"25. As I have said, PWK is a man with multiple disadvantages but who can and does function remarkably well within the constraints of his care package. Dr Rippon was clearly impressed by his abilities to think and express himself in interview, as I was by his ability to handle himself in Court. Yet there is another side to the picture when PWK is overwhelmed by anxiety and speaks and behaves in a way he rapidly comes to regret. That anxiety is often but not always predictable and is liable to affect every part of his life and not just the issue of the moment, whatever that may be. It is the unpredictability of that anxiety and the seriousness and breadth of its impact which is decisive in this case in overturning the legal presumption of capacity. Although in effect is principally in Section 3(1)(c), it does often extend to the earlier matters too. It is, in applying a longitudinal perspective to this, that highlights the incapacity. 26. For the reasons that already appear sufficiently in this judgment, I am satisfied that PWK lacks capacity to conduct these proceedings to determine his residence or care or his contact with other or his management of his own affairs. It is not appropriate for me to give detailed directions under this head under Section 4. It is enough to say that the detailed care package provided underSection 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is, as it seems to me, entirely in his best interests and that is further both proportionate and in his best interests to deprive him of his liberty to the extent implicit in that package. The details are matters to be worked out on the ground on the basis of decisions made in accordance with Section 4 by those responsible for his care."
"51. … to cover occasions when he has 'meltdowns' and is at that point (it is agreed) unable to make capacitous decisions. It seems to me that the outcome of an anticipatory declaration would provide a proper legal framework for the care team, ensuring that any temporary periods of deprivation of liberty are duly authorised and therefore protecting them from civil liability."
"31. … i) The local authority must prove its allegations on the balance of probabilities, no more, no less: Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof),[2009] 1 AC 11 ,[2008] 3 WLR 1 ,[2008] 2 FLR 141 , at paras [2] and [70]. ii) The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the court is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened: Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) , at para [2] per Lord Hoffmann. iii) The more serious or improbable the allegation the greater the need for evidential 'cogency': Re Dellow's Will Trusts; Lloyd's Bank v Institute of Cancer Research[1964] 1 WLR 451 at 455; Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof)[1996] AC 563 ,[1996] 2 WLR 8 ,[1996] 1 FLR 80 ; Re S-B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof),[2010] 1 AC 678 ,[2010] 2 WLR 238 ,[2010] 1 FLR 1161 at para [13]. Evidential cogency is obviously needed where the harmful event is itself disputed. However, where there is no dispute that it happened the improbability of the event is irrelevant: Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) , at paras [72] and [73]. iv) Sometimes the burden of proof will come to the judge's rescue: the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But generally speaking a judge ought to be able to make up his mind where the truth lies without needing to rely upon the burden of proof: Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) at paras [2] and [32]; Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmond and Another: The Popi M[1985] 1 WLR 948 v) It is impermissible for a judge to conclude in the case of a series of improbable causes that the least improbable or least unlikely is nonetheless the cause of the event: Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmond and Another: The Popi M; Ide v ATB Sales Ltd; Lexus Financial Services t/a Toyota Financial Services (UK) plc v Russell[2008] EWCA Civ 424 at para [4]. vi) There is no pseudo-burden or obligation cast on the respondents to come up with alternative explanations: Lancashire County Council v D and E[2010] 2 FLR 196 at paras [36] and [37]; Re C and D (Photographs of Injuries)[2011] 1 FLR 990 , at para [203]. vii) The assessment of credibility generally involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour' which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. With every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. The human capacity for honestly believing something which bears no relation to what actually happened is unlimited. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance: Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis[1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403 , per Lord Pearce; A County Council v M and F[2011] EWHC 1804 (Fam) [2012] 2 FLR 939 at paras [29] and [30]."
"Local Authority take you because you're Muslim" "they put evil in your head" "you saying your body is yours, where you get it from?" "your body comes from mama and dad" "your body is not yours, Local Authority is criminal number one"