“4. …In the vast majority of cases where the judge has before him the issue of causation of a particular event, the parties will put before the judges two or more competing explanations as to how the event occurred, which though they may be uncommon, are not improbable. In such cases, it is, as was accepted before us by the appellants, a permissible and logical train of reasoning for a judge, having eliminated all of the causes of the loss but one, to ask himself whether, on the balance of probabilities, that one cause was the cause of the event. What is impermissible is for a judge to conclude in the case of a series of improbable causes that the least improbable or least unlikely is nonetheless the cause of the event; such cases are those where there may be very real uncertainty about the relevant factual background (as where a vessel was at the bottom of the sea) or the evidence might be highly unsatisfactory. In that type of case the process of elimination can result in arriving at the least improbable cause and not the probable cause. … As a matter of common sense it will usually be safe for a judge to conclude, where there are two competing theories before him neither of which is improbable, that having rejected one it is logical to accept the other as being the cause on the balance of probabilities. It was accepted in the course of argument on behalf of the appellant that, as a matter of principle, if there were only three possible causes of an event, then it was permissible for a judge to approach the matter by analysing each of those causes. If he ranked those causes in terms of probability and concluded that one was more probable than the others, then, provided those were the only three possible causes, he was entitled to conclude that the one he considered most probable, was the probable cause of the event provided it was not improbable.”
“34. … Consideration of such a case necessarily involves looking at the whole picture, including what gaps there are in the evidence, whether the individual factors relied upon are in themselves properly established, what factors may point away from the suggested explanation and what other explanation might fit the circumstances. As Lord Mance observed in Datec Electronics Holdings Limited v UPS limited[2007] 1 WLR 1325 , at 48 and 50, there is an inherent risk that a systematic consideration of the possibilities could become a process of elimination ‘leading to no more than a conclusion regarding the least unlikely cause of loss’, which was the fault identified in The Popi M. So at the end of any such systematic analysis, the court has to stand back and ask itself the ultimate question whether it is satisfied that the suggested explanation is more likely than not to be true. The elimination of other possibilities as more implausible may well lead to that conclusion, but that will be a conclusion of fact: there is no rule of law that it must do so.”
“114. It is therefore common ground between the parties in principle that in a competing theories case: a) The court is entitled to engage in a systematic analysis of competing theories and eliminate one in favour of the other; b) That, in itself, may lead to the conclusion that the preferred theory is more likely than not to be true; but c) The court must always then stand back and ask itself the ultimate question as to whether or not the preferred explanation is more likely than not to be true.” “4. …In the vast majority of cases where the judge has before him the issue of causation of a particular event, the parties will put before the judges two or more competing explanations as to how the event occurred, which though they may be uncommon, are not improbable. In such cases, it is, as was accepted before us by the appellants, a permissible and logical train of reasoning for a judge, having eliminated all of the causes of the loss but one, to ask himself whether, on the balance of probabilities, that one cause was the cause of the event. What is impermissible is for a judge to conclude in the case of a series of improbable causes that the least improbable or least unlikely is nonetheless the cause of the event; such cases are those where there may be very real uncertainty about the relevant factual background (as where a vessel was at the bottom of the sea) or the evidence might be highly unsatisfactory. In that type of case the process of elimination can result in arriving at the least improbable cause and not the probable cause. … As a matter of common sense it will usually be safe for a judge to conclude, where there are two competing theories before him neither of which is improbable, that having rejected one it is logical to accept the other as being the cause on the balance of probabilities. It was accepted in the course of argument on behalf of the appellant that, as a matter of principle, if there were only three possible causes of an event, then it was permissible for a judge to approach the matter by analysing each of those causes. If he ranked those causes in terms of probability and concluded that one was more probable than the others, then, provided those were the only three possible causes, he was entitled to conclude that the one he considered most probable, was the probable cause of the event provided it was not improbable.”
“If the defendant knew or ought to have known that in consequence of his conduct harm to his neighbour was reasonably foreseeable, he is under a duty of care to prevent such consequences as are reasonably foreseeable. In such case the defendant is liable because he is considered negligent in relation to his neighbour, and here nuisance and negligence coincide.” 19). This is consistent with Mr McLaughlin’s opening and closing submissions, where he argued that the sole question was whether or not Mr and/or Mrs Logan knew or should have known there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of danger to the neighbouring house from the cable. 20). Given the slightly unusual circumstances in which the cable came to be installed and used, Mr Fraser noted that the reference to “his conduct” in the context of claims of this kind (i.e. claims against the owners and/or occupiers of land) includes the conduct of those who: (a) are directly responsible for the activities in question; (b) authorised them; (c) continued or adopted them (where continuing is when “someone who has knowledge or presumed knowledge of their existence fails to take any reasonable means to bring them to an end, though with ample time to do so, and where adopting is when someone makes any use of the erection, building, bank or artificial contrivance which constitutes the nuisance” (Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 24th Ed at 19-72 and 19-73 and Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880 at 894 per Lord Maugham). 21). Mr Fraser also referred me to my own summary in a previous case (Partakis-Stevens v Sihan[2022] EWHC 3249 (TCC) at paragraph 155) of what Laws LJ had said in Arscott v the Coal Authority[2004] EWCA Civ 892 at paragraph 58 about the need for foreseeability of damage: “Arscott is also a helpful authority in fleshing out the requirement that damage be reasonably foreseeable as a condition of establishing liability in nuisance. This requirement was authoritatively recognised by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties[1994] 2 AC 264 – and see again Clerk & Lindsell at [19-38]. [Arscott] is particularly useful because it contains some helpful observations about how a court should approach the issue of reasonable foreseeability. It confirms that: (a) the issue of reasonable foreseeability is a question of fact not one of law; (b) the question is what was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the nuisance, not at a later date; (c) it is reasonable to enquire what those involved at the time did in fact foresee; (c) Laws LJ plainly approved the succinct statement by the trial judge that "there is a difference between what is theoretically capable of being foreseen and what is reasonably foreseeable"; and (d) an event may be reasonably foreseeable even though the precise mechanics of its causation are not, but that there must be "some understanding of the chain of events which is putatively foreseen; otherwise we are looking not at foresight, but divination". 22). That concludes my reference to the legal principles and I now turn to the facts. The facts Pre-fire 23). Calder Vale is a small village in rural north Lancashire. Vale Terrace is a row of well-established terraced houses in Calder Vale. No. 9 was an end terrace house (with an access road giving access to the rear gardens of the houses between No.9 and No.7) and No.10 immediately adjoined it. 24). Mr and Mrs Stanley-Smith became the owners of No.9 in 1991 and have remained the owners ever since. At the time of the fire they lived there with their two children, with the eldest (Courtney) then being 18 years old. 25). Mrs Logan acquired No.10 (also in 1991) with her then husband. They separated and, as it appears from her evidence and the title register, there was a divorce as a result of which she became the sole legal and beneficial owner in 1995 after which she continued to live there with her children. 26). In around late 2005 Mrs Logan invited her then partner, Mr Davies, to move in temporarily with her whilst he was between flats. Tragically, shortly after moving he was diagnosed with a serious brain tumour and, after initial admission and discharge from hospital, it was agreed that he should remain at No.10 where he lived until 2007 when he died. Although this trial is not concerned with these matters, I can only express my admiration for Mrs Logan in caring for her partner in this way and in these circumstances. 27). Turning to the detail of the layout of the relevant areas of No.9 and No.10, due to the destruction wrought by the fire this can only be ascertained from such contemporaneous photographs are available, from the post-fire investigations of the remains and from information (to the extent that it is reliable) obtained from the Stanley-Smiths and the Logans. 28). No.9 had a rear ground floor conservatory built close up (65cm approx.) to the boundary with No.10 and extending out about half of the rear garden area. Because the boundary consisted of an open chicken wire fence, and because Mrs Logan wanted privacy for her rear garden and also some additional storage room, she bought three wooden flat-pack self-assembly sheds from a local company, two of which she erected close up to the boundary with No.9 on concrete flagging already present. The third she erected to the rear of the garden. She sited each of the sheds on top of two wooden planks, so that they were raised up from the concrete flagging to provide protection from water ingress from below. It appears that she initially intended one shed for storing her children’s bicycles. The shed closer to the rear of the house has been referred to for convenience as shed 1 and the other behind it as shed 2. However, between shed 1 and the rear of the house was enough space for two existing propane gas cylinders (needed because there was no mains gas supply) to be sited as well as a wheelie type refuse bin. 29). The dimensions of the sheds are not known but, judging from the photographs, they were approximately square shaped, with pitched felt roofs running down from the top ridges which ran parallel to the end of the house. There was a small overhang but no guttering. It appears that it was only these small overhangs which separated the rear side wall of shed 1 from the front side wall of shed 2. They had no windows but did have doors at the front. They were made of softwood, probably pine, tongue and groove panels. There is no evidence as to the floor construction. 30). When Mr Davies moved in he brought his own household items with him. He put them in the two sheds, to prevent the house from being cluttered. These items included, so Mrs Logan said in examination-in-chief – although she was not entirely sure, a fridge in shed 2. Her recollection was that he wanted not only to store but also to use his fridge whilst it was in the shed. This is the most likely explanation for what otherwise would have been a very odd thing for him to do and for her to give him permission to do, which was to provide an electrical supply to the rear shed. He was an office worker rather than an electrician or builder. He had no electrical training or aptitude and no particular enthusiasm or skill in DIY. However, what he decided to do and what he did was: (a) to drill a hole in the rear wall of No.10 at around head height, adjacent to the existing double French doors from the house to the rear garden area; (b) to obtain (there is no evidence from where) a domestic grade extension lead for internal use with a four socket end; (c) to remove the plug from the cable, draw the cable through the hole he had made in the wall, to reconnect and connect the plug to an existing electricity socket located at low level in the rear corner of No.10 (which was then, as now, the kitchen); (d) to run the cable past (either above or below or through or to the side of shed 1) so that it entered shed 2 where the plug of the fridge could then be connected to the cable so as to provide an electrical supply for it to be used. 31). A domestic grade extension lead does not have steel armouring, such as would give it additional protection against impact or other damage, including attack by rodents who, as is well known, have a propensity for gnawing through the protective rubber / plastic coating on electrical wiring and thereby causing the electrical circuit in question to fail. 32). Mrs Logan said that she had no idea why he did this. She said that she was not really interested. I find this surprising and implausible. I find as a fact that she either knew or believed, correctly as I find, that he did put a small fridge (or, possibly, freezer) in there and connected it to the cable to provide power to use the fridge / freezer for his own purposes, most likely to store products which he used and needed to be kept chilled or frozen. There is no other rational explanation on the evidence for him to have done what he did and for her to have been willing for him to do so without further enquiry. 33). In any event, what is most important for present purposes is that Mrs Logan knew that he had installed the cable in this way and knew that it was connected to the mains electrical supply in the kitchen and was being used for some reason in shed 2. 34). As I have said, there is no direct evidence how the cable was routed from the rear wall to or past shed 1. Mrs Logan is simply unable to recall. The investigating fire officer believed it must have been run along the ground, because there was no evidence of any slack indicating it had been run at high level and had collapsed during the fire nor of any join in the cable. Dr Butler reported to Mr Hammond that Mr Logan could not remember whether it ran at high level from the rear wall to the roof of shed 1 or ran at low level. In their letter of response to the letter of claim the Defendant’s solicitors stated “Mr and Mrs Logan were also unaware of the exact position of the cable as it ran through the yard area. The cable either ran underneath or behind the shed nearest to the rear of the property before going into the second shed”. 35). In the experts’ joint statement Dr Butler recorded that: “It was reported by Mr Logan that the cable was routed to the rear corner of the southern shed, where it passed inside. It is unknown whether the cable remained at high level once inside the southern shed and subsequently exited the first (and entered the second) at high level, or whether it was routed to a lower level at some point”. 36). However, in his witness statement made in April 2025 Mr Logan, whilst accepting that “it's all a bit of a blur now”, stated that “the cable came out at a high height so it was not lying on the ground. It then ran through the air to that first shed and then, I assume, it ran through to the second shed. There may have been a spur in the first shed”
“At the time of the fire Mr Stanley-Smith was away in Swansea but Mrs Stanley-Smith and their two daughters, Courtney, aged 18 years, and Sophie, aged 12 years, were at home. I understand that Courtney is the only smoker in the family but that she did not smoke during the afternoon of8 May 2018 ‘as she was trying to give up’”
“Mrs Stanley-Smith explained that during the evening of8 May 2018 she was in the conservatory with her two daughters with the window open when she could smell an unusual burning smell … [S]he assumed that her neighbours … were having a barbecue. Accordingly, she shut the conservatory window. A short time later she was in the front part of the house and could detect the smell there as well so she returned to the kitchen. … Once in the rear yard she saw smoke coming from the neighbouring yard ... Looking into the yard of [No.10] she saw flames that she described as “bright orange and strong” coming from the vicinity of [shed 1]. 63). Mr Hammond provided the information obtained from the occupants of No.9 to Dr Butler on a reciprocal basis, so that in their preliminary reports both were able to draw on the information provided to the other from the occupants of the other properties. It is not clear whether Mr Hammond specifically referred to the evidence about Courtney in relation to her smoking, however Dr Butler’s contemporaneous notes record that that he was told by Mr Logan that “No.9 are smokers”. 64). In his first report dated22 May 2018 Mr Hammond stated: “There was no evidence to suggest that the fire was the result of deliberate human agency but such a cause cannot be eliminated on the basis of the residual physical evidence alone. With regard to accidental human agency, both Mr Turney Logan and Courtney Stanley-Smith were smokers. However, their accounts were that Mr Turney Logan smoked hand–rolled cigarettes and may not have been smoking in the yard as he returned to the property at about 17:00 hours on8 May 2018 and Courtney Stanley-Smith did not smoke in the yard of 9 Vale Terrace that afternoon as she was trying to give up. If those accounts are accepted and given that hand-rolled cigarettes have a propensity to self-extinguish when not being actively smoked, the only potential cause involving smokers’ materials would appear to be if Mr Turney Logan had been lighting a cigarette and had discarded an ignition source into the wheelie bin. However, given that a fire in the wheelie bin would need to have developed significantly to attack the extension lead and give rise to the electrical power going off, I would expect Mr Turney Logan to have discovered such a fire when he first went into the kitchen to unplug electrical appliances from the sockets to trace the electrical fault”. 65). In his first report dated24 May 2018 Dr Butler did not specifically address smoking as a cause. He did say that: “There was also a wheelie bin in the vicinity of the origin of the fire. It is possible that smouldering or burning items could have been placed in the wheelie bin or items susceptible to self-heating could have been placed inside and the fire could have originated at the wheelie bin. Had this been the case, fire attack onto nearby cables suppling the second shed could have caused the protective trips to operate and the fire was actually already developing when Mr Logan was trying to identify the fault with the electricity supply and the circuit breakers”. 66). In the Defence the Defendant did not plead any positive case in relation to smoking, instead pleading at par 14(g) that “the cause of the fire was and/or is unknown”. 67). In their joint statement made15 May 2025 (prepared, as customary in the TCC, before exchange of reports) Dr Jowett and Dr Butler considered (at paragraph 17) the position if the fire originated under or adjacent to the base of the shed. They stated: “the Experts agree that the fire could be explained either by an incendive electrical fault on the extension lead, or by the initiation of a smouldering fire arising from the careless disposal of smokers’ materials”
“If [this] is accepted, then clearly a fire caused by the careless disposal of a cigarette can be discounted”. 68). In his separate report made18 June 2025 Dr Butler gave this matter more attention. In relation to Mr Logan, he noted that a discarded cigarette from No.10 “could more readily reach combustible materials around or under the southern shed and cause ignition. That said, it is noted that Mr Logan smoked roll-up cigarettes and these have a propensity to self-extinguish if not being actively smoked”
“ A cigarette from number 9 could have been discarded towards the rear of the sheds at number 10 and/or in the vicinity of the void between the conservatory of number 9 and the back of the sheds of number 10. There was only a wire mesh fence between the two properties and a cigarette end “flicked” or otherwise discarded could travel to come into contact with readily-combustible material (such as accumulated debris and leaves)”. 69). He then explained how a short-lived flaming fire of such material below the shed could have damaged the cable, if located there, causing the cable to trip and also to cause the underside of the shed floor to smoulder and, eventually, break out into a flaming fire shortly before it was seen by Mr Logan. 70). Notwithstanding these developments in his thinking, no application to amend the Defence was made to plead this as a positive case and nor, when the only witness statement served by the Claimant was from their loss adjuster directed solely to quantum, did the Defendant request that the Claimant should ensure that Courtney (or other family members) was called to give evidence, failing which it would invite the court to draw an adverse inference that the reason she was not called was because the Claimant was not prepared to expose her to cross-examination on the basis that there was reason to believe that she had indeed been smoking before the fire and had carelessly disposed of a cigarette in such a way as could have caused the fire. 71). In his skeleton argument for trial Mr McLaughlin noted that: “[Courtney] was apparently a smoker but no witness statement has been served from her or anyone else who was in the Claimant’s home to establish she had not been smoking. It is possible she had been smoking and discarded the stub either over the boundary or just on the No 10 side”