Plymouth Community Homes Limited v Lee Hammond [2026] EWCC 27

[2026] EWCC 27Case No M00PL716
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT PLYMOUTH
Date 5 May 2026
Plymouth Combined Court
The Law Courts
Armada Way
Plymouth
Before
District Judge James
Between
Plymouth Community Homes LimitedClaimantMr Lee HammondDefendant
Mr Bramwell appeared for ClaimantThe Defendant did not attendHearing Hearing date: 21 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down on 5 May 2026 and by release to the National Archives

District Judge James:

[1]In this case I am concerned with an application by Plymouth Community Homes Limited (‘the Claimant’) to enforce an access injunction that I made on 6 January 2026 against Mr Hammond (‘the Defendant’) in respect of residential premises let by the Claimant to the Defendant pursuant to an assured tenancy that began on 17 June 2013 (‘the Property’). The circumstances of this particular case are that the Claimant seeks access for the purpose of completing the electrical inspection and service that is overdue, checking the smoke alarms and for the annual legionella cylinder service. There is evidence in support of this application in a witness statement of Tania Cuxton dated 2 February 2026, which sets out that despite the granting of the injunction, the Defendant has denied the Claimant access to the Property on 16 January 2026 and 23 January 2026.[2]In its oral submissions at the hearing before me on 21 April 2026 the Claimant explained that primarily and principally it relies upon rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules as the basis for making its application. However, in both its written application and written submissions reference is made to amending the original injunction order, which I consider risks conflating the two distinct stages of the process, but raises a secondary issue that I shall therefore consider as well. The Defendant has not engaged with these proceedings, nor did he attend the hearing on 21 April 2026, but notwithstanding our adversarial system this does not mean the application is straightforward. This is because the question arises as to whether or not the court has the power to make the order sought by the Claimant. This issue is one on which there are conflicting decisions at County Court level, no higher court decision, and disagreement amongst legal practitioners and commentators. Those are in the context of gas safety inspections, whereas I am dealing with electrical and other safety checks, but the essential legal principles in both scenarios are the same.[3]On first consideration the answer to whether an order in favour of the Claimant should be made might seem obvious. The Claimant, a social landlord, is simply seeking access to carry out essential safety inspections and/or work in order to ensure the Defendant, their tenant, and his neighbours, are safe. However, the court can only make an order if the power to do so exists, and as was explained in Barker v Barker (1828) 3 Car. & P. 558, a landlord entering premises to carry out repairs without permission or an entitlement to do so commits a trespass no matter how absurd the objection of the tenant. Furthermore, as anyone with experience in this field of law knows a tenant may be denying access because of a vulnerability or mental health condition such as a hoarding disorder or depression giving rise to a risk of harm, as opposed to deliberately refusing their landlord entry.[4]The application therefore requires more detailed consideration notwithstanding the Defendant’s absence and in doing so I shall address:(i) The common law position;(ii) The injunction; and(iii) Rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules.

The Common Law Position

[5]DJ Cridge in his learned and comprehensive judgment in Southern Housing v Emmanuel [2025] EWCC 58 (‘Emmanuel’) undertook a detailed analysis of the common law on route to his conclusion that the court does not have the power to make an order of the kind sought by the Claimant in the present application. His decision is not binding on me (as with any County Court level decision), but it is persuasive, and if I am to decide this application differently it seems to me important that I should explain where my view differs.[6]The two principal authorities referred to in Emmanuel were Southam v Smout [1963] 1 WLR 606 (‘Southam’) and Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446 (‘Morris’), which concerned the powers of bailiffs (in the first case) and a police officer (in the second) acting or believing themselves to be acting under statutory authority to enter the homes of individuals who were communicating that those seeking to enter had no permission to do so and were trespassers. In Southam Lord Denning MR explains that everyone’s home is their castle and fortress that no one, including the King of England, may enter without justification at law. He goes on to explain that there is a distinction between opening a door by turning a handle, lifting a latch or pushing it open and forcing a door that was locked, bolted or barred and decided that the bailiff in knocking the door whereupon it fell open was not acting unlawfully. In Morris the House of Lords held that a police officer was not acting lawfully when he ignored the homeowner’s statement, communicated through his son, that the officer was trespassing, and proceeded upstairs to request a breath specimen. Lord Diplock explained that if Parliament intends to authorise the doing of an act, which constitutes a tort (trespass), it requires an express provision in the statute and in the absence of such a provision the presumption is that Parliament did not intend to authorise tortious conduct.[7]These two case, being decisions of the Court of Appeal (Southam) and the House of Lords (Morris), are binding on me, but in respectful disagreement with DJ Cridge I do not consider that they provide the answer in the case of access injunctions where the landlord is exercising its contractual rights set out in the tenancy agreement, as distinct from considering whether an official is acting within its statutory powers or not.[8]In the present case, the Claimant, similarly to other social landlords in these types of case, relies on the express terms of the tenancy agreement. I was referred to only clause 6 of section 3 of the Defendant’s tenancy agreement, however, it is important to consider this in the context of the tenancy agreement as a whole. In my opinion, the following are relevant: (i) Section 2 – The Landlord’s Obligations, specifically clause 2, which reads:
“Tenant’s right to occupy Not to interrupt or interfere with your right peacefully to occupy your home except where: 2.1 access is required subject to reasonable notice, to inspect the condition of your home or to carry out repairs or other works to your home or adjoining property, or 2.2 we are entitled to possession at the end of the tenancy.” (ii) Section 3 – The Tenant’s Obligations and clause 6, which states: “Giving us AccessTo allow our employees or contractors acting on our behalf access at reasonable times and subject to reasonable notice to inspect the condition of your home or any installations or to carry out repairs or other works to your home or adjoining property (we will normally give at least 24 hours notice but more immediate access may be required in an emergency). Also, when ending your tenancy, to allow access in accordance with condition 21.2 below.” (iii) Section 4 – Tenant’s Rights and in particular clause 1.1: “Right to Occupy You have the right to occupy your home without interruption or interference from us or interference from us for the duration of this tenancy (except for the obligation contained in this tenancy agreement to give access to our employees or contractors).”
[9]In addition to these terms, there are also statutorily implied terms, which are: (a) A term implied by section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 as follows:
“In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair.” and (b) A term implied by section 16 of the Housing Act 1988, which states: “It shall be an implied term of every assured tenancy that the tenant shall afford to the landlord access to the dwelling-house let on the tenancy and all reasonable facilities for executing therein any repairs which the landlord is entitled to execute.”
[10]Properly understood therefore, the tenant has exclusive possession of the property (an essential component of a tenancy) and the right to quiet enjoyment of the property. However, these are subject to any terms of the tenancy that the tenant freely agrees to enter into in the tenancy agreement or that are implied by law. Moreover, a right of entry and access does not offend against exclusive possession because a landlord exercising such rights is not taking or even seeking to share possession. It follows from this that a landlord exercising its rights is not a trespasser but instead exercising its rights granted to it by the tenant and/or law, provided it acts within the confines of those rights.[11]The question then arises of whether or not the landlord is acting within the scope of its rights and how this fits with the tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment. This is a particularly relevant consideration in access injunction cases because the landlord seeks to force entry. In this case the Claimant contends for an order that:
“…the Claimant, its agents, or contractors, or the Police, may force entry to the Property and by any other way and carry out the inspection, safety checks and works to the Property.”
[12]The correct legal approach to these potentially conflicting rights is firstly one of construction, with the Court of Appeal explaining in Goldmile v Lechouritis [2003] 2 P. & C. R. 1 (‘Goldmile’) that:
“It is axiomatic that where the provisions of any contract, including a lease, come into conflict, they are to be interpreted and applied so as to give proper effect, if possible, to both of them.”
Secondly, where the covenants are pulling in different directions such as the right to quiet enjoyment and the right of the landlord to carry out works the question is whether the landlord is taking all reasonable steps to minimise the disturbance to the tenant (see Goldmile, applied in Timothy Taylor v Mayfair House Corp [2016] EWHC 1075; Blue Manchester v North West Ground Rents [2019] EWHC 142; and London Kendall Street No. 3 v Daejan Investments [2019] L. & T. R.).[13]Applying these to this access case, the terms that I am concerned with, as is commonly the case, expressly provide that the right to quiet enjoyment is subject to the right of access, and even if this were not the case the right to quiet enjoyment is for the Property as demised, which demise includes the landlord’s right to access. On a correct construction, the Claimant is therefore entitled to access for the purposes provided for in the express and implied terms notwithstanding that this, on an absolutist interpretation, involves some interference with the Defendant’s right to quiet enjoyment. Turning then to the extent of that interference, in the context of the Claimant having:(i) Sought access complying with the terms of the tenancy agreement and giving the required notice;(ii) Having obtained an injunction and again sought access giving the required notice and in accordance with both the tenancy agreement and the injunction;(iii) Seeking to enforce entry not by committal, a draconian course of action, or by bringing possession proceedings for breach of tenancy, but by this route; and(iv) Which if granted will involve the Claimant again giving the Defendant another opportunity first to give access before this is compelled, I find it difficult to see how this could be considered anything other than taking all reasonable steps to minimise the interference with or disturbance of the Defendant’s rights. Forcing or changing the locks in the event of continued denial of access involves an additional level of interference, but provided the Property is left secure, and if the locks are changed the Claimant ensures that the Defendant is provided with a key to the new locks at no charge and without delay, I do not consider that this would be unreasonable either, when considered in the context of the stages just discussed. Conceivably, there may be cases in which it might not be reasonable for a landlord to force or change the locks on the particular facts, such as where a tenant were vulnerable and doing so presented a risk of harm to the tenant or those attending the property. In this case I required details of any vulnerabilities of the Defendant and a risk assessment to be completed by the Claimant which it complied with by completing a proportionality assessment dated 23 April 2026. This evidence does not disclose any relevant vulnerabilities or disabilities and therefore at common law I am satisfied that the Claimant is entitled to the access it seeks, save that I am not persuaded that the inclusion of “by any other way”, as sought, is justified, and would risk giving the landlord licence to take steps that I have not considered.

The Injunction

[14]It might be thought that in light of my conclusions on the first issue that there is no need for the Claimant to rely on rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules and instead the secondary case that they appear to advance in writing of amending the injunction would suffice. However, I reject this aspect of the application of the Claimant (in so far as it is being pursued) on the ground that I do not consider that I have the power to make such an order as an injunction, or absent reliance on rule 70.2A.[15]The glossary to the Civil Procedure Rules describes an injunction as “A court order prohibiting a person from doing something or requiring a person to do something”. Whilst rule 2.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules makes it clear that this is a guide to the meaning of the word, and the editors of Gee on Commercial Injunctions (7th Edition [1-006]) explain that not all orders requiring someone to do something are injunctions, in my view it encapsulates the fundamental essence and purpose of an injunction. Applying this to the order being sought by the Claimant, what I am being asked to do in the event that the Defendant continues to deny access is not order him to do or refrain from doing something but instead authorise the Claimant doing something – forcing entry. This is not the purpose of an injunction. Moreover, consideration need only be given to enforcement to understand the difficulties with describing this order as an injunction. The principal means of enforcing an injunction are committal proceedings, but I cannot see how the order sought could be enforced against the Defendant. What is sought is the court sanctioning the taking of action by the Claimant.[16]Turning to some of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules, other than rule 70.2A, that are commonly advanced as a basis for making such an order, I agree with DJ Cridge in Emmanuel and the preliminary views of HHJ Berkley in Sovereign v Hall (2024) (‘Hall’) that neither rule 25.1(1) or rule 3.1(2)(p) of the Civil Procedure Rules give the court jurisdiction to make an order of the kind sought. In addition to the reasoning that they give, which I agree with, rule 25.1(1) is concerned with interim remedies whereas what is sought here is a final order. Rule 3.1(2)(p) provides for general case management powers but I am not here being asked to case manage, I am instead being asked to make a final order. As, for example, the jurisprudence in relation to rule 3.1(7) of the Civil Procedure Rules illustrates rule 3.1 is not a work around – a litigant cannot appeal a final order by reliance on rule 3.1(7) rather than pursuant to Part 52 of the Civil Procedure Rules.[17]It follows that in my judgment the Claimant is dependent on rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules for an order of the kind they seek.

Rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules

[18]Rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows: “(1) In this rule ‘disobedient party’ means a party who has not complied with a mandatory order, an injunction or a judgment or order for the specific performance of a contract. (2) Subject to paragraph (4), if a mandatory order, an injunction or a judgment or order for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with, the court may direct that the act required to be done may, so far as practicable, be done by another person, being—(a) the party by whom the order or judgment was obtained; or(b) some other person appointed by the court. (3) Where paragraph (2) applies— (a) the costs to another person of doing the act will be borne by the disobedient party (b) upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the court directs; and(c) execution may issue against the disobedient party for the amount so ascertained and for costs. (4) Paragraph (2) is without prejudice to— (a) the court’s powers under section 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981; and (b) the court’s powers to punish the disobedient party for contempt.” (b) upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the court directs; and[19]At County Court level there is disagreement over whether rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules can be used for the purpose proposed by the Claimant in this application. HHJ Berkley in Hall and DJ Le Bas in Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (2026) (of which there is a note of the decision but no transcript) conclude that it can, whereas DJ Cridge in Emmanuel decided that it cannot, with commentary in the highly regarded Nearly Legal website and blog supportive of his view. These decisions are not binding on me but are persuasive and if I am in disagreement with any one of them it seems to me that I should engage with their reasoning.[20]In the present case I have evidence before me that the Defendant has failed to comply with my injunction order dated 6 January 2026 and therefore is a ‘disobedient party’ for the purpose of rule 70.2A. The relevant part of that order reads:
“The Defendant must on being provided with 48 hours written notice, allow the Claimant, its employees authorised agents or workmen access to the property at [address redacted] for the purpose of carrying out a Safety inspection of the Property to include the electrics, an asbestos inspection and general property inspection.”
[21]The function of rule 70.2A is to enforce compliance with a mandatory order, injunction or specific performance order, by effectively substituting for the disobedient party the Claimant or another person appointed by the court so that they may carry out the act ordered. For the court, once satisfied that there is a disobedient party, there are in my view two important issues to consider, being:(i) Whether the act that the applicant is seeking an order to do is “the act required to be done” by the original mandatory order, injunction or specific performance order (the remediation order as it is described in R v Tapecrown Ltd [2018] EWCA Crim 1345); and(ii) If so, whether the court should exercise its discretion in favour of making the order sought.

The Act Required to be Done

[22]The key points advanced in support of the argument that the act sought by the Claimant is different to that required to be done by the injunction order appear to be two-fold. Firstly, the act originally ordered is permissive whereas the act sought is forced entry and therefore a different act. Secondly, the act proposed to be carried out is one that is not permitted at common law and therefore would involve using a procedural rule to give effect to an unlawful act, which is impermissible.[23]As to the first point, I acknowledge, with the benefit of hindsight, that in preference to use of the word “allow” in the original injunction order the words “give” or “grant” should be used with potentially less ambiguity and remaining consistent with the landlord’s underlying contractual right to access. However, ultimately, I am not convinced that the correct focus is on the permissive element rather than the provision of access. When considering this issue, I am of the view that both the context and the nature of the injunction are relevant. The context is that the grant of the tenancy is expressly and impliedly subject to the right of access of the landlord for the limited purposes set out in the terms (see paragraphs 8 & 9 above). The Defendant has permitted access for the purpose of inspecting and carrying out works and has taken the tenancy subject to these conditions, he is not entitled to refuse access provided it is within the scope of the Claimant’s right of access, nor can he retract the permission he gave at the outset of the tenancy without varying the terms of the tenancy. In relation to the injunction, the very nature of an injunction is to compel or prohibit something, and in this case, it is the former. Compelling the allowing of access does not in truth and substance leave any element of choice or election to the Defendant – he is required to give access to the Claimant and it is this act of giving access that in my view is the act required to be done by the original injunction order.[24]In relation to the use of force, I take the view that it is more important to focus on the specifics than the label, which as I understand it is the approach adopted by HHJ Berkley in Hall (see paragraphs 11 & 12). This was a slightly easier task in that case than the present where I have no detail of what is being proposed and where the proposed order seeks to “…force entry… and by any other way…” which in my view is too wide and could in theory suggest, though I do not say the Claimant is proposing it, battering the door in or smashing a window to gain access. My understanding of what social landlords seek in these cases and the basis on which I proceed in this case is that the limits of what the Claimant is seeking is either to force the lock and then leaving it secure before leaving or changing the locks and ensuring the Defendant is provided with a key.[25]Having established the parameters or limits on the action proposed, I return to the question of what is the act required to be done by the injunction order? In my view the act required is the giving or granting, or the obtaining or gaining, of access depending on the perspective of the party. The method of achieving the act required or purpose of the injunction is unlikely to be identical in the hands of a third party as compared with the person against whom the injunction was obtained. Unless rule 70.2A is to be rendered nugatory the focus must surely be on whether the act required or purpose of the injunction remains fundamentally or essentially the same, although the method may be different. This can be tested by considering other common scenarios in which injunctions are obtained. For example, a landowner may install a gate and lock it unlawfully preventing someone with a right of way over his land from exercising it. If the owner of the dominant tenement were to obtain an injunction requiring the owner of the servient tenement to remove the lock and allow unobstructed use of the right of way and the servient tenement still refused to remove the lock, I cannot see why the court could not come to the aid of the owner of the dominant tenement using rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules and authorise him removing the lock even though in doing so the method would be different and he would be committing trespass to goods – the lock. Similarly, if a tenant were unlawfully evicted with the landlord changing the locks and the tenant obtained an injunction requiring the landlord to reinstate him and deliver the keys to the tenant and he maintained his refusal, I cannot see why the tenant could not use rule 70.2A and ask the court to authorise a change of the locks so the tenant could resume occupation if this was sought notwithstanding that the method of reinstatement was different. Conversely, if person A were ordered to deliver up a unique piece of artwork or jewellery to person B (its true owner) by an injunction or order for specific performance and failed to do so, I doubt that rule 70.2A could be relied upon to authorise person B to force entry to person B’s home to retrieve the item. This, to my mind, would be a different act and without any lawful basis.[26]The effect of this is, as more succinctly put by HHJ Berkley, to adopt a purposive rather than literal approach to rule 70.2A. Whilst the act required by the injunction cannot literally be performed by the same method by the Claimant as the Defendant, the act can be fundamentally and essentially achieved by the Claimant forcing or changing the lock to secure access.[27]Turning to the second argument, for the reasons I have set out when considering the common law position above, I respectfully disagree that the limited acts of forcing the lock and then securing it or changing the locks and providing the new key to the Defendant would be unlawful at common law. Nor do I consider that the minimalistic damage in forcing or replacing the lock alters the position. It is no more than is necessary, reasonable and proportionate to secure compliance with the terms of the tenancy. If the Defendant continues to deny access, the Defendant would likely be unable by reason of the prevention principle to successfully claim that the Claimant was in breach of tenancy in taking this action as to do so would involve him relying on his own breach.[28]It follows from my view on the common law position that I consider that rule 70.2A is a mechanism for allowing a landlord to enforce its rights and does not seek to change the substantive law.

The Discretion

[29]Having concluded that I do have the power to make the order sought pursuant to rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules, it is clear from the wording of the rule that I have a discretion as to whether or not to make such an order.[30]When this application came before me on the papers on 10 March 2026 I ordered that the Claimant “file with the court details of any known vulnerabilities of the Defendant and any risk assessment completed in respect of the forced entry sought, in the event that the Court makes such an Order.” This was done, albeit belatedly, through the proportionality assessment dated 23 April 2026, and I am satisfied that there are no known relevant vulnerabilities or disabilities disclosed that might be causing him to not give access and no identified risks in making the order sought. However, there are potential risks to the Defendant and his neighbours in these essential safety checks not being carried out. This, together with the persistent denial of access to the Property by the Defendant, evidenced in the statements of the Claimant’s access coordinator lead me to exercise my discretion in favour of the Claimant. I will therefore make an order but in the more limited terms that I have discussed above, removing the reference to “by any other way” and being specific as to the action permitted. I also consider that the Defendant should be personally served with my order bearing in mind the dyslexia that I am aware from the proportionality assessment that he has, which will allow the Claimant to verbally explain matters as well as putting them in writing. Furthermore, the Defendant should have a final opportunity to comply voluntarily, although this could be at the same appointment that the Claimant attends to force or change the locks in the event that he does not do so.

Conclusions

[31]The issue of access injunctions and the application of rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules is not straightforward and has resulted in conflicting decisions at County Court level. I have therefore given a written decision to engage with the interesting arguments raised by DJ Cridge and others and to explain why I have come to a different conclusion. I concur that this is an area where guidance from a higher court would be welcome.[32]For the reasons I have explained above, I conclude that the court does have the power pursuant to rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules to enforce an injunction by permitting the Claimant to force or change the locks of the Property to gain the access that it is entitled to under the terms of their tenancy agreement with the Defendant. This is not the same as making an injunction in these terms or amending the injunction, it is a subsequent stage that only arises after non-compliance with the original injunction order.[33]I am also satisfied that this case is an appropriate case to exercise my discretion in making such an order, but I do so subject to some conditions as follows:(i) The order should be personally served on the Defendant with the Claimant to explain verbally as well as in writing what is required of him;(ii) Pursuant to rule 70.2A I am ordering that the Claimant may enforce the injunction order dated 6 January 2026 whether by itself or its employees, contractors or agents by forcing or changing the locks on a date and time that the Defendant is notified not less than 48 hours in advance in writing and conditional on the Claimant securing the Property and making good any damage caused, if any, or providing the Defendant with a key to the replacement lock at no charge in the event that the locks are changed; and(iii) The Defendant must be given the opportunity to give access to the Defendant prior to forcing or changing the locks, although this can be at the same appointment as the Claimant proceeds to take the action ordered in paragraph (ii).[34]It follows that I allow the application of the Claimant to the extent set out above.