Ashley Peters v Mary Joseph [2026] EWCC 52

Case No J10CL421[2026] EWCC 52IN THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURTCourt 55Thomas More BuildingVenue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondon WC2A 2LLDate 21/08/2026
Before
HER HONOUR JUDGE EVANS-GORDON
Between
ASHLEY PETERSClaimantMARY JOSEPHDefendant
Mr Ben Waistell (instructed by Paris Smith Solicitors) for ClaimantThe Defendant in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 10 th& 21 st August 2026
JUDGMENTHer Honour Judge Evans-Gordon:
[1]This judgment follows the sentencing hearing consequent upon findings of contempt made by me against the Defendant in my judgment of 24 April 2026. The Claimant is Ashley Peters (“Mr Peters”), he is the son of the Defendant, Mary Joseph (“Ms Joseph”). I made an order following the hearing with brief oral reasons and indicated that I would provide my written reasons at a later date.[2]In a judgment dated 24 April 2024, I found that Ms Joseph was in deliberate breach of undertakings given to the court, initially on 24 June 2022 and renewed on 29 July 2024, following the trial of this claim which relates to the beneficial ownership of the property known as 1 Cicely Road, London SE15 5HW (“the property”), a home shared by both parties at the time the undertakings were given. The relevant undertakings were i) not to interfere with Mr Peters’ occupation of the property, ii) and not to change the locks on that property. On 4th October 2024, Ms Joseph changed the locks on the property and excluded Mr Peters from occupation. On the morning of the sentencing hearing Mr Peters was still excluded from the property, notwithstanding my findings of contempt and the refusal of Mr Justice Edwin Johnson, on 14 July 2026, to release Ms Joseph from those undertakings pending the conclusion of the re-trial of the case. For reasons that are not clear to me, Mr Justice Edwin Johnson’s Order referred only to undertakings given in 2022 and not those given in 2024.

Representation

[3]Representation As previously, Mr Waistell appeared for Mr Peters and Ms Joseph appeared in person. I am grateful to both for the moderate way in which they approached the issues and for the agreement as to the applicable legal principles.

Materials considered

[4]Materials considered I have re-read my judgment and the order made by Mr Justice Edwin Johnson following his written judgment allowing Mr Peters’ appeal against the decision of Recorder Eaton-Turner following trial. While I have also read Mr Justice Edwin Johnson’s judgment, it is not relevant to the matters with which I am concerned. I have also read both party’s skeleton arguments and several letters written by third parties and submitted by Ms Joseph in relation to her previous good character.

The law

[5]The law The relevant, agreed, legal principles are as follow: i) “1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council’s Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender’s culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused. 2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty. 3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt. 4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters. 5. Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children of vulnerable adults in their care. 6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea. 7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually, the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor’s care, may justify suspension.” (Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15; [2022] 4 WLR 103 (“Crossland”) at ¶44) ii) Breach of a court order or undertaking will always be a serious matter, typically meriting a substantial custodial sentence because it undermines the administration of justice (COPA v Wright [2024] EWHC 3316 (Ch); Navigator Equities Limited v Deripaska [2021] EWCA Civ 1799; McKendrick v The Financial Conduct Authority [2019] EWCA Civ 524); iii) As indicated in Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Hussain [2022] EWCA Civ 1264) (“Business Mortgage Finance”), the court, in sentencing for contempt, must consider the following checklist of aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the seriousness of the contempt:
“(a) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy; (b) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; (c) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; (d) the degree of culpability; (e) whether the contemnor has been placed in breach of the order by reason of the conduct of others; (f) whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the deliberate breach; (g) whether the contemnor has co-operated; (h) whether there has been any acceptance of responsibility, any apology, any remorse or any reasonable excuse put forward.”; iv) Pursuant to the guidance given in Business Mortgage Finance, the court must also consider the following matters: “(2) Sentences / sanctions are fact specific. (3) The Court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders and first-time offenders, out of prison... (6) Committal to prison may serve two distinct purposes: (a) punishment of past contempt and (b) securing compliance: see Lightfoot v Lightfoot [1989] 1 FLR 414 at 414–417 (Lord Donaldson MR). (7) It is good practice for the Court’s sentence to include elements of both purposes (punishment and compliance) to make clear what period of committal is regarded as appropriate for punishment alone, i.e. what period would be regarded as just if the contemnor were promptly to comply with the order in question: see JSC Bank v Soldochenko(No 2) [2012] 1 WLR 350. (8) Committal may be suspended: see CPR Part 81.9(2). Suspension may be appropriate: (a) as a first step with a view to securing compliance with the Court’s orders: see Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 at 2381; and (b) in view of cogent personal mitigation: see Templeton Insurance Ltd v Thomas [2013] EWCA Civ 35.”

Discussion and decision

[6]As is apparent from the foregoing, Ms Joseph complied with her undertakings for c.2 years and 4 months. Following the trial, on 29 July 2024, Ms Joseph renewed her undertakings, pending an appeal. She was reminded of those undertakings and their ongoing force in an email written to her by Mr Peters’ solicitors sent on 28 August 2024. Video evidence relating to the occasion when the locks on the property were changed and Mr Peters was excluded from the property show Ms Joseph being reminded that her actions were a breach of her undertakings but Ms Joseph’s response was “I don’t care” and excused her actions on the grounds that “We are not safe”.[7]To be fair to her, Ms Joseph has always accepted that her actions constituted a breach of her undertakings and that she knew that to be the case. Her defence was of the nature of necessity because, she alleged, Mr Peters and his visitors posed a threat to her and her daughter. On 31 March 2026, the date on which Mr Justice Edwin Johnson handed down his judgment on the appeal, Ms Joseph knew that Mr Peters’ appeal had been granted therefore the case had not been finalised and her undertakings continued. In my judgment of 24 April 2026, I rejected the defence of necessity. At that point Ms Joseph knew she was in continuing breach of her undertakings. She did not readmit Mr Peters to the property or provide him with keys.[8]At a hearing before Mr Justice Edwin Johnson on 14 July 2026, Ms Joseph made an oral application to discharge her undertakings. That application was refused (save in respect of one, irrelevant undertaking). Mr Justice Edwin Johnson, as recorded on the face of his Order of 14 July 2026, informed Ms Joseph that she was still bound by her undertakings which he appended to his Order in a schedule so there could be no doubt as to what they were.[9]Regretfully, Ms Joseph did not comply with her undertakings after that hearing. Further, she had not complied even as the sentencing hearing before me opened. Despite the contents of her skeleton argument, Ms Joseph again sought to be discharged from her undertakings and, initially, indicated that she would not permit Mr Peters to reoccupy the property. It was not until I made it clear that she was likely to receive an immediate term of imprisonment to achieve compliance that she agreed to readmit Mr Peters and provide him with all necessary keys. I adjourned the hearing to later in the day to permit Ms Joseph to obtain and provide keys to Mr Peters. The keys to the front and back doors of the property were provided to Mr Peters at court. It was not possible to provide the key to Mr Peters’ room to him at court as it was held by a third person but I was assured that it would be available to him by 12 noon on the following day.[10]Ms Joseph’s breaches of her undertakings are very serious, as she accepted. She has been in breach for approximately 1 year and 10 months. She continued to breach her undertakings even after my judgment and after a High Court Judge informed her that she was still bound by them. But for the threat of immediate imprisonment, Ms Joseph would still be in breach. Her actions have caused harm in that Mr Peters has been excluded from his home of very many years and has been put to the expense of renting accommodation. She has not acted under any pressure. Ms Joseph’s actions were deliberate, as she herself accepts. She is fully culpable for her actions and has not been placed in breach of her undertakings by anyone other than herself.[11]While Ms Joseph ostensibly acknowledged the seriousness of her breaches, it does not seem to me that she truly understood how serious the matter was. Her apologies, without compliance and while stating that she would not comply, were either very hollow and cynical or indicated a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of her position. It was not until Ms Joseph thought she would go to prison that compliance was achieved. Her reaction when she, mistakenly, believed an immediate sentence of imprisonment was being imposed suggests that she had not appreciated that imprisonment could be an outcome and thus not appreciated the seriousness of her conduct. In the sense that she has fully engaged with the contempt proceedings, Ms Joseph has co-operated although there has been a marked lack of co-operation in relation to compliance. There has been no early admission of the contempt.[12]In light of the above, it seems to me that, absent any good reason for not sending Ms Joseph to prison immediately or other mitigating factor, an immediate sentence of imprisonment should be imposed by way of punishment for the contempt to date together with a further suspended sentence to achieve committal. This is because of the deliberate nature of the breach, the lack of a reasonable excuse, the degree of culpability and the failure to comply even after the judgments of 31 March 2026, 24 April 2026 and the Order of 14 July 2026.[13]However, I must consider other factors or matters as well, in accordance with the guidance given in both Crossland and Business Mortgage Finance. In this case those other matters are whether a fine might be a sufficient penalty, at least in relation to the punishment element of the sentence; the desirability of keeping offenders, particularly first-time offenders, out of prison; Ms Joseph’s previous good character; and her caring responsibilities for her elderly mother in Nigeria.[14]In light of the desirability of keeping first time offenders out of prison and Ms Joseph’s previous good character together with her need to go to Nigeria from time to time to provide care for her elderly mother, it seems to me that a fine would be a sufficient penalty to impose on her in relation to the punishment aspect of her contempt sentence, notwithstanding the seriousness of the contempt. I heard evidence of her caring responsibilities during the trial of this application, and it was common ground that Ms Joseph would spend extended periods in Nigeria. Indeed, Ms Joseph was in Nigeria between sometime in March and sometime in April 2026 for this purpose when she was unable to attend the hand down of the judgements of 31 March and 24 April. It would be wrong to impose a hardship on Ms Joseph’s mother unless absolutely necessary. That Ms Joseph was of previous good character was not contradicted on behalf of Mr Peters. Further, on the peculiar facts of this case, these parties would have to continue to occupy the property together following Ms Joseph’s release after serving half her sentence as it is unlikely that the trial of this matter will be reheard within the next few months. I cannot see how imposing an immediate custodial sentence will assist, at least a civil relationship, within this family, when three of them must live together.[15]Given the seriousness of the contempt, a fine of £1,500 is the appropriate penalty by way of punishment. I have no reason to believe that such a sum is disproportionate in light of Ms Joseph’s resources. Despite inviting me, in her skeleton argument, to impose a fine rather than a prison sentence, she produced no evidence as to her resources. I do know that she owns a flat which she rents out and that she travels to Nigeria on a regular basis therefore it is hard to see how such a fine could be disproportionate. In any event, there is no reliance on any Convention right therefore the question of proportionality in relation to the breach or the right that is being protected does not arise.[16]There remains, however, the compliance aspect of the sentence. It seems to me and Mr Waistell accepted, it is open to me to combine a fine and a suspended sentence, the former by way of punishment and the latter to secure compliance although I must be careful not to impose a double penalty (see Phonographic Performance Ltd v Ellis (T/A BLA BLA BAR) [2018] EWCA 2812; Cuciurran v Secretary of State for Transport [2022] EWCA Civ 1519). Unusual though it may be, in my view this case is one in which such an approach will achieve the objects of sentencing proportionately and appropriately by way of punishment.[17]As at the date of the hearing, Mr Peters was still excluded from the property. While Ms Joseph produced and handed over 2 of the 3 required keys, the third was still outstanding. Further, Ms Joseph’s history of non-compliance was long and persisted even when she knew she was a) in contempt and b) still obliged to comply with her undertakings. For these reasons, in my judgment, there is a requirement to impose a suspended sentence to ensure not just compliance by re-admitting Mr Peters to the property but also to ensure ongoing compliance thereafter. If Ms Joseph does not remedy her breach or repeats it, an immediate committal is almost inevitable.[18]Mr Waistell submitted that a term of 6 months in relation to the compliance aspect of the sentence would be appropriate, and I agree. He submitted that I should suspend it until the conclusion of these proceedings. I am not willing to impose such an open-ended order and am of the view that a period of 12 months is appropriate. This is a significant period which should result in the parties reaching some sort of enduring modus vivendi. As the parties have agreed that neither party will grant any tenancies of any part of the property pending the final determination of these proceedings, the primary causes of the previous breaches should not arise again.