London Borough of X v CD & Ors (Care Proceedings : Placement in Pakistan) [2016] EWFC 51

Case No ZC15C00087

[2016] EWFC 51

IN THE FAMILY COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date 8 June 2016

London

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE MARK ROGERS

(sitting as a High Court Judge)

(In Private)

B E T W E E N:

LONDON BOROUGH OF X Applicant

(1) CD

(2) EF

(3) GH Respondents

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MR. A. NORTON QC (Instructed by the London Borough of X Legal Services) appeared on behalf of the Local Authority.

MR. P. HORROCKS (Instructed by Morrison Spowart) appeared on behalf of the Mother.

MR. H. SETRIGHT QC and MS. J. GASPARRO (Instructed by Burke Niazi) appeared on behalf of the Father.

MISS S. STAMFORD (Instructed by Hodge Jones & Allen) appeared on behalf of the Guardian.

_________

J U D G M E N T (Approved)

Between

London Borough of XClaimant

CD & Ors (Care Proceedings : Placement in Pakistan)Defendant

[1]The child with whom I am concerned is GH. He is not yet one-and-a-half. The mother is CD. She was fifteen at the time of conception and is now seventeen. She is an Indian Hindu from an Indian diplomatic family. The father is EF, who is twenty-nine. He is a Pakistani Muslim and is in the United Kingdom pursuant to a student visa, although that, I think, has expired and his precise immigration status and ability to remain long-term is questionable.

[2]Before the case began Mr. Andrew Norton QC helpfully provided a bundle of preliminary material, amongst which is a detailed and, as far as I can tell, uncontroversial case chronology. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to read a substantial background into this judgment.

[3]Underlying it as one of the central features is the mother’s personality and in particular her sad history of mental ill health. In section E of the bundle there is a series of documents from Dr. Sumi Ratnam, who is a consultant in forensic psychiatry. Amongst other places, at E18 the diagnosis of the mother’s bipolar disorder is given. In terms of social functioning it is accepted that her parenting or her capacity for parenting is affected by her mental state. Without condescending to detail, the chronology amply shows the serious impact of the mother’s ill health, particularly at periods of crisis and chaos. She has been detained under the Mental Health Act. She has received psychiatric inpatient treatment. In the spring of 2014, which of course is when the mother and father met and within a short period GH was conceived, it was an extremely chaotic period for the mother. Happily, over the past couple of years substantial improvement has been noticed and full recognition of that is to be found in the progress of Dr. Ratnam’s opinion at E286 in the most recent report of 15th February of this year. Her increased stability is acknowledged. It is shown in terms of her mental functioning in the community. Those of us who practice or have experience in this jurisdiction of course know something of the difficulties facing individuals with problems of mental ill health. More important is the real evidence of those who have dealt with the mother.

[4]Dr. Ratnam’s evidence was not challenged and she was not called to give evidence. It is, therefore, important, notwithstanding anecdotal judicial professional knowledge, to hang on to the actual evidence. In a series of questions and answers at E286 to 288 the doctor expresses a balanced and appropriately cautious evaluation of the mother’s progress. The very nature of bipolar disorder is that it is chronic and cyclical. Relapse has happened and can create major short-term crises. Medication and general life stability help. A degree of insight, of which the mother has some, although not complete in Dr. Ratnam’s view, also assists. Insight may lead to the earlier seeking of assistance and medical intervention, which, again, of course is a positive. The serious underlying long-term impact of the mother’s illness is recognised certainly by her advisors and those who care for her and no doubt in part has led to the formulation of the proposal now put before the court.

[5]In a helpful passage in his report of 21st February of this year the children’s guardian, Mr. Campbell, at paras.16 to 20 at E315 to 516 highlights the mother’s progress but draws attention rightly, in my judgment, to the key underlying risk of relapse. He emphasises the stress factors and adopts Dr. Ratnam’s expert view. He specifically and carefully identifies the different non-exhaustive but key stress factors at para.20, with all of which I agree.

[6]I emphasise that mental ill health is absolutely not in itself a disqualification from parenting and some of the mother’s more extreme and risky behaviours must be viewed in the context of her illness. She is not to be condemned. She requires help and understanding. The sadness of this, as of many such cases, is that whatever instinctive sympathy the court has for a vulnerable young person, the focus of the proceedings remains on the welfare of the child in question. I mention all this at the outset in the hope that the mother understands that her behaviour, if described as risky, unstable or chaotic, is not being punished but merely placed in the context of the court’s overall duty.

[7]As soon as GH was born, proceedings were issued and allocated to High Court Judge level given the complexities and serious nature of the issues. It has taken a year-and-a-quarter or thereabouts to resolve this case, which is too long, not just in terms of statutory and forensic targets but in terms of welfare. GH’s future needs resolving. At its early stages this was a case of extreme complexity with a raft of issues. In fact, there remain three separate sets of proceedings before the court: the care proceedings, those instituted under the legislation dealing with forced marriage and an application for a placement order. However, in my judgment, in the end the matter has simplified somewhat forensically and has become a straight choice between two options. I propose to concentrate upon that choice and to some extent take as read the background and the earlier issues now resolved.

[8]The transcribed judgments of Pauffley J illuminate and, in fact, resolved the questions of jurisdiction, potential diplomatic immunity and the validity or lack of it of the purported marriage. Those matters are separate and, happily, there is even a general consensus as to the implication of Pakistani law and practice, avoiding the need for detailed investigation by me. The application for a placement order is not now pursued, given the local authority’s ultimate care plan. The forced marriage proceedings are still live and a small additional bundle was filed in relation to them. Both her Ladyship and I have made orders from time to time in those proceedings and a number of undertakings by the father in that regard remain in place. Relief under that jurisdiction was plainly required when at an early stage the risks were real and at a high level. Unfortunately, the mother’s own parents reacted badly to her relationship and pregnancy. They took what might be regarded as a hard line when a sympathetic one might have been better. The threats of abduction, violence and potential forced marriage were real and present but now clearly have faded to some extent.

[9]There was debate as to the utility of all or any of the father’s undertakings or their necessity, not least given the mother’s age and the current state of her relationship. In the argument I indicated to Mr. Setright QC my broadly sympathetic approach to his general argument and thus little time was spent, given the diminishing impact of that element of the case. The key area of investigation was, therefore, as to the application by the local authority for a care order as originally formulated, which has translated into a care plan, now proposing placement with the paternal aunt and uncle in Z region in Pakistan. That plan is advocated by the local authority and supported by the father and the children’s guardian as the preference. The alternative proposal advocated by Mother alone is that she should be permitted to care for or steps should be taken to investigate the potential for her to care for the child, GH. I use that rather vague language in relation to the mother’s proposal because, in my judgment, notwithstanding Mr. Horrocks’s able advocacy, I remain, even now, uncertain as to the precise detail of the plan in terms of practical arrangements and legal framework.

[10]The legal principles in this case are, of course, very well known and do not require lengthy exposition or analysis. Helpfully, Mr. Norton in his opening note at para.61 and following summarises the law and no one appeared to disagree and I am satisfied it is an accurate summary. I content myself, therefore, with the reminder that decisions depend upon firm facts, properly and forensically found in the way enunciated in Mr. Norton’s note. It is pointed out that, in fact, since no party is seeking a public law order, the question of threshold is not an absolute requirement, however it is a useful discipline and as the local authority was originally seeking a care order and a placement order, some effort was made to achieve an agreed or at least a minimum threshold. At A154 to 157 is the composite document produced by Mr. Norton. It is adequate in terms of the lowest common denominator but properly some important other issues were explored in the evidence: most significantly, the nature of the parental relationship, its inception and development and the father’s knowledge and motives were all under review. In closing, Mr. Setright in a thoughtful and interesting submission invited me to be sparing in terms of precise and critical findings against his client, the father, even if, for the sake of argument, the evidence would have justified it. He stressed the importance of restraint so as not to damage the father’s character later, for example when GH is old enough to digest the information about his own life. There is, in my judgment, some force in that. The court has no wish or need to make gratuitous or humiliating findings and it is often now considered that excessive detail or graphic description rarely adds much to the basic findings and can, if preserved in documentary form, be positively counterproductive later on. Accordingly, I do not propose to go far beyond what I consider to be the essential findings necessary to describe the case and to explain my decisions.

[11]Reverting briefly to the law. At the decision-making phase, the child’s welfare is paramount. All of the circumstances, including but not limited to those articulated in the checklist, have to be considered. The range of outcomes has to be reviewed and the realistic options have to be identified and thereafter evaluated, considering the advantages and disadvantages in a proper, balanced way. The impact of the orders has to be considered and the enormity or, looking at it at the other end, the proportionality of the proposals weighed. The hearing and overall process have to be scrupulously fair and the obvious impact of any order upon established private and family life arrangements has to be weighed. In other words, there are plain Art.6 and

Art.8 Convention

rights engaged. Although the local authority is not asking for a public law order, the making of a special guardianship order, particularly given the relocation of the child to Pakistan and the effective severance of the face-to-face relationship between the child and the parents, is a very profound order in context and, in my judgment, is much nearer to an adoption or the adoption end of the spectrum than would be a conventional child arrangements order and so should not be made lightly. It is not precisely the situation envisaged by the Supreme Court in Re B in respect of adoption care plans but it is close. Before rejection of the mother’s proposal it needs careful scrutiny as it is a serious and potentially irreversible step to sever effectively the maternal cultural and emotional relationship. All of these factors I must weigh in the round before stepping back, looking at the case as a whole and making a welfare-driven conclusion.

[12]I heard first from the local authority social work team: Miss K, Miss L and Miss M. The latter mentioned social worker is, in fact, the mother’s own social worker, who has a supportive and liaison role, an individual, unfortunately, much criticised subsequently in cross-examination and in argument.

[13]First Miss K. She provided a range of documents, all of which were referred to, perhaps most significant is the parenting assessment at E255 completed on 3rd February. She produced the care plan and spoke to the plan, in particular outlining the practicalities of the Pakistan placement. In my judgment, the parenting assessment is full and balanced. At E269 there is a helpful and, in my judgment, detailed analysis of the parents, particularly the mother, concluding that the mother would be unable to meet the needs of the child or, indeed, her own needs. It is important, in my judgment, to note that the report is written when the mother was well and that fact is specifically referenced. In a detailed cross-examination by Mr. Horrocks, the social worker made appropriate concessions of acknowledgement. She confirmed the improvement in the mother’s mental health and stability. She praised the N placement as supportive. She drew attention to wider issues beyond just mental health and, notwithstanding the cross-examination, adhered to the reservations about the mother’s capacity. She rejected the suggestions that her approach was overly critical, judgmental and superficial. Those are my words but, in my judgment, the gist of the attack. She rejected the proposition that the local authority had lacked energy in exploring other options. Interestingly, she confirmed that so far as her conversations were concerned, the mother had not expressed a desire to live in a supportive family environment, though that is now her case.

[14]The service manager, Miss L, was called specifically to discuss the change of care plan and in particular to deal with developments in relation to the practical implementation of the special guardianship plan for the aunt and uncle. An issue also arose as to the availability of funding to support the placement and the start up costs. In particular, the children’s guardian’s mind had been exercised with the issue and he was keen for the local authority to revisit the level of funding, particularly if building costs were involved. She spoke, in my judgment, fairly, in a balanced way and in a way that was sympathetic to do what she possibly could within the obvious constraints of budget within which she worked.

[15]Miss M spoke to her many documents which were identified. Like her colleagues, she spoke approvingly of the mother’s progress. She was heavily criticised in cross-examination in terms of commitment and motivation but she rejected the proposition that she had let the mother down by failing to provide sufficient support and to be a true and genuine advocate. Miss M’s position was, in my judgment, not an easy one. She agreed that she has principally the role of supporting the mother and so, unlike her colleagues, was not required to have the child’s welfare at the heart of her individual approach. She said that she was aware of that and that she had, as far as she could, fought the mother’s corner and not let her down.

[16]Mr. Horrocks’s argument in relation to the local authority witnesses was similar and, therefore, I take it broadly. He submitted that the local authority had, indeed, let her down or at the very least had written her off too soon. He challenged in a number of respects the social work practice and approach and drew attention, as he submitted, to the lack of focus and criticised the authority for an adherence to bureaucracy above welfare. In the course of the hearing I indicated my reluctance to embark upon a whole scale analysis of how the social workers did their jobs day-to-day. It remains my view that it is not the court’s principal function to dictate, some would say to attempt ex post facto to micro manage, how a social worker does his or her job. The court must be alive to the reality in which social work practice exists. Any social worker has not one but many clients and social work departments can be stretched in terms of personnel and finance. That is not to excuse but to give context. The essence of counsel’s challenge was that, notwithstanding that, the local authority had failed proactively to seek out an extended family placement and had not given the possibilities under arrangements made directly or informally through the Asian Family Counselling Service a chance. In my pre-trial directions of 17th March 2016 at B295 I had, in fact, allowed the matter to be explored and information to be collected from the AFCS, as I might call it. It was not in the nature of an expert report but the identification of services. The reality is that although a short-term unregistered placement outside of the regulations was potentially an option, the AFCS did not appear able to put forward a concrete proposal. That is not to criticise that organisation, which, as Mr. Horrocks rightly emphasised, has a track record of which it can be proud, but I reject his submission that the local authority deliberately set out to undermine or at least to put obstacles in the way of proper engagement with the AFCS. The difficulties raised inevitably questions about the monitoring of such placements and the supervision and regulation of such placements. Those are not empty matters of bureaucracy but are central requirements laid down by Parliament or the Rules. To allow children subject to control in the widest sense by the courts and local authorities to be placed in informal settings would not be realistic or sensible. It would be potentially dangerous and an abdication of the dual responsibility of the courts and the local authorities. I do not accept the local authority simply gave up on the practicalities of the option. However I remain unconvinced, as I understand the local authority to be, of the merit of such an option, even if available. I am sorry to say that even now the mother’s case remains embryonic and in the end untenable. I do not for a moment seek to criticise counsel’s presentation because he was seeking to paint a broad picture of the potential resource without very much, if any, concrete evidence, but in the end it needs to be reduced into a properly formulated legal proposition. Helpfully, he and Mr. Norton at my request produced proposed orders dealing with the directions that the court might make, depending upon which proposal was preferred. It seemed to me that that was a useful discipline because it distilled in the end the real problem which I see. In Mr. Horrocks’s document the preamble drafted which would reflect the decision favourable to his client reads as follows:

“Upon the court hearing submissions on behalf of all parties and the court determining with reasons to follow in a judgment to be handed down that: 1. The local authority has not adduced sufficient evidence as to the mother’s proposal that she move to live with GH long-term in suitable supported accommodation with a further package of professional assistance and support. 2. Accordingly, the court does not currently have before it enough or adequate evidence to evaluate all the options and to undertake a global holistic and multifaceted evaluation of the child’s welfare, which takes into account all the negatives and the positives and all the pros and cons of each realistic option. The final hearing must be adjourned part-heard to allow the lacuna in the evidence to be addressed and the court to be able to evaluate properly all parallel proposals for a long-term placement of the child and thereafter that is translated in the proposed draft to a further perhaps two-day hearing at a later date with a whole raft of further information being filed.”

Put in that way it seems to me that that really encapsulates the difficulty with the mother’s proposal because it depends entirely upon the court being satisfied that the local authority has failed to adduce evidence of the proper options to be put on the table.

[17]The other way of looking at it, as Mr. Horrocks submits, is that the mother has not been given a fair chance to put her case and that the local authority either has inhibited that or at least has given her no real support. That is not just a cross-examination point based upon instructions but in part receives credible support from Miss NO at C247 and Mr. PQ, who has variously acted as the mother’s mentor, advocate and at times litigation friend, in his documents at C233 and F110. They were both critical of the local authority’s approach. In passing and having referred to the specific page, it is not without significance that Mr. Q’s agenda (I do not use that pejoratively) was to find the mother a mother and baby foster placement, which is somewhat different, in my judgment, from the nature of the proposal in fact put during the hearing.

[18]Reverting to Miss O and Mr. Q, they were both impressive in their different ways and both committed to the support of the mother. They are both experienced professionals in their respective fields. It is, therefore, with regret that I record that their criticisms of the social workers at least in part and supported by the mother’s own evidence have value. I make every allowance for the day-to-day pressures on social workers but I accept and find that the working relationships in this case were not good and that the apparent offhand, even cold, approach appears to have soured relations to some extent. I go no further than that, however, since in the end that is not an issue which goes to the heart of the matter because without hesitation I reject the suggestion that the local authority has acted in bad faith or has shown a lack of commitment or that social work judgments were impaired. I accept that interpersonal relationships and time management could have been much better but that does not in the end, in my judgment, invalidate the overall thrust for the evidence given by the witnesses. The broader point is that Mr. Q feels the mother’s progress has not been acknowledged and realistic options have not been explored. Alternatively, in the mother’s case and supported by this judgment that AFCS has been written off prematurely. I accept that Mr. Q’s view is given conscientiously and his evidence deserves respect. He was fair in accepting in cross-examination by Mr. Norton that there remained difficulties even with the mother’s proposal. There is, of course, no identified placement, nor any obvious structure for the identification of such a placement. He was unable to say whether the mother would cope with the proposed very different environment. He accepted that the position and role of the father would be a significant complicating factor but notwithstanding all that he obviously thought that the options should have been explored. He speaks, as he acknowledged, from the mother’s perspective. He did not, therefore, consider in depth the uncertainties for GH, the impact of delay and the consequences of failure if things went badly wrong. That was simply outside of the scope of his remit. He did not in these proceedings have the status of an expert but, in fairness to him and given his obvious long experience and competence, I give substantial weight to his view.

[19]NO from the N project was plainly a caring, supportive and passionate witness for the mother. I have no doubt at all that the mother has derived much from her time at N but it is not a model for the future plan of the mother and child together. It is by definition a therapeutic and empowering environment for women in the situation that the mother finds herself and it has given the mother time and space to begin to address her problems and to develop her very many creative skills. I am not convinced in the end that the N experience is a particularly helpful guide as to how the mother would cope as a parent in any of the alternative scenarios.

[20]The mother was reluctant at first to give evidence and I do not criticise her for that at all but I was keen if possible to engage with her to some extent and after a most helpful discussion with counsel and the setting of some fairly restrictive ground rules, the mother did give evidence, albeit for a limited period and on a preordained list of topics. She spoke through an interpreter. As well as hearing from her I observed her over a long period in court. Although her mental health has improved greatly, it is clear to me from what she said and how she appeared that she remains a vulnerable, immature and easily distracted young woman. She found, I think, the proceedings boring and often tried to engage those around her, rather than attempting to listen and absorb the material. I do not blame her at all that I found her demeanour and many of her specific answers somewhat superficial. She articulated in terms, and I hope I have the exact quotation, a desire to have “a mature elderly woman, who knows how to bring up children” as someone with whom she could live. She spoke ambiguously about her religion and culture and her relationship with the father. I recognise, as was submitted, that the complexity of the relationship made it quite difficult for the two of them to sit in court, listening to the other speaking of their respective perceptions of the relationship. The relationship is, indeed, complex. I am satisfied it is ongoing. That is not, in fact, seriously in issue. More importantly, I am satisfied it will continue. The mother, notwithstanding all of the reservations, in the end described him as “keeping me happy”. She said that her priority was to look after her child but, strikingly, in my judgment, she said that only after a long, singularly significant pause for thought and, as I find, even though speaking through an interpreter, her answer was equivocal. Although the case for a wider family or mother and baby placement was advocated vigorously, I am sorry to say that I remain unconvinced that that is Mother’s real view or commitment. Much more likely is that she is counting down the days until she is eighteen, when I believe she thinks she will have much more freedom of movement. In digging down into the potential placement the mother was unable to give more than general answers. That may be because the proposition is only general but I had serious reservations that she had really thought things through. It would, standing back objectively, in my judgment, obviously be very difficult for the court or the local authority to insist upon the continuity of such a placement and the risk of breakdown or voluntary cessation is, in my judgment, high. For GH to be received back into foster care would be a disaster. In short and without articulating many of the other points and answers given, though I am deeply sympathetic to her plight and regard her as a victim of circumstances, I agree with the analysis of the local authority and children’s guardian as to the risks and uncertainties which arise in the mother’s case and not simply from her mental ill health background.

[21]The father’s position is, in my judgment, complex. He too gave evidence through the interpreter. There are many reservations about him both as a partner for the mother and as a parent and they are set out in extenso in the documents. His case is a simple one, however: that he has made a conscientious decision to put forward no positive case in terms of his own care and so it is unnecessary to dwell long on this aspect. In an effective cross-examination on behalf of the local authority, Mr. Norton highlighted the inherent and manifest inconsistencies and uncertainties in the father’s factual case. In deference to Mr. Setright’s submission it is not necessary to examine the more profound potential findings but I record that the circumstances of the parties meeting, of the dynamics of their relationship, the extraordinary and, in my judgment, unpalatable circumstances of their purported marriage and of the plain elements it seems to me which continue, albeit reduced, of the father’s controlling personality cannot be ignored. I do not know and it is unnecessary to investigate whether he specifically targeted the mother or someone like her or sought her out. Equally, his precise knowledge of her age when they met, about which there is sensitivity because of the potential criminal aspect, is not key to my determination but in the broadest sense I am satisfied and feel compelled to find that he took advantage of a vulnerable young person in her circumstances at a point of crisis. Even now he is still a major influence. They have both matured somewhat and now there are mutual benefits to the relationship and it has become less one-sided but I am quite sure not balanced or mutual or equal, however, or whichever epithet is chosen and they were debated. I am sure he remains the dominant party and, albeit the mother soon will be an autonomous adult, she must continue to ensure that she retains her independence. I accept that in supporting the placement in Pakistan, the father is showing concern for GH’s welfare but I am also quite sure that it is an arrangement with which he feels comfortable because it suits his own circumstances.

[22]I heard, finally, from the children’s guardian. It is a matter of regret and I feel bound to record that his physical presence was not great during the hearing. He was perfectly entitled to be absent because permission had been given but with the benefit of hindsight his attendance at compulsory training and participation in another case in parallel was not ideal. We were only able to proceed thanks to the great cooperation which I acknowledge of a District Judge at the Central Family Court, who substantially altered her sitting arrangements to accommodate this case. All that having been said and having been put on the record for completeness, I am, in fact, satisfied that Mr. Campbell was kept fully up to date. The child and he were well represented and I am sure was he was provided with a full account of events. Happily, his written evidence filed in advance of the proposed final hearing was impressive and, although there were significant developments in the case, he kept abreast of them and he did not alter his view. He was engaged personally and through counsel in the question as it developed of the funding of the support plan for the special guardianship order. His evidence orally was helpful and impressive. He spoke not critically but with great regret about the mother’s difficulties but he was clear in his mind that he was not willing to support a placement with Mother now or in the foreseeable future. He described her in a short but telling phrase, which encapsulates the essence of it, as vulnerable, suggestible and in need of guidance. With those three elements I entirely agree. He was not persuaded of the merit of an AFCS placement or equivalent. In the first place he was not convinced that there was such a placement available but more broadly he was unconvinced as to its workability. In the end he felt that the Pakistan option was the “only realistic family option”.

[23]Against all of that evidence, which I have done no more than summarise and comment upon in passing, together with all of the paper material, which I do not overburden this judgment with extensive citation, I come to my principal task and I have to identify the realistic options in terms of GH’s welfare and that includes, of course, timescale. It is necessary to look at the pros and cons. The first, and I mention it essentially for the sake of completeness, is the general proposition of a placement with Mother. The advantages are, of course, the obvious advantage, if possible, of a child living with their natural parent, if not both. The second is that on any view the father would either be a cohabitant parent or closely involved. The third is that the mother would have professional and social support. The fourth is that the mother’s own Hindu culture and religious heritage would be in play and, albeit somewhat conditionally, that if the mother is well, such a placement would potentially provide some stability. The disadvantages are again fairly obvious: that this plan in general terms is speculative, which is why no one in reality advocates it as a direct placement unsupported by other means. The mother’s circumstances are not settled. Her current environment is temporary, albeit she can remain for the foreseeable next few months. In my judgment, the relationship she has with the father would be the dominant dynamic in the family. Fourthly, any parenting would be stressful and stress gives rise to potential insecurity. In her particular case the risk of increased stress would lead to the chance or relapse into the more chaotic elements of her bipolar presentation and, although there is some community support in the general sense, the mother has no family or immediate Hindu cultural community support. In short, just as did others, I found a direct placement with the mother immediately not even to meet the test of a realistic option at the present or in the foreseeable future. The more nuanced aspect, therefore, and the one formulated as the mother’s principal case is based upon the adjournment of the decision for further investigation and then a resumption of the hearing. The advantage for that would be arguably that it would produce a workable solution, secondly that it would give the mother a chance that she feels she has missed to demonstrate her ability, albeit objectively that may not be a fair judgment, thirdly that it would preserve the option of placement within the birth family and, fourthly, it would allow for the development of contact with the father, perhaps and probably in the longer term leading to a cohabitant relationship between the parents. The disadvantages, in summary form, would be the uncertainty of such a proposal for the reasons in part I have mentioned. Secondly, the delay, which is not only the short-term forensic delay, although significant, but the delay before true security and stability could be assured. Thirdly and entirely practically, there is no obvious resource available at the present time. Fourthly, the plan as formulated is, in my judgment, unclear to what extent a short-term placement could develop into a long-term placement. I recognise that Mr. Horrocks has in his draft nailed his colours to the so-called long-term mast but that, in my judgment, leads to the further disadvantage that a long-term placement within a wider family context is simply not a viable solution for this child. Lastly in terms of disadvantages, it would reduce GH’s chance for immediate stability.

[24]I turn, therefore, to the other potential option, namely the placement with the aunt and uncle. Although it is the principal care plan advocated, I can deal with it quite shortly. Ms. Hussain in her assessment of 23rd December 2015 provided a lengthy assessment of the couple in Pakistan. It is at E173 and it has not been challenged. Its conclusion at E235 is positive. Not only is it positive, it is in many ways a glowing testimonial. It is in the end, therefore, the basis upon which the local authority puts its case, having rightly, in my judgment, stepped back from the option of adoption and placement. The plan, therefore, is the local authority’s, supported by the father and the children’s guardian. The reason I can deal with the matter quite shortly is that even the mother recognises some merit in it because she puts it as her first alternative if she is found unsuitable to care for the child. I have to say that I felt, as I articulated at the time, that Mr. Horrocks’s vigorous criticisms of that option were difficult forensically to reconcile with the mother’s case but in the end of course he had to test the evidence to see if it was robust but it remains the mother’s preferred alternative against placement outside of the family altogether. Many of the criticisms of the Pakistan option were based upon uncertainty because the couple involved have no relationship as yet of any significance with GH and that is a fair point but I reject absolutely the proposition that it would be psychologically damaging for GH, and I use counsel’s words, to “live a lie” in the way he would be brought up because of the cultural and religious ambiguities in his background. I simply reject that. If that had been so, then that would have been a fundamental impediment, it seems to me, but the evidence I have on that point is reassuring.

[25]Undertaking briefly a balance. The advantage is that it remains a family placement: although remote, it would promote the other side of the child’s background, namely the Pakistani Muslim heritage; it is a proposal which has been assessed and passed positively; it is, I am satisfied, practical and properly resourced and is not dependent upon an individual level of funding. There was a fear that the whole edifice would collapse unless a minimum amount of payment was available and that in the end turned out not to be the case. It has the advantage on the evidence I have of being potentially stable and long-term for this child. The substantial disadvantage, which Mr. Horrocks rightly emphasised, is the element of uncertainty that there is no existing relationship and there has been no contact. He also rightly emphasised the further disadvantage of the geography, which is obvious, the consequence leading to the next disadvantage: the effective curtailment of the parental relationship principally in relation to the mother but also to some extent in relation to the father. A further disadvantage is, whilst I accept the good faith as described to me of the prospective special guardians, that the reality is that although the Hindu religion and culture of the mother’s side of the family would be acknowledged, I see no realistic prospect of it being promoted or given equal prominence. All of those reservations are well understood by the children’s guardian, who addressed the issues, and I accept, therefore, that this is an unusual care plan because, unlike many cases, the child is not already placed, does not have an established relationship and by dint of geography and circumstance the transitional plan is short and to some extent intensive.

[26]There are, of course, many other factors in play in the overall balance but my task is to step back. GH needs a decision and I am quite sure that a decision is long overdue. I come to the clear conclusion, in fact, that the guardian is right that the only realistic placement is with the aunt and uncle. Although I have given very anxious thought to what is, in fact, the second of three propositions, namely adjournment with a view to further investigation, I am clear that that is unrealistic and may be dismissed as such. Even if I am wrong and it could arguably be deemed realistic, it remains so speculative, so fraught with risk and uncertainty and so heavy with delay that GH’s welfare points overwhelmingly to his placement in Pakistan and that in the end is the proposal that I prefer and the care plan which needs implementation. I am sorry that it will involve inevitably the marginalisation of the natural parents and that is not a step that the court contemplates lightly but it is unavoidable, it seems to me, in this case. They have a role in terms of contact in the present circumstance and, in my judgment, the father particularly has a role in the transitional process and I was not persuaded of the need for substantial reduction. It follows, therefore, from what I have said that that is my preferred option. In terms of forensic completeness, I reject the, as I regarded, deemed application to adjourn these proceedings for a further full investigation and resumption of the hearing part heart. This is, in my judgment, now the determinative decision and we move to the phase of implementation.

[27]As to the other ancillary matters which were raised, by the end, in my judgment, they had effectively fallen away. There was some concern as to the child’s name and whether it would be unfairly descriptive of him, giving rise to difficultly. I am quite sure on the evidence that it will not.

[28]In terms of his faith, he is obviously far too young to make personal decisions and the environment in the special guardian’s house is likely to be driven by, as I understand it, their adherence to Islam. It follows as a matter of practicality but also in his best interests that he too in that environment should be encouraged to develop his Muslim faith. I hope, and it can be no more probably than this, that he will not lose sight of his mother’s background, religious and cultural heritage but it will inevitably take second place.

[29]The issue of circumcision, in fact, I think is not a live one now before the court. No one invites me to make any adjudication. In my judgment, the evidence was clear that it was not such a keen or pressing issue as had before been believed and is unlikely now to arise but if it did would have to be coped with at the time and not prospectively.

[30]I am quite satisfied with the care plan. I am satisfied with the transition plan, which of course, as I have said, will involve an accelerated process. It will have to be flexible and that was well understood and although the general framework of an increasing degree of physical contact and time is sensible, exactly how that translates into the day-to-day experience will have to be managed at the time by those implementing it. The child of course by virtue of this care plan will be permanently resident outside of the United Kingdom and that is of course permission which I grant, given the circumstances of this case. It is my hope that very good quality indirect contact can be achieved. With inevitably the modern means of electronic communication that is entirely possible and I have confidence from what I have read that that will be promoted. I hope that the mother will not lose heart and will not lose contact because, although I am sure she will be devastated by the decision I have given, that is not in any way an indication that she has no role at all to play in this boy’s future. Her role is different. It is perhaps limited but it remains significant. Accordingly, for those reasons I will proceed, subject to counsel’s argument, to make an order at the appropriate moment but unless there is any other particular feature of the case that any counsel wishes me to deal with now, I propose to say no more in terms of judgment and simply invite any further submissions on how we move forward. __________