“[RKG] is unable to use and weight relevant information. Despite repeated explanations from obstetric, psychiatric and HIV professionals, she consistently dismisses significant risks to herself and her baby. She continues to advocate for a vaginal or water birth and opposes caesarean section whilst failing to balance these views against the medical consequences of untreated HIV infection and inadequate antenatal care. Her decisions are driven by fixed psychotic beliefs and denial rather than a balanced consideration of risks and benefits. … [RKG] is unable to weigh the benefits of HIV treatment against the risks of non-treatment because she rejects the validity of the HIV diagnosis itself. Her decisions are entirely based on the fixed belief that she does not have HIV. Consequently, she cannot engage in a balanced consideration of treatment options…”
“P’s ability under section 3(1)(c) MCA to use or weigh information relevant to the decision as part of the decision-making process “should not involve a refined analysis of the sort which does not typically inform the decision … made by a person of full capacity”: In re M (An Adult) (Capacity: Consent to Sexual Relations) at para 81. It would also derogate from personal autonomy to require a potentially incapacitous person to undertake a more refined analysis than persons of full capacity.” l. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because she makes an unwise decision: s.1(4). As Peter Jackson J stated in Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust v JB[2014] EWHC 342 (COP) at [7]: “The temptation to base a judgement of a person’s capacity upon whether they seem to have made a good or bad decision, and in particular upon whether they have accepted or rejected medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided. That would be to put the cart before the horse or, expressed another way, to allow the tail of welfare to wag the dog of capacity. Any tendency in this direction risks infringing the rights of that group of persons who, though vulnerable, are capable of making their own decisions. Many who suffer from mental illness are well able to make decisions about their medical treatment, and it is important not to make unjustified assumptions to the contrary.”
“The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.”