“[93] First, by including Schedule 3 in the MCA, Parliament authorised a system of recognition and enforcement of foreign orders notwithstanding the fact that the approach of the foreign courts and laws to these issues may be different to that of the domestic court. These differences may extend not only to the way in which the individual is treated but also to questions of jurisprudence and capacity. Thus the fact that there are provisions within the Act that appear to conflict with the laws and procedures of the foreign state should not by itself lead to a refusal to recognise or enforce the foreign order. Given that Parliament has included section 63 and Schedule 3 within the MCA, clearly intending to facilitate recognition and enforcement in such circumstances, it cannot be the case that those other provisions within the Act that seemingly conflict with the laws and procedures of the foreign state are mandatory provisions of the laws of England and Wales so as to justify the English Court refusing to recognise the foreign order on grounds of such inconsistency. In such circumstances, it is only where the Court concludes that recognition of the foreign measure would be manifestly contrary to public policy that the discretionary ground to refuse recognition will arise. Furthermore, in conducting the public policy review, the Court must always bear in mind, in the words of Munby LJ that ‘the test is stringent, the bar is set high’. [94] Secondly, there is likely to be a wide variety in the decisions made under foreign laws that are put forward for recognition under Schedule 3. As the Ministry of Justice has observed, inevitably there may be concerns about some of the foreign jurisdictions from which orders might come. But as the Ministry also observes, taking account of such concerns is surely the purpose of the public policy review. Although no wide-ranging review as to the merits of the foreign measure is either necessary or appropriate, a limited review will always be required as indicated by the European Court in Pellegrini. That will be sufficient to identify any cases where the content and form of the foreign measure, and the processes by which it was taken, are objectionable. It also seems to me that the circumstances in which Schedule 3 is likely to be invoked, and the number of countries whose orders are presented for recognition, are likely to be limited. In oral submissions, Mr Rees pointed out that, in theory, the Court could be faced with applications to recognise and enforce orders from any country in the world, including, for example, North Korea or Iran. That may be right in theory, but common sense suggests it is, to say the least, unlikely in practice, at least in the foreseeable future. And if such orders were to be presented for recognition, the public policy review would surely lead swiftly to identifying grounds on which recognition would be refused. It is much more likely that the orders presented for recognition will be those of foreign countries whose legal systems, laws and procedures are closely aligned to our own. Concerns of this nature can be addressed by admitting evidence of the process by which the foreign protective measures were made and general evidence relating to the legal system of the state that made the order. [95] Thirdly, most orders presented for recognition are likely to be of short duration, and/or in respect of persons whose capacity may fluctuate, and/or who are in receipt of a progressive form of treatment. As a result, in such cases there is likely to be repeated requests to scrutinise a succession of orders. Recognition and enforcement is likely to require close co-operation, not only between the medical and social care authorities of the two countries, but also between the Courts and legal systems. The Convention provides a mechanism using the Central Authorities but, pending ratification of the Convention, there may well be the need for direct communication between judges of the two jurisdictions.”
“[41] It is this cooperative arrangement, at senior court level, characterised by what is described as “an extremely active approach” by the Irish High Court to its wardship jurisdiction, that is identified as the primary safeguard in the protection of the fundamental rights and liberties at stake. I consider that the HSE are both entirely correct and accurate when they identify the very close relationship between all those involved in the care and treatment of Irish adults placed in England and those involved at all levels in the Irish system as fundamental both to the fairness and proportionality of the process. 42. Many of the cases, particularly those concerned with anorexia nervosa, involve circumstances when the professionals are ‘firefighting’. By this I mean they are dealing with an urgent and potentially life threatening situation. Frequently, the contemplated treatment is of relatively limited duration, though 18 months is not uncommon. Additionally, long-term deprivation of liberty and compulsory medical treatment is inherently undesirable. 43. Experience in the Court of Protection makes it easy to contemplate circumstances in which deprivation of liberty and/or medical treatment of some kind might be required on a much longer term basis. In exchanges with Mr Setright, I posited the very real challenges faced by severely autistic adults and their families often requiring long-term intervention. My concern was that there was a risk, with the effluxion of time, that the careful scrutiny afforded by the regime that I have outlined above might become diluted and take on a more routine administrative complexion. Were that to happen it is not difficult to contemplate circumstances developing in ways which might be contrary to an individual’s welfare and human rights. 44. It is self-evident that these cases engageArticle 2 ECHR (right to life); Article 5(4) (right to challenge deprivation of liberty); and Articles 6 and 8 ECHR (rights to ‘an effective procedural possibility, judicial or otherwise, of influencing the course of [non- consensual] treatment or having it reviewed by an independent authority’ (see LM v Slovenia[2014] ECHR 608 at 185)).”