‘[48] The validity of the status quo argument is certainly well established in the preCA 1989 authorities. In D v M (Minor: Custody Appeal)[1982] 3 All ER 897 , Ormrod LJ said: '… it is generally accepted by those who are professionally concerned with children that, particularly in the early years, continuity of care is a most important part of a child's sense of security and that disruption of established bonds is to be avoided whenever it is possible to do so. Where, as in this case, a child of two years of age has been brought up without interruption by the mother (or a mother substitute) it should not be removed from her care unless there are strong countervailing reasons for doing so. This is not only the professional view, it is commonly accepted in all walks of life.' Factors in any particular case relating to the status quo will fall to be considered in a case to which CA 1989, s 1 applies under s 1(3)(c) where the court must have regard to 'the likely effect on [the child] of any change in his circumstances'. [49] In more recent times the prescient observations of Ormrod LJ, which were made at a time when the early work of John Bowlby and others on 'Attachment Theory' was available, have been borne out by the enhanced understanding of the neurological development of a young child's brain that has become available, particularly, during the past decade. As a result, the importance of a child's attachment to his or her primary care giver is now underpinned by knowledge of the underlying neurobiological processes at work in the developing brain of a baby or toddler. [50] In the context of 'attachment theory', the wording of ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f), which places emphasis upon the 'value' of a 'relationship' that the child may have with a relevant person, is particularly important. The circumstances that may contribute to what amounts to a child's 'status quo' can include a whole range of factors, many of which will be practically based, but within that range the significance for the child of any particular relationship is likely to be a highly salient factor. The focus within CA 1989, s 1(3)(c) is upon the 'likely effect on' the child of any change. The focus in ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f)(i) is upon 'the value to the child' of any particular relationship continuing. [51] It is not my purpose in this judgment to express a view upon the relative importance of attachment/status quo arguments as against those relating to a placement in the family. Each case must necessarily turn on its own facts and the weight to be attached to any factor in any case will inevitably be determined by the underlying evidence. In any event, for reasons to which I have already adverted, it is not necessary to do so in this case as, unfortunately, the judge does not appear to have engaged in any real way with the effect on the children of moving them from the care of their primary, and only, attachment figure or with the value to them of maintaining that relationship.’
‘[53] In the context of ‘change’, the changes listed by the judge are all practical, environmental or cultural, whereas, from the focus of a two-and-a-half year old child the most important change is likely to be that his ‘mother’ has dropped out of his life. That is so with respect to the changes listed during the checklist analysis and also later during consideration of the positives and negatives of each option (see para [28](a) h above). The welfare checklist requires regard to be had to the effect on the child of such a change and, I am afraid, there is no indication in the judgment that any regard was had to that factor. In like manner, as I have already explained, there is no consideration of the ‘value’ of the relationship with Y during the judge’s analysis under ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f). [54] Conversely, when the judge came to list the positive features with respect to Y, the fact that the children had established a strong and entirely beneficial primary attachment to her is not mentioned when it should surely have been at the top of the list; the fact that they were attached to her and she was not simply their current foster carer was, on her side of the case, what the case was all about, yet it does not feature as a factor. The judge's reference to the establishment of 'a family life together' which is entitled to 'proper and full weight' has the ring of an argument based upon rights rather than, more importantly in the context of the children's welfare, their emotional reality.’