselves, and none have remunerative employment, though they are still fairly young and there is no substantial reason why this should not still happen. All of them still have their main home at the family home to a greater or lesser extent; but soon they will all be adults beyond their first university degree and, in addition to what they should be able to earn for themselves in due course, the husband has already made generous provision for them.[15]In 2021 the husband financed the purchase of another property, Property S, which has always been held by the children, and is now held jointly and equally between the four children. This is in the latter stages of a refurbishment project and the plan is that it will soon be let, perhaps on an ‘Air B’n B’ basis, and the children will share the rental income, which is likely to produce a significant figure for each of them. A sum approaching £5,500,000 has been spent on purchasing and refurbishing this property. In addition, the husband has invested approximately £500,000 for each child in investment accounts, to which they have access or will do in due course. The effect of all this is that approximately £7,500,000 of liquid matrimonial assets has been transferred to the children, the large majority in the last four years or so. This generous provision, which the husband has executed in what he sees as a genuine and sincere attempt to promote the children’s best interests and future is no doubt welcome by the children. It has been done, however, with the knowledge but without the active support of the wife. It is controversial for her and she regards herself as un-consulted on and unhappy with this spending of matrimonial assets. She loves the children, and has their best interests in her heart, but is anxious that the children have received too much too young to the detriment of the development of their own ambition and drive. Despite her unhappiness, it has not been suggested by the wife that the court should set aside these transactions or that there should be an add-back in relation to them. It has been expressly conceded that ‘conduct’ within the meaning of Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25(2)(g) is not being argued here (Cp.25); but it is a context for some issues in the case to which I will return below. These events illustrate how, to some extent at least, the husband sees the wealth that he has generated as his own with which he is free to do what he wishes, rather than family assets generated by a partnership of husband and wife. Whilst he sensibly acknowledges the legal position, I have observed an element of irritation in the husband for having to account to the wife for all this.[16]The relationship broke down over a number of years, but the point of separation for the purposes of these proceedings has been identified by both parties as being November 2023. In November 2023 the wife issued her divorce application and, a few days later she told the husband she wanted a divorce and served on him the divorce application. Despite the events of November 2023, which came as a shock and a disappointment to the husband, the parties have both continued to this day to live at the family home, albeit living separate lives and doing their best to avoid each other. No doubt this arrangement, which has now subsisted for nearly two years, has been difficult for both parties.[17]Conditional Order of Divorce followed in October 2024. There is not yet a Final Order of Divorce, but this awaits resolution of the financial remedies proceedings and is not in itself controversial.[18]The ‘duration of the marriage’ for my purposes was therefore from August 1995 to November 2023, some 28 years, on any view a long marriage.

THE FINANCIAL REMEDIES PROCEEDINGS

[19]In November 2023, the wife issued Form A, seeking a range of financial remedies.[20]Forms E were exchanged in April 2024.[21]A First Appointment was heard by DJ Hudd in May 2024. On this occasion, standard First Appointment directions were made and the case was timetabled to a private FDR (pFDR) before Mr Nicholas Allen KC in October 2024 and a post pFDR directions hearing before me in February 2025. With the approval of Peel J, the case was allocated to me sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge and I am hearing the case in that capacity.[22]The pFDR duly took place in October 2024 but no compromise was reached. For the usual obvious reasons, I have not been told, and cannot be told, what indications were given by the pFDR tribunal nor which of the parties declined to accept them, nor what without prejudice offers have been made.[23]In February 2025 I listed a PTR for July 2025 and a seven-day final hearing to commence in September 2025 (later reduced to six days). Both these hearings have now taken place as scheduled.[24]Section 25 narrative statements were exchanged in July 2025.[25]I have heard the evidence and submissions and written this judgment within the six-day time estimate.

THE BASIC LAW

[26]In dealing with the claim I must, of course, consider the factors set out in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, sections 25 and 25A, together with any relevant case law. Neither side has sought an outcome which includes spousal periodical payments beyond implementation so section 25A is not engaged here.[27]Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25 reads as follows:-(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24, 24A or 24B above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.(2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24,24A or 24B above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters:- (a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire; (b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; (d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; (e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; (f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; (g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; (h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.[28]In addition to these statutory factors, my analysis of the case has been and has to be conducted against the background of a number of relevant and well-established principles from the case law identifying how the court should produce a result which is fair as between the parties, which I shall summarise as follows.[29]First, in its computational phase, the court should seek to identify a distinction between matrimonial property and non-matrimonial property: “It is important to recognise that there is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. In general terms, this distinction turns on the source of the assets. Non-matrimonial property is typically pre-marital property brought into the marriage by one of the parties or property acquired by one of the parties by external inheritance or gift. In contrast, matrimonial property is property that comprises the fruits of the marriage partnership or reflects the marriage partnership or is the product of the parties’ common endeavour”: Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, paragraph 47.[30]Secondly, in identifying what are the fruits of the marriage produced by the parties’ common endeavour, there should be no discrimination between the role of breadwinner and homemaker: “In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles”: White v White [2001] AC 596, p.605.[31]Thirdly, in its distributional phase, the court should (at least as a starting point) seek to divide the matrimonial property equally between the parties; but to leave non-matrimonial property with the party who contributed it:
“It is not in dispute that matrimonial property is subject to the sharing principle with the starting point being equal sharing… the time has come to make clear that non-matrimonial property should not be subject to the sharing principle”: Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, paragraphs 7 and 48. In the words of Mostyn J in JL v SL [2015] EWHC 360: “Matrimonial property is the property which the parties have built up by their joint (but inevitably different) efforts during the span of their partnership. It should be divided equally. This principle is reflected in statutory systems in other jurisdictions. It resonates with moral and philosophical values. It promotes equality and banishes discrimination.”
[32]Fourthly, the sharing methodology described above can be overridden if there is a good reason, for example a reason based on the needs or compensation principle: “each is entitled to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, unless there is good reason to the contrary”: Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 at paragraph 16.[33]Fifthly, an earning capacity is not an asset subject to the sharing principle: “Is an earning capacity capable of being a matrimonial asset to which the sharing principle applies and in the product of which, as a result, an applicant spouse has an entitlement to share? In my view, there are a number of reasons why the clear answer is that it is not”: Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727 at paragraphs 121-122 .[34]Sixthly, once separation has occurred, endeavour by one party which post-dates this moment cannot be categorised as common marital endeavour: “Whatever regime was then put in place by the parties in relation to their mutual and ongoing contributions to their children's welfare and the financial support of the family, it was not an ongoing marital partnership. For this reason, and absent arguments about needs and compensation, I do not accept the wife's proposition that her ongoing contributions to the general welfare of the family matched those of the husband's and/or gave rise to any entitlement to an equal share in the husband's post-separation earnings”: C v C [2018] EWHC 3186 at paragraph 40.

SECTION 25 ANALYSIS

[35]I therefore turn to my section 25 analysis.

WELFARE AND NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN OF THE FAMILY

[36]The children here are not minors, so while their needs and circumstances form a circumstance of the case, they are not my first consideration. In fact, there is sufficient wealth here already in the children’s names for their needs not to form any part of this case and this consideration has not significantly featured in the dispute before me.

CAPITAL AND INCOME RESOURCES

[37]I turn to consider the “property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future” and also “the income, earning capacity…which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire”. I have the following comments and findings to make on these subjects.[38]In assessing the capital resources here, I propose to place assets and debts in two separate categories. Category 1 Assets and Debts are those which exist at the moment and in relation to which, even where they are illiquid, a present value can be placed on them by conventional valuation methodologies. Category 2 Assets and Debts are those which are (to a greater or lesser extent) contingent upon future events which may or may not occur. The two categories need to be disaggregated because they fall to be treated in a different way in terms of what orders the court is likely to make. Where a foreign exchange currency conversion issue exists, I have adopted the parties’ mutual suggestion of using the following rates: £1 = 1.88 Canadian Dollar (CA$); £1 = 1.08 Swiss Franc (CHF); and £1 = 1.36 US Dollar (US$).[39]I turn first to Category 1 Assets and Debts. My conclusions on the numbers are set out in my asset schedule below. I shall set out below some findings and comments which explain the conclusions I have made about these items. Where I make no comment or finding, but include a figure in my asset schedule below, that is because the figure is agreed and the item uncontroversial.[40]The family home is held in the joint names of the parties and is mortgage-free. It has an agreed value for the purposes of these proceedings of £6,950,000. I have deducted an agreed figure for notional sale costs at 3% and so the net value is £6,741,500.[41]The husband also owns, in his sole name and mortgage-free, a property B abroad. It is common ground that this should be sold and that the net proceeds should be divided equally between the parties. Subject to this agreement being adopted, the value is agreed (for illustration purposes) at US$ 2,500,000. I have included this figure in my schedule less an agreed figure of 7% for sale costs, which after currency conversion produces a figure for net value of £1,709,559.[42]The LM Trust is a discretionary trust set up in March 2010 in which the husband is the Settlor and the trustees are NM Trust Limited and into which the husband settled, inter alia, a number of NM shares some years ago, the value of which was severely damaged. The husband has very recently been in strong dispute with the trustees about the management of this trust to the extent of exchanging legal letters with them (via instructed Solicitors, who have already billed for £50,000 in legal costs and been paid). The parties have differed on various aspects of how I should treat the LM Trust. I make the following comments and findings about this:-(i) The assessment of these issues has not been assisted by the husband’s incorrectly asserting right up to the eleventh hour of this litigation that he was not a beneficiary under the LM Trust, nor did it have any meaningful value. It became clear very late in the day (only after Counsels’ opening notes were written) that not only is the husband a beneficiary in the LM Trust, but he had written a ‘letter of wishes’ to the trustees on 10th March 2010 identifying himself as ‘The Primary Beneficiary’ (Lp.2178). Further, it emerged (Cp.633) that, in fact, the fund was worth US$1,058,822 (£778,546), a substantial amount. The Trust, in fact, had minimal assets until February 2025 when the husband repaid a loan to the Trust of £710,000, as explained to the wife in correspondence on 5 February 2025 [Lp.2839] and confirmed in the husband's correspondence with NM, disclosed by the husband on 18 March 2025 [Lp.2869]. I am minded (on a balance of probabilities) to accept the husband’s explanation for his incorrect provision of information on these matters and to regard them as careless rather than deliberate errors by him; but I am afraid that this is one of a number of areas when Mr Bentham has been given good cause to criticise the husband in the way he has handled his disclosure obligations. In so far as it is the husband’s view, and Mr Kingscote’s case, that the wife’s legal team have conducted this case in an over-zealous manner which has run up costs unnecessarily, then I am afraid these incidents, and a number of others like them, have rather undermined their case. The husband’s Form E is a fairly full and helpful document and his disclosure has been very extensive, and I am not regarding him as a dishonest non-discloser, but in some instances he has allowed his irritation and resentment at being asked so many questions (a number of times he compared the effect of the questioning to being held as a “prisoner” in his own kitchen or basement) rather to justify giving less than clear and comprehensive answers and explanations to some questions.(ii) The husband’s case is that I should regard as most important the fact that, as well as himself and the wife, the four children of the family are beneficiaries under this trust and, in effect, I should cause the trust to be transferred to the children by the mechanism of the husband and wife resigning as beneficiaries on the basis of a payment of £150,000 to the wife by the husband.(iii) The wife’s case is that, since it is highly likely (given the ‘letter of wishes’) that the trustees would abide by any request to pay all the money in the trust to the husband, especially since the children have already received very large amounts from him, this should be regarded as a resource which is currently in joint names, but is available in its entirety to the husband. I find myself entirely agreeing with the wife’s case on this point and my order will assume that the husband can access all this money himself if he so wishes. I shall require the wife to undertake to resign forthwith as a beneficiary herself and it will be up to the husband as to whether he takes the money himself or leaves it in the trust or causes it to be distributed to the children. The figure of £778,546 will accordingly appear in my asset schedule as a joint asset as between the husband and the wife; but in the mathematics of distribution, I will assume that it is the husband’s asset. If he decides to give it to the children that will be his choice, but not at the wife’s expense.(iv) An additional issue, which also showed the husband’s lack of proper care in his disclosure obligations, is the fact that in a discussion at the opening of this hearing a figure of £55,687 was included as a debt of the husband as a result of trustees’ fees which the trustees had raised arising out of a dispute between the husband and the trustees. The husband sat quietly through that discussion without alerting anybody to a recent development of which he was aware, but apparently nobody else was, to the effect that, after the husband had spent £50,000 (from matrimonial assets) in legal fees with his solicitors, the trustees had on 11th August 2025 written to the husband offering to waive the trustees’ fees in their entirety, albeit on certain terms, in effect a ‘drop hands’ basis. As a result of this development, I do not propose to include the debt of £55,687 in my asset schedule. If the husband wishes to challenge the terms offered by the trustees then he may do so, but at his own cost in terms of future outlays and at his own risk.[43]The values of the parties’ respective pensions, and the tax attributable to them, are agreed figures in the asset schedule. It is common ground, given the ages of the parties and the nature of the pensions and the agreed tax figures, that I should regard the net figures as being immediately realisable and akin to cash in the bank and I have not on this occasion caused the pension assets to be placed in a discrete schedule of their own as this is unnecessary on the facts this case.[44]The husband has a debt to a medical professional, albeit at the fairly modest level in the context of the case, of £4,256. There is a County Court Judgment (CCJ) against the husband in this sum. Hearing his evidence, the husband plainly feels very strongly about this debt, is very angry with the medical professional and wishes to spend money litigating with a view to setting aside the CCJ. I propose to include this debt in my asset schedule (since it exists at present) but not include any figure for litigation spending on fighting the physiotherapist in court. If the husband wishes to litigate the matter further then he may do so, but at his own cost in terms of future outlays and at his own risk.[45]It is common ground that the husband holds some £2,200,000 in three identified Barclays Bank Deposit accounts. Since they exist, and since there is no security charged against them, and since it is open to the husband to spend this money if he so wishes, I take the view that this money needs to be included in Category 1 of my asset schedule. In doing so, I am cognisant of the fact that, in some ways related to these Barclays Bank deposit accounts, the husband owes some US$ 10,000,000 plus accruing interest to his employer, BN; albeit that the loan is not repayable until 2032 (Lp.561). Since this loan is not payable for many years to come, and the extent to which it will in fact be repayable is contingent on certain future events, I have decided not to include it in my Category 1 asset schedule; but I shall consider it again below in the context of my analysis of the Category 2 assets and debts and decide what are the appropriate consequences arising out of the existence of this loan on Category 1 and Category 2 sharing issues.[46]I turn to the issue of the husband’s interest in the ZP investment. This investment comprises a limited partnership off-shore in which the husband and his brother (JG) invested money (in 2021) which has been used to acquire interests in some of the Company A funds in the hope and expectation that they will achieve a long-term return, but not in this instance dependent on his continued employment with Company A. The husband has invested a total of US$ 5,590,000 (£4,110,294) in the ZP investment. There is a ‘waterfall’ arrangement between the two brothers whereby the husband’s brother receives all his capital plus a 5% ‘hurdle rate’ before the husband receives anything, in return for which the brother is liable for any future capital call which may arise. The investment is undoubtedly illiquid at the moment, but it may turn out to be valuable. The parties have differed on various aspects of how I should treat the ZP investment. I make the following comments and findings about this:-(i) It has been common ground (in lieu of attempting a formal valuation) that I should place this asset in my schedule at the cost price of £4,110,294.(ii) There have, however, been two live disputes about what deductions I should make from this to obtain a fair net figure for this investment.(iii) First, should I take off 12% Remittance Tax (which is currently available via the Temporary Repatriation Facility offered by HMRC, but requires a nomination to this effect by 5th April 2027 and a prompt payment of the relevant 12% tax, which is agreed to be £493,235)? Or should I assume that a later remittance will be at a much higher rate, the husband speculates that it would be 45%, which would produce a tax liability of £1,849,362? On this issue I prefer the wife’s case. If the investment can be remitted in a period when it attracts 12% remittance tax then it would seem to be unwise, and a failure of reasonable tax mitigation (notwithstanding the earlier arrival of the liability), to wait a few years longer and risk a much higher rate of remittance tax, whether 45% or otherwise. It is for the husband to make the actual decision, but my mathematics will assume the lower rate of 12%.(iv) Secondly, should I apply a ‘court discount’ on a ‘broad evaluative basis’ reflecting illiquidity in accordance with Peel J’s analysis in HO v TL [2023] EWFC 215? The husband suggests a figure of 20%. The wife says there should be no deduction. On this issue I prefer the husband’s case. The illiquidity of this asset is certainly a problem which justifies a discount and, exercising a broad evaluation, I consider 20% to be fair, so my mathematics will assume the application of this discount.(v) Accordingly, the figure I shall place in my asset schedule is £4,110,294 less Remittance Tax of £493,235 (12%) less a discount of 20% on the net figure = £2,936,847.[47]Having made these determinations, I am now able to set out my assessment of the Category 1 Assets and Debts of the parties in my asset schedule. The situation can be summarised as follows:- CATEGORY 1 ASSETS & DEBTS48. Joint Family home This figure reflects an agreed value of £6,950,000 less 3% notional sale costs = £6,741,500 6,741,500 Joint Barclays account 9,629 Joint Barclays account 0 LM Trust Fund This figure reflects the agreed value of the money in the LMtrust fund (US$1,058,823) converted to £778,546 together with the attribution decisions described above. 778,546 TOTAL 7,529,67549. Wife Cash at bank 27,879 Outstanding Legal Costs This figure is based on costs incurred of £1,156,990 less costs paid of £841,326 = costs outstanding of £315,664 -315,664 Amex debt -353 John Lewis debt -8,189 Savings account 372,146 Bank shares 64,480 Bank pension less tax 2,869 TOTAL 143,16850. Husband Property B This figure reflects an agreed value of US $2,500,000 = £1,838,235less 7% notional sale costs = £1,709,559 1,709,559 Cash at bank 247,268 Outstanding Legal Costs This figure is based on costs incurred of £1,188,246 less costs paid of £930,159 = costs outstanding of £258,087 -258,087 Amex debt -4,567 CCJ Medical professional -4,256 Property B HoA liability -12,068 J Funds (less CGT and remittance tax) This figure is based on the total of the agreed balances for the six J accounts (£8,880,754) less CGT of £94,911 and Remittance Tax of £387,042 = £8,398,801 8,398,801 Barclays Treasury Deposits x 3 This figure is based on the agreed balances for the three Barclays Treasury Deposit accounts numbered. There is a dispute as to whether I should,in the light of the relationship between these deposit accounts and the [BN] loan, include these deposit accounts in the Category 1 Schedule of Assets. I have to include them here, for reasons explained above and developed below. 2,200,000 Tax Liability on FUND A2 already paid Carry The tax is due on 31 January 2026 -820,551 Q fund (less tax) This figure is based on the agreed balance of the Q fund of £71,620 less Tax of £22,918 = £48,702 48,702 Savings account 4 Interest in ZP (less Remittance Tax & 20% discount) This figure is based on the agreed figure for H’s interest in ZP less Remittance Tax of £493,235 (12%) less a discount of 20% on the net figure = £2,936,847 2,936,847 Aegon SIPP CE 47,942 pension CE 98,018 offshore pension CE 838,105 Tax charge on pensions -332,122 TOTAL 15,093,595 CATEGORY 1 ASSETS AND THE SHARING PRINCIPLE

CATEGORY 1 ASSETS & DEBTS

[48]Subject to the attribution issues which I have resolved above and the dispute about how to treat the $10,000,000 owed personally by the husband to BN, which I have discussed above and to which I shall return to in detail below, it is common ground that all the Category 1 Assets fall into the category of matrimonial property to which the equal sharing principle (described above) prima facie applies.[49]If I assume (for the purposes of this discussion) that there is to be an equal sharing of all the Category 1 Assets, then the remaining headline dispute which I need to resolve is whether that equal division is to be achieved by transferring the family home to the wife with a lower equalising lump sum (as the wife strongly wishes) or to order the sale of the family home with an equal division of the net proceeds with a higher equalising lump sum (as the husband wishes). The mathematical illustration of these two positions is as follows.53. Wife’s position on the equalisation of the Category 1 Assets/Debts Category 1 Assets/Debts Wife Husband Own Assets per Schedule 143,168 15,093,595 Family home to W 6,741,500 0 Property B sold and split 50:50 854,780 -854,780 Joint accounts to H 0 9,629 LM Trust Fund to H 0 778,546 Equalising lump sum H to W 3,643,771 -3,643,771 TOTAL 11,383,219 11,383,21954. Husband’s position on the equalisation of the Category 1 Assets/Debts Category 1 Assets/Debts Wife Husband Own Assets per Schedule 143,168 15,093,595 Family home sold - 50:50 3,370,750 3,370,750 Property B sold and split 50:50 854,780 -854,780 Joint accounts to H 0 9,629 LM Trust Fund to H 0 778,546 Equalising lump sum H to W 7,014,521 -7,014,521 TOTAL 11,383,219 11,383,219[50]The husband’s case before me is that he has no in principle opposition to the wife’s retaining the family home, but that (in his view) it cannot be done without leaving him with an unfairly low amount of liquid capital. Having considered this argument, I have reached the conclusion that it does not hold sufficient weight to cause me not to conclude that the fairest answer here is for me to accede to the wife’s request to have the family home transferred to her. Although I recognise the illiquidity of his ZP investment, there is in my view sufficient liquidity elsewhere in his assets to enable him to buy a suitable home mortgage-free with liquid money to spare. I attach some weight to the emotional argument advanced by the wife that she is a proud homemaker who regards the family home as her ‘domain’; but I also recognise the substantial saving on sale costs and re-purchase costs that would follow from the decision to retain it. Although the evidence before me suggested that a house purchase at £4,000,000 would very adequately meet the housing need of either party in city F, and therefore the wife cannot powerfully say that she ‘needs’ to retain the family home, she will be left as a result of my order in a financial position where retaining the family home is a financially viable option and I see no reason for imposing an order which stands in the way of this strong desire and I shall therefore make an order transferring the family home to her. A quid pro quo of this decision, in my view, is that it is reasonable to adjust downwards the lump sum due from the husband to the wife from the equalising lump sum of £3,643,771 referred to above by an amount which reflects that the husband is likely to incur substantial purchase costs on a new property (Stamp Duty alone on a house price purchase of £4,000,000 will be £393,750 at present rates) when the wife will not need to do so. This is a similar adjustment to the one I made in my judgment in OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B) at paragraph 39 when a husband wished to retain the family home and his wife would have to purchase a new property. I shall discuss below whether an adjustment should also be made here to reflect the outstanding sum due to BN.

NEEDS AND COMPENSATION

[51]Neither the ‘needs’ principle nor the ‘compensation’ principle are engaged in this case. The figures on the above schedule are such that the wife’s sharing claim plainly exceeds any needs claim which she could reasonably advance and such a claim has (sensibly) not been pursued at trial by the wife. Since the issue of needs does not really arise here, and the sharing principle dominates, other section 25 factors such as standard of living during the marriage and contributions do not feature much here. Both parties have made a full contribution in the present context.

PRESENT AND LIKELY FUTURE INCOME

[52]Before I turn to the Category 2 Assets and Debts, I propose to say something about present and likely future income of the parties, since in the husband’s case the likelihood of his continuing to work may have a significant effect on what will be derived from some of his private equity carry.[53]The wife is aged 60 and, as I have said above, has not had remunerative employment for nearly 30 years. She has been the homemaker and this was the way the family conducted their arrangements. It is really too late to change this and it has (sensibly) not been suggested by the husband that the wife has any earning capacity relevant to this case and it is common ground that she will be living off capital for the remainder of her life. In view of the figures involved here, that capital will be sufficient to meet her income needs (on a Duxbury basis or otherwise) so there is no need for any analysis here of her likely investment returns. As I have already said, if she decides to retain the family home and have a smaller Duxbury fund then that is a matter for her.[54]The disclosure has revealed an unusually extensive amount of information about the husband’s past and present income, the figures going back nearly 20 years. For my purposes I shall focus on the figures since 2018 (when the husband joined Company A). I am cognisant that there were a number of less good years in the period 2013 to 2018, but some very good years in the period before that when he was working for Company B. I am not sure that averaging these figures out over a long period of time, whether it be 10, 15 or 20 years, is of any great assistance to the court in determining the issues I have to decide. My overall impression is that the husband is good at what he does, works very long hours and is valued and trusted by BN, whose decisions will play a crucial role in what happens in the future. One piece of evidence supporting this proposition is the note BN handwrote on the husband’s bonus letter in January 2024, thanking him for his role, although I do not want to read too much into this. The husband indeed holds a number of positions with Company A, reflecting various different but important roles within the business. He is a senior manager. A significant part of his role is the fundraising element; but he also has wider role in managing investment managers and leading general business development. A screenshot of a recent remote meeting (which I have seen) provides some evidence that BN is thinking that the husband will have a significant role in the future alongside an element of succession planning reflecting the fact that the husband is aged 65. The figures in the table below covering the situation since 2018 are as follows:- y/e 5th April Gross Income Tax Liability Net Income 2019 677,910 286,618 391,292 2020 1,588,514 694,060 894,454 2021 2,674,920 1,182,590 1,492,330 2022 2,820,862 1,248,975 1,571,887 2023 5,754,016 2,571,257 3,182,759 2024 1,038,578 391,499 647,079 2025 3,737,399 1,703,340 2,034,059[55]On any view the husband has been a high earner with Company A up to and including the present; but it is important for me to make an assessment of what is reasonably likely to happen in the future. I observe that the husband’s presentation of the likely future throughout these proceedings has emphasised his advancing age, his wish to work fewer hours and his expectation of imminent retirement. His Form E (in April 2024) suggested that “he intends to retire from all executive roles at the end of 2024 and no later than 30th June 2025”. This date has, of course, passed without the retirement having taken place. His replies in July 2024 said: the retirement date was “increasingly likely to be 31st December 2025”; but as this date approaches that is now not the plan. His July 2025 witness statement updates this thought by saying “I have just turned 65 and have made no secret of my desire to retire from my executive roles sooner rather than later…I want to be able to step back” (Cp.325). I accept that these comments represent his genuine thoughts on this matter; but this would also impact on his deferred compensation. An attractive scenario from the husband’s perspective would be for him to continue his employment (so attracting the continuing future benefits) but in a less demanding, less executive and more strategic role. In the end, therefore, I have to make an assessment with the limited information we do have, albeit on a broad basis. On a balance of probabilities, I have reached the conclusion that the most likely outcome is that the husband will continue to work at the present level for the next year or two and that, thereafter, a compromise outcome will be reached

THE SHARING PRINCIPLE AND CATEGORY 2 ASSETS AND DEBTS

[56]In the context of all the above information, I now turn to the Category 2 Assets and Debts, which are those which are (to a greater or lesser extent) contingent upon future events which may or may not occur. The assets in this category all arise out of interests which the husband may receive in the context of his work for Company A and, in diverse and complicated ways, turn on contingencies which the court must do its best to assess. The court must also address the likely quantification of these interests as best as it can.[57]It is common ground that the division of these assets should be carried out on a Wells sharing basis. Whilst Wells sharing solutions are, as a starting point, unattractive and are, generally speaking, “a matter of last resort as it is antithetical to a clean break” (Mostyn J in WM v HM [2018] 1 FLR 313, quoted by Lewison LJ in Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 at paragraph 196), in cases involving significant amounts of contingent assets, these solutions are necessary to avoid “considerable unfairness”: Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 at paragraph 135.[58]The difficulty which then arises in these cases, as it does here, is how to frame a fair Wells sharing order which reflects the general sharing principles described above. Before turning to the detail of these interests, I propose to set out some of the applicable law, which builds on the general principles discussed above and specifically applies in situations such as this. In particular, this engages a discussion about the reported cases where private equity carry is involved: notably the decision of Coleridge J in B v B [2013] EWHC 1232, the decision of Mostyn J in A v M [2021] EWFC 89 and the decision of Sir Jonathan Cohen in ES v SS [2023] EWFC 177:-(i) The private equity model process is described in detail by Coleridge J in his judgment in B v B. I summarise his description, with some extra detail emerging from the present case and from two helpful papers on this subject published in the Financial Remedies Journal A Beginner’s Guide to Deferred Compensation (and Other Forms of Remuneration) by Joe Rainer and Thomas Rodwell [2022] 1 FRJ 11 and Dealing with Private Equity Investments in Financial Remedies Cases by Andrej Bojarski KC and Marc Samuels [2025] 1 FRJ 45. , as follows.(ii) A private equity house will set up a fund and, on the ‘launch date’, invite investors, typically institutional investors, to subscribe to the fund. Once the fund is fully or adequately subscribed, it will ‘close’ (i.e. the chance to subscribe is finished). There may be a ‘first close’ and a final close’. Then the fund managers will make investments in suitable businesses, typically taking an equity stake and securing appointments for the equity house at director level with a strategy of increasing the value of the investment. In due course, hopefully at an opportune moment, the investments will be liquidated and the proceeds returned to the fund with an enhanced value. The fund will have a formal ‘termination date’ fixed at the outset as the best estimate when all the investments will have been realised, but this can be (and often is) extended by decision of the investors if the realisation takes longer than expected or conversely shortened where the investments are realised sooner than originally expected. The investors will receive a return calculated by reference to a formula agreed at the outset, which will include a ‘hurdle rate’, essentially a first charge on the return before the equity house can claim a portion.(iii) From the perspective of the equity house’s employees or investment executives, there will be chances to make money in a number of different ways (in addition to their ongoing salary and bonuses). The equity house will receive management fees fixed at the outset, typically a percentage of the fund, which it may decide to share with its employees pursuant to an agreed plan. Further, the employees will have the opportunity to ‘co-invest’ with the outside investors so that they have ‘skin in the game’ and share in a successful investment. Further, the employees (pursuant to a plan agreed between them and the equity house) may be entitled to ‘carried interest’ (sometimes called ‘carry’) on returns on funds which exceed the ‘hurdle rate’ agreed with the investors. Typically, the equity house will be able to determine when the carry should be regarded as ‘vested’ in a particular employee, at which point the entitlement arises; but (depending on how the vesting is framed) the entitlement may cease if the employee becomes a ‘bad leaver’ from the equity house. Vesting tends not to occur fully (in this case anyway) until one year after the successor fund is fully paid up (e.g. the Fund A3 carry will not be fully vested until one year after the Fund A4 fund is fully paid up). In this way the equity house can hold the employee close because cessation of employment may lead to loss of a significant entitlement.(iv) It has been recognised that the entitlement to future carry is properly to be regarded as a hybrid resource, both in the sense that it has some characteristics as a return on investment and some characteristics of a bonus on earnings (A v M at paragraph 10) and also that it “might be characterised as something of a hybrid – partly product of endeavours during the marriage, partly product of endeavours post-separation and therefore a hybrid approach to sharing may be appropriate”: B v B at paragraph 47. The double-hybrid nature of these assets does present the court with some complex assessment issues.(v) Mostyn J in A v M decided (at least on the facts of that case but perhaps more generally) that these carry interests should be divided according to a mathematical formula. The formula applied was A ÷ B = C, where: (i) ‘A’ is the period (measured in months) from the establishment of the fund to the date of trial; (ii) ‘B’ is the number of months from establishment of the fund to the likely end of the term of the fund; and (iii) ‘C’ is the marital fraction of the recipient party’s carry, expressed as a percentage. Mostyn J does, however, concede that “Although I have reached my decision with the assistance of mathematics, it has at its heart a broad evaluation of fairness”: A v M at paragraph 83. My own view is that while a mathematical formula is all well and good as a strategy to solve some problems of this nature, it does not necessarily fit with the facts of all cases, including this one. A particular issue in the present case is that there is evidence from the husband, which I broadly accept, is that a lot of work was done by the husband in the period after the separation in November 2023 to enhance the value of some of the interests. For example, the value to the husband from the vesting of carry interests in an earlier fund has to be earned by work done in relation to a later fund. In such circumstances the Mostyn J view that the date of the trial is important in these analyses (and its inclusion in the formula) does not always sit easily with other case law, for example Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727 and C v C [2018] EWHC 3186. A further problem is that calculating ‘B’, the likely end of the fund, involves either taking an unreliable fund termination date or taking speculative guesses at dates possibly long into the future. Further, the input in terms of work done by any particular equity house employee may vary over the life-time of the fund in a non-linear way. I agree with the view expressed in the FRJ paper Dealing with Private Equity Investments in Financial Remedies Cases by Andrej Bojarski KC and Marc Samuels [2025] 1 FRJ 45 at p.49 :
“While having simplicity and consistency to commend it, it might be questioned whether Mostyn J’s linear approach is fair in the event that the evidence indicates that the carry hurdle was met before the separation, or if there was something exceptional about the work done in either the marital period or the post-separation period which had a disproportionate effect on the value of the fund.”
Further, the way in which carry is awarded, earned and vested is not a linear reflection of endeavour susceptible to a straightforward simple mathematical formula. The essential exercise for the court is to achieve a fair outcome, which in this context is likely to be the one which seeks to promote the sharing of assets which can be identified as the product of capital by endeavour prior to the separation, which is one which involves a broad as well as mathematical evaluation. In my view, the task is similar to the one I had in OS v DT [2025] EWFC 156 (B) in relation to bonuses. I note that the decision by Sir Jonathan Cohen in ES v SS followed a similar path, not applying any mathematical formula but seeking an outcome which is a “fair outcome and one thatreflects the provenance of funds… and post-separation endeavour”.[59]The parties’ positions on the Category 2 Assets and Debts are reflected in the helpful draft orders which each legal team has produced.[60]The wife’s open position is that (coupled with a clean break) she should be entitled to receive lump sums equivalent to 50% of all sums (net of tax) received by the husband in respect of:-(i) Any future carried interest return in the Fund A2 private equity investment fund managed by Company A (hereinafter referred to as Fund A2).(ii) Any future carried interest return in the Fund A3 private equity investment fund managed by Company A (hereinafter referred to as Fund A3).(iii) Any future carried interest return in the Fund B1 private equity investment fund established by or on behalf of Company A (hereinafter referred to as Fund B1). My understanding is that, in so far as any carry was payable at all, it would be paid via the HMF and HC payments schemes – see below.(iv) Any future return on the interest in the trust established by or on behalf of Company A for the purpose of holding, administering and distributing interests in Fund A1 and Fund A2 for the benefit of participating partners and employees, including the respondent, (hereinafter referred to as The CYT), limited to allocations made up to the date of the final financial remedies order, but including allocations made in 2025.(v) Any future return on the interest in the synthetic equity and / orgrowth share entitlements awarded to partners (including the respondent) by Company A pursuant to the Company A Partner Equity Plan (hereinafter the APP), specifically rights to participate in the proceeds of any sale, flotation, merger or other realisation of Company A.(vi) Any sum received in the future as part of the house portion of the management fees generated by Company A, being the share of such fees allocated to partners (including the respondent) from time to time and distributed in connection with the management of Company A funds pursuant to the APP (hereinafter the HMF payments).(vii) Any sum received in the future as part of the share of house portion of the carried interest allocated to Company A as general partner, then distributed to partners (including the respondent) pursuant to the APP. (hereinafter the HC payments).[61]The wife accepts that, as a quid pro quo for receiving her share in these interests, she will give an undertaking to be liable to pay one half of the loan monies owed to BN (pursuant to the loan of US$10,000,000 dated 2022) in so far as it falls to be repaid directly to BN as and when it is due, including accrued interest. The loan document itself requires repayment by 2032. She doesn’t offer up any specific security for this obligation, which is both large and a long way away in time.[62]The wife further argues that, rather than have a set percentage of anything which the husband receives in due course in relation to his work on two other funds – the Fund A4 (Fund A4) and Fund B2 – she should have her overall lump sum payable now increased by £413,000.[63]The husband’s open position (also coupled with a clean break) is as follows:-(i) The sums of money in the Barclays deposit accounts should be removed from the figures used for calculating the sharing of Category 1 Assets above and should be treated as being ring-fenced to re-pay the loan to BN. There should accordingly be an acknowledgement of the sums already received in relation to carried interest return on Fund A2 (now held in the husband’s Barclays deposit accounts (£2,200,000) from which an appropriate adjustment should be made to reflect the portion of those funds which is notionally payable to BN under the 2022 loan agreement (£1,917,917), the actual amount rolled up in an overall lump sum.(ii) The wife should receive a lump sum equivalent to 27% of any future carried interest return on Fund A2 less an appropriate adjustment to reflect the portion of those funds which is notionally payable to BN under the 2022 loan agreement.(iii) The wife should receive a lump sum equivalent to 16% of any future carried interest return on Fund A3 less an appropriate adjustment to reflect the portion of those funds which is notionally payable to BN.(iv) The wife should receive a lump sum equivalent to 50% of any future return on the interest in the CYT, limited to allocations made up to 31st December 2024.(v) The wife should receive a lump sum equivalent to 50% of any future return on the interest in the synthetic equity and / or growth share entitlements received by 6 November 2025, with the percentage reducing to 25% on returns received between 7 November 2025 and 6 November 2027, with nothing thereafter.[64]In order to decide what order I should make I propose to identify some features of all the funds (and other items) over which the wife mounts a claim. I propose to do this in the following tabular form:- Fund / Other Item Key dates Narrative comments FUND A2 Carry Fund Established: Eight years pre-separation First Close: Eight years pre-separation Final Close: Eight years pre-separation Investment Period Ended: Four years pre-separation Fund Termination Date: Four years post-separation First Carry paid: One year post-separation Final Carry Paid: Estimated Eight years post-separation Vesting in H: 100% at date of separation The majority of the work specifically done by H on this fund was done prior to separation, but he continues to work on it in the sense that he manages those who manage the fund. This is 100% vested so he should receive the benefits whether or not he continues in employment with Company A. An amount has already been received. A further amount is anticipated, though not guaranteed. Any payments are subject to tax. These benefits are expressly referenced in the BN Loan and so, in an informal sense, these benefits (including those already paid) are earmarked for repayment of the loan, but there is no formal security for this. FUND A3Carry Fund Established: Five years pre-separation First Close: Four years pre-separation Final Close: Two years pre-separation Investment Period Ended: Year of separation Fund Termination Date: Seven years post-separation First Carry paid: Estimated Six years post-separation Final Carry Paid: Estimated Twelve years post-separation Vesting in H: 37.5% as at date of separation; 62.5% at Two years post-separation; 90% estimated as at Two years post-separation (end); 100% estimated at Three years post-separation The majority of the work specifically done by H on this fund was done prior to separation, but he continues to work on it in the sense that he manages those who manage the fund. An amount is anticipated, though not guaranteed. Any payments are subject to tax. An amount of the Carry in FUND A3 was awarded (according to H’s evidence) in 2021 in lieu of a bonus for work done in the period 2018 to 2021 The increase in vesting from 37.5% in the year of separation up to an estimated 100% vested by three years post-separation significantly relied upon H’s hard work on fundraising in Fund A4 such that the amount raised rose from 21% in the year of separation to 110% of target now. This involved a large amount of post-separation endeavour (see, for example, the husband’s account in his statement at Cp.326 & 327, which I accept). Once vesting has occurred, H should receive the benefits whether or not he continues in employment with Company A. These benefits are expressly referenced in the BN Loan and so, in an informal sense, these benefits are earmarked for repayment of the loan, but there is no formal security for this. BN loan Loan Date: 2022 BN granted H a substantial loan repayable (with interest) by 2032 (Lp.561). Repayment appears only to be due from payments made to H under his FUND A2 and FUND A3 Carry entitlements but there is no formal charge against any money received. He can spend all receipts in the meantime, but still be liable to repay the loan. FUND B1 Carry Fund Established: Two years pre-separation Final Close: One year pre-separation Investment Period Ended: Two years post-separation Fund Termination Date: Six years post-separation First Carry paid: Unknown Final Carry Paid: Estimated Six years post-separation, but subject to fund extensions Vesting in H: None The majority of the work specifically done by H on this fund was done prior to separation, but he continues to work on it in the sense that he manages those who manage the fund. My understanding is that, in so far as any funds would be payable at all, it would be paid via vested amounts in the HMF and HC payment schemes. Vesting (of HC/HMF) is currently 70% and the remaining 30% is likely to be vested by 3 years post separation. This vesting is significantly attributable to H’s successful post-separation work on FUND B2. Once vesting has occurred, H should receive the benefits (if there are any) whether or not he continues in employment with Company A. In his oral evidence H stated that he did not expect ever to receive anything from FUND B1 directly held carried interest and on that basis was content to share equally half of whatever he received. This was not in the end conceded by H’s legal team. Further, he made no concession in relation to the FUND B1 carried interest held via HC/HMF. CYT Year of separation to Two years post-separation The husband was awarded rights in future carry from Fund A1 and FUND A2 within a CYT, in effect by way of bonus. These interests would only pay out in the event of H’s continued employment at the date of payment. It is common ground that 50% of any payments will be paid to W in so far as they related to CYT allocations prior to one year post-separation For the allocations made in 2025 (but before the final hearing) W seeks 50% of them but H does not agree. Synthetic equity and / or growth share Rights given: One year pre-separation In the event that a buyer wanted to purchase a stake in Company A (all or some of it) then the husband (and others) would be entitled to a portion of the purchase price, subject to his still being in employment and subject to the amount received exceeding the hurdle price. (Lp.878). On a hypothetical sale of the whole of Company A at US$ 3 billion, H might receive approximately £18 million (subject to tax). The husband told me that, on any currently predictable timescale, it was highly unlikely that these rights would ever come to anything and there is nothing at present to suggest this will change. On a sale of a limited portion of Company A (say 10%) the rights would be worth nothing because of the hurdle price. The husband’s offer (which limits any rights to a period before November 2027) is unlikely therefore to have any effect. Since there is nothing in the offing, any receipt from this source would relate to work after the separation. The work on this that the husband has done to date has produced no tangible results. FUND A4 Fund Established:One year pre-separation First Close: Year of separation Final Close: Two years post-separation Investment Period Ended: Estimated Seven years post-separation Fund Termination Date: Estimated: Twelve years post-separation First Carry paid: Estimated Ten years post-separation-Twelve years post-separation Final Carry Paid: Estimated Sixteen years post-separation - Seventeen years post-separation Vesting in H: None The majority of the work specifically done by H on this fund was done after separation. He needed to do this to secure full vesting in FUND A3. The fundraising is completed but he continues to work on it in the sense that he manages those who manage the fund. None of the carry is vested and will not vest for some time to come. Fund B2 Fund Established: Year of separation First Close: Year of separation Final Close: Two years post-separation Investment Period Ended: Estimated Five years post-separation Fund Termination Date: Estimated Nine years post-separation First Carry paid: Unknown Final Carry Paid: Estimated Nine years post-separation, but subject to fund extensions Vesting in H: None The majority of the work specifically done by H on this fund was done after separation. The fundraising is completed but he continues to work on it in the sense that he manages those who manage the fund. None of the carry is vested and will not vest for some time to come.[65]I think there is also some weight (in a broad rather than mathematical sense) to be attached to a contemplation of how these rights would have looked if the husband had resigned from his employment in November 2023. His account (Cp.335) is as follows:- “I feel that it is important for the court to understand what would have happened to my Company A interests had I left Company A when ED ended our marriage in November 2023. I was in any event thinking about leaving at that point in time due to internal politics…. Had I left then:-(i) I would have had no chance of increasing my vested Fund A3 carry (37.5% at that stage).(ii) I would have lost all of my allocated but unpaid CYT in Fund A1 and FUND A2.(iii) I would have lost all of my APP entitlements (as no HC had vested).(iv) I would have lost my salary and bonuses.(v) I would have had no chance of receiving any carry in FUND A4. …I have worked extremely hard since November 2023 (probably harder than prior to that date). As a result, the liquid resources have increased… and I now have considerably more potential Company A assets than I had at separation.” (i) I would have had no chance of increasing my vested Fund A3 carry (37.5% at that stage). (ii) I would have lost all of my allocated but unpaid CYT in Fund A1 and FUND A2. (iii) I would have lost all of my APP entitlements (as no HC had vested). (iv) I would have lost my salary and bonuses. (v) I would have had no chance of receiving any carry in FUND A4. …I have worked extremely hard since November 2023 (probably harder than prior to that date). As a result, the liquid resources have increased… and I now have considerably more potential Company A assets than I had at separation.”[66]Stepping back and considering all the above facts and principles I have reached the following conclusions about the sharing issues for the Category 2 Assets and Debts:-(i) The wife is entitled to share in the FUND A2, Fund A3 and FUND B1 carry interests since they are all to a significant extent the product of endeavour made by the husband during the marriage, that is prior to November 2023.(ii) Making a broad as well as a mathematical assessment, and doing my best to identify the extent to which they are the product of marital endeavour, I take the view that the fair figures for the wife’s sharing claim for each of these interests respectively is 50% for the FUND A2 carry interests (I regard the case for treating any significant portion of this as post-separation endeavour is weak), 30% for the FUND A3 carry interests (a better claim is made out for treating this as, in part, the product of post-separation endeavour) and 50% for the directly held FUND B1 carry interests (the amount he conceded in his oral evidence) but 30% for the FUND B1 carry interests vested via the HMF and HC payment schemes (a better claim is made out for treating this as, in part, the product of post-separation endeavour, not unlike the FUND A3).(iii) As a quid pro quo for the above I take the view that the proper way of dealing with the BN loan is as follows. The Barclays deposit accounts should be treated as available cash and counted in with the Category 1 division without deduction in relation to a notional portion of the BN loan (and following the mathematics above) and the wife will need to confirm her undertaking to reimburse the husband with 35% of any monies which actually fall to be repaid under the BN loan (including interest, whether to him personally or to anybody to whom the debt is assigned). I have calculated 35% by factoring in with appropriate weighting that, by my decision, the wife will not get a half share of all the carry against which the BN loan is set off. In order to ensure that this is a secure obligation, given the size and time distant nature of the obligation, I propose to make it a quid pro quo of the sharing arrangement of the carry interests that the will wife will permit a charge to be placed on the family home (once it has been transferred to her) to secure this obligation. The charge should have a provision enabling her to move it on to a replacement property in the event that she decides to move home.(iv) In relation to the CYT sharing I propose to adopt the husband’s solution that there should be a lump sum equivalent to 50% of any future return on the interest in the CYT, limited to allocations made up to 31st December 2024. I have not been persuaded that the allocations made in 2025 can properly be regarded as the product of marital endeavour as they are too distant in time from the separation.(v) I have not been persuaded that any of the other claims made by the wife adequately cross the line to persuade me that they should be regarded as the product of marital endeavour. I make one exception to this, (since it is expressly offered by the husband, though it seems unlikely to produce any tangible result, but this is not impossible). The wife should receive a lump sum equivalent to 50% of any future return on the interest in the synthetic equity and / or growth share entitlements received by 6 November 2025, with the percentage reducing to 25% on returns received between 7 November 2025 and 6 November 2027, with nothing thereafter.

OUTCOME

[67]Drawing together the threads from all of the above, I propose to make the following order in this case:-(i) The family home will be transferred to the wife forthwith with a division of chattels to be agreed (I suggest that a referral to arbitration in the event of non-agreement on chattels, as suggested by the husband, would be sensible).(ii) Property B will be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.(iii) The joint Barclays Bank accounts will be transferred to the husband.(iv) The husband will pay to the wife a lump sum of £3,443,771. In reaching this sum, the only adjustment I have made from the tables above is to take into account that the husband is likely to spend approximately £400,000 on the purchase costs of a new home. I do not particularly differ with the husband’s suggestion of a timescale of three months for the payment of the lump sum, probably finishing early in the New Year 2026, to give the husband a reasonable chance to find suitable alternative accommodation. The mechanism for payment shall involve sensible and lawful tax mitigation and I am optimistic that a form of words will be found to decide how this is to be done.(v) The wife will cooperate by undertaking with her removal as a beneficiary from the LM Trust (on the basis that it will then be a matter for the husband as to what he does with it, which may be that he pays it to himself).(vi) The various provisions in relation to the Company A assets set out in paragraph 66 above will be made orders. I invite the parties to see if they can agree a targeted form of commitment to future disclosure relevant to these interests. The husband’s draft order had little on this subject. The wife’s draft order had rather a lot and seemed to me to be more invasive than necessary. I would be pleased if a compromise could be reached somewhere between the two positions.(vii) Otherwise, there will be an immediate clean break.(viii) I was told that the parties are likely to reach an agreement on interim arrangements and my order will need to find a suitable form of words for this.(ix) As far as costs are concerned, my strong provisional view is that I propose to make no order as to costs. In reaching this conclusion I have recognised the FPR 2010 Part 28 starting point of no order as to costs and the fact that my order has fallen somewhere between the two open offers so that neither side could be considered to be the winner or the loser in this dispute. I am prepared to receive further submissions on this but do not encourage them.[68]The net effect of these two proposals on the Category 1 assets and debts can be illustrated in the following table:- 74. Division of the Category 1 Assets/Debts Category 1 Assets/Debts Wife Husband Own Assets per Schedule 143,168 15,093,595 Family home to W 6,741,500 0 Property B sold and split 50:50 854,780 -854,780 Joint accounts to H 0 9,629 LM Trust Fund to H 0 778,546 Purchase costs of new home 0 -400,000 Equalising lump sum H to W 3,443,771 -3,443,771 TOTAL 11,183,219 11,183,219[69]What the wife receives in the future from the Category 2 assets will depend on how the various assets pay out and cannot be predicted with guaranteed accuracy; but this outcome is intended to produce a fair and equal distribution of matrimonial property overall.

NEXT STEPS

[70]This is my decision and I invite Counsel to produce a draft order which matches these conclusions. Given that I have already received two very helpful draft orders, I am hoping that this can be done relatively swiftly. Any differences can be referred to me by email in the first instance. Can I invite a communication to me by email by no later than Wednesday 8th October 2025, which will hopefully include an agreed version of the order for my approval but might be an explanation of why the draft has been controversial and not agreed.[71]As indicated at the hearing, I am hoping to deal with this order without another hearing in court; but if there are significant disputes then I may have to convene a hearing.[72]I am sending out this judgment by email on Wednesday 24th September 2025 and this will be the relevant date for calculating the 21-day appeal period. If either side wishes to make an application to me for permission to appeal then I am prepared to receive it by email.[73]As indicated at the hearing, I am content for this judgment to be shared straight away with the parties.[74]My provisional view (noting the contents of the President’s Guidance of 19th June 2024: Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments) is that I should publish this judgment, but with appropriate redactions and anonymisation to ensure that the parties’ identities cannot be discovered and that commercially sensitive material is not included. As discussed at the hearing, I would like to invite the legal teams to see if they can agree a suitably redacted and anonymised version for me to approve. I am prepared to receive any representations on the point if anybody wishes to go down a different path. HHJ Edward Hess Central Family Court 23rd September 2025