“A report is required pursuant tosection 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 ”
‘On balance, we advise the court that the risks to the patient’s quality of life, contact with support from his family and JMC’s mental health, currently outweigh the possible advantages in moving the patient to currently available alternative accommodation which is substantially further away (Formby, Merseyside). We will continue to review his progress with a view to trying to eventually find a more appropriate residence in the Wirral Area’. 8. On the basis of the above, the parties agreed to conclude the section 21A proceedings, on the basis that the qualifying requirement would be met, subject to further review following additional input and recommendations from the Trust. The final order recorded that: ‘Professor K Wilson’s team intends to continue to work with JMC over the next six months and at the end of this period will be able to provide a more definitive long-term social prognosis (“the further report”). 9. Permission was granted for the ‘further report’ to be disclosed to JMC’s RPR and litigation friend, however no report was subsequently produced. It would appear that further follow up visits did take place following the conclusion of the proceedings, however no substantive recommendations were made and the ‘further report’ envisaged by the order of25 July 2019 , was not produced. JMC was discharged by the Trust on01 April 2020 (my emphasis). 10. Since the last involvement of the Trust, there have been concerns raised by social care professionals that his presentation has markedly deteriorated. JMC’s contact with his family and access to the community was substantially curtailed over the course of the pandemic, and there do not appear to have been any efforts to implement the individualised sort of care plan recommended by Professor Wilson. There have been concerns raised by social care professionals and the Best Interests Assessor that JMC’s willingness to accept personal care has declined substantially, he refuses to shower or wash at the placement, and concerns have been raised by social care professionals that there has been an overall deterioration in his mood and willingness to engage in activities that used to be of interest. Dr Feroze, mental health assessor, also raised concerns as follows:- ‘[JMC] is likely to continue to display issues around poor personal hygiene and resistance to care. He does come across as somewhat blunted and irritable in mood which appears to be a long-standing issue but he is resistant to a change of antidepressant. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the care home staff continue to encourage him to consider a medication change and arrange a review with his GP.’
“In making the section 49 Order the learned Judge erred in law for the following reasons: (a) in the manner in which she considered and applied the relevant factors including those contained inPractice Direction 14E ; and/or (b) by concluding that the information required was within the remit of the Trust and that information from the local authority is not required (save in relation to sexual disinhibition) and by including in the section 49 order a requirement to address adult social care issues including his “care” and his “environment” that fall within the remit of the local authority’s duties and responsibilities arising under theSocial Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act); and/or (c) by concluding that her Order does not require the Trust to provide healthcare services to JMC in circumstances in which it had already decided not to provide and would not have been offered to him had he had mental capacity contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in N v ACCG[2017] UKSC 22 ; and/or (d) in the alternative, not limiting the report to a review by the Trust based on the information already in its possession or control.” (a) in the manner in which she considered and applied the relevant factors including those contained inPractice Direction 14E ; and/or (b) by concluding that the information required was within the remit of the Trust and that information from the local authority is not required (save in relation to sexual disinhibition) and by including in the section 49 order a requirement to address adult social care issues including his “care” and his “environment” that fall within the remit of the local authority’s duties and responsibilities arising under theSocial Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act); and/or (c) by concluding that her Order does not require the Trust to provide healthcare services to JMC in circumstances in which it had already decided not to provide and would not have been offered to him had he had mental capacity contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in N v ACCG[2017] UKSC 22 ; and/or (d) in the alternative, not limiting the report to a review by the Trust based on the information already in its possession or control.”
“Section 49 reports are, paradigmatically, appropriate where the NHS body (typically a Mental Health Trust) has a patient within their care, who is known to them. This ought to enable the clinician to draw quickly on his knowledge of the patient and respond concisely to the identified questions, which will be directed to the issues clearly set out in the Practice Direction. Importantly, it avoids the patient having to meet with a further professional with whom, he or she, has no existing relationship. Instructions under Section 49 should be clearly focused with tight identification of the issues. It should be expected that the reports will be concise and will not require extensive analysis across a wider range of questions than those contemplated in the Practice Direction. Reports requiring that kind of response should be addressed to an independent expert.”
“18. I do have a very wide discretion pursuant to section 49 to call for information from, amongst other people, a local authority or an NHS body dealing with such matters relating to P as the court may direct. I must operate that section firstly, in accordance with the overriding objective of the rules of the Court of Protection … and with regard toPD 14E . The PD lists common factors that I may consider. Many are plainly not relevant to this case but my view is that factors (d), (e) and (g) are ones that I must consider. 19. Very plainly if I do make a direction for section 49 report from an NHS Trust, I am always calling upon their resources in order to prepare that report. In this respect, resources are not just financial. Clinicians will be called upon to spend their time preparing and writing the report. The reality is that, if it is a report about a party with whom they are very familiar with and are engaged in treating, it may reasonably be said that the preparation of the report is less resource intensive that if they have a lesser degree of familiarity. It also seems to be self-evident that an NHS body can only provide a report relating to information which is within their remit. If any information that is required is properly within the remit of the local authority, then fairly self-evidently it is the local authority who should provide that information.”
“3. The following are common factors which the court may consider when deciding whether to order a section 49 report— (a) where P objects to the substantive application or wishes to be heard by the court and does not qualify for legal aid; (b) where it has not been possible to appoint a litigation friend or rule 1.2 representative, including where the court has made a direction under rule 1.2(5); (c) where a party is a litigant in person and does not qualify for legal aid; (d) where the public body has recent knowledge of P; or it is reasonably expected that they have recent knowledge of P; or should have knowledge due to their statutory responsibilities under housing, social and/or health care legislation; (e) the role of the public body is likely to be relevant to the decisions which the court will be asked to make; (f) the application relates to an attorney or deputy and involves the exercise of the functions of the Public Guardian; (g) evidence before the court does not adequately confirm the position regarding P’s capacity or where it is borderline; or if information is required to inform any best interests decision to be made in relation to P by the court.” (a) where P objects to the substantive application or wishes to be heard by the court and does not qualify for legal aid; (b) where it has not been possible to appoint a litigation friend or rule 1.2 representative, including where the court has made a direction under rule 1.2(5); (c) where a party is a litigant in person and does not qualify for legal aid; (d) where the public body has recent knowledge of P; or it is reasonably expected that they have recent knowledge of P; or should have knowledge due to their statutory responsibilities under housing, social and/or health care legislation; (e) the role of the public body is likely to be relevant to the decisions which the court will be asked to make; (f) the application relates to an attorney or deputy and involves the exercise of the functions of the Public Guardian; (g) evidence before the court does not adequately confirm the position regarding P’s capacity or where it is borderline; or if information is required to inform any best interests decision to be made in relation to P by the court.”
“In this case the Trust initially accepted a referral to assess and provide reports in relation to JMC. However, on1 April 2020 it decided to discharge him from their service on clinical grounds. That was a proper decision that was not challenged and could not be challenged other than on public law grounds. Thereafter, JMC has been referred on at least two subsequent occasions but on each occasion the Trust has decided not offer services to him based on proper clinical grounds.”
“Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed … reasons should be read on the assumption that, unless he has demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account. This is particularly true when the matters in question are so well known as those specified in section 25(2) [of theMatrimonial Causes Act 1973 ]. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself.”