“A medication plan should be drawn up by the Local Authority and the Trust, having liaised with B, to address: a) The transition to open medication with A’s consent and how that can be most effectively and safely achieved. b) The imparting of information to A about her pubertal development. c) The imparting of information to A about the risks and benefits of maintenance hormone treatment. d) The imparting of information to A about the use of covert medication. The plan will include consideration of whether, when, where and by whom any such information should be given to A, and the involvement of B in the implementation of the plan given that she now knows of the use of covert medication and expresses a wish to help to encourage A to take the maintenance hormone treatment. By directing that the issues set out above should be addressed I am not, at this stage, directing what the contents of the plan should be.”
“Dr X became quite emotional when he was giving evidence before me. He told me that the likely success of the treatment was 100 percent. There is no failure rate. He told me it transforms a child into a woman. He said it is the basic human right of every girl to blossom into a woman and he found it inconceivable that it should be blocked. He said failure to treat it was unthinkable and it should have been done five years ago.”
“[76] An appointment in the endocrine transition clinic was arranged for A on19 October 2017 . She failed to attend. A further appointment was arranged for21 December 2017 but a phone call shortly before the appointment said that A would be unable to attend because her mother, who had LPA, had an upset stomach. A eventually attended an appointment on 19 April, some six months late, accompanied by her grandmother. The hospital note reads at G13: “Explained to them this difficult and distressing diagnosis. Ovaries have not developed properly and are so tiny as to be barely visible on ultrasound scans. Same for the uterus although, unlike the ovaries, this will grow with treatment. Neither A, nor apparently mum, were bothered by her lack of periods and being home schooled A does not have a peer group of class-mates with whom to compare physical development. She declined pubertal (inaudible) today by Sister J. Reassured that she is at no major excess risk of fracture now. However, in order to develop into a mature woman and, crucially, to avoid getting premature osteoporosis (brittle bone disease) in her 30s and 40s rather than her 70s or 80s, she will need to start oestrogen replacement and continue for four decades. Understandably, she is not delighted by the prospect but we explained the lack of any viable alternative. She elected for oral over patch oestrogen replacement with progesterone deferred until after she has begun to experience vaginal spotting.”
“[45] He noted the comment from numerous professionals as to the difficulties in seeing A individually and that on occasion, B was heard in the background prompting A. He stated: “Obviously, A places great weight on mother’s views. As a child we acknowledge A had a degree of cognitive deficit and because home schooled, had limited exposure to alternative points of view.” [46]. He said, greater than that, the expression of mother’s views by A are such, “...that I believe they profoundly impact upon A’s ability to weigh information with which she is provided, including validity and alternatives” and he gave examples of “doctors in the NHS lie”
“A has significant health needs associated with epilepsy and primary-ovarian failure. She has been resistant to treatment plans, particularly in relation to the latter diagnosis. The aim of the plan is to provide a supportive, engaging environment where A’s understanding of the benefits of treatment and her compliance can be promoted more effectively.”
“(5) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. (6) Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person's rights and freedom of action.”
“4 Best interests (1) In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a person's best interests, the person making the determination must not make it merely on the basis of— (a) the person's age or appearance, or (b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best interests. (2) The person making the determination must consider all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, take the following steps. (3) He must consider— (a) whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity in relation to the matter in question, and (b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be. (4) He must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him. … (6) He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— (a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and (c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. (7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of— (a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on matters of that kind, (b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, … (11) “Relevant circumstances” are those— (a) of which the person making the determination is aware, and (b) which it would be reasonable to regard as relevant.”
"The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or are interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be."
“… the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection (and for that matter the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court relating to people who lack capacity) is limited to decisions that a person is unable to take for himself. It is not to be equated with the jurisdiction of family courts under theChildren Act 1989 , to take children away from their families and place them in the care of a local authority, which then acquires parental responsibility for, and numerous statutory duties towards, those children. There is no such thing as a care order in respect of a person of 18 or over. Nor is the jurisdiction to be equated with the wardship jurisdiction of the High Court. Both may have their historical roots in the ancient powers of the Crown as parens patriae over people who were then termed infants, idiots and the insane. But the Court of Protection does not become the guardian of an adult who lacks capacity and the adult does not become the ward of the court.”
“… the 2005 Act does not contemplate as a norm the conferring of the full gamut of decision-making power, let alone parental responsibility, over an adult who lacks capacity.”
“In other words, it is a decision about what would be best for this particular individual, taking into account, so far as practicable, his individual characteristics, likes and dislikes, values and approach to life.”
“[10] Where a patient lacks capacity it is accordingly of great importance to give proper weight to his wishes and feelings and to his beliefs and values. On behalf of the Trust in this case, Mr Sachdeva QC submitted that the views expressed by a person lacking capacity were in principle entitled to less weight than those of a person with capacity. This is in my view true only to the limited extent that the views of a capacitous person are by definition decisive in relation to any treatment that is being offered to him so that the question of best interests does not arise. However, once incapacity is established so that a best interests decision must be made, there is no theoretical limit to the weight or lack of weight that should be given to the person's wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. In some cases, the conclusion will be that little weight or no weight can be given; in others, very significant weight will be due. [11] This is not an academic issue, but a necessary protection for the rights of people with disabilities. As the Act and the European Convention make clear, a conclusion that a person lacks decision-making capacity is not an "off-switch" for his rights and freedoms. To state the obvious, the wishes and feelings, beliefs and values of people with a mental disability are as important to them as they are to anyone else, and may even be more important. It would therefore be wrong in principle to apply any automatic discount to their point of view.”
“Whilst I entirely agree that some form of balance sheet may be of assistance to judges, its use should be no more than an aide memoire of the key factors and how they match up against each other. If a balance sheet is used it should be a route to judgment and not a substitution for the judgment itself. A key step in any welfare evaluation is the attribution of weight, or lack of it, to each of the relevant considerations; one danger that may arise from setting out all the relevant factors in tabular format, is that the attribution of weight may be lost, with all elements of the table having equal value as in a map without contours.”
“I am bound to say that this is a case where I do not think that a 'balance sheet' approach (see: Re A (Male Sterilisation)[2000] 1 FLR 549 per Thorpe J at §560F-H) is helpful. It does not really accommodate the enormity of the conflicting principles which are conceptually divergent.”
“…. There are times when very severely incapacitated patients can neither consent nor refuse treatment. In these circumstances the College echoes the view of the Law Commission that treatment should be made available to severely incapacitated patients judged according to their best interests and administered in the least restrictive fashion. In exceptional circumstances this may require the administration of medicines within foodstuffs when the patient is not aware that that is being done. … The treatment plan should normally be subject to weekly review initially and if the requirement for covert medication does persist, full reviews at less frequent intervals should take place.”