“The authorised officer of the London Borough of Waltham Forest was originally minded to take on the role of deputy for Sybil. However, in light of significant demand pressures, limited staffing resources within the section, and the complexity of the evidence submitted by the Public Guardian, the authorised officer has made the decision to withdraw the agreement to act.”
“I was the person who first wrote to the OPG with concerns over (a) the LPAs, (b) the ‘will’, (c) the ‘trust deed’ which my brother Ray holds regarding our mother’s affairs. My concerns are that the proper procedures were not observed in obtaining them. I am requesting my niece Fatima assumes control of our mother’s affairs.”
“I would like the LPA in favour of my uncle Ray to be revoked and I to replace him instead of the proposed Waltham Forest Council. I would like the court to review my uncle’s acquisition of the leasehold of [the property in Walthamstow] from my grandmother. I would like the court to review the will dated17th July 2008 as I believe she lacked capacity to understand what she was signing.”
“Subsection (4) applies if the court is satisfied - (a) …. (b) that the donee (or, if more than one, any of them) of a lasting power of attorney – (i) has behaved, or is behaving, in a way that contravenes his authority or is not in P’s best interests, or (ii) proposes to behave in a way that would contravene his authority or would not be in P’s best interests.” (a) …. (b) that the donee (or, if more than one, any of them) of a lasting power of attorney – (i) has behaved, or is behaving, in a way that contravenes his authority or is not in P’s best interests, or (ii) proposes to behave in a way that would contravene his authority or would not be in P’s best interests.”
“The court may – (a) … (b) if P lacks capacity to do so, revoke the instrument or the lasting power of attorney.” (a) … (b) if P lacks capacity to do so, revoke the instrument or the lasting power of attorney.”
“Deputies for personal welfare decisions will only be required in the most difficult cases where: (a) important and necessary actions cannot be carried out without the court’s authority, or (b) there is no other way of settling the matter in the best interests of the person who lacks capacity to make particular welfare decisions.”
“[56]. The vast majority of decisions about incapacitated adults are taken by carers and others without any formal general authority. That was the position prior to the passing of the MCA under the principle of necessity: see Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)[1990] 2 AC1 , and in particular the speech of Lord Goff of Chieveley. In passing the MCA, Parliament ultimately rejected the Law Commission’s proposal of a statutory general authority and opted for the same approach as under the previous law by creating in section 5 a statutory defence to protect all persons who carry out acts in connection with the care or treatment of an incapacitated adult, provided they reasonably believe that it will be in that person’s best interests for the act to be done. Crucially, however, all persons who provide such care and treatment are expected to look to the Code. Certain categories of person are required by the statute, under section 42(4), to have regard to the Code (for example, anybody acting in relation to the incapacitated person in a professional capacity). In addition, however, as the Code itself makes clear, the Act applies more generally to everyone who looks after incapacitated persons, including family carers. Although not legally required to have regard to the Code, the Code itself stipulates that they should follow the guidance contained therein insofar as they are aware of it. [57]. The Act and Code are therefore constructed on the basis that the vast majority of decisions concerning incapacitated adults are taken informally and collaboratively by individuals or groups of people consulting and working together. It is emphatically not part of the scheme underpinning the Act that there should be one individual who as a matter of course is given a special legal status to make decisions about incapacitated persons. Experience has shown that working together is the best policy to ensure that incapacitated adults such as E receive the highest quality of care. This case is an example of what can go wrong when people do not work together.”
“It is axiomatic that the family is the cornerstone of our society and a person who lacks capacity should wherever possible be cared for by members of his natural family, provided that such a course is in his best interests and assuming that they are able and willing to take on what is often an enormous and challenging task. That does not, however, justify the appointment of family members as deputies simply because they are able and willing to serve in that capacity. The words of section 16(4) are clear. They do not permit the court to appoint deputies simply because “it feels confident it can” but only when satisfied that the circumstances and the decisions which will fall to be taken will be more appropriately taken by a deputy or deputies rather than by a court, bearing in mind the principle that decisions by the courts are to be preferred to decisions by deputies. Even then, the appointment must be as limited in scope and duration as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances. It would be a misreading of the structure and policy of the statute, and a misunderstanding of the concept and role of deputies, to think it necessary to appoint family members to that position in order to enable them better to fulfil their role as carers for P.”
“The applicant seeks an order undersection 22(4)(b) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 directing: (1) The revocation of the registered LPAs made by Sybil on23 April 2008 and registered on23 September 2008 and26 January 2009 . (2) Should the court decide to remove the attorney, the court is asked to consider appointing London Borough of Waltham Forest Council as deputy to manage the property and financial affairs of Sybil.” order: (a) reciting the fact that Waltham Forest Council was not prepared to act as Sybil’s deputy and that it had suggested that a panel deputy be appointed instead; (b) joining Fatima and Karl as parties to the proceedings as the second and third respondents respectively; (c) requiring an officer of the court to send the Public Guardian copies of the respondents’ acknowledgments of service and witness statements: (d) requiring the Public Guardian to respond by 20 November; (e) giving the respondents a final opportunity to file and serve any further evidence or submissions by 4 December; and (f) listing the matter for hearing on10 December 2015 . David Richards’ witness statement for the Public Guardian