Field Industrial Supplies WLL v Fredy Thomas [2025] EWCC 59

[2025] EWCC 59Case No K8QZ6V6RDate 9 October 2025
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT NORTHAMPTON
Before
RECORDER NEVILLE
Between
Field Industrial Supplies WLLClaimantFredy ThomasDefendant
Ms N Rakhimjonova (instructed by LK Law LLP) for ClaimantMr G Goodwill (instructed by Marie De Louise Solicitors) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 6 August 2025, 3 September 2025
JUDGMENTRecorder Neville:
[1]The principal issue in this case is whether the County Court has jurisdiction to decide an action brought at common law on a foreign judgment, a matter upon which counsel have been unable to locate any direct authority. I have concluded that the County Court does not have jurisdiction and that, despite the Defendant being debarred from taking the point, the Court should do so of its own motion. The Claimant did not, as it should have done, consider jurisdiction prior to issue, the underlying claim has no merit in any event, and the proceedings are struck out rather than transferred to the High Court.

Background facts

[2]Save where noted, the following is uncontroversial: a). The Claimant, a company incorporated under the laws of Qatar, is a family business that supplies industrial utility products for power, water, sewage and the oil and gas industries. One of its directors is Francis Frederic, who was the Claimant’s assistant general manager until he took over the business from his father in 2024. The Francis family originate from Kerala, in India. The Defendant is Mr Francis’ first cousin, and in 2006 Mr Francis’ father offered him a job working for the Claimant in Qatar. The Defendant moved to Doha, living with Mr Frederic’s family until he married in 2010 and moved into his own accommodation. He says that he was badly treated by Mr Frederic and his family, which Mr Frederic denies. b). The Defendant’s role in the business grew, and by 2013 he was responsible for much of its financial administration, and this included depositing and issuing cheques. Mr Syamraj Nadarajan, also from Kerala, was hired to assist him. In 2016 the Defendant told the Claimant that he was leaving its employment, stating that he planned to move to New Zealand with his wife. This did not transpire, the Defendant instead moving back to India for around a year and then to the United Kingdom. He is now a British citizen. c). Mr Nadarajan continued to work for the Claimant, but in mid-2019 Mr Frederic investigated concerns that he might be assisting a rival company. The Claimant obtained copies of Mr Nadarajan’s bank statements, became concerned at payments received in 2014 by way of cheque, and referred the matter to the police. Following their interview with Mr Nadarajan, he departed Qatar that night, never to return. By September 2019 at the latest, the Claimant’s investigations led Mr Frederic to conclude that Mr Nadarajan had committed cheque fraud and was assisted by the Defendant. The Defendant denies any wrongdoing. d). Investigators working on behalf of the Qatari authorities tried to contact the Defendant by email using details given to them by Mr Frederic, but never received any reply. e). On 28 February 2021, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Doha brought proceedings in the Court of First Instance with the Defendant and Mr Nadarajan specified as the first and second defendants. At a preliminary hearing on 29 April 2021, a court-appointed accounting expert presented a report concluding that the Defendant had embezzled QR 243,303 (£52,046.80 as at the date of issue) through three cheques and that Mr Nadarajan had embezzled QR 234,677. f). The Defendant says he missed the correspondence from the investigators and the Qatari court; the Claimant says he deliberately ignored it. g). Later in 2021, Mr Frederic was travelling to the UK on business and the two met at Caffè Nero at Heathrow Airport on 16 November 2021. The Claimant asserts that during their conversation, covertly recorded by Mr Frederic, the Defendant admitted wrongdoing; the Defendant denies this. h). The Qatari court held a further hearing on 31 March 2022. In its judgment of the same date, the court recorded that both defendants were lawfully summonsed but had not responded or attended, that it accepted the outcome of the investigation, and that both defendants had committed a criminal offence under Article 362 of the Criminal Code. In reaching its conclusion the Court referred to the law of contract, trust and agency. Both defendants were convicted, and the court’s resulting order reads (in translation): The court ruled: In absentia: 1) to give the two convicts a custodial sentence of six months and to fine them a sum of 3000 Qatari riyals for each convict for the charges against them, with their deportation from the state after the penalty imposed on them has been performed or has lapsed. 2) to order the first convict Fredy Thomas to pay the victim company the sum of QR 243,303 to be received through civil execution. 3) to order the second convict Simraj Nadarajan to pay the victim company the sum of QR 234,677 to be received through civil execution. i). From now on, I shall refer to the court’s judgment and order as “the Judgment”. On 1 June 2022 a Certificate of No Appeal was issued. Paragraph 1 of the Judgment has not been executed, as both individuals had long since departed Qatar and no extradition proceedings have been commenced. j). The present proceedings were served by the Claimant’s solicitors on 7 November 2023, and the Defendant contacted Mr Frederic directly. Their telephone call was again covertly recorded by Mr Frederic, who asserts that the Defendant admitted his wrongdoing and admitted his liability to pay the sum ordered in the Judgment; this is again denied by the Defendant. k). A Defence was filed on 4 December 2023. The Claimant made an application for summary judgment that was dismissed by DDJ Reed following a hearing on 23 September 2024. On 3 March 2025, HHJ Murdoch gave permission to the Claimant to amend its Particulars of Claim to include a claim based on the asserted admissions by the Defendant.[3]The start of the trial on 6 August 2025 was delayed by having been moved at short notice from another court; through no apparent fault of the parties I had no papers at all until past 10am and no trial bundle until one could be photocopied. Mr Goodwill had filed a note immediately before the trial raising the issue of jurisdiction. This caused further delay while Ms Rakhimjonova considered her position. I had heard evidence from Mr Frederic and the Defendant, the trial had to be adjourned part-heard due to lack of time. While otherwise regrettable, that adjournment has permitted counsel to make focused written submissions. I thank Ms Rakhimjonova and Mr Goodwill for their assistance with both re-listing and in resolving the substantive issues.

Issues

[4]As they arise from the pleadings and the parties’ submissions, the following issues arise for decision: a). Does the County Court have jurisdiction to decide a claim brought at common law on a foreign judgment? If not, should the Defendant be taken as having submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction by filing a defence and failing to dispute the Court’s jurisdiction under the procedure set out in CPR 11? If the answer to that question is no, then that part of the proceedings must be either struck out or transferred to the High Court. b). Does the Judgment meet the necessary common law requirements? Those in issue are: i) Has the Claimant shown that the Qatari court had jurisdiction over the Defendant? ii) Has the Claimant shown that the Judgment (so far as claimed) is not payable in respect of taxes, charges of a like nature, any fine or penalty, or other public liability? c). Only if the Claimant gets this far, has the Defendant established any of the following defences to the claim: i) Did the Qatari proceedings deprive the Defendant of a fair trial, such that recognition or enforcement of the Judgment is contrary to the common law or, alternatively, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights? ii) Relatedly, should the Court decline to recognise the Judgment on the grounds of fraud, malice or a breach of the rules of natural justice? d). Finally, if the claim brought on the Judgment fails, should the Court enter judgment on an alternative basis pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim? Ms Rakhimjonova clarified the Claimant’s case as that the claimed admission of liability to pay amounted to a separate cause of action that could survive dismissal of the claim brought directly on the Judgment.[5]In addressing the issues, I shall only set out the parties’ submissions where necessary to explain my conclusions. Mr Goodwill additionally sought to make arguments as to limitation; this had never been pleaded, and for the reasons given at the hearing I refused to allow the defendant to raise it at such a late stage. Jurisdiction Does the County Court have jurisdiction?

Jurisdiction

[6]The State of Qatar is not a signatory of the Hague Convention, nor can a judgment of a Qatari court be recognised or directly enforced by the High Court or the County Court pursuant to any UK legislation. The claim is therefore brought under the common law. This also means that CPR 74, requiring certain applications to enforce judgments of foreign courts to be made in the High Court, does not apply.[7]In Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443 at 457, Parker LJ noted as follows: The first method of enforcement here of a foreign judgment was by an action upon the judgment. The foreign judgment, in the absence of statute, could have no direct operation in England and Wales because of the principle of the territoriality of a court's jurisdiction. At first, the basis for enforcing the foreign judgment by action in this country was thought to be the doctrine of comity but that was later replaced by the doctrine of obligation, namely, that the judgment of a court having competent jurisdiction over the Defendant imposed on him an obligation to pay the sum for which judgment had been given: see Russell v. Smyth (1842) 9 M. & W. 810 , 819; Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 and the cases cited in Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 11th ed. (1987), vol. 1, p. 420.[8]The cause of action has been so described in numerous authorities over the years, including at the highest level: see Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors [2012] UKSC 46 at [9]. More recently, in Lenkor Energy Trading DMCC v Puri [2021] EWCA Civ 770, the Court of Appeal was concerned with a judgment where the Defendant argued illegality in relation to the underlying contract. Lewison LJ held that: 40. First, this is not a question of enforcing a contract. It is a question of enforcing a judgment given by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction. The two are not the same: Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 222, 224. There are sound justifications for taking a different approach to substantive claims and enforcement claims, reflecting the different role performed by the court in each circumstance: RBRG Trading (UK) Ltd v Sinocore International Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 838, [2018] 2 Lloyd's Rep 133 [26] (3). The judgment of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction creates an obligation to pay the judgment sum enforceable in this jurisdiction as a debt, irrespective of the underlying cause of action: Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M & W 628, 633; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] 1 Ch 433, 513. In addressing the arguments in this case, it is important to heed that distinction between the substantive matter decided by the Qatari court and the claim brought on its Judgment.[9]The question in the present case is therefore whether the “obligation to pay the judgment sum enforceable in this jurisdiction as a debt” is a cause of action justiciable in the County Court. Counsel have been unable to find any direct authority, nor even an example of such a claim being decided in the County Court. I afford no significance to the latter point, as if such claims are permissible then they will often have been undefended, decided by summary judgment, or gone unreported.[10]The County Court is a creature of statute, its jurisdiction restricted to that conferred by Parliament. Numerous pieces of legislation do so in relation to particular disputes, and exclude jurisdiction in others, but I have not been referred to any provision that expressly concerns a claim on a foreign judgment. Turning to the principal source of the County Court’s jurisdiction, Part II of the County Courts Act 1984, the only provisions that might conceivably assist the Claimant are these: 15 General jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the county court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on contract or tort. […] and26. 23 Equity jurisdiction.27. The county court shall have all the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and determine— […] (g) proceedings for relief against fraud or mistake, where the damage sustained or the estate or fund in respect of which relief is sought does not exceed in amount or value the county court limit.[11]Ms Rakhimjonova, pointing to the substantive issues of law relied upon by the Qatari court in its reasons, and which would also be engaged were they tried in this country, argued that the claim was founded on contract and tort; section 15(1) was thereby engaged. Mr Goodwill, despite having initially disputed jurisdiction at the start of the trial, told me that on reflection he accepted this to be correct. As I indicated to the parties during argument, as the issue is jurisdiction I am unwilling to consider myself bound by that concession if I do not conscientiously believe it to be right. For the following reasons, I reject that the County Court does have jurisdiction.[12]First, addressing the basis for the Judgment as described in its reasons, I consider it inappropriate to reach any conclusions about Qatari law in the absence of evidence as to its meaning and effect. The underlying factual accusations against the Defendant do have analogues in English law, most likely conversion, deceit, unjust enrichment or fraud. It might also be presumed that the Defendant’s alleged conduct would be contrary to his contract of employment but again I have no evidence on the point. In relation to tort and contract, the meaning of “founded on” at section 15(1) was considered in Hutchings v Islington LBC [1998] 1 WLR 1629. I need not set out the background facts, and in relation to the present issue Evans LJ held as follows: […] My reasons shortly are these:(1) the parties, correctly in my view, treated the issue as arising from the terms of the contract of employment; and(2) even if the plaintiff's pension rights under the scheme strictly should be categorised as statutory, nevertheless he enjoys them by virtue of his contract of employment. As a matter of common sense, and in law also in my opinion, his claim to enforce them is “founded on” that contract for the purposes of section 15(1). That phrase may be a term of art in English law: see the divergence of judicial opinion between Bramwell and Brett L.JJ. in Bryant v. Herbert (1878) 3 C.P.D. 389 (described as a “curious conflict” in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th ed. (1986), vol. 2, p. 1026), but even if it is, the present action falls within it: “The rule … that … if, in order successfully to maintain his action, it is necessary for [the plaintiff] to rely upon and prove a contract, the action is one founded upon contract:” see per A. L. Smith L.J. in Turner v. Stallibrass [1898] 1 Q.B. 56 , 58. The plaintiff cannot “found” his claim without alleging and proving what his terms of employment were. It therefore falls within the scope of section 15(1) as so defined.[13]Applying that test here, a claim on a foreign judgment is not founded on contract or tort. To succeed, the Claimant need not prove any contractual relationship or obligation on the part of the Defendant, nor breach of contract or other duty, nor the elements of any related tort. It need only prove the common law requirements for recognition of a foreign judgment. The phrase “founded on” does not appear in section 23(g), but there is no basis upon which to infer a Parliamentary intention to distinguish foreign judgments related to fraud. To conclude that jurisdiction stems from the nature of the underlying dispute would be contrary to the authorities’ repeated warning not to conflate the cause of action arising from the doctrine of obligation with the cause of action upon which the foreign court reached its judgment.[14]Two other matters put forward by the Claimant can be addressed in brief terms. First, the Claimant relies on Sun Legend Investments Ltd v Jade Yuk Kuen Ho [2013] BPIR 532, in which District Judge Musgrave held that the debtor could not oppose a bankruptcy petition arising from a judgment issued in Hong Kong on the basis that no action had been taken on the judgment in the English courts. Nothing in that authority assists the Claimant, as shown by the District Judge’s concluding remarks: [28] I agree with Mr Weaver’s basic submission that Sun Legend has a cause of action and is in a position no different from any other creditor who seeks to pursue bankruptcy without holding an English judgment. Mrs Ho is perfectly entitled to oppose the petition on substantive grounds but she has chosen not to do so nor did she apply to set aside the statutory demand. If she had any point in relation to recognition there is no reason why it should not have been raised. I also accept the submission that a bankruptcy petition does not constitute enforcement of the Hong Kong judgment. The bankruptcy jurisdiction since 1986 is a separate jurisdiction involving a class remedy. There is no requirement for an English judgment as a precondition to proceeding with a petition. There is in my view a debt due to Sun Legend which satisfies the requirements of the Insolvency Act 1986.[15]Ms Rakhimjonova rested her reliance on the authority on the Defendant having admitted the debt, just like Mrs Ho. Yet as I shall later hold, this is not the case; nor in any event does the argument survive exposure to the conceptual distinction between a bankruptcy petition and a claim.[16]Second, and in fairness to the Claimant, it did try twice to issue proceedings in the High Court. As explained in Ms Rakhimjonova’s closing note:10. On 7 August 2023, the Claimant filed the claim at the High Court, King’s Bench Division for recognition of the Qatari Judgement. This application was rejected only to be re-filed with the Court on 5 September 2023. The same was rejected again with the following reasons: “Pursuant Practice Direction 7A 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the value of this claim is below the minimum for the High Court. Please issue your claim in a County Court.”11. On 18 September 2023, the Claimant’s solicitors made submissions to the High Court, expressly relying upon PD7A r.2.4(2) of the CPR and paragraph 11.3 of the King’s Bench Division Guide, both of which direct such applications to be brought before the High Court.[17]I have now been shown such of the correspondence with the court office upon which the former relies, including an email from an administrative officer in the Kings Bench Division issue office explaining why the second attempt was rejected. The email sets out that the correspondence had been referred to a Master:
"A Master has considered the proposed proceedings and your email of 18 September 2023 but points out the following. Article 4A of the High Court and County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1991 (SI 1991/724) provides that "4A. Except for proceedings to which article 5 applies, a claim for money in which the County Court has jurisdiction may only be commenced in the High Court if the value of the claim is more than £100,000."
Article 5 relates to personal injury claims. You do not suggest that the County Court lacks jurisdiction. Also, section 40 of the County Courts Act 1984 provides that claims wrongly commenced in the High Court must be struck-out or transferred. You have cited CPR PD7A paragraph 2.4, but: (1) it is expressly subject to paragraph 2.1 which provides that a claim can only be commenced in the High Court if its value is over £100,000 and (2) it cannot overrule Article 4A. Accordingly, the Master's view is that this Claim cannot be commenced in the High Court (although it might well be possible for the County Court to transfer to the High Court). If you wish to seek to persuade the Master otherwise, please respond to these points and the Master will consider what to do (and including whether to direct a hearing)."[18]I cannot see that the High Court ever adjudicated upon whether the County Court had jurisdiction, the point never having been raised. While the High Court has the power to transfer proceedings to the County Court even where the latter would otherwise have no jurisdiction, see National Westminster Bank Plc v King [2008] EWHC 280 (Ch), no such order was made. Nor does it appear that after proceedings were then issued in the County Court, any application was made to have it transferred to the High Court, as the Master had observed “might well be possible”.[19]Taking all the above points together, I hold that the County Court has no jurisdiction to consider this part of the claim. I cannot see that this interpretation causes any wider difficulties. Claims wrongly issued in the County Court can be transferred to the High Court (subject to subject 42(1)(b)), and claims issued in the High Court can be transferred to the County Court if thought appropriate in light of the considerations at CPR 30.3(2). It is right that in the latter case the High Court, rather than this Court, should choose when to relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction.

Should the Defendant be taken as having submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction in any event?

[20]Ms Rakhimjonova correctly observes that a Defence was filed, and the issue of jurisdiction never raised at all until the morning of trial. She argues, again entirely correctly, that the Defendant therefore failed to comply with the requirements at CPR 11: Procedure for disputing the court’s jurisdiction(1) A Defendant who wishes to – (a) dispute the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim; or (b) argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction may apply to the court for an order declaring that it has no such jurisdiction or should not exercise any jurisdiction which it may have.(2) A Defendant who wishes to make such an application must first file an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Part 10.(3) A Defendant who files an acknowledgment of service does not, by doing so, lose any right that they may have to dispute the court’s jurisdiction.(4) An application under this rule must – (a) be made within 14 days after filing an acknowledgment of service; and (b) be supported by evidence.(5) If the Defendant – (a) files an acknowledgment of service; and (b) does not make such an application within the period specified in paragraph (4), they are to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try the claim. […][21]So, she submits, the Defendant is debarred from disputing the Court’s jurisdiction. I agree that this must be the case here, and the seriousness of that failure should not be understated.[22]The Court is nonetheless entitled to take up an issue of jurisdiction for itself, and prior to the hearing on 3 September I alerted the parties to this possibility so that they might make submissions. In Taylor & Ors v Evans [2023] EWHC 2490 (KB), the particulars of claim included a claim under the Equality Act 2010 asserting that the Claimants had suffered harassment and victimisation contrary to the provisions of that Act. The proceedings had been brought in the High Court, but Part 9 of the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the County Court. Having found that CPR 11 was engaged, Master Dagnall held as follows:50. In my judgment, the following is the case: first, CPR Part 11 as interpreted in Hoddinott and subsequent cases does give rise to a statutory waiver with regards to all the questions of jurisdiction where a Part 11 application is not made. That has the practical effect that the Defendant is barred from raising the point unless the Defendant pursues an application for relief from sanctions which the Defendant has not done. It seems to me that this may be particularly relevant in relation to costs which I am not at the present point dealing with.51. However, it seems to me, secondly, that the court can and should still take the jurisdictional point for the following reasons. It is part of the system of law in England and Wales and the consequent rule of law that the courts are subject to Parliament. It does not seem to me that the High Court can ignore the express requirement of Parliament in section 113 and elsewhere in Part 9 of the Equality Act 2010 that a statutory jurisdiction created by Parliament can only be exercised by the County Court. This is not what might be described as a common law or original or inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. This is a jurisdiction created by Parliament where Parliament has laid down how the jurisdiction is to be exercised and who it is to be exercised by.52. For the High Court to deal with the case, subject to Mr. Turner's other points which I will deal with in due course, it seems to me would be for the High Court to arrogate to itself a jurisdiction it simply does not have, and that would be wrong. It is not the same situation as the court as a result of a waiver ignoring a point under the CPR which is it for the parties to raise if it is to be raised at all. It is also not the situation of the court ignoring some other procedural point regarding the court's power to try a claim where that is simply a procedural point separate from the claim itself. Here the claim is a Part 7 Equality Act 2010 claim and Parliament has said that those claims are for the County Court alone and laid that down expressly in section 113 and 114 and onwards. I do not see how CPR Part 11, a procedure which exists under the 1997 Civil Procedure Act which provides for rules to be made with regards to practice and procedure of the court, can override such statutory provisions.[23]In the present case, and if my preceding analysis is correct, the cause of action pursued by the Claimant has been recognised for over a century as falling outside those founded on contract or tort. Yet Parliament has never taken the opportunity to include it within the County Court’s jurisdiction, and I note that CPR 47 reserves proceedings with a statutory underpinning to the High Court. One can well imagine why this should be so for claims involving issues of international private law and that might findings concerning the institutions of other states. The points made in Taylor at [51]-[52] apply equally to a procedural default having the consequence of the County Court arrogating a jurisdiction to itself that properly lays in the High Court. In this case, the parties’ failure to properly and timeously consider jurisdiction provides poor justification for the County Court to act outside the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Parliament. I reject that CPR 11 should operate to do so here.

Transfer or strike out?

[24]In addressing consequences, section 42 of the County Courts Act 1984 relevantly provides as follows: 42 Transfer to High Court by order of the county court(1) Where the county court is satisfied that any proceedings before it are required by any provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (7) to be in the High Court, it shall– (a) order the transfer of the proceedings to the High Court; or (b) if the court is satisfied that the person bringing the proceedings knew, or ought to have known, of that requirement, order that they be struck out.(2) Subject to any such provision, the county court may order the transfer of any proceedings before it to the High Court.(3) An order under this section may be made either on the motion of the court itself or on the application of any party to the proceedings.(4) The transfer of any proceedings under this section shall not affect any right of appeal from the order directing the transfer. […] (7) The provisions referred to in subsection (1) are any made– (a) under section 1 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990; or (b) by or under any other enactment.[25]I find that subsection (1) applies, and that the condition precedent at (1)(b) is met such that striking out is mandatory. If subsection (1) does not apply, then exercising the discretion at subsection (2) and taking into account the considerations at CPR 30.3(2), I would still decline to order transfer. My reasons are as follows.

and

[26]I respectfully agree with the suggestion in Butterworth v Lang [2015] EWHC 529 (Ch) that the matter should be approached according to the familiar three-stage structure set out in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906. First dealing with the seriousness of the default, while the Defendant is certainly to be criticised for failing to address the question of jurisdiction until the last minute, it did so by simply asking for the statutory source of the County Court’s jurisdiction. It was the responsibility of the Claimant to ensure, when issuing the claim, that the County Court had jurisdiction, but the Claimant plainly never turned its mind to the issue until that simple question was asked out loud. Even then, submissions were only made on section 15 of the 1984 Act at my own instigation. Contrary to Ms Rakhimjonova’s arguments, none of the correspondence between the Claimant’s solicitors and the KBD office excuses this failure. This is also relevant to the second stage. The Master simply said that the Claimant had not “suggest[ed] that the County Court lacks jurisdiction” – a form of words that ought to have caused the Claimant to ensure that the County Court did have jurisdiction before issuing there. It is clear from the Master’s concluding remarks that if the Claimant had replied to say that it could not identify how the County Court had jurisdiction and wished the matter to be resolved, then the Master would have turned his mind to that specific matter and convened a hearing if appropriate. Instead the Master’s remarks were, it appears, taken as licence to issue in the County Court; that is certainly how they were represented to me. They cannot justify that characterisation.[27]I find that issuing the claim without having identified the source of the County Court’s jurisdiction was a serious default, for which there was no good reason. I turn to evaluate all the circumstances of the case to enable me to deal justly with the matter. If the issue had been canvassed at the start of proceedings, before the parties and the Court had been put to the expense of a full trial, beyond question the correct decision would be to transfer the proceedings to the High Court. Fault for that lies with both parties, but the Defendant’s contribution can be recognised (if appropriate) when deciding the issue of costs. Having heard the parties’ submissions and evidence in full, it would be wholly contrary to the overriding objective to now require the High Court to repeat the entire exercise. Mr Goodwill suggested that if the matter were transferred to the High Court then I could be authorised to hear the case as a High Court Judge for that specific purpose, but the practicalities of that course are (to say the least) uncertain and it would still occasion further delay. As a result of the work already undertaken, I have reached the view that the claim should be struck out rather than re-heard. Furthermore, this this is one of the rare cases where the underlying merits of the claim are so very weak as to factor into the exercise of discretion at stage 3. I give my reasons for this conclusion below, when considering whether the Qatari court had jurisdiction over the Defendant. The claim on the Judgment is struck out under CPR 3.4 as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.

The Qatari court’s jurisdiction over the Defendant

[28]An essential requirement for enforcement of a foreign judgment is that the foreign court had jurisdiction over the Defendant. As my conclusions on jurisdiction are informed by the merits of the claim, and having heard evidence and argument, it is right to set out my assessment of this issue.[29]The parties agree that the circumstances in which a foreign court is treated as having had jurisdiction over the Defendant according to English law is correctly set out in Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 16th edition, at 14R-058: First Case If the person against whom the judgment was given was, at the time the proceedings were instituted, present in the foreign country. For a natural person this requires physical presence in the territory, and for a legal person it requires a fixed place of business in the territory. Second Case If the person against whom the judgment was given was claimant, or counterclaimed, in the proceedings in the foreign court. Third Case If the person against whom the judgment was given, submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings. Fourth Case Subject to Rule 58, if the person against whom the judgment was given, had before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the courts of that country.[30]The Claimant accepts that the second to the fourth cases cannot apply, so it must rely on the first. The Defendant’s case in response is straightforward: the alleged wrongdoing was in 2014, the Claimant left Qatar in 2016, wrongdoing was first suggested in 2019, and proceedings were not instituted until 2021. The Defendant cannot be taken as subject to the Qatari court’s jurisdiction.[31]It is clear that the rule ordinarily calls for physical presence, or perhaps residence. In Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, CA, described in Dicey as the leading modern authority, the Court of Appeal set out three principles at 517-518: First, in determining the jurisdiction of the foreign court in such cases, our court is directing its mind to the competence or otherwise of the foreign court "to summon the defendant before it and to decide such matters as it has decided:" see Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 790, per Lindley M.R. Secondly, in the absence of any form of submission to the foreign court, such competence depends on the physical presence of the defendant in the country concerned at the time of suit. (We leave open the question whether residence without presence will suffice.) From the last sentence of the dictum of Lord Parmoor cited above, and from a dictum of Collins M.R. in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Actien-gesellschaft fur Motor undMotorfahrzeugbau vorm. Cudell & Co. [1902] 1 K.B. 342, 346, it would appear that the date of service of process rather than the date of issue of proceedings is to be treated as "the time of suit" for these purposes. But nothing turns on this point in the present case and we express no final view on it. Thirdly, we accept the submission of Sir Godfray Le Quesne (not accepted by Mr. Morison) that the temporary presence of a defendant in the foreign country will suffice provided at least that it is voluntary (i.e. not induced by compulsion, fraud or duress).[32]Clearly the Defendant was not physically present in Qatar on the date that proceedings were instituted, nor on the date they were served. To overcome his absence, Ms Rakhimjonova first observes that the law is not fully settled as to the type and length of residence that will suffice: see, for example, The Official Receiver of the Bangkok of Commerce Public Company Limited v Saxena [2023] EWHC 521 (Comm) at [48], in which Dame Clare Moulder DBE declined to rule on whether Mr Saxena was within the jurisdiction of the Thai courts when his presence there arose solely due to his forcible extradition. I agree that the requirement for physical presence on a particular date may, hypothetically, have exceptions – one such possible exception is envisaged in Adams in relation to the second principle, above.[33]The potential exception put forward in this case borrows from the law of extradition, concerning where an individual is properly described as a “fugitive”. Ms Rakhimjonova referred me to the convenient description of the principle and its purpose given by Fordham J in Makowska v Poland [2020] EWHC 2371 (Admin): 27. […] The principle as to whether the person is a "fugitive" having "knowingly placed [herself] beyond the reach of a legal process" is one of contextual application and falls to be applied "on a case by case basis" (Wisniewski paragraph 59). This is in law a distinct question from whether, and requires more than that, the person has been "unlawfully at large" (as to which see Wisniewski at paragraphs 51-57). The function and purpose of the principle is that any lapse of time or consequences of lapse of time so far as extradition is concerned is a consequence of the persons "own choice and making" (see Kakis at 783B), so that any delay "in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings" can be said to have been "brought about by" the person themselves (see Kakis at 783A). Lord Diplock's exposition (in Kakis at 783A, endorsed in Gomes) spoke of the conduct of a person "by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest". The description of a person having "knowingly placed [herself] beyond the reach of a legal process" (Wisniewski at paragraph 59) includes a person who breaches the obligations of a suspended sentence(a) by a voluntary act of leaving the jurisdiction in question thereby knowingly preventing themselves from performing those obligations (see Wisniewski paragraph 60) or(b) by a voluntary act of ceasing to keep in contact with the authorities thereby becoming a person whose whereabouts are unknown to the authority which is entitled to know of them, putting it beyond that authority's power to deal with the person (see Wisniewski paragraph 62).[34]I first reject that fugitivity can establish jurisdiction in personam as a matter of principle. Taken at its highest, and if all the facts asserted by the Claimant were found and suggested inferences drawn, the Claimant’s case is that the Defendant committed the acts upon which the Judgment is based, left Qatar in anticipation of discovery, and later refused to engage with the Qatari authorities to avoid the consequences of his wrongdoing. This means he was neither present nor resident when proceedings were instituted, and no authority has been cited for the proposition that an individual’s prior presence or residence will suffice solely because it was ceased in contemplation of proceedings. As observed in Dicey at 14-084, agreement to submit to the jurisdiction cannot be implied from the fact that the cause of action arose within a foreign country or from the additional fact that the defendant was present there when the cause of action arose; see the cited case of Emanuel v Symon [1908] 1 KB 302. Nor, finally, does fugitivity operate as a discrete jurisdictional gateway even in extradition; it instead answers a claim of delay on the part of the prosecuting authorities and factors into any Article 8 proportionality assessment.[35]Nor, if I am wrong, could the Claimant succeed in showing fugitivity on the facts. In Makowska, Fordham J reduced the principles expressed in the relevant authorities to three linked themes: 28. In grappling with the idea of fugitivity, expressed in the authorities which were cited and to which I have referred, I have found it helpful to think in particular about the following three linked themes:(i) locational dynamism;(ii) informational deficit; and(iii) intended consequential elusiveness. That is not to say that these are elements of a litmus test; nor that all three themes can be expected to be present. A person whose location changes, with a lack of information, becoming elusiveness can be seen as a paradigm case of a fugitive. These themes, or some of them at least, can be seen to be met by each of the following situations: a person who flees the country; a person who conceals their whereabouts; a person who evades arrest; a person whose act of leaving a country knowingly prevents themselves from performing obligations; a person who ceases contact with authorities so as to become a person whose whereabouts are unknown to those authorities and cannot be dealt with by those authorities; a person whose actions are the cause of any delays in their pursuit by the authorities. These themes, as it seems to me, reflect the ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'fugitive'. They link directly to the underlying idea of extradition delays being consequential upon the individual's own choices, with what are, in effect, penalising consequences for the individual in an analysis of the extradition circumstances, under the law. 29. I have also found it instructive to consider the position in a case on the other side of the line, namely the Pillar-Neumann case. That was an accusation warrant case. It related to alleged offences of fraud and embezzlement between November 1997 and 2001 in Austria and the Netherlands, the requested person having moved to the United Kingdom in 1998. The Austrian authorities' case was that, knowing that she was wanted by the Austrian authorities, the requested person had knowingly refused to leave the United Kingdom and go to Austria to be arrested pursuant to a domestic Austrian warrant, which was said to have made her a fugitive. Hamblen LJ explained the Divisional Court's rejection of that contention (see paragraphs 64-70). The requested person had been living openly in the UK, not concealing her identity or location (paragraph 66). As Hamblen LJ explained (paragraphs 69-70):
"She was not fleeing the country or concealing her whereabouts. She was not taking any positive steps to evade or avoid arrest. She was simply carrying on living in her country of residence, as she was lawfully entitled to do. Nor was she knowingly placing herself beyond the reach of a legal process. She took no positive steps to place herself anywhere."
So, there was no locational dynamism, but rather a consistency of location. There was no informational deficit, but rather an openness and lack of concealment. There was no consequential elusiveness. There was thus no basis for the, in effect, penalising consequences for the individual in the extradition analysis.[36]As argued by Mr Goodwill, the Defendant left Qatar in 2016, so two years after the alleged wrongdoing and two to three years before the Claimant developed any suspicions. There is no basis upon which it can be properly inferred that he left to avoid detection. He was cross-examined on the change in plans after leaving, doubt being cast upon the truth of the initial account of his wife having found employment in New Zealand. The explanation he gave, being a change in New Zealand’s immigration rules, is not manifestly implausible. Even if the Defendant was deceptive, which I strongly doubt, it is impossible to draw a logical connection with elusiveness. He returned to mutual family in India where the grapevine promptly informed Mr Frederic’s family of his whereabouts, and then moved to the UK.[37]Ms Rakhimjonova points to what the Defendant said in the first covertly recorded conversation, on 16 November 2021. The Defendant submits that the covert recordings relied upon the Claimant should not be admitted into evidence in any event, but for the moment I consider them de bene esse. Only two minutes and 16 seconds of a much longer meeting have been translated, transcribed and placed in the bundle, and I can set it out in its entirety: (“Uncle” refers to Mr Frederic’s father) Mr Frederic Do you know that what you have done is a criminal offence? Mr Frederic Although it was done in Qatar. There is an MLAT treaty between Qatar and <inaudible>. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Do you know about it? Mr Frederic Once the crime has been established there, they will transfer the crime documents here. Then an investigation will take place here. They will check whether it's genuine. They will ask for information from the bank to check if it is genuine. The court here will ask for information from that Bank to verify if it is genuine. It will take time to complete all these processes. Once all these are done, what will be the consequences? Mr Frederic Read the criminal offence of cheque forgery. In our place, the punishment is 11 years of imprisonment. In Qatar, there are different punishments. Not an ordinary punishment. Mr Frederic If it is executed here... Either they will transfer from here to there or execute here. Try to find out what the punishment here if they execute here. You have three kids Mr Frederic (Overlap) <Inaudible> Defendant I clearly know that I'll go to prison whether it's here or there. Defendant I'm very sure that if Uncle files a case, I'll be in jail whatever it may be. Defendant Even if it's in our place, here or in Qatar I will be in jail. Mr Frederic You have no problem with that. You are not afraid of it. You are very courageous. Defendant (Overlap) <Inaudible> Mr Frederic That is why you did all this. Anyway you committed it knowingly. You might have thought it was not a problem and see later. Defendant It's not like that I know that Uncle showing me mercy by not moving against me I know even today. Defendant That is only reason I am here now. Defendant Uncle could have done on day Uncle could have done when he found out. Defendant Uncle could forwarded when he found out about this cheque[38]The statement “That is the only reason I am here now” is put forward by Mr Frederic as the Defendant’s confession that avoiding responsibility for his wrongdoing is why he is now in the UK rather than Qatar. A casual reader of this judgment might find that interpretation surprising and assume it to be justified by the wider evidence. They would be wrong. Even if the Claimant established all its allegations against the Defendant, and all the asserted adverse inferences against the Defendant were drawn, I would reject the Claimant’s case on this point.[39]The extract must be read as coming after Mr Frederic had given a lengthy explanation as to how institution of criminal proceedings would now inevitably lead to the Defendant going to prison. The heart of the conversation was the issue of the cheques being paid to Mr Nadarajan or his associates, as had previously been made clear to the Defendant. Taking into account the whole conversation and its context, the only sensible interpretation of the comment is that the Defendant attributed delay (or, as he saw it, forbearance) in progressing criminal proceedings to him still being at liberty.[40]Nor is fugitivity established by the rest of the Claimant’s case, even taken at its highest. Whatever his reasons for leaving Qatar, the Defendant remained entirely open about his whereabouts. Mr Frederic heard through mutual family that the Defendant had not moved to New Zealand but remained in India, and then that he had moved to the UK. Mr Frederic’s witness statement describes how during the 2019 investigation he sent images of cheques to the Defendant using WhatsApp; the Defendant replied and the two discussed the matter. When Mr Frederic visited the UK in 2021, the two were in contact and readily arranged a meeting. The Defendant texted his full home address to Mr Frederic and it was Mr Frederic’s choice to meet at a coffee shop at Heathrow Airport instead. Mr Frederic describes how, by the end of the meeting, the Defendant “was at ease and even invited me to his home to see his family”; that invitation was rejected. When the present proceedings were issued, there was no difficulty with service and the two had a telephone conversation about them very soon afterwards.[41]The final point put forward in support of fugitivity is the lack of response to the Qatari investigator and court correspondence. The Defendant’s explanation is that he received the relevant documents by email, could not read Arabic so did not know what they were, so thought they were spam and disregarded them. Even if this is untrue, and the Defendant deliberately ignored the Qatari court proceedings to avoid them, I cannot see that failing to take positive steps to engage with foreign proceedings amounts to fugitivity. Even if it does so in extradition, its application to establish civil jurisdiction in personam on a foreign court would entirely undermine the purpose of the Third Case listed in Dicey, above, which concerns a person who has voluntarily appeared in the proceedings (see the further discussion at 14-073). A person who engaged with proceedings would be held to have submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction, but a person who did not engage would be counted a fugitive. The Claimant’s contention that a foreign court can gain jurisdiction over someone overseas by demanding they act is plainly circular.[42]Taking all those matters together, including the other attacks on the Defendant’s credibility made by Ms Rakhimjonova, there is no arguable basis upon which the Defendant can properly be described as a fugitive. The observations made by Fordham J at [29] about the Pillar-Neumann case apply equally here. Even on the Claimant’s case the Defendant was entirely open about his whereabouts, took no steps that had the purpose of putting himself beyond the reach of a legal process, and was not in any respect elusive. Is the Judgment payable in respect of taxes, charges of a like nature, any fine or penalty, or other public law?[43]While this issue no longer arises, in deference to the arguments advanced I set out a brief assessment. As stated in Dicey at 14-026, it is “well settled that an English court will not entertain an action for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal or revenue, or other public law of a foreign country.”[44]In Raulin v Fischer [1911] 2 K.B. 93, a French court had sentenced the defendant to one month’s imprisonment and, upon considering expert medical evidence, ordered her to pay the plaintiff 15,000 francs in damages. Deciding the English action on that judgment, the High Court held that the award of damages could be severed from the criminal penalty. While French law made no such distinction, it was for the English court to “determine whether the judgment sued on was a penal one or not”. The award of damages was for a private wrong, had been able to take account of the issue of contributory negligence despite that being no defence to the criminal charge, and the civil remedy (unlike the sentence) would not abate on the plaintiff’s death. It was “not in any respect a judgment in a proceeding ‘in favour of the State whose law had been infringed’.” The principles applied that case are consistent with the way they have been more recently expressed in Islamic Republic of Iran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374.[45]In my judgment, the second and third paragraphs of the Qatari court’s order can likewise be severed from the punitive sanction in the first: they are reached through an analysis of the civil wrongs committed against the Claimant; they accord with the sum assessed as having been embezzled; they are payable to the Claimant; and they are recoverable through civil execution.

Admission of liability

[46]The Particulars of Claim were amended to include that the Defendant had admitted his liability to pay the compensation ordered in the Judgment, as follows: 14. The Compensation Award is a due and payable debt first established as a judgment debt and subsequently as a debt admitted by the Defendant, as established by various pieces of evidence, notably in two recordings in which the Defendant admits the debt and states that he will repay it.[47]The underlying factual matrix was also pleaded. HHJ Murdoch gave permission for an Amended Defence to be filed and served, but this was never done. Nonetheless, no consequential application was made and Ms Rakhimjonova simply invites the Court to decide whether the Claimant has proved its claim in this respect.[48]No substantive cause of action in relation to the Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing has been pleaded, Ms Rakhimjonova instead argued that an admission of a debt crystallises it into a separate cause of action upon which judgment can be obtained. No authority has been cited to that effect, and I note that in Ashmore and Others v Corporation of Lloyd's [1992] 1 W.L.R. 446 at 452D, Lord Templeman rejected that an admission could create a duty in tort if no such duty existed beforehand, and criticised the plaintiff for failing to properly plead how that duty had arisen. In my judgment the law is clear: an admission is a form of evidence that may be adduced in support of a party’s case and may (if in writing) entitle a party to apply for judgment under CPR 14; it does not create a separate cause of action. No written admissions are relied upon, so CPR 14 falls away. Even if the Defendant had clearly and unequivocally admitted liability, that admission cannot circumvent the lack of jurisdiction to hear the underlying cause of action. The prior conclusion on jurisdiction means that this part of the proceedings must also be struck out.

Conclusion

[49]As the County Court lacks jurisdiction and I decline to exercise any discretion to transfer the claim to the High Court, the claim is struck out. Upper Tribunal Judge Neville (sitting as a Recorder) 9 October 2025