R v John Daniels [2025] EWCR 10

[2025] EWCR 10Case No 41B21555022IN THE CROWN COURT AT ST ALBANSSt Albans Crown Court,Bricket Road, St. Albans, AL1 3JWDate 20/10/2025
Before
Mr Justice Foxton
Between
RexCrownJohn DanielsDefendant
Patrick Dennis ( for 30 July 2025 hearing and written submissions on 31 July, 13 August and 14 October 2025) and Szilvia Booker (for the 20 October 2025 hearing and written submissions on 20 October 2025) (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the CrownPeter Glenser KC and Sean Sullivan (instructed by Lawton) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 30 July and 20 October 2025Further written submissions: 31 July, 13 August, 14 October and 20 October 2025
Approved RulingI direct that pursuant to Crim.PR r.5.5(1) no official shorthand note shall be taken of this judgment and that copies of this version as handed down (subject to editorial corrections) may be treated as authentic.This judgment was handed down remotely at 13:20 on 20 October 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................Mr Justice Foxton :

Introduction

[1]On 14 January 2022 a search warrant was executed at the Defendant’s address. In the course of the search, three “3D” printers were located and various plastic components produced using the “3D” printers. These included a “lower receiver” manufactured to a design produced for the manufacture of a so-called “FGC9” model which, when manufactured and assembled appropriately, is a semi-automatic lethal firearm.[2]The charges preferred against the Defendant concern only the possession of the “lower receiver”. The charges comprise:a. As Count 1, the possession of a “prohibited firearm” contrary to s.5(1)(aba) of the Firearms Act 1968, on the following basis: i. The effect of the definition of s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968 is that the s.5(1)(aba) offence is committed by possession of a stipulated component part of a prohibited firearm, with a receiver being one of the stipulated component parts. ii. The lower receiver is a “receiver” for the purpose of s.57(1D). iii. The lower receiver is a component part of a prohibited firearm, being a component part of a firearm with a barrel length of less than 60cm in overall length within s.5(1)(aba).b. In the alternative, as Count 2, possession of a firearm without a firearm certificate contrary to s.1(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1968 on the basis that: i. The effect of the definition of s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968 is that the s.5(1)(aba) offence is committed by possession of a stipulated component part of a firearm without a firearm certificate, with a receiver being one of the stipulated component parts. ii. The lower receiver is a “receiver” for the purpose of s.57(1D). iii. The lower receiver is a component of a firearm for the purpose of s.1(1)(a).[3]The Defendant accepts that he was in possession of the lower receiver and that he did not have a firearms certificate for it but denies that he committed either offence:a. He denies that the lower receiver is a “receiver” within s.57(1D)(b), contending that it is at best a component in a receiver.b. He also denies that the lower receiver was an item capable of being used as a part of a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon for purposes of s.57(1D) because(i) the hammer had been broken off (he says intentionally) and(ii) there was no “upper receiver” (paragraph 5 of the Defence Statement: “half of it being missing”).c. If either of those arguments is accepted, it would provide a complete answer to both Counts 1 and 2. If they are rejected, the Defendant denies Count 1 on the basis that the lower receiver, even if a component for s.571D) purposes, is not a component of a prohibited weapon as alleged.

The procedural history

[4]The trial of this matter has been fixed for 5 days, and was initially listed for 28 May 2024. Both parties served expert evidence intended to support their case at trial:a. The Prosecution from Ms Natalie Woodcock of Eurofins Forensic Sciences of 12 October 2022.b. The Defendant from David Platt of Keith Borer Consultants 1 September 2023 and JWF Harriman of 25 March 2024.c. The Prosecution a reply report from Ms Woodcock of 15 May 2024.[5]On 28 May 2024, the case was adjourned, and referred to one of the Presiding Judges with a view to determining whether the case should be retained for trial by a High Court Judge. Mr Justice Murray gave a direction to that effect on 5 July 2024. In the meantime, directions were given as follows:a. Joint experts’ reports identifying areas of agreement and disagreement were to be served (and this was done by 16 July 2024).b. The parties were to “formulate … such novel and important points of law” as arose and compile them in one document.[6]As so formulated, five points of law were initially identified:a. “Is a lower receiver a component part for the purpose of section 57(1)(c) and 57(1D)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968?”b. “Does the fact that the lower receiver had a broken hammer render it not a relevant component for the purposes of section 57(1)(c) and 57(1D)(b) Firearms Act 1968?”c. “Is the classification of the lower receiver a matter of law or is it a matter of fact for the jury to resolve?”d. “If it is a matter of fact is the defendant’s intent a relevant consideration?”e. “If the classification of the lower receiver is a matter of law, what is the correct classification?”[7]By 14 March 2025, when the prosecution served a second skeleton, it was stated that there were now two issues:a. “Whether the lower receiver, seized as part of exhibit RJC/02, is a relevant component part as defined by sections 57(1)(c) and 57(1D)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968?”b. “Whether the provisions of section 5(1)(aba) of the Act apply on the basis that the firearm the lower receiver is a component part of is less than 60cm in overall length?”[8]The skeleton suggested that the latter question involved an issue for the jury depending on whether “the jury think it is a reasonable possibility that the lower receiver would have been used [by the Defendant] to construct an FGC-9 with a barrel length of more than 16cm”.[9]The matter came before me on 30 July 2025 for legal argument. The expert witnesses did not attend. In the course of that argument, it became apparent that further research was required in relation to the legislative background to s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968. In addition, there were certain technical issues of potential relevance to the interpretation of that issue on which the parties were unable to assist me.[10]Further written submissions followed on 31 July (the Defence), 6 August (Prosecution) and 13 August (Defence) in the course of which a significant body of further material was filed. It was apparent from those materials that the purpose behind s.57(1D) may not have been accurately understood at the time of oral submissions, and that the arguments engaged certain factual issues which went beyond the scope of the experts’ joint memorandum.[11]I informed the parties that I had concluded that it was not appropriate to issue any legal ruling, without a more secure understanding on the court’s part of the agreed factual background (which had not been reduced into an Agreed Statement of Facts) and certain technical matters. In addition, I was concerned that what had been intended to be a hearing in open court, on matters of obvious wider interest, had in the event largely come to be argued on paper. I provided the parties with a draft Agreed Statement of Facts recording my understanding of what was agreed, and those areas where I required further assistance, and directed the parties to provide a final version, with the matter finally to be determined at or at the start of the trial.[12]In the event, a week before trial, the court received a further joint report from Mr Platt and Mr Harriman commenting on my draft, and a report from Ms Woodcock addressing a number of questions arising out of the draft. There were further discussions at court, the effect of which is that the following matters were common ground:a. There are firearms designs which involve two separate parts, an upper receiver and a lower receiver and this has been the case since the late 1950s.b. For such firearms, upper and lower receivers can be purchased separately from different manufacturers.c. That was the position when s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968 was introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2017.d. The receiver of a firearm does not take the gas pressure of firing but can be subjected to other forces generated by moving parts within then firearm.e. In firearms with separate upper and lower receivers, the lower receiver does not bear the pressure of firing a gun, albeit it must still have some degree of structural integrity.f. The lower receiver found in the Defendant’s possession did not contain a “breech mechanism” and the barrel and stock are not assembled to it but to an upper receiver.

The Section 57(1D) issue

[13]Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968 provides:
“(1) In this Act, the expression ‘firearm’ means— (a) a lethal barrelled weapon (see subsection (1B)); (b) a prohibited weapon; (c) a relevant component part in relation to a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon (see subsection (1D)) … (1B) In subsection (1)(a), “lethal barrelled weapon” means a barrelled weapon of any description from which a shot, bullet or other missile, with kinetic energy of more than one joule at the muzzle of the weapon, can be discharged. … (1D) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), each of the following items is a relevant component part in relation to a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon— (a) a barrel, chamber or cylinder, (b) a frame, body or receiver, (c) a breech block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the pressure of discharge at the rear of a chamber, but only where the item is capable of being used as a part of a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon.” (a) a lethal barrelled weapon (see subsection (1B)); (b) a prohibited weapon; (c) a relevant component part in relation to a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon (see subsection (1D)) … (a) a barrel, chamber or cylinder, (b) a frame, body or receiver, (c) a breech block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the pressure of discharge at the rear of a chamber, but only where the item is capable of being used as a part of a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon.”
[14]In interpreting that section, the court is entitled to take account of the state of law as it existed prior to the legislation in issue (Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation [42-5]), and consultation papers and reports by government or parliamentary bodies or the Law Commission where legislation is introduced to give effect to those reports or where they identify the mischief to which the legislation in issue was aimed ([24-9]). In addition, the Explanatory Notes for the legislation in question are also an important aid (Wilson v First County Trust (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, [64]).[15]As originally enacted, s.57(1) of Firearms Act 1968 provided:
“(1) In this Act, the expression ‘firearm’ means a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged and includes— (a) any prohibited weapon, whether it is such a lethal weapon as aforesaid or not; and (b) any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon; and (c) any accessory to any such weapon designed or adapted to diminish the noise or flash caused by firing the weapon; and so much of section 1 of this Act as excludes any description of firearm from the category of firearms to which that section applies shall be construed as also excluding component parts of, and accessories to, firearms of that description.” (a) any prohibited weapon, whether it is such a lethal weapon as aforesaid or not; and (b) any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon; and (c) any accessory to any such weapon designed or adapted to diminish the noise or flash caused by firing the weapon; and so much of section 1 of this Act as excludes any description of firearm from the category of firearms to which that section applies shall be construed as also excluding component parts of, and accessories to, firearms of that description.”
[16]As enacted, therefore, s.57(1) did not seek on its face to distinguish between different component parts of firearms, nor engage with the issue as to the level of assembly at which a “component part” should be identified.[17]The Firearms Consultative Committee (“FCC”), the independent body established under the auspices of s.22 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 to review the working of the Firearms Acts, commented on this feature of the 1968 Act in their Ninth Annual Report for the year 1997/1998. At [4.2], the FCC noted that: “The term ‘component part’ of a firearm is not defined in statute. In practice, there is a clear consensus that the frame and other major components of a gun, such as the barrel, slide or revolver cylinder, are clearly ‘components’, whereas a common screw, used in a variety of machines, is not a ‘component’”.[18]The report referred to concerns expressed by a defence manufacturer as to the scope of the current legislation, leading to the establishment of a sub-committee to address the issue so as to “draw a clear divide between those components which should be subject to strict controls, and those to which a de minimis approach … might be applied”, and they recommended a statutory reform to that end. The report of the sub-committee was printed as Annex C to the report:a. It noted the importance of “ensuring that component parts which would significantly assist criminals in constructing firearms or in restoring de-activated firearms to working order were subject to control.”b. It expressed the view that component parts such as small screws and nails which were commonly used other than in firearms should not be subject to licensing control.c. In this connection, they drew a distinction between components (of which the frame, barrel and cylinder were given as examples) and “smaller sub-components”.d. The definition suggested provided “the term ‘component part’ shall apply to(i) any barrel, chamber or cylinder;(ii) any frame, action, body or receiver;(iii) any breech, block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the pressure of discharge at the rear of the chamber;(iv) any other part of the firearm upon which pressure caused by firing the weapon impinges directly” and “items which are more or less unique to firearms, which are not readily replaced by items found in general use (such as coil springs, screws, washers and the like), and without which a person of reasonable skill could not create a firearm or repair a scrap or deactivated firearm.”[19]The FCC returned to this issue in its Tenth Annual Report for the year 1998-1999. It noted at [13.2] that “the trade” had expressed concern about measures proposed in the Ninth Report, and it had decided to look at the issue again. The sub-group formed to do so endorsed the following definition: “The term ‘component part’ shall apply to(i) any barrel, chamber of cylinder;(ii) any frame, action, body or receiver;(iii) any breech, block, bolt, or other mechanism for containing the charge at the rear of the chamber;(iv) any other part of the firearm upon which the pressure caused by firing the weapon impinges directly” ([13.10]). The FCC observed at [13.11] that “this matched the long-standing view that component parts should be ‘pressure bearing parts” and accorded with those parts routinely recorded on firearms certificates and in dealers’ registers.[20]The experts agree that the manufacture of weapons with separate upper and lower receivers has been a feature of certain weapon designs since the late 1950s. It is not clear when the legal issues which weapons designed with separate upper and lower receivers were capable of raising first achieved prominence in the UK. However, the fact that some weapon-types had separate upper and lower receivers was known to the Law Commission when it was asked to consider reform to firearms legislation in 2015.[21]In 2015, the Law Commission issued “Firearms Law: A Scoping Consultation Paper” (Consultation Paper No 224) (“the Consultation Paper”) which addressed the issue of “component parts” in chapter 3. At [3.3], the Consultation Paper noted that the absence of a definition had led to “the same item [being] classified in different ways by different juries sitting in different courts.” The Consultation Paper referred to judicial decisions holding that the issue of whether something was a component part was one of fact for the jury.[22]By way of a potential solution, the Consultation Paper referred to the Ninth Report of the FCC, noting “the general principles laid down by the FCC are the product of careful consideration and debate by a range of experts and for that reason the Law Commission has relied upon them to inform our own approach to this issue” ([3.28]).

(b) of EU Council Decision 2014/164/EU:

“Parts and components’ shall mean any element or replacement element specifically designed for a firearm and essential to its operation, including a barrel, frame or receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm.”
[23]At [3.42], the Consultation Paper referred to a “second option” of limiting the legislation to “pressure-bearing parts,” as suggested in the FCC’s Tenth Report. It noted that at [3.44] that “this approach would have the benefit of providing a relative degree of certainty, although there would exist the potential for disagreement over whether the part in question is in fact pressure bearing” and that “expert evidence would in many cases be necessary to assist with this inquiry.” At [3.46], the Consultation Paper referred to two difficulties in defining component parts solely by reference to the question of whether they are pressure-bearing: the risk of the definition being under-inclusive; and “difficulty at the margins in determining whether the pressure of firing does in fact impact directly upon the item in question” (and whether there was a required minimum extent).[24]At [3.47], the Law Commission considered a third alternative – “a part without which the thing could not operate as a lethal-barrelled weapon” – referring to potential disagreements about whether the classification was met, and the risk of over-inclusion.[25]At [3.49], the Law Commission came down in favour of the suggestion in the FCC’s Ninth Report, and against a catch-all by reference to whether the part was pressure- bearing. The Consultation Paper also recommended a requirement that the component part be capable of fulfilling its function as part of a working firearm. This was to resolve an apparent conflict between R v Bewley [2012] EWCA Crim 1457 (holding that a component part of something which was not itself a lethal-barrelled weapon could not itself be a “component part” for s.57(1) purposes) and R v Ashton [2007] EWCA Crim234 (holding that a component part of a de-activated weapon could, in its disassembled state, constitute a “component part”), noting that the effect of its recommendation would be to reverse Bewley.[26]At [3.54], the Law Commission set out “Provisional proposal 2”:
“To maximise clarity and certainty, the FCC’s modified list of component parts should be enshrined in law, namely: (1) the barrel, chamber, cylinder; (2) the frame, body or receivers upper and lower where present in the complete firearm; (3) the breech, block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the charge at the rear of the chamber.”
[27]It is to be noted that the reference to “receivers upper and lower” was the Law Commission’s own interpolation of what was implicit in the FCC Ninth Report, rather than language appearing in the Ninth Report. The definition of “receiver” in the glossary was “the component of the firearm housing parts of the operating mechanism. Also known as the ‘frame’ in handguns, especially revolvers.”[28]The Law Commission’s report, “Firearms Law – Reforms to Address Pressing Problems” (Law Com No 363) (“the Report”) was published on 15 December 2015. Component parts were addressed in chapter 3. At [3.9], the Report noted that the Law Commission had recommended making the FCC definition statutory and that: “As a consequence of this, the term ‘component part’ would be defined as:(1) The barrel, chamber or cylinder.(2) Frame, body or receivers upper and lower.(3) Breech, block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the charge at the rear of the chambers”.[29]At [3.10] the Report stated that the recommendation would “ensure that those parts that have the potential for criminal misuse are subject to control whilst not requiring every washer and screw to be included as a separate entry on a firearm certificate.”[30]At [3.11] they noted that they did not recommend adopting the phrase “any other part of the firearm upon which the pressure caused by firing the weapon impinges directly” because “it would undermine our goal of maximising clarity.”[31]The proposed reform had received support in the consultation process, including from the Countryside Alliance, whose submission, noted at [3.14], expressed the understanding (from which the Law Commission did not dissent) that the definition proposed extended to “receivers upper and lower.” At [3.20] the definition proposed was:
“(1) The barrel, chamber, cylinder. (2) Frame, body or receivers. (3) Breech, block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the charge at the rear of the chamber.”
While this did not include the words “upper or lower”, the Report clearly communicates that the recommendation was to implement those aspects of the FCC definition in the Ninth Report which extended to “receivers, upper and lower”. In its glossary, the Law Commission once again defined “receiver” as “the component of the firearm housing parts of the operating mechanism. Also known as the ‘frame’ in handguns, especially, revolvers.”[32]It will be apparent that in its enacted form, the definite article in the first limb was replaced with the indefinite article, which was also introduced into the second and third limbs, and that the reference in the second to “receivers” was replaced with “receiver”. The effect of s.6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 would make the argument that the use of the singular as opposed to the plural was of significance a very challenging one. There was no suggestion that the conditions for reference to Hansard as an aid to interpretation were applicable. In case there was anything which might assist the Defendant, I have reviewed the debates, which contains nothing to suggest that Parliament was intending to do other than implement the Law Commission’s recommendations in the definition of “component parts”.[33]Mr Glenser KC referred to the Explanatory Notes which accompanied the Police and Crime Act 2017. It is also helpful to refer to those which were placed before Parliament accompanying the Bill, of which there are three sets, in essentially the same form.[34]The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill as it was brought to the House of Commons on 10 February 2016 (Bill 134) stated at [121] of the-then clause 77 of Bill (which, in relation to the definition of “component parts”, was throughout in the form essentially enacted) that it: “gives effect to the Law Commission recommendations (at paragraphs 3.20, 3.28 and 3.44 of its report):• ‘that the term “component part” in the Firearms Act 1968 be defined as(1) The barrel, chamber or cylinder;(2) Frame, body or receivers;(3) Breech, block, bolt or other mechanism for containing the charge at the rear of the chamber.’• ‘that the Secretary of State be given the power to amend the statutory list of component parts by way of statutory instrument, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure’;• ‘that the legislation be enacted to clarify that a component part shall remain classified as such so long as it is capable of fulfilling its function as part of a lethal-barrelled weapon”. of the chamber.’ a lethal-barrelled weapon”.[35]The Commentary on the Provisions of the Bill, addressing what was then clause 77, stated of the definitions at [779]:
“These terms are not defined further but will take their commonly understood meanings, namely: • Barrel – that part of a firearm through which a projectile or shot charge travels under the impetus of powder gasses, compressed air, or other like means. A barrel may be rifled or smooth; • Chamber – the rear part of the barrel bore that has been formed to accept a specific cartridge or shotshell. In a revolver the holes in the cylinder represent multiple chambers; • Frame – in revolvers, pistols, and break-open guns, the basic unit of a firearm which houses the firing and breech mechanism and to which the barrel and grips are attached; • Body – another word for receiver or frame; • Receiver – the basic unit of a firearm which houses the firing and breech mechanism and to which the barrel and stock are assembled; • Breech block – the locking and cartridge head support mechanism of a firearm that does not operate in line with the axis of the bore; • Bolt – on a rifle, this is a component which slides into an extension to the barrel at the breech end and rotates to lock.” at the breech end and rotates to lock.”
[36]It will be apparent that the statement as to what was said to be the commonly understood meaning of the word “receiver” would not apply to the lower receiver found at the Defendant’s property, which does not contain a breech mechanism and to which the barrel and stock are not assembled.[37]The Explanatory Notes accompanying the draft of the Bill as it was brought to the House of Commons on 19 May 2016 (Bill 3) addressed what was then clause 104 in the same way (at [136] and [820]); as did those for the draft brought to the House of Lords on 14 June 2016 (HL Bill 55) addressing the-then clause 111 (see [144] and [881]). The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Act referred to the Law Commission Consultation Paper (at [137]) and the Report ([139]), stating that ss.125 to 128 of the 2017 Act were intended to remedy the deficiencies the Law Commission had identified ([138]-[139]). At [147] and [931], in the Commentary on the Provisions section, they contain the same statement as the three sets of Explanatory Notes which had accompanied the Bills.[38]Having regard to all of these matters, I am satisfied that the word “receiver” in s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968 extends to both upper and lower receivers when manufactured as free-standing parts, and not simply, as Mr Glenser KC submitted, to a single part which performs the functions of both an upper and lower receiver. That conclusion is supported by the following factors:a. That was clearly the intention of the recommendations in the FCC Ninth Report which the Law Commission endorsed, in which the proposed definition included “any frame, action, body or receiver” (“any” receiver clearly extending to both an upper and lower receiver), and in which the proposed definition was intended to apply to “the frame and other major components of a gun.” The lower receiver, housing the trigger, magazine (if the design includes one) and stock is clearly a “major component” of a gun.b. This was the result the Law Commission was clearly seeking to achieve, as is clear from the Consultation Paper and Report.c. Parliament was clearly intending to enact the Law Commission recommendations, as is clear from the three sets of Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bills and the version accompanying the Act.d. The expression “frame, body or receiver” is a wide one, capable on its ordinary meaning of extending to component parts which house parts of a firearm’s operating system.e. Upper and lower receivers are very different from the types of sub-component which the FCC and Law Commission wished to place outside the Firearms Act regime. They are manufactured and sold independently, with upper or lower receivers of one manufacture capable of being used in conjunction with compatible lower or upper receiver of another manufacture. It is not suggested that they have an ordinary use outside the firearms context, in the way in which screws and washers, for example, would.f. The Commentary in the various sets of Explanatory Notes on which Mr Glenser KC relies provides an accurate description of single receiver units which combine the functions which are separated in designs which involve upper and lower receivers. However, that illustration (which will be apt for a great many receiver types to which s.57(1D) will be applied) is insufficient, in my view, to require a more limited construction of s.57(1D) than its language suggests and than the Law Commission clearly intended that language to bear. The effect of Mr Glenser KC’s submission is that s.57(1D) would not give effect to the Law Commission’s recommendations but would alter them in an important respect. However, the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bills and the Act make it clear that this was not the intention. A provision commenting on the operation of the Bill is not a location in which a significant change to the effect of an implementing Bill of this kind would be found.g. The consequence of the Defendant’s arguments would seriously curtail the public safety imperative underlying s.57(1D) and expressed in the Law Commission Report. It would entail that firearms legislation could be avoided in respect of important parts of a functioning firearm by the simple expedient of keeping the upper and lower receiver separate, even though the separate manufacture of these items was a prevalent practice when s.57(1D) was enacted (as is clear from the references in the Consultation Paper and Report to “receivers upper and lower” and was agreed between the experts).h. To the extent that Mr Glenser KC in his written submissions sought to distinguish between upper and lower receivers on the basis that the former are pressure-bearing, there is no basis for such a distinction in the wording of s.57(1D) and the Law Commission specifically considered and rejected a distinction between component parts of a firearm on that basis.[39]It follows that I am satisfied that the lower receiver found at the Defendant’s address is a receiver for the purpose of s.57(1D) of the Firearms Act 1968. I am also satisfied the issue is a question of law, not a question of fact for the jury. It concerns the proper interpretation of the word “receiver” in s.57(1D) on its language and by reference to its legislative history. It is relevant in this respect that the purpose of s.57(1D) was to reduce the scope for inconsistent jury verdicts under the preceding version of s.57, in which the issue of whether a particular item was a “component part” was a question of fact for the jury.[40]For the same reason, I am satisfied that Mr Glenser KC’s alternative argument that the lower receiver found at the Defendant’s address was not a “receiver” for s.57(1D)(b) purposes because “half of it was missing” is wrong. That pre-supposes that only a single item capable of performing the functions of both an upper and lower receiver is caught by this part of s.57(1D). However, I have rejected that argument. On the basis of my conclusion that s.57(1D) applies to both lower receivers and upper receivers, what was found at the Defendant’s address was not “half a receiver” for s.57(1D)(b) purposes, but a complete and functioning lower receiver.

Postscript

[41]As might be expected, the significance of the fact that some weapon-types have separate upper and lower receivers has also been an issue of debate in the U.S. The United States Gun Control Act 1968 (18 USC § 921(a)(3)) defines “firearm” to include “any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; and (b) the frame or receiver of any such weapon”. In weapons with upper and lower receivers, it was generally the lower receiver which was serialized and treated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as the controlled firearm (e.g. 27 CFR § 478.11 (2021)). However the application of 18 USC § 921(a)(3)) to separate upper and lower receivers has been a matter of legal controversy, with three District Courts having issued rulings to the effect that an AR-15 lower receiver on its own did not constitute a frame or receiver (United States v Roh SACR 14-167-JV, Minute of Order p.8 (C.D. Cal), July 27, 2020; United States v Rowold 429 F. Supp. 3d 469, 475-77 (N.D. Ohio 2019) and United States v Jimenez 191 F. Supp. 3d. 1038, 1041 (N.D. Cal, 2016)).[42]In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms issued a new regulation (87 Fed. Reg. 24652). This sought to address the status of weapons with upper and lower receivers (27 CFR §478.12(a)(1), (a)(2)), as well as addressing weapons parts kits “designed to” or which “may readily be converted to expel a projectile” (27 CFR §478.11), and “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional” frames or receivers (§478.12(c)). A challenge that aspects of that regulation were ex facie inconsistent with the Gun Control Act 1968 was rejected by a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court in 23-852 Bondi v VanDerStok, 2 March 2025. Footnote 1 of

Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on behalf of the Court states:

“Where the agency’s old regulations defined frames and receivers as those parts housing all of a firearm’s key components, 43 Fed. Reg. 13537, ATF’s new rule redefined those terms to include parts housing only some key components, see 27 CFR §478.12(a)(1), (a)(2). But because the plaintiffs did not challenge that amendment or others in proceedings below, see Brief for Respondent VanDerStok 31, n. 4, we have no occasion to pass upon them.”

The significance of the broken hammer

[43]Mr Glenser KC also argues that the item found at the Defendant’s address did not constitute a lower receiver within s.57(1D)(b) because it was not “capable of being used as a part of a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon” due to the broken hammer.

The relevant authorities

[44]There are a number of decisions which have considered the effect of different types of deficiencies in devices charged as firearms under the Firearms Act 1968 or predecessor legislation. They must be considered in the context of the wording of the specific legislative provision in issue. There are two principal types of wording:a. “Designed or adapted” wording;b. “capable” wording.[45]The first in point in time is Cafferata v Wilson [1936] 3 All ER 149, which involved the sale of a dummy revolver, fitted with a partially bored barrel. By fully drilling the barrel, the device could be made capable of discharging a missile by 5 minutes drilling with an electric drill, or 30 minutes hand-drilling. The seller was charged with unlawful sale of a firearm contrary to s.2(1) of the Firearms Act 1920 and convicted before the magistrates. Section 12(1) of that Act defined a firearm as “any lethal firearm or other weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, or any part thereof.” (in effect a form of “capability” wording). Upholding the conviction, the Divisional Court described the conclusion that the dummy revolver as a whole was part of a firearm as “quite a tenable proposition”, alternatively finding that “[t]he dummy contains everything else necessary for making a revolver except the barrel, and therefore all the other parts of it except those which required to be bored are ‘parts thereof’ within the meaning of the section.” Neither analysis appeared to treat the dummy revolver as a firearm in itself.[46]Cafferata was followed in R v Freeman (1970) 54 Cr App R 251, in which the defendant had been found in possession of a starting pistol, which could be adapted by drilling to fire bullets. The Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for possession of a firearm contrary to s.1(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1968, applying the definition in s.57(1) that a firearm “means a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged and includes — (b) any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon.” The jury had been directed that “an article like this, that can be adapted to fire bullets by drilling the barrel and making some other alterations, is a firearm under the meaning of the Act.” That direction is not wholly clear as to whether the article was a firearm on the basis that it could be adapted to fire bullets, or a component part of such a firearm. However, it was approved. The Court observed:
“It would indeed be unfortunate if an object, which by the use of an electrical drill of a type that can be bought at almost any general store in any High Street can be so easily adapted into a lethal weapon, should not come within section 1(1) of the Act.”
[47]Similar issues came before the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland in Kelly v MacKinnon (1982) SCCR 205, [1983] SLT 9, which reached a different interpretation of the Act. The defendant was in possession of a replica revolver which fired blank cartridges and could easily be converted to fire live ammunition, and a starting pistol which had been altered inter alia by removal of the trigger mechanism and cylinder advance and by blocking the barrel. It too was capable of easy conversion into a weapon capable of being fired. It was held that neither weapon constituted a firearm within the 1968 Act. The Lord Justice-General (Lord Emslie) held that the definition of a firearm was “a lethal barrelled weapon (of any description) from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged” and “a component of a lethal barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged” (emphasis added). He held that:
“A component part of something which is not a lethal weapon cannot, by itself, be a firearm and it is nothing to the point that parts of that which is not a lethal weapon could be stripped therefrom and used in the construction of something which, when completed, would become a lethal weapon. It is nothing to the point either that a part which is a component of an article which, not being a lethal weapon, might in various ways be converted or adapted in order to become such a lethal weapon..”
[48]The suggestion in Cafferata that the dummy revolver as a whole was part of a firearm was described as “manifestly absurd”, and the reasoning in that case strongly criticised in both formulations. Similar criticism was made of R v Freeman,

the Lord Justice stating:

“If an article is not a lethal barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged or a component part of such a weapon it is not a ‘firearm’ for the purposes of the Act. Whether it would be easy or difficult to convert such an article into such a lethal weapon is quite irrelevant and where one is dealing with, let us say, an object which is not a component part of such a lethal weapon but which could be used in the construction of such a lethal weapon, it cannot be seriously suggested that it is, for that reason, a ‘firearm; in its own right, or might be held to be so treating the matter as one of fact and degree.”
[49]There then followed a series of cases concerned with s.5(1)(a) of the 1968 Act which prohibited possession of a weapon “designed or adapted that if pressure is applied to the trigger missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty” (“continuous fire”): a. In R v Jobling [1981] Crim LR 625 (of which no transcript is readily available, but parts of which are set out in R v Clarke (1986) 82 Cr App Rep 308), the defendant was in possession of a Bren gun which had been modified so to prevent it firing when the automatic (as opposed to single shot) mode was selected. It would have taken 45-60 minutes work to return the weapon to a condition for continuous firing. Mr Justice Taylor accepted a submission of no case to answer, holding that the test was whether, assuming its parts to be in working order, the firearm by reason of its design (whether original or modified) or by reason of any adaptation would fire continuously if pressure were applied to the trigger at the time of the alleged offence, holding:
“The relevant time in considering whether the weapon offends against (section 5) is the time of the alleged offence. It is, therefore, insufficient, even if it is not wholly irrelevant, to ask whether the weapon was originally designed to fire continuously. One must ask whether it remains so. The Act does not restrict design to original design. On the other hand I consider counsel for the defence's first question, ‘Does it fire continuously?’ needs qualification. If all that prevents the gun at the relevant time from firing continuously is a temporary fault, such as lack of lubrication or a broken part, it would still be a prohibited weapon. Likewise, if, for example, a piece of wire restricting movement of the trigger, or some other superficial device, was applied so as to prevent normal function. In my judgment the proper test is as follows: assuming its parts to be in working order, would this firearm by reason of its design (whether original or modified) or by reason of any adaptation, fire continuously if pressure were applied to the trigger at the time of the alleged offence?” b. In R v Pannell (1982) 76 Cr App R 53, the defendant was found in possession of the component parts of three 9 mm Stirling carbines originally designed to fire either automatically or one shot at a time. A rod had been inserted into the trigger mechanisms of these weapons with the object of restricting their operation and producing a weapon that would fire only single shots, but it was found that it was possible to fire several shots in succession if pressure could be sustained to hold the trigger in a particular position by “an operation of some delicacy”
. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the defendant was not in possession of a prohibited weapon “designed or adapted” for continuous fire. Eveleigh LJ stated at 55-56:
“The words in the section are descriptive of the kind of firearm which is prohibited. An automatic firearm may jam. It cannot at that moment be fired without an adjustment. It nonetheless remains an automatic firearm. It was then argued that as it was virtually impossible to sustain the appropriate pressure for any substantial period so as to be able to maintain the discharge of missiles for any desired period, the words of the section were not satisfied … The fact that the appropriate pressure is difficult to sustain does not in our opinion make section 5 inapplicable. We think however this matter can be dealt with on a broader basis. It was not the prosecution's case that this weapon was adapted to achieve continuous fire. The case was that it was a firearm designed to achieve continuous fire. In our opinion it clearly was. It had been adapted for the purpose of converting it to a single shot weapon. In our judgment nothing had been done to convert this weapon to one of a different character. It was less efficient as an automatic weapon than it had been but it did not cease to be one designed as such.” c. In R v Clarke (1986) 82 Cr App Rep 308, a firearms dealer had possession of a sub-machine gun designed for continuous fire, but missing a trigger, pivot pin and magazine, and therefore incapable of automatic fire in that state. A firearms specialist had been able to tie a piece of string across the “sear” and round the trigger guard (which took a minute or two) and thereby achieve continuous fire. The expert said that it would have been possible to create a replacement trigger in 20 minutes and two days to manufacture a magazine. The defendant was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon which was “so designed or adapted that, if pressure was applied to the trigger, missiles continued to be discharged until pressure was removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles was empty”, contrary to s.5(1)(a), either on the basis of possession of the prohibited weapon itself or of “any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon”
. The issue of whether a submission of no case to answer should have been rejected by the trial judge went on appeal, and the appeal was dismissed. d. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the s.5(1)(a) required the weapon to be complete at the time of possession such that s.5(1)(a) only applied to a weapon which fired continuously if pressure were applied to the trigger at the time of the alleged offence. The Court also rejected the argument that component parts of an incomplete “continuous fire” weapon did not constitute a firearm. Following Pannell, and disapproving Jobling, the Court of Appeal, agreed that the continuous fire condition was “‘descriptive of the kind of firearm which is prohibited”’ rather than descriptive of an individual weapon at the very time that an accused is alleged to have been in possession of it.” The Court noted at 213-14:
“We do not overlook the possibility that a firearm which is designed or adapted to perform in the manner set out in section 5(1)(a) may cease to be so. Thus, a lethal barrelled weapon might be so damaged or altered whether by accident or design or by the removal of so many components that it was no longer something that could be fairly described as a ‘weapon’. On the other hand, a firearm which is designed or adapted for automatic fire still remains so designed despite the fact that an essential component such as the trigger may be missing.” e. The Court of Appeal went on to consider the alternative “component part” basis of the charge.

(a) ”

. Given the potential importance of this point to this case, it is helpful to explain it in a little more depth. Section 5(1)(a) prohibited possession of “any firearm which is so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty.” Section 57(1)(b) provided that the word “firearm” in s.5(1)(a) included “any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon.” The defendant sought to argue that since the components of the Sterling carbines were not themselves independently capable of continuous fire, it was not possible to commit this offence by the possession of the component alone. The Court of Appeal rejected that construction, holding that reading the two sections together had the following effect:
“A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Secretary of State, he has in his possession … any component part of any firearm which is so designed that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until …” f. A similar issue came before the High Court of Justiciary in Jessop v Stevenson [1988] SLT 223, with the defendant in possession of a Bren gun modified so as to only fire single shots. It would have taken two or three minutes work to restore the gun to automatic fire. The High Court of Judiciary held that the defendant was in possession of a prohibited weapon. The court distinguished the issue before it from that which arose in Mackinnon, because the issue before the court was not whether the article was a firearm (which it clearly was), but whether it was a prohibited weapon. Section 5(1)(a), addressing that issue, was “descriptive of the kind of firearm which is to be subject to the general proposition and not descriptive of any individual weapon at the time it is found to be in the possession of a member of the public.” g. R v Law [1999] Crim LR 837 also involved a firearm designed to be used as a semi-automatic weapon. It had been modified with the intention that it should not be capable of burst fire but could still be so used in the hands of an expert. The issue was whether it was a prohibited weapon within s.5(1A) of the 1968 Act, namely a “firearm which is so designed or adapted that two or more missiles can be successfully discharged without repeated pressure on the trigger” (an amendment to the previous continuous fire wording). The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether it was enough that, as designed, the firearm was capable of burst fire, or whether the prosecution had to prove that the firearm had been designed or adapted with the intention of being used for burst fire. The Court of Appeal upheld the objective construction of the words “designed or adapted.”
The Criminal Law Review commentary criticises the reasoning, suggesting that the same result could have been reached on the basis that the original design had been intended to achieve burst fire, albeit it had been unsuccessfully modified in an attempt to remove that capability. h. Finally, in R v Ashton [2007] EWCA Crim 234, the defendant was found in possession of the gas plug of a decommissioned general purpose machine gun. The gas plug was itself in working order, but there was no evidence as to whether the gun from which it was extracted had or had not been de-activated (which was an exception to the operation of the relevant part of the 1968 Act). The Court of Appeal held that that exception applied “so long as a de-activated weapon remains in its complete state”, but “was not intended to apply to any component part of such a weapon and that must be for the good public policy reason that once a weapon, de-activated or not, is disassembled then the parts which are then made available are capable of being re-assembled into a working weapon” ([7]).[50]In Brown v Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] Lexis Citation 3423, the Divisional Court had to consider s.5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968, which then provided:
“A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Defence Council, he has in his possession, or purchases or acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers – … (b) any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing.”
The defendant was charged with possession of a stun gun, and advanced the defence that the device was not in working order. The fault had not been identified, but there was no evidence that the device had ever worked.[51]The magistrate, the relevant fact-finding body, found that “although the stun gun did not operate anyone with a knowledge of electrical devices might be able to identify the defective component or components and replace them.” On the basis of that finding, the magistrate concluded that the stun gun was a prohibited weapon. There were no findings before the Divisional Court as to how difficult it would have been to effect the necessary repair. On the facts as found, the Divisional Court held that the magistrate had been correct in his legal conclusion. The Court referred to the decision in Clarke, holding that the issue was the purpose of which the stun gun had been “designed or adapted”, rather than whether it was its working state. This section involved the same statutory wording as the continuous fire cases.[52]In R v Bewley [2012] EWCA Crim 1457, the defendant was found in possession of a modified starting pistol, designed to fire blanks, but modified by drilling out part of the barrel off centre. In addition, the top part of the hammer had been broken off. By mounting the weapon in a vice, using a mallet and punch to hammer a pellet through the muzzle, loading a blank cartridge, and using a mallet and punch to strike the firing pin, the weapon had been made to discharge a missile with sufficient force. The defendant was charged with possession of a prohibited firearm contrary to section 5(1)(aba) of the Firearms Act 1968, namely a firearm “less than 60cm long.” To constitute a “firearm”, the pistol had to be “a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged”. The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether this requirement was satisfied.[53]After reviewing the prior authorities, at [15], Moses LJ noted the different wording in issue in the case at hand from that addressed in prior cases:
“The question in the instant appeal is not whether the gun was designed or adapted to discharge a shot, bullet or other missile, as in R v Law , R v Clarke , R v Jobling and R v Pannell but whether it had the capacity to do so. Those cases are of significance in that they teach that the mere fact that only an expert could discharge a missile from the starting pistol does not mean that it did not have the capacity to discharge a missile and thus did not remove it from the scope of the definition in section 57(1)”
. I would interpolate that the issue of the starting pistol’s “capacity” arose from the requirement that “any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged” from the device.[54]At [16], he continued:
“Although section 57(1) uses the present tense, ‘can be discharged’, a weapon may fall within the definition in section 57(1) despite some temporary fault at the time it is in the possession of the accused. Even Taylor J in R v Jobling acknowledged that a mere temporary fault would not preclude the weapon from the prohibition. So did Eveleigh LJ in R v Pannell 76 Cr App R 53 …The very notion of the capacity of a weapon must refer not only to its condition at the time of possession but to its construction and its potential as a means of discharging a missile. But once it is recognised that a gun might fall within the definition of firearm, even if its condition at the time renders it incapable of firing, the question arises as to the extent to which it is permissible to look to possible alterations to the gun from the condition in which it is found in the possession of the accused. If a minor repair is all that is needed, the gun is a firearm. But what if it needs a major conversion, adaptation or repair before it can discharge a missile?”
[55]Moses LJ referred to previous decisions, before the 1982 amendment including Cafferata v Wilson [1936] 3 All ER 149 and R v Freeman [1970] 1 WLR 788), and to the criticism of the reasoning of those decisions in Kelly v MacKinnon (1982) SCCR 205 which he found compelling. While the court would have been bound to follow the English authorities had the statutory scheme remained the same, the court concluded that the amendments effected by the Firearms Act 1982 justified a different conclusion. These had introduced provisions addressing imitation firearms which were “so constructed or adapted as to be readily convertible into a firearm to which section 1 applies”. There was a statutory test in s.1(6) of what “readily convertible” meant, and a statutory defence if the defendant could show that he did not know and had no reason to suspect that an imitation firearm could be readily convertible into a firearm to which section 1 applied. At [28] he stated:
“Accordingly, the principle identified in R v Freeman [1970] 1 WLR 788 is, under the current statutory scheme, no longer of any application. If the item can be easily adapted into a lethal weapon, to adopt Sachs LJ's words (at p 792), with the use of equipment described in section 1(6) of the 1982 Act, then it will, subject to the statutory defence, fall within the 1968 Act. But no conclusion can be reached as to whether an imitation firearm is readily convertible without proper consideration of section 1(6) and, if it is raised, the defence in section 1(5) . Those subsections raise questions of fact which must be resolved. Whether an item falls within section 57(1) should no longer be answered by reference to R v Freeman or to Cafferata v Wilson [1936] 3 All ER 149. Courts should look to the 1982 Act read with the 1968 Act. It would be absurd to allow the prosecution to sidestep the safeguards within the 1982 Act merely by construing firearm as meaning an item which could “easily” be converted into a lethal-barrelled weapon, capable of discharging a missile, in the application of the principle in R v Freeman.”
[56]At [34], the Court of Appeal considered whether the starting pistol could be considered a component part of “such a lethal or prohibited weapon”, even if it was not a lethal or prohibited weapon in itself. This was said to be “an impossible construction”, on the basis that “the definition of firearm cannot include a component part of a lethal-barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can not be discharge … If the starting pistol does not fall within the definition of firearm within section 57(1), no part of it could do so.” Significantly, the court continued:
“We can underline this conclusion by reference to the missing hammer. If the only reason that the starting pistol could not discharge a missile was the absence of the hammer, then it was plainly a firearm. Absent the hammer, a suitably sized ‘ball peen’ hammer could be used to strike the firing pin. If, contrary to our conclusion, a missile could be discharged from the starting pistol if the hammer had been present, then its absence would merely lead to the conclusion that the remaining parts of the pistol were component parts of a lethal or prohibited weapon as defined.”
[57]Ashton was not cited in Bewley, and, as the Law Commission noted in [3.17] of the Consultation Paper, the decisions are not consistent, to the extent that the latter focusses on the functionality of the weapon of which the component part formed part, rather than of the component part itself. The Law Commission recommended reversing this aspect of Bewley, which was duly done in s.57(1D) of the 1968 Act.[58]In R v Hurley [2013] EWCA Crim 1008, the defendant was found in possession of a stun gun, the issue being whether it was “designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing” within the meaning of s.5(1)(b) of the 1968 Act (i.e. the same issue as arose in Brown), the particular issue in that case being the absence of evidence as to the amount of current which the stun gun had been designed or adapted to discharge. The Court of Appeal held that it was sufficient that this was a device designed to discharge electricity. At [13], the Court endorsed the conclusion in Brown that “such a device, even if not working properly because of some unknown fault, is within the prohibited category.”[59]In R v Heddell [2016] EWCA Crim 443, the defendant was found in possession of a replica sub-machine gun, originally manufactured to fire caps. The replica had subsequently been converted in such a way that the removal of a steel bolt, which would take 20-30 seconds, would enable it to fire live rounds. The defence case was that, as seized, the replica was incapable of firing a live round (i.e. raising the issue of whether the replica was “a lethal barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged” in s.57(1) rather than the “designed or adapted” issue raised in the continuous fire cases).[60]The Court of Appeal reviewed Cafferata, Freeman and Bewley dealing with starting pistols which had had features intended to prevent the discharge of missiles which could readily be removed. At [22], the Court held that Bewley had modified the earlier authorities such that a device of this kind would only be a firearm if it “could be converted into a weapon from which a missile could be discharged without any special skill or the necessity for specialist equipment.” At [24], the Court of Appeal stated:
“We do not … read Bewley as affecting the position where an item which already satisfies the definition of a firearm within section 57(1) requires some minor repair or attention before it can be discharged. It seems to us that paragraph 16 of Bewley acknowledges that this is the case.”
[61]The Court distinguished in this regard between a firearm “in the sense that the weapon had already been converted so as to be capable of being fired in its present condition” (albeit some minor repair or attention was required before it can be discharged”) and “something which had started off life as an imitation firearm and which, notwithstanding the work which had been carried out, had not been converted into a firearm and which required further work to turn it into one”. The Court said that the judge was right to leave this issue to the jury.

Conclusion

[62]The issue in this case is whether the receiver which the Defendant was in possession of was “capable of being used as a part of a lethal barrelled weapon or a prohibited weapon”.[63]I am satisfied that on the correct interpretation of s.57(1D), that involves consideration of the use to which the relevant component part can be put (rather than of the item of which it was, or was intended to be, a component part). That reflects the wording in s.57(1D), which was adopted to reverse this aspect of the decision in Bewley and to prefer the conclusion reached in Ashton.[64]However, the language in s.57(1D), with its reference to the “capability” of the component part, rather than the purpose for which the component part was designed or intended, requires the issue to be approached on the same basis as that adopted when determining whether the “can be discharged” requirement of the definition of a “firearm” is satisfied.[65]That involves applying the analysis in R v Heddell [2016] EWCA Crim 443, on which basis if the jury is sure:a. the lower receiver was designed to operate as a component part of a lethal barrelled or prohibited weapon;b. but required some form of repair or attention before it would be capable of being used as part of a lethal barrelled or prohibited weapon; then whether it would constitute a “component part” for s.57(1D) purposes could depend on the jury’s decision as to what was required to effect the repair. Without wishing to define the issue for the moment, where what was required was only a minor repair, the jury could conclude that the capability requirement was satisfied. However, the jury could reach the contrary conclusion where major work was required for the component part to be used as part of a lethal barrelled or prohibited weapon. The precise form of any direction to the jury can be addressed as necessary at some later point.

The “dual use” argument

[66]This part of Mr Glenser KC’s argument involved the suggestion that the lower receiver would not constitute a “component part” of a lethal barrelled or prohibited weapon if the Defendant’s intention in manufacturing it was not to use it for this purpose, but only as a part in the printed version of the “FGC-9” he had produced which was not, and was not intended to be, a functioning firearm or where there was no intention to use it with a barrel of prohibited length. Mr Glenser KC argued that the Defendant’s intention was capable of rendering the lower receiver a “dual use” item.[67]This is a complex issue and I have decided that it is better tackled once the evidence has been heard, rather than in the abstract.