“But in my view, when the magnetic factors engage the fundamental and intensely personal competing principles of the sanctity of life and of self-determination which an individual with capacity can lawfully resolve and determine by giving or refusing consent to available treatment regimes: (i) the decision maker and so the judge must be wary of giving weight to what he thinks is prudent or what he would want for himself or his family, or what he thinks most people would or should want, and (ii) if the decision that P would have made, and so their wishes on such an intensely personal issue can be ascertained with sufficient certainty it should generally prevail over the very strong presumption in favour of preserving life.” (i) the decision maker and so the judge must be wary of giving weight to what he thinks is prudent or what he would want for himself or his family, or what he thinks most people would or should want, and (ii) if the decision that P would have made, and so their wishes on such an intensely personal issue can be ascertained with sufficient certainty it should generally prevail over the very strong presumption in favour of preserving life.”
“In a case such as the present one, reference should be made, in examining a possible violation of Article 2, toArticle 8 of the Convention and to the right to respect for private life and the notion of personal autonomy which it encompasses. In Pretty the Court was not prepared to exclude that preventing the applicant by law from exercising her choice to avoid what she considered would be an undignified and distressing end to her life constituted an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed underArticle 8 of the Convention . In Haas it asserted that an individual’s right to decide in which way and at which time his or her life should end was one of the aspects of the right to respect for private life.”