“Bysection 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 Parliament made special provision regarding freedom of expression. It provides that when considering whether to grant relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression, the court must have particular regard to the importance of the right. The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions in the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd[2004] 2 AC 457 . For present purposes the decision of the House on the facts of Campbell and the difference between the majority and the minority are not material. What does, however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test….”
“Lord Hoffmann's formulation was adopted by Lord Hope of Craighead in In re British Broadcasting Corpn[2010] 1 AC 145 , para 17. Since “neither article has as such precedence over the other” (In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication)[2005] 1 AC 593 , 603, para 17, per Lord Steyn), the weight to be attached to the rival interests under articles 8 and 10 —and so the interest which is to prevail in any competition—will depend on the facts of the particular case. In this connection it should be borne in mind that—picking up the terminology used in the Von Hannover case 40 EHRR 1—the European court has suggested that, where the publication concerns a question “of general interest”, article 10(2) scarcely leaves any room for restrictions on freedom of expression: Petrina v Romania (Application No 78060/01) given14 October 2008 , para 40.”
“jurisdictions dealing with detention, care and treatment of people with mental disorders and disabilities, the starting point is usually privacy and always anonymity, although either or both may be relaxed.”
“The Practice DirectionPD4C sets out the factors to consider when the court is deciding to hold a public hearing. These are: (a) In this regard, the evidence before the court confirms that P is a vulnerable adult. Previous placements have broken down and the difficulties, in the event that this placement broke down, would be significant in terms of identifying an alternative placement. P himself appears to have no ability to control the information which may lead to reprisals against him. He reveals information to others about his offences. To the extent that P’s welfare (in its widest possible sense) would be compromised by a public hearing, there is evidence to support the concern that P’s welfare could be compromised. There is accordingly a need to protect P as a party to the proceedings. (b) The Official Solicitor agrees that there is a risk that the evidence in the case could be reported in a sensationalist way given P’s sexual interest in children and his fetishism surrounding urination. However, that risk can be reduced with appropriate orders in relation to what can be reported. Furthermore, the court should have confidence that accredited media organisations will report the proceedings in a responsible way. (c) In these proceedings, District Judge Davies gave a judgment which resulted in the proceedings being heard in private. Furthermore, previous hearings have been in private. (d) This application will be heard either at the Royal Courts of Justice (or any other main court centre). The majority of Court of Protection hearings before Tier 3 judges have appropriate facilities to allow the general public to access the hearing. (e) A Local Authority asserts that there is a risk of disruption if the public have access to the hearing. The subject matter of the application may cause an adverse reaction from persons attending. The Official Solicitor submits that there is a risk of disruption to the proceedings but the nature of this risk cannot be predicted at this stage. Members of the public who have a genuine interest in the work of the Court of Protection are unlikely to be disruptive during the course of the hearing. However, members of the public who for example could be part of a vigilante group or family members of P’s victims are more likely to be disruptive during the course of the hearing. In the absence of any evidence as to whether there would be disruption, this is speculative at this stage. Furthermore, if such disruption occurred the court would have the power to remove persons from the court.”