“In plain language, the main allegation facing these parents is that there was an attempt to murder or cause very significant harm to their six-week-old baby by suffocation”
“I would go further and announce loud and clear that the standard of proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold under section 31(2) or the welfare considerations in section 1 of the 1989 Act is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”
“No matter what the context may be, I regard smothering, to the extent that must be contemplated here given the degree of collapse, to be at the furthest end of the spectrum of probability. It is highly improbable that a parent would deliberately act in this way and very cogent evidence is therefore required before a court, on the balance of probabilities, can say that such an event probably did take place. The degree of improbability and the cogency of the evidence is of a different order to a momentary squeezing or shaking of a baby.”
"It is an elementary proposition that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation."
"Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof."
"There remains a temptation to believe that it is always possible to identify the cause of injury to a child. Where the prosecution is able, by advancing an array of experts, to identify a nonaccidental injury and the defence can identify no alternative causes, it is tempting to conclude that the prosecution has proved its case. Such temptation must be resisted. In this, as in so many fields of medicine, the evidence may be insufficient to exclude beyond reasonable doubt an unknown cause."
“[100] …. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
“… where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as ‘storycreep’ – may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith.”
“[30] Inevitably in such cases, the oral evidence of the key protagonists, most often the mother and her partner, is highly significant. The case law has developed in a way designed to ensure that, whilst there is recognition of the fact that the oral evidence of lay parties is often critical, it also has its limitations; there are dangers in an over reliance by the judge on either demeanour, or upon the fact that a witness has told demonstrable lies. 36. [41] The court must, however, be mindful of the fallibility of memory and the pressures of giving evidence. The relative significance of oral and contemporaneous evidence will vary from case to case. What is important, as was highlighted in Kogan, is that the court assesses all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it and does not inappropriately elevant one kind of evidence over another”
“It was as though he was trying to cry but couldn’t. Like he was in shock. We were calling his name trying to rouse him, eyes were half open”
‘facial bruising seen, resolving’ [I491]. No further detail as to location is given. It is not until the first child protection medical letter [E13] that there is greater detail regarding where the ‘bruising’ was seen – ‘around both eyes, in the creases between the eyes in the creases between the nose and cheeks bilaterally and circumferentially around the mouth’
‘… exceptionally in this case, we have clear exculpatory evidence of (a) why the child collapsed at home; (b) why he collapsed at hospital (at least twice) and (c) why, once his reflux was treated, he largely recovered. In contrast, there is no or no reasonable explanation, on the local authority’s case, as to how the alleged inflicted event precipitated later collapses. On the local authority’s case, the alleged infliction of injury coincided with natural events at home, repeated in hospital: an extraordinary coincidence…’
‘There are, however, some subtle, angulated purplish, bruise-like lesions in the paranasal areas (each side of the nose) and across the bridge of the nose and upper cheeks/ lower eyelids. My opinion is that these are bruises.’
‘photographs are difficult to interpret …there is evidence of purple red discolouration around the eyes, the bridge of the nose and over the upper lip…consistent with and supportive of the description of bruising….’